Fix bug in aes-586.pl.

# to process in one stroke.

#

# Timing attacks are classified in two classes: synchronous when

# attacker consciously initiates cryptographic operation and collect

# attacker consciously initiates cryptographic operation and collects

# timing data of various character afterwards, and asynchronous when

# malicious code is executed on same CPU simultaneously with AES,

# instruments itself and performs statistical analysis of this data.

# CBC, do masks the plain-text in this exact way [secure cipher output

# is distributed uniformly]. Yes, one still might find input that

# would reveal the information about given key, but if amount of

# candidate inputs to be tried is larger than amount possible key

# candidate inputs to be tried is larger than amount of possible key

# combinations then attack becomes infeasible. This is why revised

# AES_cbc_encrypt "dares" to switch to larger S-box when larger chunk

# of data is to be processed in one stroke. The current size limit of

		&mov	($acc,$_inp);		# load inp

		&lea	($acc,&DWP(16,$acc));	# advance inp

		&mov	($_inp,$acc);		# save inp

		&mov	($_len,$s2);		# save len

	&jnz	(&label("slow_dec_loop_x86"));

	&mov	("esp",$_esp);

	&popf	();