Commit 31db43df authored by Dr. Stephen Henson's avatar Dr. Stephen Henson
Browse files

Update from 0.9.8-stable.

parent 512cab01

CHANGES

+5 −0
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -793,6 +793,11 @@ 


 Changes between 0.9.8k and 0.9.8l  [xx XXX xxxx]



  *) Don't check self signed certificate signatures in X509_verify_cert():

     it just wastes time without adding any security. As a useful side effect

     self signed root CAs with non-FIPS digests are now usable in FIPS mode.

     [Steve Henson]



  *) In dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message() the check if the current message

     is already buffered was missing. For every new message was memory

     allocated, allowing an attacker to perform an denial of service attack

crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c

+5 −8
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -1609,7 +1609,11 @@ static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 
	while (n >= 0)

		{

		ctx->error_depth=n;

		if (!xs->valid)



		/* Skip signature check for self signed certificates. It

		 * doesn't add any security and just wastes time.

		 */

		if (!xs->valid && xs != xi)

			{

			if ((pkey=X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL)

				{
@@ -1619,13 +1623,6 @@ static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) 
				if (!ok) goto end;

				}

			else if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0)

				/* XXX  For the final trusted self-signed cert,

				 * this is a waste of time.  That check should

				 * optional so that e.g. 'openssl x509' can be

				 * used to detect invalid self-signatures, but

				 * we don't verify again and again in SSL

				 * handshakes and the like once the cert has

				 * been declared trusted. */

				{

				ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;

				ctx->current_cert=xs;