curl_formparse() should no longer have any size-limit in the data section (b4956530) · Commits · CYBER - Cyber Security / TS 103 523 MSP / TLMSP / TLMSP curl

lib/formdata.c

+10 −2

Original line number	Diff line number	Diff line
		@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ int FormParse(char *input,
		/* nextarg MUST be a string in the format 'name=contents' and we'll
		build a linked list with the info */
		char name[256];
		char contents[4096]="";
		char *contents;
		char major[128];
		char minor[128];
		long flags = 0;
		@@ -115,7 +115,12 @@ int FormParse(char *input,
		struct HttpPost subpost; / a sub-node */
		unsigned int i;

		if(1 <= sscanf(input, "%255[^=]=%4095[^\n]", name, contents)) {
		/* Preallocate contents to the length of input to make sure we don't
		overwrite anything. */
		contents = malloc(strlen(input));
		contents[0] = '\000';

		if(1 <= sscanf(input, "%255[^=]=%[^\n]", name, contents)) {
		/* the input was using the correct format */
		contp = contents;

		@@ -156,6 +161,7 @@ int FormParse(char *input,
		if(2 != sscanf(type, "%127[^/]/%127[^,\n]",
		major, minor)) {
		fprintf(stderr, "Illegally formatted content-type field!\n");
		free(contents);
		return 2; /* illegal content-type syntax! */
		}
		/* now point beyond the content-type specifier */
		@@ -287,8 +293,10 @@ int FormParse(char *input,
		}
		else {
		fprintf(stderr, "Illegally formatted input field!\n");
		free(contents);
		return 1;
		}
		free(contents);
		return 0;
		}