Commit cb150cbc authored by Matt Caswell's avatar Matt Caswell
Browse files

Update cookie_len for size_t



Reviewed-by: default avatarRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
parent 12472b45
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+3 −3
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -1378,7 +1378,7 @@ int pqueue_size(pqueue *pq);

typedef struct dtls1_state_st {
    unsigned char cookie[DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH];
    unsigned int cookie_len;
    size_t cookie_len;
    unsigned int cookie_verified;
    /* handshake message numbers */
    unsigned short handshake_write_seq;
@@ -1958,7 +1958,7 @@ void dtls1_stop_timer(SSL *s);
__owur int dtls1_is_timer_expired(SSL *s);
void dtls1_double_timeout(SSL *s);
__owur int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET *pkt, unsigned char *cookie,
                                         unsigned char cookie_len);
                                         size_t cookie_len);
__owur int dtls1_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s);
__owur size_t dtls1_min_mtu(SSL *s);
void dtls1_hm_fragment_free(hm_fragment *frag);
+1 −1
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -870,7 +870,7 @@ int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
    int al;
    unsigned int cookie_len;
    size_t cookie_len;
    PACKET cookiepkt;

    if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2)
+5 −3
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -853,7 +853,7 @@ static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
#endif

int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET *pkt, unsigned char *cookie,
                                  unsigned char cookie_len)
                                  size_t cookie_len)
{
    /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
    if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, DTLS1_VERSION)
@@ -865,14 +865,16 @@ int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET *pkt, unsigned char *cookie,

int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
{
    unsigned int cookie_leni;
    if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
        s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie,
                                  &(s->d1->cookie_len)) == 0 ||
        s->d1->cookie_len > 255) {
                                  &cookie_leni) == 0 ||
        cookie_leni > 255) {
        SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
               SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
        return 0;
    }
    s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_leni;

    if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
                                              s->d1->cookie_len)) {