First implementation of BFK TPs (9490350e) · Commits · ITS - Intelligent Transport Systems / ttcn / PKI TS 103 525-3

ItsPki_TestCases.ttcn

+49 −11

Original line number	Diff line number	Diff line
		@@ -11139,6 +11139,9 @@ module ItsPki_TestCases {
		* <pre>
		* Pics Selection: PICS_IUT_EA_ROLE
		* Initial conditions:
		* the EA in 'operational' state
		* authorized with CERT_EA certificate
		* and the ITS-S in 'enrolled' state
		* Expected behaviour:
		* ensure that {
		* when {
		@@ -11169,7 +11172,7 @@ module ItsPki_TestCases {
		* </pre>
		*
		* @see ETSI TS 103 525-2 v1.2.2 TP SECPKI_EA_BFK_AUTH_01_BV
		* @reference ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.3.5.1, 6.2.3.5.3
		* @reference ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.3.5.3
		*/
		testcase TC_SECPKI_EA_BFK_AUTH_01_BV() runs on ItsPkiHttp system ItsPkiHttpSystem {
		// Local variables
		@@ -11259,13 +11262,16 @@ module ItsPki_TestCases {
		* <pre>
		* Pics Selection: PICS_IUT_EA_ROLE
		* Initial conditions:
		* the EA in 'operational' state
		* authorized with CERT_EA certificate
		* and the ITS-S in 'enrolled' state
		* Expected behaviour:
		* ensure that {
		* when {
		* the IUT receives a ButterflyAuthorizationRequestMessage message (REQ)
		* }
		* then {
		* the IUT send an EtsiTs103097Data to the ITS-S
		* the IUT send to the ITS-S a ButterflyAuthorizationResponseMessage
		* containing butterflyCertificateResponse
		* containing RaEeCertInfo
		* containing version
		@@ -11480,6 +11486,11 @@ module ItsPki_TestCases {
		* <pre>
		* Pics Selection: PICS_IUT_EA_ROLE
		* Initial conditions:
		* the EA in 'operational' state
		* authorized with CERT_EA certificate
		* and the AA is emulated by TS and
		* authorized with CERT_AA certificate
		* and EA is configured to use emulated AA to generate certificates
		* Expected behaviour:
		* ensure that {
		* when {
		@@ -11617,6 +11628,15 @@ module ItsPki_TestCases {
		* <pre>
		* Pics Selection: PICS_IUT_EA_ROLE
		* Initial conditions:
		* the EA in 'operational' state
		* authorized with CERT_EA certificate
		* and the EA already received the ButterflyAuthorizationRequestMessage
		* indicating the sha256 message hash MSG_HASH
		* and the EA already responded with ButterflyAuthorizationResponseMessage
		* containing EtsiTs102941Data
		* containing butterflyAuthorizationResponse
		* containing nextDlTime
		* indicating DNL_TIME
		* Expected behaviour:
		* ensure that {
		* when {
		@@ -11753,6 +11773,11 @@ module ItsPki_TestCases {
		* @desc Check that the butterfly certificate request message contains expanded cocoon key
		* <pre>
		* Pics Selection: PICS_IUT_EA_ROLE
		* the EA in 'operational' state
		* authorized with CERT_EA certificate
		* and the AA in 'operational' state
		* authorized with CERT_AA certificate
		* and EA is configured to use AA of the current configuration to generate certificates
		* Initial conditions:
		* Expected behaviour:
		* ensure that {
		@@ -11884,6 +11909,19 @@ module ItsPki_TestCases {
		* <pre>
		* Pics Selection: PICS_IUT_EA_ROLE
		* Initial conditions:
		* the EA in 'operational' state
		* authorized with CERT_EA certificate
		* and the EA already responded with ButterflyAuthorizationResponseMessage (MSG_RESPONSE)
		* containing EtsiTs102941Data
		* containing butterflyAuthorizationResponse
		* containing nextDlTime
		* indicating DNL_TIME
		* and containing currentI
		* indicating I_VALUE
		* and containing requestHash
		* indicating MSG_HASH
		* and the EA already received from emullated AA one or more ButterflyCertResponse messages
		* containing AcaEeCertResponsePrivateSpdu (CERT_RESPONSE)
		* Expected behaviour:
		* ensure that {
		* when {
		@@ -11907,7 +11945,7 @@ module ItsPki_TestCases {
		* </pre>
		*
		* @see ETSI TS 103 525-2 v1.2.2 TP SECPKI_EA_BFK_AUTH_06_BV
		* @reference ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.3.5.4
		* @reference ETSI TS 102 941 [1], clause 6.2.3.5.1, 6.2.3.5.3
		*/
		testcase TC_SECPKI_EA_BFK_AUTH_06_BV() runs on ItsPkiHttp system ItsPkiHttpSystem {
		// Local variables
		@@ -11962,7 +12000,7 @@ module ItsPki_TestCases {
		mw_http_response_ok(
		mw_http_message_body_binary(
		mw_binary_body_ieee1609dot2_data(
		mw_butterflyAuthorizationResponse(
		mw_butterfly_cert_response(
		mw_encryptedData(
		{ , mw_recipientInfo_pskRecipInfo(v_aes_sym_key_hashed_id8), },
		mw_symmetricCiphertext_aes128ccm
		@@ -11975,8 +12013,8 @@ module ItsPki_TestCases {
		log("* " & testcasename() & ": FAIL: Failed to verify PKI message *");
		f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictTestBody(c_tbDone, e_error);
		} else {
		log(match(v_etsi_ts_102941_data, mw_etsiTs102941Data_ra_ee_cert_info(mw_ra_ee_cert_info)));
		if (match(v_etsi_ts_102941_data, mw_etsiTs102941Data_ra_ee_cert_info(mw_ra_ee_cert_info)) == true) {
		log(match(v_etsi_ts_102941_data, mw_etsiTs102941Data_ra_aca_cert_response(mw_ra_aca_cert_response)));
		if (match(v_etsi_ts_102941_data, mw_etsiTs102941Data_ra_aca_cert_response(mw_ra_aca_cert_response)) == true) {
		log("* " & testcasename() & ": PASS: Well formated ButterflyAuthorizationResponseMessage received *");
		f_selfOrClientSyncAndVerdictTestBody(c_tbDone, e_success);
		} else {

ItsPki_TestControl.ttcn

+7 −0

Original line number	Diff line number	Diff line
		@@ -87,6 +87,13 @@ module ItsPki_TestControl {

		execute(TC_SECPKI_EA_AUTHVAL_RCV_01_BV());
		execute(TC_SECPKI_EA_AUTHVAL_RCV_02_BI());

		execute(TC_SECPKI_EA_BFK_AUTH_01_BV());
		execute(TC_SECPKI_EA_BFK_AUTH_02_BV());
		execute(TC_SECPKI_EA_BFK_AUTH_03_BV());
		execute(TC_SECPKI_EA_BFK_AUTH_04_BV());
		execute(TC_SECPKI_EA_BFK_AUTH_05_BV());
		execute(TC_SECPKI_EA_BFK_AUTH_06_BV());
		}

		if (PICS_IUT_AA_ROLE) {

lib/LibItsPki_Templates.ttcn

+21 −21

Original line number	Diff line number	Diff line
		@@ -228,37 +228,37 @@ module LibItsPki_Templates {
		) modifies mw_etsiTs103097Data_encrypted := {
		} // End of template mw_authorizationValidationResponseMessage

		template (value) EtsiTs103097Data/AuthorizationRequestMessage/ m_authorizationRequestMessage(
		template (value) EtsiTs103097Data m_authorizationRequestMessage(
		in template (value) EncryptedData p_encryptedData
		) modifies m_etsiTs103097Data_encrypted := {
		} // End of template m_authorizationRequestMessage

		template (present) EtsiTs103097Data/AuthorizationRequestMessage/ mw_authorizationRequestMessage(
		template (present) EtsiTs103097Data mw_authorizationRequestMessage(
		template (present) EncryptedData p_encryptedData := ?
		) modifies mw_etsiTs103097Data_encrypted := {
		} // End of template mw_authorizationRequestMessage

		template (value) EtsiTs103097Data/AuthorizationResponseMessage/ m_authorizationResponseMessage(
		template (value) EtsiTs103097Data m_authorizationResponseMessage(
		in template (value) EncryptedData p_encryptedData
		) modifies m_etsiTs103097Data_encrypted := {
		} // End of template m_authorizationResponseMessage

		template (present) EtsiTs103097Data/EnrolmentResponseMessage/mw_butterflyAuthorizationRequest(
		template (present) EtsiTs103097Data mw_butterflyAuthorizationRequest(
		template (present) EncryptedData p_encryptedData := ?
		) modifies mw_etsiTs103097Data_encrypted := {
		} // End of template mw_butterflyAuthorizationRequest

		template (present) EtsiTs103097Data/EnrolmentResponseMessage/mw_butterflyAuthorizationResponse(
		template (present) EtsiTs103097Data mw_butterflyAuthorizationResponse(
		template (present) EncryptedData p_encryptedData := ?
		) modifies mw_etsiTs103097Data_encrypted := {
		} // End of template mw_butterflyAuthorizationResponse

		template (present) EtsiTs103097Data/EnrolmentResponseMessage/mw_butterfly_cert_request(
		template (present) EtsiTs103097Data mw_butterfly_cert_request(
		template (present) EncryptedData p_encryptedData := ?
		) modifies mw_etsiTs103097Data_encrypted := {
		} // End of template mw_butterfly_cert_request

		template (present) EtsiTs103097Data/EnrolmentResponseMessage/mw_butterfly_cert_response(
		template (present) EtsiTs103097Data mw_butterfly_cert_response(
		template (present) EncryptedData p_encryptedData := ?
		) modifies mw_etsiTs103097Data_encrypted := {
		} // End of template mw_butterfly_cert_response