DANE support for X509_verify_cert() (170b7358) · Commits · CYBER - Cyber Security / TS 103 523 MSP / TLMSP / TLMSP OpenSSL

crypto/x509/x509_err.c

+2 −0

Original line number	Diff line number	Diff line
		@@ -74,6 +74,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA X509_str_functs[] = {
		{ERR_FUNC(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN), "build_chain"},
		{ERR_FUNC(X509_F_BY_FILE_CTRL), "by_file_ctrl"},
		{ERR_FUNC(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY), "check_policy"},
		{ERR_FUNC(X509_F_DANE_I2D), "dane_i2d"},
		{ERR_FUNC(X509_F_DIR_CTRL), "dir_ctrl"},
		{ERR_FUNC(X509_F_GET_CERT_BY_SUBJECT), "get_cert_by_subject"},
		{ERR_FUNC(X509_F_NETSCAPE_SPKI_B64_DECODE), "NETSCAPE_SPKI_b64_decode"},
		@@ -134,6 +135,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA X509_str_functs[] = {

		static ERR_STRING_DATA X509_str_reasons[] = {
		{ERR_REASON(X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH), "akid mismatch"},
		{ERR_REASON(X509_R_BAD_SELECTOR), "bad selector"},
		{ERR_REASON(X509_R_BAD_X509_FILETYPE), "bad x509 filetype"},
		{ERR_REASON(X509_R_BASE64_DECODE_ERROR), "base64 decode error"},
		{ERR_REASON(X509_R_CANT_CHECK_DH_KEY), "cant check dh key"},

crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c

+399 −9

Original line number	Diff line number	Diff line
		@@ -114,6 +114,7 @@

		static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
		static int verify_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
		static int dane_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
		static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e);
		static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX ctx, X509 x, X509 *issuer);
		static X509 find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX ctx, STACK_OF(X509) sk, X509 x);
		@@ -125,6 +126,7 @@ static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
		static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
		static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
		static int get_issuer_sk(X509 *issuer, X509_STORE_CTX ctx, X509 *x);
		static int check_dane_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth);

		static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX ctx, X509 *pissuer,
		unsigned int preasons, X509_CRL crl, X509 *x);
		@@ -237,6 +239,7 @@ static int verify_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)

		int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
		{
		struct dane_st dane = (struct dane_st )ctx->dane;

		if (ctx->cert == NULL) {
		X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
		@@ -264,6 +267,14 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
		X509_up_ref(ctx->cert);
		ctx->num_untrusted = 1;

		/*
		* If dane->trecs is an empty stack, we'll fail, since the user enabled
		* DANE. If none of the TLSA records were usable, and it makes sense to
		* keep going with an unauthenticated handshake, they can handle that in
		* the verify callback, or not set SSL_VERIFY_PEER.
		*/
		if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane))
		return dane_verify(ctx);
		return verify_chain(ctx);
		}

		@@ -565,9 +576,18 @@ static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int num_untrusted)
		X509 *x = NULL;
		X509 *mx;
		int (cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX xctx) = ctx->verify_cb;
		struct dane_st dane = (struct dane_st )ctx->dane;
		int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
		int trust;

		if (DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane) && num_untrusted > 0) {
		switch (trust = check_dane_issuer(ctx, num_untrusted)) {
		case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED:
		case X509_TRUST_REJECTED:
		return trust;
		}
		}

		/*
		* Check trusted certificates in chain at depth num_untrusted and up.
		* Note, that depths 0..num_untrusted-1 may also contain trusted
		@@ -637,7 +657,14 @@ static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int num_untrusted)
		return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;

		trusted:
		if (!DANETLS_ENABLED(dane))
		return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
		if (dane->pdpth < 0)
		dane->pdpth = num_untrusted;
		/* With DANE, PKIX alone is not trusted until we have both */
		if (dane->mdpth >= 0)
		return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
		return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
		}

		static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
		@@ -1524,6 +1551,17 @@ static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
		ctx->error_depth = n;
		xi = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);

		/*
		* With DANE-verified bare public key TA signatures, it remains only to
		* check the timestamps of the top certificate. We report the issuer as
		* NULL, since all we have is a bare key.
		*/
		if (ctx->bare_ta_signed) {
		xs = xi;
		xi = NULL;
		goto check_cert;
		}

		if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
		xs = xi;
		else {
		@@ -2074,6 +2112,7 @@ int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX ctx, X509_STORE store, X509 *x509,
		ctx->tree = NULL;
		ctx->parent = NULL;
		ctx->dane = NULL;
		ctx->bare_ta_signed = 0;
		/* Zero ex_data to make sure we're cleanup-safe */
		memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(ctx->ex_data));

		@@ -2270,15 +2309,311 @@ void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_dane(X509_STORE_CTX ctx, struct dane_st dane)
		ctx->dane = dane;
		}

		static unsigned char *dane_i2d(
		X509 *cert,
		uint8_t selector,
		unsigned int *i2dlen)
		{
		unsigned char *buf = NULL;
		int len;

		/*
		* Extract ASN.1 DER form of certificate or public key.
		*/
		switch (selector) {
		case DANETLS_SELECTOR_CERT:
		len = i2d_X509(cert, &buf);
		break;
		case DANETLS_SELECTOR_SPKI:
		len = i2d_X509_PUBKEY(X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(cert), &buf);
		break;
		default:
		X509err(X509_F_DANE_I2D, X509_R_BAD_SELECTOR);
		return NULL;
		}

		if (len < 0 \|\| buf == NULL) {
		X509err(X509_F_DANE_I2D, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
		return NULL;
		}

		*i2dlen = (unsigned int)len;
		return buf;
		}

		#define DANETLS_NONE 256 /* impossible uint8_t */

		static int dane_match(X509_STORE_CTX ctx, X509 cert, int depth)
		{
		struct dane_st dane = (struct dane_st )ctx->dane;
		unsigned usage = DANETLS_NONE;
		unsigned selector = DANETLS_NONE;
		unsigned ordinal = DANETLS_NONE;
		unsigned mtype = DANETLS_NONE;
		unsigned char *i2dbuf = NULL;
		unsigned int i2dlen = 0;
		unsigned char mdbuf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
		unsigned char *cmpbuf = NULL;
		unsigned int cmplen = 0;
		int i;
		int recnum;
		int matched = 0;
		danetls_record *t = NULL;
		uint32_t mask;

		mask = (depth == 0) ? DANETLS_EE_MASK : DANETLS_TA_MASK;

		/*
		* The trust store is not applicable with DANE-TA(2)
		*/
		if (depth >= ctx->num_untrusted)
		mask &= DANETLS_PKIX_MASK;

		/*
		* If we've previously matched a PKIX-?? record, no need to test any
		* furher PKIX-?? records, it remains to just build the PKIX chain.
		* Had the match been a DANE-?? record, we'd be done already.
		*/
		if (dane->mdpth >= 0)
		mask &= ~DANETLS_PKIX_MASK;

		/*-
		* https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.1
		* https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.2
		* https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.3
		* https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.4
		*
		* We handle DANE-EE(3) records first as they require no chain building
		* and no expiration or hostname checks. We also process digests with
		* higher ordinals first and ignore lower priorities except Full(0) which
		* is always processed (last). If none match, we then process PKIX-EE(1).
		*
		* NOTE: This relies on DANE usages sorting before the corresponding PKIX
		* usages in SSL_dane_tlsa_add(), and also on descending sorting of digest
		* priorities. See twin comment in ssl/ssl_lib.c.
		*
		* We expect that most TLSA RRsets will have just a single usage, so we
		* don't go out of our way to cache multiple selector-specific i2d buffers
		* across usages, but if the selector happens to remain the same as switch
		* usages, that's OK. Thus, a set of "3 1 1", "3 0 1", "1 1 1", "1 0 1",
		* records would result in us generating each of the certificate and public
		* key DER forms twice, but more typically we'd just see multiple "3 1 1"
		* or multiple "3 0 1" records.
		*
		* As soon as we find a match at any given depth, we stop, because either
		* we've matched a DANE-?? record and the peer is authenticated, or, after
		* exhausing all DANE-?? records, we've matched a PKIX-?? record, which is
		* sufficient for DANE, and what remains to do is ordinary PKIX validation.
		*/
		recnum = (dane->umask & mask) ? sk_danetls_record_num(dane->trecs) : 0;
		for (i = 0; matched == 0 && i < recnum; ++i) {
		t = sk_danetls_record_value(dane->trecs, i);
		if ((DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(t->usage) & mask) == 0)
		continue;
		if (t->usage != usage) {
		usage = t->usage;

		/* Reset digest agility for each usage/selector pair */
		mtype = DANETLS_NONE;
		ordinal = dane->dctx->mdord[t->mtype];
		}
		if (t->selector != selector) {
		selector = t->selector;

		/* Update per-selector state */
		OPENSSL_free(i2dbuf);
		i2dbuf = dane_i2d(cert, selector, &i2dlen);
		if (i2dbuf == NULL)
		return -1;

		/* Reset digest agility for each usage/selector pair */
		mtype = DANETLS_NONE;
		ordinal = dane->dctx->mdord[t->mtype];
		} else if (t->mtype != DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL) {
		/*-
		* Digest agility:
		*
		* <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-9>
		*
		* For a fixed selector, after processing all records with the
		* highest mtype ordinal, ignore all mtypes with lower ordinals
		* other than "Full".
		*/
		if (dane->dctx->mdord[t->mtype] < ordinal)
		continue;
		}

		/*
		* Each time we hit a (new selector or) mtype, re-compute the relevant
		* digest, more complex caching is not worth the code space.
		*/
		if (t->mtype != mtype) {
		const EVP_MD *md = dane->dctx->mdevp[mtype = t->mtype];
		cmpbuf = i2dbuf;
		cmplen = i2dlen;

		if (md != NULL) {
		cmpbuf = mdbuf;
		if (!EVP_Digest(i2dbuf, i2dlen, cmpbuf, &cmplen, md, 0)) {
		matched = -1;
		break;
		}
		}
		}

		/*
		* Squirrel away the certificate and depth if we have a match. Any
		* DANE match is dispositive, but with PKIX we still need to build a
		* full chain.
		*/
		if (cmplen == t->dlen &&
		memcmp(cmpbuf, t->data, cmplen) == 0) {
		if (DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(usage) & DANETLS_DANE_MASK)
		matched = 1;
		if (matched \|\| dane->mdpth < 0) {
		dane->mdpth = depth;
		dane->mtlsa = t;
		OPENSSL_free(dane->mcert);
		dane->mcert = cert;
		X509_up_ref(cert);
		}
		break;
		}
		}

		/* Clear the one-element DER cache */
		OPENSSL_free(i2dbuf);
		return matched;
		}

		static int check_dane_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
		{
		struct dane_st dane = (struct dane_st )ctx->dane;
		int matched = 0;
		X509 *cert;

		if (!DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane) \|\| depth == 0)
		return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;

		/*
		* Record any DANE trust anchor matches, for the first depth to test, if
		* there's one at that depth. (This'll be false for length 1 chains looking
		* for an exact match for the leaf certificate).
		*/
		cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, depth);
		if (cert != NULL && (matched = dane_match(ctx, cert, depth)) < 0)
		return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
		if (matched > 0) {
		ctx->num_untrusted = depth - 1;
		return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
		}

		return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
		}

		static int check_dane_pkeys(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
		{
		struct dane_st dane = (struct dane_st )ctx->dane;
		danetls_record *t;
		int num = ctx->num_untrusted;
		X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
		int recnum = sk_danetls_record_num(dane->trecs);
		int i;

		for (i = 0; i < recnum; ++i) {
		t = sk_danetls_record_value(dane->trecs, i);
		if (t->usage != DANETLS_USAGE_DANE_TA \|\|
		t->selector != DANETLS_SELECTOR_SPKI \|\|
		t->mtype != DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL \|\|
		X509_verify(cert, t->spki) <= 0)
		continue;

		/* Clear PKIX-?? matches that failed to panned out to a full chain */
		X509_free(dane->mcert);
		dane->mcert = NULL;

		/* Record match via a bare TA public key */
		ctx->bare_ta_signed = 1;
		dane->mdpth = num - 1;
		dane->mtlsa = t;

		/* Prune any excess chain certificates */
		num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
		for (; num > ctx->num_untrusted; --num)
		X509_free(sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain));

		return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
		}

		return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
		}

		static void dane_reset(struct dane_st *dane)
		{
		/*
		* Reset state to verify another chain, or clear after failure.
		*/
		X509_free(dane->mcert);
		dane->mcert = NULL;
		dane->mtlsa = NULL;
		dane->mdpth = -1;
		dane->pdpth = -1;
		}

		static int dane_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
		{
		X509 *cert = ctx->cert;
		int (cb)(int xok, X509_STORE_CTX xctx) = ctx->verify_cb;
		struct dane_st dane = (struct dane_st )ctx->dane;
		int matched;
		int done;

		dane_reset(dane);

		matched = dane_match(ctx, ctx->cert, 0);
		done = matched != 0 \|\| (!DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane) && dane->mdpth < 0);

		if (done)
		X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain);

		if (matched > 0) {
		ctx->error_depth = 0;
		ctx->current_cert = cert;
		return cb(1, ctx);
		}

		if (matched < 0) {
		ctx->error_depth = 0;
		ctx->current_cert = cert;
		ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
		return -1;
		}

		if (done) {
		/* Fail early, TA-based success is not possible */
		ctx->current_cert = cert;
		ctx->error_depth = 0;
		ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED;
		return cb(0, ctx);
		}

		/*
		* Chain verification for usages 0/1/2. TLSA record matching of depth > 0
		* certificates happens in-line with building the rest of the chain.
		*/
		return verify_chain(ctx);
		}

		static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
		{
		struct dane_st dane = (struct dane_st )ctx->dane;
		int (cb) (int, X509_STORE_CTX ) = ctx->verify_cb;
		int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
		X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
		int ss = cert_self_signed(cert);
		STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp = NULL;
		unsigned int search;
		int may_trusted = 1;
		int may_trusted = 0;
		int may_alternate = 0;
		int trust = X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
		int alt_untrusted = 0;
		@@ -2294,14 +2629,19 @@ static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
		#define S_DOALTERNATE (1 << 2) /* Retry with pruned alternate chain */
		/*
		* Set up search policy, untrusted if possible, trusted-first if enabled.
		* If not trusted-first, and alternate chains are not disabled, try
		* building an alternate chain if no luck with untrusted first.
		* If we're doing DANE and not doing PKIX-TA/PKIX-EE, we never look in the
		* trust_store, otherwise we might look there first. If not trusted-first,
		* and alternate chains are not disabled, try building an alternate chain
		* if no luck with untrusted first.
		*/
		search = (ctx->untrusted != NULL) ? S_DOUNTRUSTED : 0;
		if (DANETLS_HAS_PKIX(dane) \|\| !DANETLS_HAS_DANE(dane)) {
		if (search == 0 \|\| ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST)
		search \|= S_DOTRUSTED;
		else if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS))
		may_alternate = 1;
		may_trusted = 1;
		}

		/*
		* Shallow-copy the stack of untrusted certificates (with TLS, this is
		@@ -2313,6 +2653,17 @@ static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
		return 0;
		}

		/* Include any untrusted full certificates from DNS */
		if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) && dane->certs != NULL) {
		for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(dane->certs); ++i) {
		if (!sk_X509_push(sktmp, sk_X509_value(dane->certs, i))) {
		sk_X509_free(sktmp);
		X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
		return 0;
		}
		}
		}

		/*
		* Still absurdly large, but arithmetically safe, a lower hard upper bound
		* might be reasonable.
		@@ -2381,6 +2732,10 @@ static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
		* case we may prune some more untrusted certificates and try
		* again. Thus the S_DOALTERNATE bit may yet be turned on
		* again with an even shorter untrusted chain!
		*
		* If in the process we threw away our matching PKIX-TA trust
		* anchor, reset DANE trust. We might find a suitable trusted
		* certificate among the ones from the trust store.
		*/
		if ((search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0) {
		OPENSSL_assert(num > i && i > 0 && ss == 0);
		@@ -2388,6 +2743,16 @@ static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
		for (; num > i; --num)
		X509_free(sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain));
		ctx->num_untrusted = num;

		if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) &&
		dane->mdpth >= ctx->num_untrusted) {
		dane->mdpth = -1;
		X509_free(dane->mcert);
		dane->mcert = NULL;
		}
		if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) &&
		dane->pdpth >= ctx->num_untrusted)
		dane->pdpth = -1;
		}

		/*
		@@ -2426,6 +2791,13 @@ static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
		* trust. If not done, and not self-signed look deeper.
		* Whether or not we're doing "trusted first", we no longer
		* look for untrusted certificates from the peer's chain.
		*
		* At this point ctx->num_trusted and num must reflect the
		* correct number of untrusted certificates, since the DANE
		* logic in check_trust() depends on distinguishing CAs from
		* "the wire" from CAs from the trust store. In particular, the
		* certificate at depth "num" should be the new trusted
		* certificate with ctx->num_untrusted <= num.
		*/
		if (ok) {
		OPENSSL_assert(ctx->num_untrusted <= num);
		@@ -2497,14 +2869,27 @@ static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
		* certificates over and over.
		*/
		(void) sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp, x);

		/*
		* Check for DANE-TA trust of the topmost untrusted certificate.
		*/
		switch (trust = check_dane_issuer(ctx, ctx->num_untrusted - 1)) {
		case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED:
		case X509_TRUST_REJECTED:
		search = 0;
		continue;
		}
		}
		}
		sk_X509_free(sktmp);

		/*
		* Last chance to make a trusted chain, check for direct leaf PKIX trust.
		* Last chance to make a trusted chain, either bare DANE-TA public-key
		* signers, or else direct leaf PKIX trust.
		*/
		if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) <= depth) {
		if (trust == X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED && DANETLS_HAS_DANE_TA(dane))
		trust = check_dane_pkeys(ctx);
		if (trust == X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED &&
		sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == ctx->num_untrusted)
		trust = check_trust(ctx, 1);
		@@ -2522,6 +2907,9 @@ static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
		ctx->error_depth = num-1;
		if (num > depth)
		ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG;
		else if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) &&
		(!DANETLS_HAS_PKIX(dane) \|\| dane->pdpth >= 0))
		ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED;
		else if (ss && sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
		ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
		else if (ss)
		@@ -2530,6 +2918,8 @@ static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
		ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
		else
		ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
		if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane))
		dane_reset(dane);
		return cb(0, ctx);
		}
		}

include/openssl/x509.h

+2 −0

Original line number	Diff line number	Diff line
		@@ -1073,6 +1073,7 @@ void ERR_load_X509_strings(void);
		# define X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN 106
		# define X509_F_BY_FILE_CTRL 101
		# define X509_F_CHECK_POLICY 145
		# define X509_F_DANE_I2D 107
		# define X509_F_DIR_CTRL 102
		# define X509_F_GET_CERT_BY_SUBJECT 103
		# define X509_F_NETSCAPE_SPKI_B64_DECODE 129
		@@ -1119,6 +1120,7 @@ void ERR_load_X509_strings(void);

		/* Reason codes. */
		# define X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH 110
		# define X509_R_BAD_SELECTOR 133
		# define X509_R_BAD_X509_FILETYPE 100
		# define X509_R_BASE64_DECODE_ERROR 118
		# define X509_R_CANT_CHECK_DH_KEY 114

include/openssl/x509_vfy.h

+2 −0

Original line number	Diff line number	Diff line
		@@ -264,6 +264,8 @@ struct x509_store_ctx_st { /* X509_STORE_CTX */
		X509_STORE_CTX *parent;
		CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data;
		struct dane_st *dane;
		/* signed via bare TA public key, rather than CA certificate */
		int bare_ta_signed;
		} /* X509_STORE_CTX */ ;

		void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth);

test/Makefile

+24 −3

Original line number	Diff line number	Diff line
		@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ RANDTEST= randtest
		DHTEST= dhtest
		DSATEST= dsatest
		SSLTEST= ssltest
		DANETEST= danetest
		RSATEST= rsa_test
		ENGINETEST= enginetest
		EVPTEST= evp_test
		@@ -90,7 +91,7 @@ EXE= $(NPTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(BNTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(ECTEST)$(EXE_EXT) \
		$(DESTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(SHA1TEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(SHA256TEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(SHA512TEST)$(EXE_EXT) \
		$(MDC2TEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(RMDTEST)$(EXE_EXT) \
		$(RANDTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(DHTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(ENGINETEST)$(EXE_EXT) \
		$(GOST2814789TEST)$(EXE_EXT) \
		$(GOST2814789TEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(DANETEST)$(EXE_EXT) \
		$(BFTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(CASTTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(SSLTEST)$(EXE_EXT) \
		$(EXPTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(DSATEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(RSATEST)$(EXE_EXT) \
		$(EVPTEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(EVPEXTRATEST)$(EXE_EXT) $(IGETEST)$(EXE_EXT) \
		@@ -108,7 +109,7 @@ OBJ= $(NPTEST).o $(BNTEST).o $(ECTEST).o \
		$(HMACTEST).o $(WPTEST).o \
		$(RC2TEST).o $(RC4TEST).o $(RC5TEST).o \
		$(DESTEST).o $(SHA1TEST).o $(SHA256TEST).o $(SHA512TEST).o \
		$(MDC2TEST).o $(RMDTEST).o \
		$(MDC2TEST).o $(RMDTEST).o $(DANETEST).o \
		$(RANDTEST).o $(DHTEST).o $(ENGINETEST).o $(CASTTEST).o \
		$(BFTEST).o $(SSLTEST).o $(DSATEST).o $(EXPTEST).o $(RSATEST).o \
		$(EVPTEST).o $(EVPEXTRATEST).o $(IGETEST).o $(JPAKETEST).o $(V3NAMETEST).o \
		@@ -120,7 +121,7 @@ SRC= $(NPTEST).c $(BNTEST).c $(ECTEST).c \
		$(ECDSATEST).c $(ECDHTEST).c $(GMDIFFTEST).c $(PBELUTEST).c $(IDEATEST).c \
		$(MD2TEST).c $(MD4TEST).c $(MD5TEST).c \
		$(HMACTEST).c $(WPTEST).c \
		$(RC2TEST).c $(RC4TEST).c $(RC5TEST).c \
		$(RC2TEST).c $(RC4TEST).c $(RC5TEST).c $(DANETEST).c \
		$(DESTEST).c $(SHA1TEST).c $(MDC2TEST).c $(RMDTEST).c \
		$(RANDTEST).c $(DHTEST).c $(ENGINETEST).c $(CASTTEST).c \
		$(BFTEST).c $(SSLTEST).c $(DSATEST).c $(EXPTEST).c $(RSATEST).c \
		@@ -317,6 +318,9 @@ $(METHTEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(METHTEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
		$(SSLTEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(SSLTEST).o $(DLIBSSL) $(DLIBCRYPTO)
		@target=$(SSLTEST); $(BUILD_CMD)

		$(DANETEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(DANETEST).o $(DLIBSSL) $(DLIBCRYPTO)
		@target=$(DANETEST); $(BUILD_CMD)

		$(ENGINETEST)$(EXE_EXT): $(ENGINETEST).o $(DLIBCRYPTO)
		@target=$(ENGINETEST); $(BUILD_CMD)

		@@ -435,6 +439,23 @@ clienthellotest.o: clienthellotest.c
		constant_time_test.o: ../e_os.h ../include/internal/constant_time_locl.h
		constant_time_test.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
		constant_time_test.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h constant_time_test.c
		danetest.o: ../e_os.h ../include/internal/dane.h ../include/openssl/asn1.h
		danetest.o: ../include/openssl/bio.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h
		danetest.o: ../include/openssl/comp.h ../include/openssl/conf.h
		danetest.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/dtls1.h
		danetest.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/ec.h
		danetest.o: ../include/openssl/engine.h ../include/openssl/err.h
		danetest.o: ../include/openssl/evp.h ../include/openssl/hmac.h
		danetest.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
		danetest.o: ../include/openssl/objects.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
		danetest.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
		danetest.o: ../include/openssl/pem.h ../include/openssl/pem2.h
		danetest.o: ../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h
		danetest.o: ../include/openssl/sha.h ../include/openssl/srtp.h
		danetest.o: ../include/openssl/ssl.h ../include/openssl/ssl2.h
		danetest.o: ../include/openssl/ssl3.h ../include/openssl/stack.h
		danetest.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../include/openssl/tls1.h
		danetest.o: ../include/openssl/x509.h ../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h danetest.c
		destest.o: ../include/openssl/des.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h
		destest.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h destest.c
		dhtest.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/bio.h ../include/openssl/bn.h