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Although this is forbidden by all three(!) relevant specifications, there seem to be multiple server implementations in the wild that send it. Since we didn't check for unexpected extensions in any given message type until TLS 1.3 support was added, our previous behavior was to silently accept these extensions and pass them over to the custom extension callback (if any). In order to avoid regression of functionality, relax the check for "extension in unexpected context" for this specific case, but leave the protocol enforcment mechanism unchanged for other extensions and in other extension contexts. Leave a detailed comment to indicate what is going on. Reviewed-by:Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by:
Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4463)