Commit 88858868 authored by Matt Caswell's avatar Matt Caswell
Browse files

Change various repeated rr[someindex] references to a pointer



Improves the readability of the code, and reduces the liklihood of errors.

Reviewed-by: default avatarRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
parent e8eb224b
Loading
Loading
Loading
Loading
+74 −65
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
    int enc_err, rret, ret = -1;
    int i;
    size_t more, n;
    SSL3_RECORD *rr;
    SSL3_RECORD *rr, *thisrr;
    SSL3_BUFFER *rbuf;
    SSL_SESSION *sess;
    unsigned char *p;
@@ -147,6 +147,8 @@ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
    sess = s->session;

    do {
        thisrr = &rr[num_recs];

        /* check if we have the header */
        if ((RECORD_LAYER_get_rstate(&s->rlayer) != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
            (RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer)
@@ -190,19 +192,19 @@ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
                 * because it is an SSLv2ClientHello. We keep it using
                 * |num_recs| for the sake of consistency
                 */
                rr[num_recs].type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
                rr[num_recs].rec_version = SSL2_VERSION;
                thisrr->type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
                thisrr->rec_version = SSL2_VERSION;

                rr[num_recs].length = sslv2len & 0x7fff;
                thisrr->length = sslv2len & 0x7fff;

                if (rr[num_recs].length > SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(rbuf)
                if (thisrr->length > SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(rbuf)
                    - SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
                    al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
                    SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
                    goto f_err;
                }

                if (rr[num_recs].length < MIN_SSL2_RECORD_LEN) {
                if (thisrr->length < MIN_SSL2_RECORD_LEN) {
                    al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
                    SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
                    goto f_err;
@@ -221,13 +223,13 @@ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
                /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */
                if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &type)
                        || !PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &version)
                        || !PACKET_get_net_2_len(&pkt, &rr[num_recs].length)) {
                        || !PACKET_get_net_2_len(&pkt, &thisrr->length)) {
                    al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
                    SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
                    goto f_err;
                }
                rr[num_recs].type = type;
                rr[num_recs].rec_version = version;
                thisrr->type = type;
                thisrr->rec_version = version;

                /* Lets check version. In TLSv1.3 we ignore this field */
                if (!s->first_packet && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
@@ -235,7 +237,7 @@ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
                    SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
                    if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00)
                        && !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) {
                        if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
                        if (thisrr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
                            /*
                             * The record is using an incorrect version number,
                             * but what we've got appears to be an alert. We
@@ -285,13 +287,13 @@ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
                }

                if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->enc_read_ctx != NULL
                        && rr[num_recs].type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
                        && thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
                    SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_RECORD_TYPE);
                    al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
                    goto f_err;
                }

                if (rr[num_recs].length >
                if (thisrr->length >
                    SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(rbuf) - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
                    al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
                    SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
@@ -307,11 +309,11 @@ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
         * Calculate how much more data we need to read for the rest of the
         * record
         */
        if (rr[num_recs].rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) {
            more = rr[num_recs].length + SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
        if (thisrr->rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) {
            more = thisrr->length + SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
                - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
        } else {
            more = rr[num_recs].length;
            more = thisrr->length;
        }
        if (more > 0) {
            /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
@@ -325,43 +327,44 @@ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
        RECORD_LAYER_set_rstate(&s->rlayer, SSL_ST_READ_HEADER);

        /*
         * At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length,
         * or s->packet_length == SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length
         * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
         * At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
         * + thisrr->length, or s->packet_length == SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
         * + thisrr->length and we have that many bytes in s->packet
         */
        if (rr[num_recs].rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) {
            rr[num_recs].input =
        if (thisrr->rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) {
            thisrr->input =
                &(RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer)[SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
        } else {
            rr[num_recs].input =
            thisrr->input =
                &(RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer)[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
        }

        /*
         * ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr' rr->input points
         * at rr->length bytes, which need to be copied into rr->data by either
         * the decryption or by the decompression When the data is 'copied' into
         * the rr->data buffer, rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer
         * ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'thisrr' thisrr->input
         * points at thisrr->length bytes, which need to be copied into
         * thisrr->data by either the decryption or by the decompression When
         * the data is 'copied' into the thisrr->data buffer, thisrr->input will
         * be pointed at the new buffer
         */

        /*
         * We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] rr->length
         * bytes of encrypted compressed stuff.
         * We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
         * thisrr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff.
         */

        /* check is not needed I believe */
        if (rr[num_recs].length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) {
        if (thisrr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) {
            al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
            goto f_err;
        }

        /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
        rr[num_recs].data = rr[num_recs].input;
        rr[num_recs].orig_len = rr[num_recs].length;
        /* decrypt in place in 'thisrr->input' */
        thisrr->data = thisrr->input;
        thisrr->orig_len = thisrr->length;

        /* Mark this record as not read by upper layers yet */
        rr[num_recs].read = 0;
        thisrr->read = 0;

        num_recs++;

@@ -369,7 +372,7 @@ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
        RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer);
        RECORD_LAYER_clear_first_record(&s->rlayer);
    } while (num_recs < max_recs
             && rr[num_recs - 1].type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
             && thisrr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
             && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)
             && s->enc_read_ctx != NULL
             && (EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx))
@@ -392,14 +395,16 @@ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
        mac_size = (size_t)imac_size;
        OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
        for (j = 0; j < num_recs; j++) {
            if (rr[j].length < mac_size) {
            thisrr = &rr[j];

            if (thisrr->length < mac_size) {
                al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
                goto f_err;
            }
            rr[j].length -= mac_size;
            mac = rr[j].data + rr[j].length;
            i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &rr[j], md, 0 /* not send */ );
            thisrr->length -= mac_size;
            mac = thisrr->data + thisrr->length;
            i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thisrr, md, 0 /* not send */ );
            if (i == 0 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, mac_size) != 0) {
                al = SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
@@ -423,11 +428,11 @@ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
        goto f_err;
    }
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
    printf("dec %"OSSLzu"\n", rr->length);
    printf("dec %"OSSLzu"\n", rr[0].length);
    {
        size_t z;
        for (z = 0; z < rr->length; z++)
            printf("%02X%c", rr->data[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
        for (z = 0; z < rr[0].length; z++)
            printf("%02X%c", rr[0].data[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
    }
    printf("\n");
#endif
@@ -444,16 +449,17 @@ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
        OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);

        for (j = 0; j < num_recs; j++) {
            thisrr = &rr[j];
            /*
             * orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
             * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
             * therefore we can safely process the record in a different amount
             * of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
             */
            if (rr[j].orig_len < mac_size ||
            if (thisrr->orig_len < mac_size ||
                /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
                (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
                 rr[j].orig_len < mac_size + 1)) {
                 thisrr->orig_len < mac_size + 1)) {
                al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
                goto f_err;
@@ -467,23 +473,23 @@ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
                 * contents of the padding bytes.
                 */
                mac = mac_tmp;
                ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, &rr[j], mac_size);
                rr[j].length -= mac_size;
                ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, thisrr, mac_size);
                thisrr->length -= mac_size;
            } else {
                /*
                 * In this case there's no padding, so |rec->orig_len| equals
                 * |rec->length| and we checked that there's enough bytes for
                 * |mac_size| above.
                 */
                rr[j].length -= mac_size;
                mac = &rr[j].data[rr[j].length];
                thisrr->length -= mac_size;
                mac = &thisrr->data[thisrr->length];
            }

            i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &rr[j], md, 0 /* not send */ );
            i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thisrr, md, 0 /* not send */ );
            if (i == 0 || mac == NULL
                || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
                enc_err = -1;
            if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + mac_size)
            if (thisrr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + mac_size)
                enc_err = -1;
        }
    }
@@ -503,14 +509,16 @@ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
    }

    for (j = 0; j < num_recs; j++) {
        /* rr[j].length is now just compressed */
        thisrr = &rr[j];

        /* thisrr->length is now just compressed */
        if (s->expand != NULL) {
            if (rr[j].length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH) {
            if (thisrr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH) {
                al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
                goto f_err;
            }
            if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s, &rr[j])) {
            if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s, thisrr)) {
                al = SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
                goto f_err;
@@ -520,44 +528,45 @@ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
        if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) {
            size_t end;

            if (rr[j].length == 0) {
            if (thisrr->length == 0) {
                al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_RECORD_TYPE);
                goto f_err;
            }

            /* Strip trailing padding */
            for (end = rr[j].length - 1; end > 0 && rr[j].data[end] == 0; end--)
            for (end = thisrr->length - 1; end > 0 && thisrr->data[end] == 0;
                 end--)
                continue;

            rr[j].length = end;
            rr[j].type = rr[j].data[end];
            if (rr[j].type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
                    && rr[j].type != SSL3_RT_ALERT
                    && rr[j].type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
            thisrr->length = end;
            thisrr->type = thisrr->data[end];
            if (thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
                    && thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT
                    && thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
                al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_RECORD_TYPE);
                goto f_err;
            }
        }

        if (rr[j].length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) {
        if (thisrr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) {
            al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
            goto f_err;
        }

        rr[j].off = 0;
        thisrr->off = 0;
        /*-
         * So at this point the following is true
         * rr[j].type   is the type of record
         * rr[j].length == number of bytes in record
         * rr[j].off    == offset to first valid byte
         * rr[j].data   == where to take bytes from, increment after use :-).
         * thisrr->type   is the type of record
         * thisrr->length == number of bytes in record
         * thisrr->off    == offset to first valid byte
         * thisrr->data   == where to take bytes from, increment after use :-).
         */

        /* just read a 0 length packet */
        if (rr[j].length == 0) {
        if (thisrr->length == 0) {
            RECORD_LAYER_inc_empty_record_count(&s->rlayer);
            if (RECORD_LAYER_get_empty_record_count(&s->rlayer)
                > MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS) {