Loading crypto/bn/bn.h +0 −4 Original line number Diff line number Diff line Loading @@ -435,8 +435,6 @@ void BN_set_negative(BIGNUM *b, int n); int BN_div(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rem, const BIGNUM *m, const BIGNUM *d, BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_div_no_branch(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rem, const BIGNUM *m, const BIGNUM *d, BN_CTX *ctx); #define BN_mod(rem,m,d,ctx) BN_div(NULL,(rem),(m),(d),(ctx)) int BN_nnmod(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *m, const BIGNUM *d, BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_mod_add(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx); Loading Loading @@ -505,8 +503,6 @@ int BN_gcd(BIGNUM *r,const BIGNUM *a,const BIGNUM *b,BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_kronecker(const BIGNUM *a,const BIGNUM *b,BN_CTX *ctx); /* returns -2 for error */ BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse(BIGNUM *ret, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n,BN_CTX *ctx); BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse_no_branch(BIGNUM *ret, const BIGNUM *A, const BIGNUM *n,BN_CTX *ctx); BIGNUM *BN_mod_sqrt(BIGNUM *ret, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n,BN_CTX *ctx); Loading crypto/bn/bn_div.c +5 −3 Original line number Diff line number Diff line Loading @@ -169,13 +169,15 @@ int BN_div(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rem, const BIGNUM *m, const BIGNUM *d, #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ASM */ /* BN_div computes dv := num / divisor, rounding towards zero, and sets up * rm such that dv*divisor + rm = num holds. /* BN_div[_no_branch] computes dv := num / divisor, rounding towards * zero, and sets up rm such that dv*divisor + rm = num holds. * Thus: * dv->neg == num->neg ^ divisor->neg (unless the result is zero) * rm->neg == num->neg (unless the remainder is zero) * If 'dv' or 'rm' is NULL, the respective value is not returned. */ static int BN_div_no_branch(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rm, const BIGNUM *num, const BIGNUM *divisor, BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_div(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rm, const BIGNUM *num, const BIGNUM *divisor, BN_CTX *ctx) { Loading Loading @@ -406,7 +408,7 @@ err: /* BN_div_no_branch is a special version of BN_div. It does not contain * branches that may leak sensitive information. */ int BN_div_no_branch(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rm, const BIGNUM *num, static int BN_div_no_branch(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rm, const BIGNUM *num, const BIGNUM *divisor, BN_CTX *ctx) { int norm_shift,i,loop; Loading crypto/bn/bn_gcd.c +3 −1 Original line number Diff line number Diff line Loading @@ -203,6 +203,8 @@ err: /* solves ax == 1 (mod n) */ static BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse_no_branch(BIGNUM *in, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n, BN_CTX *ctx); BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse(BIGNUM *in, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n, BN_CTX *ctx) { Loading Loading @@ -501,7 +503,7 @@ err: /* BN_mod_inverse_no_branch is a special version of BN_mod_inverse. * It does not contain branches that may leak sensitive information. */ BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse_no_branch(BIGNUM *in, static BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse_no_branch(BIGNUM *in, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n, BN_CTX *ctx) { BIGNUM *A,*B,*X,*Y,*M,*D,*T,*R=NULL; Loading crypto/bn/bn_mont.c +71 −13 Original line number Diff line number Diff line Loading @@ -176,7 +176,6 @@ int BN_from_montgomery(BIGNUM *ret, const BIGNUM *a, BN_MONT_CTX *mont, max=(nl+al+1); /* allow for overflow (no?) XXX */ if (bn_wexpand(r,max) == NULL) goto err; if (bn_wexpand(ret,max) == NULL) goto err; r->neg=a->neg^n->neg; np=n->d; Loading Loading @@ -228,19 +227,76 @@ int BN_from_montgomery(BIGNUM *ret, const BIGNUM *a, BN_MONT_CTX *mont, } bn_correct_top(r); /* mont->ri will be a multiple of the word size */ #if 0 BN_rshift(ret,r,mont->ri); #else /* mont->ri will be a multiple of the word size and below code * is kind of BN_rshift(ret,r,mont->ri) equivalent */ if (r->top <= ri) { ret->top=0; retn=1; goto err; } al=r->top-ri; # define BRANCH_FREE 1 # if BRANCH_FREE if (bn_wexpand(ret,ri) == NULL) goto err; x=0-(((al-ri)>>(sizeof(al)*8-1))&1); ret->top=x=(ri&~x)|(al&x); /* min(ri,al) */ ret->neg=r->neg; x=ri; rp=ret->d; ap= &(r->d[x]); if (r->top < x) al=0; else al=r->top-x; ap=&(r->d[ri]); nrp=ap; /* This 'if' denotes violation of 2*M<r^(n-1) boundary condition * formulated by C.D.Walter in "Montgomery exponentiation needs * no final subtractions." Incurred branch can disclose only * information about modulus length, which is not really secret. */ if ((mont->N.d[ri-1]>>(BN_BITS2-2))!=0) { size_t m1,m2; v=bn_sub_words(rp,ap,mont->N.d,ri); /* this -----------------------^^ works even in al<ri case * thanks to zealous zeroing of top of the vector in the * beginning. */ /* if (al==ri && !v) || al>ri) nrp=rp; else nrp=ap; */ /* in other words if subtraction result is real, then * trick unconditional memcpy below to perform in-place * "refresh" instead of actual copy. */ m1=0-(size_t)(((al-ri)>>(sizeof(al)*8-1))&1); /* al<ri */ m2=0-(size_t)(((ri-al)>>(sizeof(al)*8-1))&1); /* al>ri */ m1|=m2; /* (al!=ri) */ m1|=(0-(size_t)v); /* (al!=ri || v) */ m1&=~m2; /* (al!=ri || v) && !al>ri */ nrp=(BN_ULONG *)(((size_t)rp&~m1)|((size_t)ap&m1)); } /* 'i<ri' is chosen to eliminate dependency on input data, even * though it results in redundant copy in al<ri case. */ for (i=0,ri-=4; i<ri; i+=4) { BN_ULONG t1,t2,t3,t4; t1=nrp[i+0]; t2=nrp[i+1]; t3=nrp[i+2]; ap[i+0]=0; t4=nrp[i+3]; ap[i+1]=0; rp[i+0]=t1; ap[i+2]=0; rp[i+1]=t2; ap[i+3]=0; rp[i+2]=t3; rp[i+3]=t4; } for (ri+=4; i<ri; i++) rp[i]=nrp[i], ap[i]=0; # else if (bn_wexpand(ret,al) == NULL) goto err; ret->top=al; ret->neg=r->neg; rp=ret->d; ap=&(r->d[ri]); al-=4; for (i=0; i<al; i+=4) { Loading Loading @@ -278,10 +334,12 @@ int BN_from_montgomery(BIGNUM *ret, const BIGNUM *a, BN_MONT_CTX *mont, if (!BN_rshift(ret,t2,mont->ri)) goto err; #endif /* MONT_WORD */ #if !defined(BRANCH_FREE) || BRANCH_FREE==0 if (BN_ucmp(ret, &(mont->N)) >= 0) { if (!BN_usub(ret,ret,&(mont->N))) goto err; } #endif retn=1; bn_check_top(ret); err: Loading util/libeay.num +0 −2 Original line number Diff line number Diff line Loading @@ -3511,8 +3511,6 @@ BIO_get_callback_arg 3902 EXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_set_callback 3903 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_ASIdOrRange 3904 EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779 i2d_ASIdentifiers 3905 EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779 BN_div_no_branch 3906 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_mod_inverse_no_branch 3907 EXIST::FUNCTION: SEED_decrypt 3908 EXIST::FUNCTION:SEED SEED_encrypt 3909 EXIST::FUNCTION:SEED SEED_cbc_encrypt 3910 EXIST::FUNCTION:SEED Loading Loading
crypto/bn/bn.h +0 −4 Original line number Diff line number Diff line Loading @@ -435,8 +435,6 @@ void BN_set_negative(BIGNUM *b, int n); int BN_div(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rem, const BIGNUM *m, const BIGNUM *d, BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_div_no_branch(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rem, const BIGNUM *m, const BIGNUM *d, BN_CTX *ctx); #define BN_mod(rem,m,d,ctx) BN_div(NULL,(rem),(m),(d),(ctx)) int BN_nnmod(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *m, const BIGNUM *d, BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_mod_add(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx); Loading Loading @@ -505,8 +503,6 @@ int BN_gcd(BIGNUM *r,const BIGNUM *a,const BIGNUM *b,BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_kronecker(const BIGNUM *a,const BIGNUM *b,BN_CTX *ctx); /* returns -2 for error */ BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse(BIGNUM *ret, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n,BN_CTX *ctx); BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse_no_branch(BIGNUM *ret, const BIGNUM *A, const BIGNUM *n,BN_CTX *ctx); BIGNUM *BN_mod_sqrt(BIGNUM *ret, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n,BN_CTX *ctx); Loading
crypto/bn/bn_div.c +5 −3 Original line number Diff line number Diff line Loading @@ -169,13 +169,15 @@ int BN_div(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rem, const BIGNUM *m, const BIGNUM *d, #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ASM */ /* BN_div computes dv := num / divisor, rounding towards zero, and sets up * rm such that dv*divisor + rm = num holds. /* BN_div[_no_branch] computes dv := num / divisor, rounding towards * zero, and sets up rm such that dv*divisor + rm = num holds. * Thus: * dv->neg == num->neg ^ divisor->neg (unless the result is zero) * rm->neg == num->neg (unless the remainder is zero) * If 'dv' or 'rm' is NULL, the respective value is not returned. */ static int BN_div_no_branch(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rm, const BIGNUM *num, const BIGNUM *divisor, BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_div(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rm, const BIGNUM *num, const BIGNUM *divisor, BN_CTX *ctx) { Loading Loading @@ -406,7 +408,7 @@ err: /* BN_div_no_branch is a special version of BN_div. It does not contain * branches that may leak sensitive information. */ int BN_div_no_branch(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rm, const BIGNUM *num, static int BN_div_no_branch(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rm, const BIGNUM *num, const BIGNUM *divisor, BN_CTX *ctx) { int norm_shift,i,loop; Loading
crypto/bn/bn_gcd.c +3 −1 Original line number Diff line number Diff line Loading @@ -203,6 +203,8 @@ err: /* solves ax == 1 (mod n) */ static BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse_no_branch(BIGNUM *in, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n, BN_CTX *ctx); BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse(BIGNUM *in, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n, BN_CTX *ctx) { Loading Loading @@ -501,7 +503,7 @@ err: /* BN_mod_inverse_no_branch is a special version of BN_mod_inverse. * It does not contain branches that may leak sensitive information. */ BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse_no_branch(BIGNUM *in, static BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse_no_branch(BIGNUM *in, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n, BN_CTX *ctx) { BIGNUM *A,*B,*X,*Y,*M,*D,*T,*R=NULL; Loading
crypto/bn/bn_mont.c +71 −13 Original line number Diff line number Diff line Loading @@ -176,7 +176,6 @@ int BN_from_montgomery(BIGNUM *ret, const BIGNUM *a, BN_MONT_CTX *mont, max=(nl+al+1); /* allow for overflow (no?) XXX */ if (bn_wexpand(r,max) == NULL) goto err; if (bn_wexpand(ret,max) == NULL) goto err; r->neg=a->neg^n->neg; np=n->d; Loading Loading @@ -228,19 +227,76 @@ int BN_from_montgomery(BIGNUM *ret, const BIGNUM *a, BN_MONT_CTX *mont, } bn_correct_top(r); /* mont->ri will be a multiple of the word size */ #if 0 BN_rshift(ret,r,mont->ri); #else /* mont->ri will be a multiple of the word size and below code * is kind of BN_rshift(ret,r,mont->ri) equivalent */ if (r->top <= ri) { ret->top=0; retn=1; goto err; } al=r->top-ri; # define BRANCH_FREE 1 # if BRANCH_FREE if (bn_wexpand(ret,ri) == NULL) goto err; x=0-(((al-ri)>>(sizeof(al)*8-1))&1); ret->top=x=(ri&~x)|(al&x); /* min(ri,al) */ ret->neg=r->neg; x=ri; rp=ret->d; ap= &(r->d[x]); if (r->top < x) al=0; else al=r->top-x; ap=&(r->d[ri]); nrp=ap; /* This 'if' denotes violation of 2*M<r^(n-1) boundary condition * formulated by C.D.Walter in "Montgomery exponentiation needs * no final subtractions." Incurred branch can disclose only * information about modulus length, which is not really secret. */ if ((mont->N.d[ri-1]>>(BN_BITS2-2))!=0) { size_t m1,m2; v=bn_sub_words(rp,ap,mont->N.d,ri); /* this -----------------------^^ works even in al<ri case * thanks to zealous zeroing of top of the vector in the * beginning. */ /* if (al==ri && !v) || al>ri) nrp=rp; else nrp=ap; */ /* in other words if subtraction result is real, then * trick unconditional memcpy below to perform in-place * "refresh" instead of actual copy. */ m1=0-(size_t)(((al-ri)>>(sizeof(al)*8-1))&1); /* al<ri */ m2=0-(size_t)(((ri-al)>>(sizeof(al)*8-1))&1); /* al>ri */ m1|=m2; /* (al!=ri) */ m1|=(0-(size_t)v); /* (al!=ri || v) */ m1&=~m2; /* (al!=ri || v) && !al>ri */ nrp=(BN_ULONG *)(((size_t)rp&~m1)|((size_t)ap&m1)); } /* 'i<ri' is chosen to eliminate dependency on input data, even * though it results in redundant copy in al<ri case. */ for (i=0,ri-=4; i<ri; i+=4) { BN_ULONG t1,t2,t3,t4; t1=nrp[i+0]; t2=nrp[i+1]; t3=nrp[i+2]; ap[i+0]=0; t4=nrp[i+3]; ap[i+1]=0; rp[i+0]=t1; ap[i+2]=0; rp[i+1]=t2; ap[i+3]=0; rp[i+2]=t3; rp[i+3]=t4; } for (ri+=4; i<ri; i++) rp[i]=nrp[i], ap[i]=0; # else if (bn_wexpand(ret,al) == NULL) goto err; ret->top=al; ret->neg=r->neg; rp=ret->d; ap=&(r->d[ri]); al-=4; for (i=0; i<al; i+=4) { Loading Loading @@ -278,10 +334,12 @@ int BN_from_montgomery(BIGNUM *ret, const BIGNUM *a, BN_MONT_CTX *mont, if (!BN_rshift(ret,t2,mont->ri)) goto err; #endif /* MONT_WORD */ #if !defined(BRANCH_FREE) || BRANCH_FREE==0 if (BN_ucmp(ret, &(mont->N)) >= 0) { if (!BN_usub(ret,ret,&(mont->N))) goto err; } #endif retn=1; bn_check_top(ret); err: Loading
util/libeay.num +0 −2 Original line number Diff line number Diff line Loading @@ -3511,8 +3511,6 @@ BIO_get_callback_arg 3902 EXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_set_callback 3903 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_ASIdOrRange 3904 EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779 i2d_ASIdentifiers 3905 EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779 BN_div_no_branch 3906 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_mod_inverse_no_branch 3907 EXIST::FUNCTION: SEED_decrypt 3908 EXIST::FUNCTION:SEED SEED_encrypt 3909 EXIST::FUNCTION:SEED SEED_cbc_encrypt 3910 EXIST::FUNCTION:SEED Loading