Commit c436e05b authored by Rich Salz's avatar Rich Salz
Browse files

Remove unused eng_rsax and related asm file 



Reviewed-by: default avatarAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
parent a2b18e65

crypto/bn/Makefile

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Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -108,8 +108,6 @@ x86_64-mont5.s: asm/x86_64-mont5.pl 
	$(PERL) asm/x86_64-mont5.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) > $@

x86_64-gf2m.s:	asm/x86_64-gf2m.pl

	$(PERL) asm/x86_64-gf2m.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) > $@

modexp512-x86_64.s:	asm/modexp512-x86_64.pl

	$(PERL) asm/modexp512-x86_64.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) > $@

rsaz-x86_64.s:	asm/rsaz-x86_64.pl

	$(PERL) asm/rsaz-x86_64.pl $(PERLASM_SCHEME) > $@

rsaz-avx2.s:	asm/rsaz-avx2.pl

crypto/bn/asm/modexp512-x86_64.pl

deleted100644 → 0
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File deleted.

Preview size limit exceeded, changes collapsed.

crypto/engine/eng_rsax.c

deleted100644 → 0
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Original line number Diff line number Diff line 
/* crypto/engine/eng_rsax.c */

/* Copyright (c) 2010-2010 Intel Corp.

 *   Author: Vinodh.Gopal@intel.com

 *           Jim Guilford

 *           Erdinc.Ozturk@intel.com

 *           Maxim.Perminov@intel.com

 *           Ying.Huang@intel.com

 *

 * More information about algorithm used can be found at:

 *   http://www.cse.buffalo.edu/srds2009/escs2009_submission_Gopal.pdf

 */

/* ====================================================================

 * Copyright (c) 1999-2001 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.

 *

 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without

 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions

 * are met:

 *

 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright

 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.

 *

 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright

 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in

 *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the

 *    distribution.

 *

 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this

 *    software must display the following acknowledgment:

 *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project

 *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"

 *

 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to

 *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without

 *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact

 *    licensing@OpenSSL.org.

 *

 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"

 *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written

 *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.

 *

 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following

 *    acknowledgment:

 *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project

 *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"

 *

 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY

 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE

 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR

 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR

 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,

 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT

 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;

 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)

 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,

 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)

 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED

 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.

 * ====================================================================

 *

 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young

 * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim

 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).

 */



#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>



#include <stdio.h>

#include <string.h>

#include <openssl/crypto.h>

#include <openssl/buffer.h>

#include <openssl/engine.h>

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA

# include <openssl/rsa.h>

#endif

#include <openssl/bn.h>

#include <openssl/err.h>



/* RSAX is available **ONLY* on x86_64 CPUs */

#undef COMPILE_RSAX



#if (defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \

     defined(_M_AMD64) || defined (_M_X64)) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM)

# define COMPILE_RSAX

static ENGINE *ENGINE_rsax(void);

#endif



void ENGINE_load_rsax(void)

{

/* On non-x86 CPUs it just returns. */

#ifdef COMPILE_RSAX

    ENGINE *toadd = ENGINE_rsax();

    if (!toadd)

        return;

    ENGINE_add(toadd);

    ENGINE_free(toadd);

    ERR_clear_error();

#endif

}



#ifdef COMPILE_RSAX

# define E_RSAX_LIB_NAME "rsax engine"



static int e_rsax_destroy(ENGINE *e);

static int e_rsax_init(ENGINE *e);

static int e_rsax_finish(ENGINE *e);

static int e_rsax_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f) (void));



# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA

/* RSA stuff */

static int e_rsax_rsa_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa,

                              BN_CTX *ctx);

static int e_rsax_rsa_finish(RSA *r);

# endif



static const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN e_rsax_cmd_defns[] = {

    {0, NULL, NULL, 0}

};



# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA

/* Our internal RSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */

static RSA_METHOD e_rsax_rsa = {

    "Intel RSA-X method",

    NULL,

    NULL,

    NULL,

    NULL,

    e_rsax_rsa_mod_exp,

    NULL,

    NULL,

    e_rsax_rsa_finish,

    RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC | RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE,

    NULL,

    NULL,

    NULL

};

# endif



/* Constants used when creating the ENGINE */

static const char *engine_e_rsax_id = "rsax";

static const char *engine_e_rsax_name = "RSAX engine support";



/* This internal function is used by ENGINE_rsax() */

static int bind_helper(ENGINE *e)

{

# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA

    const RSA_METHOD *meth1;

# endif

    if (!ENGINE_set_id(e, engine_e_rsax_id) ||

        !ENGINE_set_name(e, engine_e_rsax_name) ||

# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA

        !ENGINE_set_RSA(e, &e_rsax_rsa) ||

# endif

        !ENGINE_set_destroy_function(e, e_rsax_destroy) ||

        !ENGINE_set_init_function(e, e_rsax_init) ||

        !ENGINE_set_finish_function(e, e_rsax_finish) ||

        !ENGINE_set_ctrl_function(e, e_rsax_ctrl) ||

        !ENGINE_set_cmd_defns(e, e_rsax_cmd_defns))

        return 0;



# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA

    meth1 = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay();

    e_rsax_rsa.rsa_pub_enc = meth1->rsa_pub_enc;

    e_rsax_rsa.rsa_pub_dec = meth1->rsa_pub_dec;

    e_rsax_rsa.rsa_priv_enc = meth1->rsa_priv_enc;

    e_rsax_rsa.rsa_priv_dec = meth1->rsa_priv_dec;

    e_rsax_rsa.bn_mod_exp = meth1->bn_mod_exp;

# endif

    return 1;

}



static ENGINE *ENGINE_rsax(void)

{

    ENGINE *ret = ENGINE_new();

    if (!ret)

        return NULL;

    if (!bind_helper(ret)) {

        ENGINE_free(ret);

        return NULL;

    }

    return ret;

}



# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA

/* Used to attach our own key-data to an RSA structure */

static int rsax_ex_data_idx = -1;

# endif



static int e_rsax_destroy(ENGINE *e)

{

    return 1;

}



/* (de)initialisation functions. */

static int e_rsax_init(ENGINE *e)

{

# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA

    if (rsax_ex_data_idx == -1)

        rsax_ex_data_idx = RSA_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);

# endif

    if (rsax_ex_data_idx == -1)

        return 0;

    return 1;

}



static int e_rsax_finish(ENGINE *e)

{

    return 1;

}



static int e_rsax_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f) (void))

{

    int to_return = 1;



    switch (cmd) {

        /* The command isn't understood by this engine */

    default:

        to_return = 0;

        break;

    }



    return to_return;

}



# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA



#  ifdef _WIN32

typedef unsigned __int64 UINT64;

#  else

typedef unsigned long long UINT64;

#  endif

typedef unsigned short UINT16;



/*

 * Table t is interleaved in the following manner: The order in memory is

 * t[0][0], t[0][1], ..., t[0][7], t[1][0], ... A particular 512-bit value is

 * stored in t[][index] rather than the more normal t[index][]; i.e. the

 * qwords of a particular entry in t are not adjacent in memory

 */



/* Init BIGNUM b from the interleaved UINT64 array */

static int interleaved_array_to_bn_512(BIGNUM *b, UINT64 *array);



/*

 * Extract array elements from BIGNUM b To set the whole array from b, call

 * with n=8

 */

static int bn_extract_to_array_512(const BIGNUM *b, unsigned int n,

                                   UINT64 *array);



struct mod_ctx_512 {

    UINT64 t[8][8];

    UINT64 m[8];

    UINT64 m1[8];               /* 2^278 % m */

    UINT64 m2[8];               /* 2^640 % m */

    UINT64 k1[2];               /* (- 1/m) % 2^128 */

};



static int mod_exp_pre_compute_data_512(UINT64 *m, struct mod_ctx_512 *data);



void mod_exp_512(UINT64 *result, /* 512 bits, 8 qwords */

                 UINT64 *g,     /* 512 bits, 8 qwords */

                 UINT64 *exp,   /* 512 bits, 8 qwords */

                 struct mod_ctx_512 *data);



typedef struct st_e_rsax_mod_ctx {

    UINT64 type;

    union {

        struct mod_ctx_512 b512;

    } ctx;



} E_RSAX_MOD_CTX;



static E_RSAX_MOD_CTX *e_rsax_get_ctx(RSA *rsa, int idx, BIGNUM *m)

{

    E_RSAX_MOD_CTX *hptr;



    if (idx < 0 || idx > 2)

        return NULL;



    hptr = RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, rsax_ex_data_idx);

    if (!hptr) {

        hptr = OPENSSL_malloc(3 * sizeof(E_RSAX_MOD_CTX));

        if (!hptr)

            return NULL;

        hptr[2].type = hptr[1].type = hptr[0].type = 0;

        RSA_set_ex_data(rsa, rsax_ex_data_idx, hptr);

    }



    if (hptr[idx].type == (UINT64)BN_num_bits(m))

        return hptr + idx;



    if (BN_num_bits(m) == 512) {

        UINT64 _m[8];

        bn_extract_to_array_512(m, 8, _m);

        memset(&hptr[idx].ctx.b512, 0, sizeof(struct mod_ctx_512));

        mod_exp_pre_compute_data_512(_m, &hptr[idx].ctx.b512);

    }



    hptr[idx].type = BN_num_bits(m);

    return hptr + idx;

}



static int e_rsax_rsa_finish(RSA *rsa)

{

    E_RSAX_MOD_CTX *hptr = RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, rsax_ex_data_idx);

    if (hptr) {

        OPENSSL_free(hptr);

        RSA_set_ex_data(rsa, rsax_ex_data_idx, NULL);

    }

    if (rsa->_method_mod_n)

        BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n);

    if (rsa->_method_mod_p)

        BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p);

    if (rsa->_method_mod_q)

        BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q);

    return 1;

}



static int e_rsax_bn_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *g, const BIGNUM *e,

                             const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx,

                             BN_MONT_CTX *in_mont,

                             E_RSAX_MOD_CTX *rsax_mod_ctx)

{

    if (rsax_mod_ctx && BN_get_flags(e, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) {

        if (BN_num_bits(m) == 512) {

            UINT64 _r[8];

            UINT64 _g[8];

            UINT64 _e[8];



            /* Init the arrays from the BIGNUMs */

            bn_extract_to_array_512(g, 8, _g);

            bn_extract_to_array_512(e, 8, _e);



            mod_exp_512(_r, _g, _e, &rsax_mod_ctx->ctx.b512);

            /* Return the result in the BIGNUM */

            interleaved_array_to_bn_512(r, _r);

            return 1;

        }

    }



    return BN_mod_exp_mont(r, g, e, m, ctx, in_mont);

}



/*

 * Declares for the Intel CIAP 512-bit / CRT / 1024 bit RSA modular

 * exponentiation routine precalculations and a structure to hold the

 * necessary values.  These files are meant to live in crypto/rsa/ in the

 * target openssl.

 */



/*

 * Local method: extracts a piece from a BIGNUM, to fit it into

 * an array. Call with n=8 to extract an entire 512-bit BIGNUM

 */

static int bn_extract_to_array_512(const BIGNUM *b, unsigned int n,

                                   UINT64 *array)

{

    int i;

    UINT64 tmp;

    unsigned char bn_buff[64];

    memset(bn_buff, 0, 64);

    if (BN_num_bytes(b) > 64) {

        printf("Can't support this byte size\n");

        return 0;

    }

    if (BN_num_bytes(b) != 0) {

        if (!BN_bn2bin(b, bn_buff + (64 - BN_num_bytes(b)))) {

            printf("Error's in bn2bin\n");

            /* We have to error, here */

            return 0;

        }

    }

    while (n-- > 0) {

        array[n] = 0;

        for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) {

            tmp = bn_buff[63 - (n * 8 + i)];

            array[n] |= tmp << (8 * i);

        }

    }

    return 1;

}



/* Init a 512-bit BIGNUM from the UINT64*_ (8 * 64) interleaved array */

static int interleaved_array_to_bn_512(BIGNUM *b, UINT64 *array)

{

    unsigned char tmp[64];

    int n = 8;

    int i;

    while (n-- > 0) {

        for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) {

            tmp[63 - (n * 8 + i)] = (unsigned char)(array[n] >> (8 * i));

    }}

    BN_bin2bn(tmp, 64, b);

    return 0;

}



/* The main 512bit precompute call */

static int mod_exp_pre_compute_data_512(UINT64 *m, struct mod_ctx_512 *data)

{

    BIGNUM two_768, two_640, two_128, two_512, tmp, _m, tmp2;



    /* We need a BN_CTX for the modulo functions */

    BN_CTX *ctx;

    /* Some tmps */

    UINT64 _t[8];

    int i, j, ret = 0;



    /* Init _m with m */

    BN_init(&_m);

    interleaved_array_to_bn_512(&_m, m);

    memset(_t, 0, 64);



    /* Inits */

    BN_init(&two_768);

    BN_init(&two_640);

    BN_init(&two_128);

    BN_init(&two_512);

    BN_init(&tmp);

    BN_init(&tmp2);



    /* Create our context */

    if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {

        goto err;

    }

    BN_CTX_start(ctx);



    /*

     * For production, if you care, these only need to be set once,

     * and may be made constants.

     */

    BN_lshift(&two_768, BN_value_one(), 768);

    BN_lshift(&two_640, BN_value_one(), 640);

    BN_lshift(&two_128, BN_value_one(), 128);

    BN_lshift(&two_512, BN_value_one(), 512);



    if (0 == (m[7] & 0x8000000000000000)) {

        goto err;

    }

    if (0 == (m[0] & 0x1)) {    /* Odd modulus required for Mont */

        goto err;

    }



    /* Precompute m1 */

    BN_mod(&tmp, &two_768, &_m, ctx);

    if (!bn_extract_to_array_512(&tmp, 8, &data->m1[0])) {

        goto err;

    }



    /* Precompute m2 */

    BN_mod(&tmp, &two_640, &_m, ctx);

    if (!bn_extract_to_array_512(&tmp, 8, &data->m2[0])) {

        goto err;

    }



    /*

     * Precompute k1, a 128b number = ((-1)* m-1 ) mod 2128; k1 should

     * be non-negative.

     */

    BN_mod_inverse(&tmp, &_m, &two_128, ctx);

    if (!BN_is_zero(&tmp)) {

        BN_sub(&tmp, &two_128, &tmp);

    }

    if (!bn_extract_to_array_512(&tmp, 2, &data->k1[0])) {

        goto err;

    }



    /* Precompute t */

    for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {

        BN_zero(&tmp);

        if (i & 1) {

            BN_add(&tmp, &two_512, &tmp);

        }

        if (i & 2) {

            BN_add(&tmp, &two_512, &tmp);

        }

        if (i & 4) {

            BN_add(&tmp, &two_640, &tmp);

        }



        BN_nnmod(&tmp2, &tmp, &_m, ctx);

        if (!bn_extract_to_array_512(&tmp2, 8, _t)) {

            goto err;

        }

        for (j = 0; j < 8; j++)

            data->t[j][i] = _t[j];

    }



    /* Precompute m */

    for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {

        data->m[i] = m[i];

    }



    ret = 1;



 err:

    /* Cleanup */

    if (ctx != NULL) {

        BN_CTX_end(ctx);

        BN_CTX_free(ctx);

    }

    BN_free(&two_768);

    BN_free(&two_640);

    BN_free(&two_128);

    BN_free(&two_512);

    BN_free(&tmp);

    BN_free(&tmp2);

    BN_free(&_m);



    return ret;

}



static int e_rsax_rsa_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa,

                              BN_CTX *ctx)

{

    BIGNUM *r1, *m1, *vrfy;

    BIGNUM local_dmp1, local_dmq1, local_c, local_r1;

    BIGNUM *dmp1, *dmq1, *c, *pr1;

    int ret = 0;



    BN_CTX_start(ctx);

    r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);

    m1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);

    vrfy = BN_CTX_get(ctx);



    {

        BIGNUM local_p, local_q;

        BIGNUM *p = NULL, *q = NULL;

        int error = 0;



        /*

         * Make sure BN_mod_inverse in Montgomery intialization uses the

         * BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag (unless RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME is set)

         */

        if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {

            BN_init(&local_p);

            p = &local_p;

            BN_with_flags(p, rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);



            BN_init(&local_q);

            q = &local_q;

            BN_with_flags(q, rsa->q, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);

        } else {

            p = rsa->p;

            q = rsa->q;

        }



        if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE) {

            if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked

                (&rsa->_method_mod_p, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, p, ctx))

                error = 1;

            if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked

                (&rsa->_method_mod_q, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, q, ctx))

                error = 1;

        }



        /* clean up */

        if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {

            BN_free(&local_p);

            BN_free(&local_q);

        }

        if (error)

            goto err;

    }



    if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)

        if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked

            (&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))

            goto err;



    /* compute I mod q */

    if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {

        c = &local_c;

        BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);

        if (!BN_mod(r1, c, rsa->q, ctx))

            goto err;

    } else {

        if (!BN_mod(r1, I, rsa->q, ctx))

            goto err;

    }



    /* compute r1^dmq1 mod q */

    if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {

        dmq1 = &local_dmq1;

        BN_with_flags(dmq1, rsa->dmq1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);

    } else

        dmq1 = rsa->dmq1;



    if (!e_rsax_bn_mod_exp(m1, r1, dmq1, rsa->q, ctx,

                           rsa->_method_mod_q, e_rsax_get_ctx(rsa, 0,

                                                              rsa->q)))

        goto err;



    /* compute I mod p */

    if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {

        c = &local_c;

        BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);

        if (!BN_mod(r1, c, rsa->p, ctx))

            goto err;

    } else {

        if (!BN_mod(r1, I, rsa->p, ctx))

            goto err;

    }



    /* compute r1^dmp1 mod p */

    if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {

        dmp1 = &local_dmp1;

        BN_with_flags(dmp1, rsa->dmp1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);

    } else

        dmp1 = rsa->dmp1;



    if (!e_rsax_bn_mod_exp(r0, r1, dmp1, rsa->p, ctx,

                           rsa->_method_mod_p, e_rsax_get_ctx(rsa, 1,

                                                              rsa->p)))

        goto err;



    if (!BN_sub(r0, r0, m1))

        goto err;

    /*

     * This will help stop the size of r0 increasing, which does affect the

     * multiply if it optimised for a power of 2 size

     */

    if (BN_is_negative(r0))

        if (!BN_add(r0, r0, rsa->p))

            goto err;



    if (!BN_mul(r1, r0, rsa->iqmp, ctx))

        goto err;



    /* Turn BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag on before division operation */

    if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {

        pr1 = &local_r1;

        BN_with_flags(pr1, r1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);

    } else

        pr1 = r1;

    if (!BN_mod(r0, pr1, rsa->p, ctx))

        goto err;



    /*

     * If p < q it is occasionally possible for the correction of adding 'p'

     * if r0 is negative above to leave the result still negative. This can

     * break the private key operations: the following second correction

     * should *always* correct this rare occurrence. This will *never* happen

     * with OpenSSL generated keys because they ensure p > q [steve]

     */

    if (BN_is_negative(r0))

        if (!BN_add(r0, r0, rsa->p))

            goto err;

    if (!BN_mul(r1, r0, rsa->q, ctx))

        goto err;

    if (!BN_add(r0, r1, m1))

        goto err;



    if (rsa->e && rsa->n) {

        if (!e_rsax_bn_mod_exp

            (vrfy, r0, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx, rsa->_method_mod_n,

             e_rsax_get_ctx(rsa, 2, rsa->n)))

            goto err;



        /*

         * If 'I' was greater than (or equal to) rsa->n, the operation will

         * be equivalent to using 'I mod n'. However, the result of the

         * verify will *always* be less than 'n' so we don't check for

         * absolute equality, just congruency.

         */

        if (!BN_sub(vrfy, vrfy, I))

            goto err;

        if (!BN_mod(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n, ctx))

            goto err;

        if (BN_is_negative(vrfy))

            if (!BN_add(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n))

                goto err;

        if (!BN_is_zero(vrfy)) {

            /*

             * 'I' and 'vrfy' aren't congruent mod n. Don't leak

             * miscalculated CRT output, just do a raw (slower) mod_exp and

             * return that instead.

             */



            BIGNUM local_d;

            BIGNUM *d = NULL;



            if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {

                d = &local_d;

                BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);

            } else

                d = rsa->d;

            if (!e_rsax_bn_mod_exp(r0, I, d, rsa->n, ctx,

                                   rsa->_method_mod_n, e_rsax_get_ctx(rsa, 2,

                                                                      rsa->n)))

                goto err;

        }

    }

    ret = 1;



 err:

    BN_CTX_end(ctx);



    return ret;

}

# endif                         /* !OPENSSL_NO_RSA */

#endif                          /* !COMPILE_RSAX */

util/pl/unix.pl

+0 −1
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -59,7 +59,6 @@ $bf_enc_src=""; 
	  'x86_64-mont' => 'crypto/bn',

	  'x86_64-mont5' => 'crypto/bn',

	  'x86_64-gf2m' => 'crypto/bn',

	  'modexp512-x86_64' => 'crypto/bn',

	  'aes-x86_64' => 'crypto/aes',

	  'vpaes-x86_64' => 'crypto/aes',

	  'bsaes-x86_64' => 'crypto/aes',