Unverified Commit ba1dbd78 authored by Daniel Stenberg's avatar Daniel Stenberg
Browse files

smtp: use the upload buffer size for scratch buffer malloc 

... not the read buffer size, as that can be set smaller and thus cause
a buffer overflow! CVE-2018-0500

Reported-by: Peter Wu
Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_2018-70a2.html
parent 0b4ccc97

lib/smtp.c

+2 −1
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -1563,13 +1563,14 @@ CURLcode Curl_smtp_escape_eob(struct connectdata *conn, const ssize_t nread) 
  if(!scratch || data->set.crlf) {

    oldscratch = scratch;



    scratch = newscratch = malloc(2 * data->set.buffer_size);

    scratch = newscratch = malloc(2 * UPLOAD_BUFSIZE);

    if(!newscratch) {

      failf(data, "Failed to alloc scratch buffer!");



      return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;

    }

  }

  DEBUGASSERT(UPLOAD_BUFSIZE >= nread);



  /* Have we already sent part of the EOB? */

  eob_sent = smtp->eob;