update references to new RI RFC

     [Steve Henson]

  *) If client attempts to renegotiate and doesn't support RI respond with

     a no_renegotiation alert as required by draft-ietf-tls-renegotiation.

     Some renegotiating TLS clients will continue a connection gracefully

     when they receive the alert. Unfortunately OpenSSL mishandled

     this alert and would hang waiting for a server hello which it will never

     receive. Now we treat a received no_renegotiation alert as a fatal 

     error. This is because applications requesting a renegotiation might well

     expect it to succeed and would have no code in place to handle the server

     denying it so the only safe thing to do is to terminate the connection.

     a no_renegotiation alert as required by RFC5746.  Some renegotiating

     TLS clients will continue a connection gracefully when they receive

     the alert. Unfortunately OpenSSL mishandled this alert and would hang

     waiting for a server hello which it will never receive. Now we treat a

     received no_renegotiation alert as a fatal error. This is because

     applications requesting a renegotiation might well expect it to succeed

     and would have no code in place to handle the server denying it so the

     only safe thing to do is to terminate the connection.

     [Steve Henson]

  *) Add ctrl macro SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support() which returns 1 if

     the updated NID creation version. This should correctly handle UTF8.

     [Steve Henson]

  *) Implement draft-ietf-tls-renegotiation-03. Re-enable

     renegotiation but require the extension as needed. Unfortunately,

     SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION turns out to be a

     bad idea. It has been replaced by

  *) Implement RFC5746. Re-enable renegotiation but require the extension

     as needed. Unfortunately, SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION

     turns out to be a bad idea. It has been replaced by

     SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION which can be set with

     SSL_CTX_set_options(). This is really not recommended unless you

     know what you are doing.

  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8l and OpenSSL 1.0:

      o Support for draft-ietf-tls-renegotiation-03.txt

      o Support for RFC5746 TLS renegotiation extension.

      o RFC3280 path validation: sufficient to process PKITS tests.

      o Integrated support for PVK files and keyblobs.

      o Change default private key format to PKCS#8.

=head1 SECURE RENEGOTIATION

OpenSSL 0.9.8m and later always attempts to use secure renegotiation as

described in draft-ietf-tls-renegotiation (FIXME: replace by RFC). This

counters the prefix attack described in CVE-2009-3555 and elsewhere.

described in RFC5746. This counters the prefix attack described in

CVE-2009-3555 and elsewhere.

The deprecated and highly broken SSLv2 protocol does not support secure

renegotiation at all: its use is B<strongly> discouraged.