# ASN.1 module Ieee1609Dot2 OID: _{iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) base(1) schema(1) major-version-2(2) minor-version-6(6)}_ @note Section references in this file are to clauses in IEEE Std 1609.2 unless indicated otherwise. Full forms of acronyms and abbreviations used in this file are specified in 3.2. ## Imports: * **[Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md)** *{iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) base(1) base-types(2) major-version-2(2) minor-version-4(4)}*
* **[EtsiTs103097ExtensionModule](EtsiTs103097ExtensionModule.md)** *{itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) itsDomain(5) wg5(5) secHeaders(103097) extension(2) major-version-1(1) minor-version-1(1)}*
## Data Elements: ### Ieee1609Dot2Data This data type is used to contain the other data types in this clause. The fields in the Ieee1609Dot2Data have the following meanings: Fields: * protocolVersion of type [**Uint8**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Uint8) (3)
contains the current version of the protocol. The version specified in this standard is version 3, represented by the integer 3. There are no major or minor version numbers. * content of type [**Ieee1609Dot2Content**](#Ieee1609Dot2Content)
contains the content in the form of an Ieee1609Dot2Content. >>> NOTE: Canonicalization: This data structure is subject to canonicalization for the relevant operations specified in 6.1.2. The canonicalization applies to the Ieee1609Dot2Content. >>> ```asn1 Ieee1609Dot2Data ::= SEQUENCE { protocolVersion Uint8(3), content Ieee1609Dot2Content } ``` ### Ieee1609Dot2Content In this structure: Fields: * unsecuredData of type [**Opaque**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Opaque)
indicates that the content is an OCTET STRING to be consumed outside the SDS. * signedData of type [**SignedData**](#SignedData)
indicates that the content has been signed according to this standard. * encryptedData of type [**EncryptedData**](#EncryptedData)
indicates that the content has been encrypted according to this standard. * signedCertificateRequest of type [**Opaque**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Opaque)
indicates that the content is a certificate request signed by an IEEE 1609.2 certificate or self-signed. * signedX509CertificateRequest of type [**Opaque**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Opaque)
indicates that the content is a certificate request signed by an ITU-T X.509 certificate. ..., >>> NOTE: Canonicalization: This data structure is subject to canonicalization for the relevant operations specified in 6.1.2 if it is of type signedData. The canonicalization applies to the SignedData. >>> ```asn1 Ieee1609Dot2Content ::= CHOICE { unsecuredData Opaque, signedData SignedData, encryptedData EncryptedData, signedCertificateRequest Opaque, ..., signedX509CertificateRequest Opaque } ``` ### SignedData In this structure: Fields: * hashId of type [**HashAlgorithm**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#HashAlgorithm)
indicates the hash algorithm to be used to generate the hash of the message for signing and verification. * tbsData of type [**ToBeSignedData**](#ToBeSignedData)
contains the data that is hashed as input to the signature. * signer of type [**SignerIdentifier**](#SignerIdentifier)
determines the keying material and hash algorithm used to sign the data. * signature of type [**Signature**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Signature)
contains the digital signature itself, calculated as specified in 5.3.1. - If signer indicates the choice self, then the signature calculation is parameterized as follows: - Data input is equal to the COER encoding of the tbsData field canonicalized according to the encoding considerations given in 6.3.6. - Verification type is equal to self. - Signer identifier input is equal to the empty string. - If signer indicates certificate or digest, then the signature calculation is parameterized as follows: - Data input is equal to the COER encoding of the tbsData field canonicalized according to the encoding considerations given in 6.3.6. - Verification type is equal to certificate. - Signer identifier input equal to the COER-encoding of the Certificate that is to be used to verify the SPDU, canonicalized according to the encoding considerations given in 6.4.3. >>> NOTE: Canonicalization: This data structure is subject to canonicalization for the relevant operations specified in 6.1.2. The canonicalization applies to the ToBeSignedData and the Signature. >>> ```asn1 SignedData ::= SEQUENCE { hashId HashAlgorithm, tbsData ToBeSignedData, signer SignerIdentifier, signature Signature } ``` ### ToBeSignedData This structure contains the data to be hashed when generating or verifying a signature. See 6.3.4 for the specification of the input to the hash. Fields: * payload of type [**SignedDataPayload**](#SignedDataPayload)
contains data that is provided by the entity that invokes the SDS. * headerInfo of type [**HeaderInfo**](#HeaderInfo)
contains additional data that is inserted by the SDS. This structure is used as follows to determine the "data input" to the hash operation for signing or verification as specified in 5.3.1.2.2 or 5.3.1.3. - If payload does not contain the field omitted, the data input to the hash operation is the COER encoding of the ToBeSignedData. - If payload field in this ToBeSignedData instance contains the field omitted, the data input to the hash operation is the COER encoding of the ToBeSignedData, concatenated with the hash of the omitted payload. The hash of the omitted payload is calculated with the same hash algorithm that is used to calculate the hash of the data input for signing or verification. The data input to the hash operation is simply the COER enocding of the ToBeSignedData, concatenated with the hash of the omitted payload: there is no additional wrapping or length indication. As noted in 5.2.4.3.4, the means by which the signer and verifier establish the contents of the omitted payload are out of scope for this standard. >>> NOTE: Canonicalization: This data structure is subject to canonicalization for the relevant operations specified in 6.1.2. The canonicalization applies to the SignedDataPayload if it is of type data, and to the HeaderInfo. >>> ```asn1 ToBeSignedData ::= SEQUENCE { payload SignedDataPayload, headerInfo HeaderInfo } ``` ### SignedDataPayload This structure contains the data payload of a ToBeSignedData. This structure contains at least one of the optional elements, and may contain more than one. See 5.2.4.3.4 for more details. The security profile in Annex C allows an implementation of this standard to state which forms of Signed¬Data¬Payload are supported by that implementation, and also how the signer and verifier are intended to obtain the external data for hashing. The specification of an SDEE that uses external data is expected to be explicit and unambiguous about how this data is obtained and how it is formatted prior to processing by the hash function. Fields: * data of type [**Ieee1609Dot2Data**](#Ieee1609Dot2Data) OPTIONAL
contains data that is explicitly transported within the structure. * extDataHash of type [**HashedData**](#HashedData) OPTIONAL
contains the hash of data that is not explicitly transported within the structure, and which the creator of the structure wishes to cryptographically bind to the signature. * omitted of type **NULL** OPTIONAL
indicates that there is external data to be included in the hash calculation for the signature.The mechanism for including the external data in the hash calculation is specified in 6.3.6. ..., >>> NOTE: Canonicalization: This data structure is subject to canonicalization for the relevant operations specified in 6.1.2. The canonicalization applies to the Ieee1609Dot2Data. >>> ```asn1 SignedDataPayload ::= SEQUENCE { data Ieee1609Dot2Data OPTIONAL, extDataHash HashedData OPTIONAL, ..., omitted NULL OPTIONAL } (WITH COMPONENTS {..., data PRESENT} | WITH COMPONENTS {..., extDataHash PRESENT} | WITH COMPONENTS {..., omitted PRESENT}) ``` ### HashedData This structure contains the hash of some data with a specified hash algorithm. See 5.3.3 for specification of the permitted hash algorithms. Fields: * sha256HashedData of type [**HashedId32**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#HashedId32)
indicates data hashed with SHA-256. * sha384HashedData of type [**HashedId48**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#HashedId48)
indicates data hashed with SHA-384. ..., * sm3HashedData of type [**HashedId32**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#HashedId32)
indicates data hashed with SM3. >>> NOTE: Critical information fields: If present, this is a critical information field as defined in 5.2.6. An implementation that does not recognize the indicated CHOICE for this type when verifying a signed SPDU shall indicate that the signed SPDU is invalid in the sense of 4.2.2.3.2, that is, it is invalid in the sense that its validity cannot be established. >>> ```asn1 HashedData::= CHOICE { sha256HashedData HashedId32, ..., sha384HashedData HashedId48, sm3HashedData HashedId32 } ``` ### HeaderInfo This structure contains information that is used to establish validity by the criteria of 5.2. Fields: * psid of type [**Psid**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Psid)
indicates the application area with which the sender is claiming the payload is to be associated. * generationTime of type [**Time64**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Time64) OPTIONAL
indicates the time at which the structure was generated. See 5.2.5.2.2 and 5.2.5.2.3 for discussion of the use of this field. * expiryTime of type [**Time64**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Time64) OPTIONAL
if present, contains the time after which the data is no longer considered relevant. If both generationTime and expiryTime are present, the signed SPDU is invalid if generationTime is not strictly earlier than expiryTime. * generationLocation of type [**ThreeDLocation**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#ThreeDLocation) OPTIONAL
if present, contains the location at which the signature was generated. * p2pcdLearningRequest of type [**HashedId3**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#HashedId3) OPTIONAL
if present, is used by the SDS to request certificates for which it has seen identifiers and does not know the entire certificate. A specification of this peer-to-peer certificate distribution (P2PCD) mechanism is given in Clause 8. This field is used for the separate-certificate-pdu flavor of P2PCD and shall only be present if inlineP2pcdRequest is not present. The HashedId3 is calculated with the whole-certificate hash algorithm, determined as described in 6.4.3, applied to the COER-encoded certificate, canonicalized as defined in the definition of Certificate. * missingCrlIdentifier of type [**MissingCrlIdentifier**](#MissingCrlIdentifier) OPTIONAL
if present, is used by the SDS to request CRLs which it knows to have been issued and have not received. This is provided for future use and the associated mechanism is not defined in this version of this standard. * encryptionKey of type [**EncryptionKey**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#EncryptionKey) OPTIONAL
if present, is used to provide a key that is to be used to encrypt at least one response to this SPDU. The SDEE specification is expected to specify which response SPDUs are to be encrypted with this key. One possible use of this key to encrypt a response is specified in 6.3.35, 6.3.37, and 6.3.34. An encryptionKey field of type symmetric should only be used if the SignedData containing this field is securely encrypted by some means. * inlineP2pcdRequest of type [**SequenceOfHashedId3**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#SequenceOfHashedId3) OPTIONAL
if present, is used by the SDS to request unknown certificates per the inline peer-to-peer certificate distribution mechanism is given in Clause 8. This field shall only be present if p2pcdLearningRequest is not present. The HashedId3 is calculated with the whole-certificate hash algorithm, determined as described in 6.4.3, applied to the COER-encoded certificate, canonicalized as defined in the definition of Certificate. ..., * requestedCertificate of type [**Certificate**](#Certificate) OPTIONAL
if present, is used by the SDS to provide certificates per the "inline" version of the peer-to-peer certificate distribution mechanism given in Clause 8. * pduFunctionalType of type [**PduFunctionalType**](#PduFunctionalType) OPTIONAL
if present, is used to indicate that the SPDU is to be consumed by a process other than an application process as defined in ISO 21177 [B14a]. See 6.3.23b for more details. * contributedExtensions of type [**ContributedExtensionBlocks**](#ContributedExtensionBlocks) OPTIONAL
if present, is used to contain additional extensions defined using the ContributedExtensionBlocks structure. >>> NOTE: Canonicalization: This data structure is subject to canonicalization for the relevant operations specified in 6.1.2. The canonicalization applies to the EncryptionKey. If encryptionKey is present, and indicates the choice public, and contains a BasePublicEncryptionKey that is an elliptic curve point (i.e., of type EccP256CurvePoint or EccP384CurvePoint), then the elliptic curve point is encoded in compressed form, i.e., such that the choice indicated within the Ecc*CurvePoint is compressed-y-0 or compressed-y-1. The canonicalization does not apply to any fields after the extension marker, including any fields in contributedExtensions. >>> ```asn1 HeaderInfo ::= SEQUENCE { psid Psid, generationTime Time64 OPTIONAL, expiryTime Time64 OPTIONAL, generationLocation ThreeDLocation OPTIONAL, p2pcdLearningRequest HashedId3 OPTIONAL, missingCrlIdentifier MissingCrlIdentifier OPTIONAL, encryptionKey EncryptionKey OPTIONAL, ..., inlineP2pcdRequest SequenceOfHashedId3 OPTIONAL, requestedCertificate Certificate OPTIONAL, pduFunctionalType PduFunctionalType OPTIONAL, contributedExtensions ContributedExtensionBlocks OPTIONAL } ``` ### MissingCrlIdentifier This structure may be used to request a CRL that the SSME knows to have been issued and has not yet received. It is provided for future use and its use is not defined in this version of this standard. Fields: * cracaId of type [**HashedId3**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#HashedId3)
is the HashedId3 of the CRACA, as defined in 5.1.3. The HashedId3 is calculated with the whole-certificate hash algorithm, determined as described in 6.4.3, applied to the COER-encoded certificate, canonicalized as defined in the definition of Certificate. * crlSeries of type [**CrlSeries**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#CrlSeries)
is the requested CRL Series value. See 5.1.3 for more information. ```asn1 MissingCrlIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE { cracaId HashedId3, crlSeries CrlSeries, ... } ``` ### PduFunctionalType This data structure identifies the functional entity that is intended to consume an SPDU, for the case where that functional entity is not an application process, and are instead security support services for an application process. Further details and the intended use of this field are defined in ISO 21177 [B20]. ```asn1 PduFunctionalType ::= INTEGER (0..255) ``` ```asn1 tlsHandshake PduFunctionalType ::= 1 iso21177ExtendedAuth PduFunctionalType ::= 2 iso21177SessionExtension PduFunctionalType ::= 3 ``` ### ContributedExtensionBlocks This type is used for clarity of definitions. ```asn1 ContributedExtensionBlocks ::= SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF ContributedExtensionBlock ``` ### ContributedExtensionBlock This data structure defines the format of an extension block provided by an identified contributor by using the temnplate provided in the class IEEE1609DOT2-HEADERINFO-CONTRIBUTED-EXTENSION constraint to the objects in the set Ieee1609Dot2HeaderInfoContributedExtensions. Fields: * contributorId of type [**IEEE1609DOT2-HEADERINFO-CONTRIBUTED-EXTENSION**](#IEEE1609DOT2-HEADERINFO-CONTRIBUTED-EXTENSION) .&id({ Ieee1609Dot2HeaderInfoContributedExtensions })
uniquely identifies the contributor. * extns of type **SEQUENCE** (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF
contains a list of extensions from that contributor. Extensions are expected and not required to follow the format specified in 6.5. ```asn1 ContributedExtensionBlock ::= SEQUENCE { contributorId IEEE1609DOT2-HEADERINFO-CONTRIBUTED-EXTENSION.&id({ Ieee1609Dot2HeaderInfoContributedExtensions }), extns SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF IEEE1609DOT2-HEADERINFO-CONTRIBUTED-EXTENSION.&Extn({ Ieee1609Dot2HeaderInfoContributedExtensions }{@.contributorId}) } ``` ### IEEE1609DOT2-HEADERINFO-CONTRIBUTED-EXTENSION This Information Object Class defines the class that provides a template for defining extension blocks. Fields: * id of type [**HeaderInfoContributorId**](#HeaderInfoContributorId) UNIQUE
```asn1 IEEE1609DOT2-HEADERINFO-CONTRIBUTED-EXTENSION ::= CLASS { &id HeaderInfoContributorId UNIQUE, &Extn } WITH SYNTAX {&Extn IDENTIFIED BY &id} ``` ### Ieee1609Dot2HeaderInfoContributedExtensions This structure is an ASN.1 Information Object Set listing the defined contributed extension types and the associated HeaderInfoContributorId values. In this version of this standard two extension types are defined: Ieee1609ContributedHeaderInfoExtension and EtsiOriginatingHeaderInfoExtension. ```asn1 Ieee1609Dot2HeaderInfoContributedExtensions IEEE1609DOT2-HEADERINFO-CONTRIBUTED-EXTENSION ::= { {Ieee1609ContributedHeaderInfoExtension IDENTIFIED BY ieee1609HeaderInfoContributorId} | {EtsiOriginatingHeaderInfoExtension IDENTIFIED BY etsiHeaderInfoContributorId}, ... } ``` ### HeaderInfoContributorId This is an integer used to identify a HeaderInfo extension contributing organization. In this version of this standard two values are defined: - ieee1609OriginatingExtensionId indicating extensions originating with IEEE 1609. - etsiOriginatingExtensionId indicating extensions originating with ETSI TC ITS. ```asn1 HeaderInfoContributorId ::= INTEGER (0..255) ``` ```asn1 ieee1609HeaderInfoContributorId HeaderInfoContributorId ::= 1 etsiHeaderInfoContributorId HeaderInfoContributorId ::= 2 ``` ### SignerIdentifier This structure allows the recipient of data to determine which keying material to use to authenticate the data. It also indicates the verification type to be used to generate the hash for verification, as specified in 5.3.1. Fields: * digest of type [**HashedId8**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#HashedId8)
If the choice indicated is digest: - The structure contains the HashedId8 of the relevant certificate. The HashedId8 is calculated with the whole-certificate hash algorithm, determined as described in 6.4.3. - The verification type is certificate and the certificate data passed to the hash function as specified in 5.3.1 is the authorization certificate. * certificate of type [**SequenceOfCertificate**](#SequenceOfCertificate)
If the choice indicated is certificate: - The structure contains one or more Certificate structures, in order such that the first certificate is the authorization certificate and each subsequent certificate is the issuer of the one before it. - The verification type is certificate and the certificate data passed to the hash function as specified in 5.3.1 is the authorization certificate. * self of type **NULL**
If the choice indicated is self: - The structure does not contain any data beyond the indication that the choice value is self. - The verification type is self-signed. >>> NOTE: Canonicalization: This data structure is subject to canonicalization for the relevant operations specified in 6.1.2. The canonicalization applies to every Certificate in the certificate field. >>> ```asn1 SignerIdentifier ::= CHOICE { digest HashedId8, certificate SequenceOfCertificate, self NULL, ... } ``` ### Countersignature This data structure is used to perform a countersignature over an already-signed SPDU. This is the profile of an Ieee1609Dot2Data containing a signedData. The tbsData within content is composed of a payload containing the hash (extDataHash) of the externally generated, pre-signed SPDU over which the countersignature is performed. ```asn1 Countersignature ::= Ieee1609Dot2Data (WITH COMPONENTS {..., content (WITH COMPONENTS {..., signedData (WITH COMPONENTS {..., tbsData (WITH COMPONENTS {..., payload (WITH COMPONENTS {..., data ABSENT, extDataHash PRESENT }), headerInfo(WITH COMPONENTS {..., generationTime PRESENT, expiryTime ABSENT, generationLocation ABSENT, p2pcdLearningRequest ABSENT, missingCrlIdentifier ABSENT, encryptionKey ABSENT }) }) }) }) }) ``` ### EncryptedData This data structure encodes data that has been encrypted to one or more recipients using the recipients’ public or symmetric keys as specified in 5.3.4. Fields: * recipients of type [**SequenceOfRecipientInfo**](#SequenceOfRecipientInfo)
contains one or more RecipientInfos. These entries may be more than one RecipientInfo, and more than one type of RecipientInfo, as long as all entries are indicating or containing the same data encryption key. * ciphertext of type [**SymmetricCiphertext**](#SymmetricCiphertext)
contains the encrypted data. This is the encryption of an encoded Ieee1609Dot2Data structure as specified in 5.3.4.2. >>> NOTE: If the plaintext is raw data, i.e., it has not been output from a previous operation of the SDS, then it is trivial to encapsulate it in an Ieee1609Dot2Data of type unsecuredData as noted in 4.2.2.2.2. For example, '03 80 08 01 23 45 67 89 AB CD EF' is the C-OER encoding of '01 23 45 67 89 AB CD EF' encapsulated in an Ieee1609Dot2Data of type unsecuredData. The first byte of the encoding 03 is the protocolVersion, the second byte 80 indicates the choice unsecuredData, and the third byte 08 is the length of the raw data '01 23 45 67 89 AB CD EF'. >>> ```asn1 EncryptedData ::= SEQUENCE { recipients SequenceOfRecipientInfo, ciphertext SymmetricCiphertext } ``` ### RecipientInfo This data structure is used to transfer the data encryption key to an individual recipient of an EncryptedData. The option pskRecipInfo is selected if the EncryptedData was encrypted using the static encryption key approach specified in 5.3.4. The other options are selected if the EncryptedData was encrypted using the ephemeral encryption key approach specified in 5.3.4. The meanings of the choices are: See Annex C.7 for guidance on when it may be appropriate to use each of these approaches. Fields: * pskRecipInfo of type [**PreSharedKeyRecipientInfo**](#PreSharedKeyRecipientInfo)
The data was encrypted directly using a pre-shared symmetric key. * symmRecipInfo of type [**SymmRecipientInfo**](#SymmRecipientInfo)
The data was encrypted with a data encryption key, and the data encryption key was encrypted using a symmetric key. * certRecipInfo of type [**PKRecipientInfo**](#PKRecipientInfo)
The data was encrypted with a data encryption key, the data encryption key was encrypted using a public key encryption scheme, where the public encryption key was obtained from a certificate. In this case, the parameter P1 to ECIES as defined in 5.3.5 is the hash of the certificate, calculated with the whole-certificate hash algorithm, determined as described in 6.4.3, applied to the COER-encoded certificate, canonicalized as defined in the definition of Certificate. * signedDataRecipInfo of type [**PKRecipientInfo**](#PKRecipientInfo)
The data was encrypted with a data encryption key, the data encryption key was encrypted using a public key encryption scheme, where the public encryption key was obtained as the public response encryption key from a SignedData. In this case, if ECIES is the encryption algorithm, then the parameter P1 to ECIES as defined in 5.3.5 is the SHA-256 hash of the Ieee1609Dot2Data of type signedData containing the response encryption key, canonicalized as defined in the definition of Ieee1609Dot2Data. * rekRecipInfo of type [**PKRecipientInfo**](#PKRecipientInfo)
The data was encrypted with a data encryption key, the data encryption key was encrypted using a public key encryption scheme, where the public encryption key was not obtained from a Signed-Data or a certificate. In this case, the SDEE specification is expected to specify how the public key is obtained, and if ECIES is the encryption algorithm, then the parameter P1 to ECIES as defined in 5.3.5 is the hash of the empty string. >>> NOTE: The material input to encryption is the bytes of the encryption key with no headers, encapsulation, or length indication. Contrast this to encryption of data, where the data is encapsulated in an Ieee1609Dot2Data. >>> ```asn1 RecipientInfo ::= CHOICE { pskRecipInfo PreSharedKeyRecipientInfo, symmRecipInfo SymmRecipientInfo, certRecipInfo PKRecipientInfo, signedDataRecipInfo PKRecipientInfo, rekRecipInfo PKRecipientInfo } ``` ### SequenceOfRecipientInfo This type is used for clarity of definitions. ```asn1 SequenceOfRecipientInfo ::= SEQUENCE OF RecipientInfo ``` ### PreSharedKeyRecipientInfo This data structure is used to indicate a symmetric key that may be used directly to decrypt a SymmetricCiphertext. It consists of the low-order 8 bytes of the hash of the COER encoding of a SymmetricEncryptionKey structure containing the symmetric key in question. The HashedId8 is calculated with the hash algorithm determined as specified in 5.3.9.3. The symmetric key may be established by any appropriate means agreed by the two parties to the exchange. ```asn1 PreSharedKeyRecipientInfo ::= HashedId8 ``` ### SymmRecipientInfo This data structure contains the following fields: Fields: * recipientId of type [**HashedId8**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#HashedId8)
contains the hash of the symmetric key encryption key that may be used to decrypt the data encryption key. It consists of the low-order 8 bytes of the hash of the COER encoding of a SymmetricEncryptionKey structure containing the symmetric key in question. The HashedId8 is calculated with the hash algorithm determined as specified in 5.3.9.4. The symmetric key may be established by any appropriate means agreed by the two parties to the exchange. * encKey of type [**SymmetricCiphertext**](#SymmetricCiphertext)
contains the encrypted data encryption key within a SymmetricCiphertext, where the data encryption key is input to the data encryption key encryption process with no headers, encapsulation, or length indication. ```asn1 SymmRecipientInfo ::= SEQUENCE { recipientId HashedId8, encKey SymmetricCiphertext } ``` ### PKRecipientInfo This data structure contains the following fields: Fields: * recipientId of type [**HashedId8**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#HashedId8)
contains the hash of the container for the encryption public key as specified in the definition of RecipientInfo. Specifically, depending on the choice indicated by the containing RecipientInfo structure: - If the containing RecipientInfo structure indicates certRecipInfo, this field contains the HashedId8 of the certificate. The HashedId8 is calculated with the whole-certificate hash algorithm, determined as described in 6.4.3, applied to the COER-encoded certificate, canonicalized as defined in the definition of Certificate. - If the containing RecipientInfo structure indicates signedDataRecipInfo, this field contains the HashedId8 of the Ieee1609Dot2Data of type signedData that contained the encryption key, with that Ieee¬¬1609¬Dot2¬¬Data canonicalized per 6.3.4. The HashedId8 is calculated with the hash algorithm determined as specified in 5.3.9.5. - If the containing RecipientInfo structure indicates rekRecipInfo, this field contains the HashedId8 of the COER encoding of a PublicEncryptionKey structure containing the response encryption key. The HashedId8 is calculated with the hash algorithm determined as specified in 5.3.9.5. * encKey of type [**EncryptedDataEncryptionKey**](#EncryptedDataEncryptionKey)
contains the encrypted data encryption key, where the data encryption key is input to the data encryption key encryption process with no headers, encapsulation, or length indication. ```asn1 PKRecipientInfo ::= SEQUENCE { recipientId HashedId8, encKey EncryptedDataEncryptionKey } ``` ### EncryptedDataEncryptionKey This data structure contains an encrypted data encryption key, where the data encryption key is input to the data encryption key encryption process with no headers, encapsulation, or length indication. Critical information fields: If present and applicable to the receiving SDEE, this is a critical information field as defined in 5.2.6. If an implementation receives an encrypted SPDU and determines that one or more RecipientInfo fields are relevant to it, and if all of those RecipientInfos contain an EncryptedDataEncryptionKey such that the implementation does not recognize the indicated CHOICE, the implementation shall indicate that the encrypted SPDU is not decryptable. Fields: * eciesNistP256 of type [**EciesP256EncryptedKey**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#EciesP256EncryptedKey)
* eciesBrainpoolP256r1 of type [**EciesP256EncryptedKey**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#EciesP256EncryptedKey)
* ecencSm2256 of type [**EcencP256EncryptedKey**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#EcencP256EncryptedKey)
..., ```asn1 EncryptedDataEncryptionKey ::= CHOICE { eciesNistP256 EciesP256EncryptedKey, eciesBrainpoolP256r1 EciesP256EncryptedKey, ..., ecencSm2256 EcencP256EncryptedKey } ``` ### SymmetricCiphertext This data structure encapsulates a ciphertext generated with an approved symmetric algorithm. Fields: * aes128ccm of type [**One28BitCcmCiphertext**](#One28BitCcmCiphertext)
* sm4Ccm of type [**One28BitCcmCiphertext**](#One28BitCcmCiphertext)
..., >>> NOTE: Critical information fields: If present, this is a critical information field as defined in 5.2.6. An implementation that does not recognize the indicated CHOICE value for this type in an encrypted SPDU shall indicate that the signed SPDU is invalid in the sense of 4.2.2.3.2, that is, it is invalid in the sense that its validity cannot be established. >>> ```asn1 SymmetricCiphertext ::= CHOICE { aes128ccm One28BitCcmCiphertext, ..., sm4Ccm One28BitCcmCiphertext } ``` ### One28BitCcmCiphertext This data structure encapsulates an encrypted ciphertext for any symmetric algorithm with 128-bit blocks in CCM mode. The ciphertext is 16 bytes longer than the corresponding plaintext due to the inclusion of the message authentication code (MAC). The plaintext resulting from a correct decryption of the ciphertext is either a COER-encoded Ieee1609Dot2Data structure (see 6.3.41), or a 16-byte symmetric key (see 6.3.44). The ciphertext is 16 bytes longer than the corresponding plaintext. The plaintext resulting from a correct decryption of the ciphertext is a COER-encoded Ieee1609Dot2Data structure. Fields: * nonce of type **OCTET STRING** (SIZE (12))
contains the nonce N as specified in 5.3.8. * ccmCiphertext of type [**Opaque**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Opaque)
contains the ciphertext C as specified in 5.3.8. >>> NOTE: In the name of this structure, "One28" indicates that the symmetric cipher block size is 128 bits. It happens to also be the case that the keys used for both AES-128-CCM and SM4-CCM are also 128 bits long. This is, however, not what “One28” refers to. Since the cipher is used in counter mode, i.e., as a stream cipher, the fact that that block size is 128 bits affects only the size of the MAC and does not affect the size of the raw ciphertext. >>> ```asn1 One28BitCcmCiphertext ::= SEQUENCE { nonce OCTET STRING (SIZE (12)), ccmCiphertext Opaque } ``` ### Aes128CcmCiphertext This type is defined only for backwards compatibility. ```asn1 Aes128CcmCiphertext ::= One28BitCcmCiphertext ``` ### TestCertificate This structure is a profile of the structure CertificateBase which specifies the valid combinations of fields to transmit implicit and explicit certificates. >>> NOTE: Canonicalization: This data structure is subject to canonicalization for the relevant operations specified in 6.1.2. The canonicalization applies to the CertificateBase. >>> ```asn1 TestCertificate ::= Certificate ``` ### SequenceOfCertificate This type is used for clarity of definitions. ```asn1 SequenceOfCertificate ::= SEQUENCE OF Certificate ``` ### CertificateBase The fields in this structure have the following meaning: Fields: * version of type [**Uint8**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Uint8) (3)
contains the version of the certificate format. In this version of the data structures, this field is set to 3. * type of type [**CertificateType**](#CertificateType)
states whether the certificate is implicit or explicit. This field is set to explicit for explicit certificates and to implicit for implicit certificates. See ExplicitCertificate and ImplicitCertificate for more details. * issuer of type [**IssuerIdentifier**](#IssuerIdentifier)
identifies the issuer of the certificate. * toBeSigned of type [**ToBeSignedCertificate**](#ToBeSignedCertificate)
is the certificate contents. This field is an input to the hash when generating or verifying signatures for an explicit certificate, or generating or verifying the public key from the reconstruction value for an implicit certificate. The details of how this field are encoded are given in the description of the ToBeSignedCertificate type. * signature of type [**Signature**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Signature) OPTIONAL
is included in an ExplicitCertificate. It is the signature, calculated by the signer identified in the issuer field, over the hash of toBeSigned. The hash is calculated as specified in 5.3.1, where: - Data input is the encoding of toBeSigned following the COER. - Signer identifier input depends on the verification type, which in turn depends on the choice indicated by issuer. If the choice indicated by issuer is self, the verification type is self-signed and the signer identifier input is the empty string. If the choice indicated by issuer is not self, the verification type is certificate and the signer identifier input is the canonicalized COER encoding of the certificate indicated by issuer. The canonicalization is carried out as specified in the Canonicalization section of this subclause. >>> NOTE: Whole-certificate hash: If the entirety of a certificate is hashed to calculate a HashedId3, HashedId8, or HashedId10, the algorithm used for this purpose is known as the whole-certificate hash. The method used to determine the whole-certificate hash algorithm is specified in 5.3.9.2. >>> ```asn1 CertificateBase ::= SEQUENCE { version Uint8(3), type CertificateType, issuer IssuerIdentifier, toBeSigned ToBeSignedCertificate, signature Signature OPTIONAL } ``` ### CertificateType This enumerated type indicates whether a certificate is explicit or implicit. >>> NOTE: Critical information fields: If present, this is a critical information field as defined in 5.2.5. An implementation that does not recognize the indicated CHOICE for this type when verifying a signed SPDU shall indicate that the signed SPDU is invalid in the sense of 4.2.2.3.2, that is, it is invalid in the sense that its validity cannot be established. >>> ```asn1 CertificateType ::= ENUMERATED { explicit, implicit, ... } ``` ### ImplicitCertificate This is a profile of the CertificateBase structure providing all the fields necessary for an implicit certificate, and no others. ```asn1 ImplicitCertificate ::= CertificateBase (WITH COMPONENTS {..., type(implicit), toBeSigned(WITH COMPONENTS {..., verifyKeyIndicator(WITH COMPONENTS {reconstructionValue}) }), signature ABSENT }) ``` ### ExplicitCertificate This is a profile of the CertificateBase structure providing all the fields necessary for an explicit certificate, and no others. ```asn1 ExplicitCertificate ::= CertificateBase (WITH COMPONENTS {..., type(explicit), toBeSigned (WITH COMPONENTS {..., verifyKeyIndicator(WITH COMPONENTS {verificationKey}) }), signature PRESENT }) ``` ### IssuerIdentifier This structure allows the recipient of a certificate to determine which keying material to use to authenticate the certificate. If the choice indicated is sha256AndDigest, sha384AndDigest, or sm3AndDigest: - The structure contains the HashedId8 of the issuing certificate. The HashedId8 is calculated with the whole-certificate hash algorithm, determined as described in 6.4.3, applied to the COER-encoded certificate, canonicalized as defined in the definition of Certificate. - The hash algorithm to be used to generate the hash of the certificate for verification is SHA-256 (in the case of sha256AndDigest), SM3 (in the case of sm3AndDigest) or SHA-384 (in the case of sha384AndDigest). - The certificate is to be verified with the public key of the indicated issuing certificate. If the choice indicated is self: - The structure indicates what hash algorithm is to be used to generate the hash of the certificate for verification. - The certificate is to be verified with the public key indicated by the verifyKeyIndicator field in theToBeSignedCertificate. Fields: * sha256AndDigest of type [**HashedId8**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#HashedId8)
* self of type [**HashAlgorithm**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#HashAlgorithm)
* sha384AndDigest of type [**HashedId8**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#HashedId8)
..., * sm3AndDigest of type [**HashedId8**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#HashedId8)
>>> NOTE: Critical information fields: If present, this is a critical information field as defined in 5.2.5. An implementation that does not recognize the indicated CHOICE for this type when verifying a signed SPDU shall indicate that the signed SPDU is invalid in the sense of 4.2.2.3.2, that is, it is invalid in the sense that its validity cannot be established. >>> ```asn1 IssuerIdentifier ::= CHOICE { sha256AndDigest HashedId8, self HashAlgorithm, ..., sha384AndDigest HashedId8, sm3AndDigest HashedId8 } ``` ### ToBeSignedCertificate The fields in the ToBeSignedCertificate structure have the following meaning: For both implicit and explicit certificates, when the certificate is hashed to create or recover the public key (in the case of an implicit certificate) or to generate or verify the signature (in the case of an explicit certificate), the hash is Hash (Data input) || Hash ( Signer identifier input), where: - Data input is the COER encoding of toBeSigned, canonicalized as described above. - Signer identifier input depends on the verification type, which in turn depends on the choice indicated by issuer. If the choice indicated by issuer is self, the verification type is self-signed and the signer identifier input is the empty string. If the choice indicated by issuer is not self, the verification type is certificate and the signer identifier input is the COER encoding of the canonicalization per 6.4.3 of the certificate indicated by issuer. In other words, for implicit certificates, the value H (CertU) in SEC 4, section 3, is for purposes of this standard taken to be H [H (canonicalized ToBeSignedCertificate from the subordinate certificate) || H (entirety of issuer Certificate)]. See 5.3.2 for further discussion, including material differences between this standard and SEC 4 regarding how the hash function output is converted from a bit string to an integer. Fields: * id of type [**CertificateId**](#CertificateId)
contains information that is used to identify the certificate holder if necessary. * cracaId of type [**HashedId3**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#HashedId3)
identifies the Certificate Revocation Authorization CA (CRACA) responsible for certificate revocation lists (CRLs) on which this certificate might appear. Use of the cracaId is specified in 5.1.3. The HashedId3 is calculated with the whole-certificate hash algorithm, determined as described in 6.4.3, applied to the COER-encoded certificate, canonicalized as defined in the definition of Certificate. * crlSeries of type [**CrlSeries**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#CrlSeries)
represents the CRL series relevant to a particular Certificate Revocation Authorization CA (CRACA) on which the certificate might appear. Use of this field is specified in 5.1.3. * validityPeriod of type [**ValidityPeriod**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#ValidityPeriod)
contains the validity period of the certificate. * region of type [**GeographicRegion**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#GeographicRegion) OPTIONAL
if present, indicates the validity region of the certificate. If it is omitted the validity region is indicated as follows: - If enclosing certificate is self-signed, i.e., the choice indicated by the issuer field in the enclosing certificate structure is self, the certificate is valid worldwide. - Otherwise, the certificate has the same validity region as the certificate that issued it. * assuranceLevel of type [**SubjectAssurance**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#SubjectAssurance) OPTIONAL
indicates the assurance level of the certificate holder. * appPermissions of type [**SequenceOfPsidSsp**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#SequenceOfPsidSsp) OPTIONAL
indicates the permissions that the certificate holder has to sign application data with this certificate. A valid instance of appPermissions contains any particular Psid value in at most one entry. * certIssuePermissions of type [**SequenceOfPsidGroupPermissions**](#SequenceOfPsidGroupPermissions) OPTIONAL
indicates the permissions that the certificate holder has to sign certificates with this certificate. A valid instance of this array contains no more than one entry whose psidSspRange field indicates all. If the array has multiple entries and one entry has its psidSspRange field indicate all, then the entry indicating all specifies the permissions for all PSIDs other than the ones explicitly specified in the other entries. See the description of PsidGroupPermissions for further discussion. * certRequestPermissions of type [**SequenceOfPsidGroupPermissions**](#SequenceOfPsidGroupPermissions) OPTIONAL
indicates the permissions that the certificate holder can request in its certificate. A valid instance of this array contains no more than one entry whose psidSspRange field indicates all. If the array has multiple entries and one entry has its psidSspRange field indicate all, then the entry indicating all specifies the permissions for all PSIDs other than the ones explicitly specified in the other entries. See the description of PsidGroupPermissions for further discussion. * canRequestRollover of type **NULL** OPTIONAL
indicates that the certificate may be used to sign a request for another certificate with the same permissions. This field is provided for future use and its use is not defined in this version of this standard. * encryptionKey of type [**PublicEncryptionKey**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#PublicEncryptionKey) OPTIONAL
contains a public key for encryption for which the certificate holder holds the corresponding private key. * verifyKeyIndicator of type [**VerificationKeyIndicator**](#VerificationKeyIndicator)
contains material that may be used to recover the public key that may be used to verify data signed by this certificate. * flags of type **BIT STRING** {usesCubk (0)} (SIZE (8)) OPTIONAL
indicates additional yes/no properties of the certificate holder. The only bit with defined semantics in this string in this version of this standard is usesCubk. If set, the usesCubk bit indicates that the certificate holder supports the compact unified butterfly key response. Further material about the compact unified butterfly key response can be found in IEEE Std 1609.2.1. ..., * appExtensions of type [**SequenceOfAppExtensions**](#SequenceOfAppExtensions)
indicates additional permissions that may be applied to application activities that the certificate holder is carrying out. * certIssueExtensions of type [**SequenceOfCertIssueExtensions**](#SequenceOfCertIssueExtensions)
indicates additional permissions to issue certificates containing endEntityExtensions. * certRequestExtension of type [**SequenceOfCertRequestExtensions**](#SequenceOfCertRequestExtensions)
If the PublicEncryptionKey contains a BasePublicEncryptionKey that is an elliptic curve point (i.e., of type EccP256CurvePoint or EccP384CurvePoint), then the elliptic curve point is encoded in compressed form, i.e., such that the choice indicated within the Ecc*CurvePoint is compressed-y-0 or compressed-y-1. >>> NOTE: Critical information fields: - If present, appPermissions is a critical information field as defined in 5.2.6. If an implementation of verification does not support the number of PsidSsp in the appPermissions field of a certificate that signed a signed SPDU, that implementation shall indicate that the signed SPDU is invalid in the sense of 4.2.2.3.2, that is, it is invalid in the sense that its validity cannot be established.. A conformant implementation shall support appPermissions fields containing at least eight entries. It may be the case that an implementation of verification does not support the number of entries in the appPermissions field and the appPermissions field is not relevant to the verification: this will occur, for example, if the certificate in question is a CA certificate and so the certIssuePermissions field is relevant to the verification and the appPermissions field is not. In this case, whether the implementation indicates that the signed SPDU is valid (because it could validate all relevant fields) or invalid (because it could not parse the entire certificate) is implementation-specific. - If present, certIssuePermissions is a critical information field as defined in 5.2.6. If an implementation of verification does not support the number of PsidGroupPermissions in the certIssuePermissions field of a CA certificate in the chain of a signed SPDU, the implementation shall indicate that the signed SPDU is invalid in the sense of 4.2.2.3.2, that is, it is invalid in the sense that its validity cannot be established. A conformant implementation shall support certIssuePermissions fields containing at least eight entries. It may be the case that an implementation of verification does not support the number of entries in the certIssuePermissions field and the certIssuePermissions field is not relevant to the verification: this will occur, for example, if the certificate in question is the signing certificate for the SPDU and so the appPermissions field is relevant to the verification and the certIssuePermissions field is not. In this case, whether the implementation indicates that the signed SPDU is valid (because it could validate all relevant fields) or invalid (because it could not parse the entire certificate) is implementation-specific. - If present, certRequestPermissions is a critical information field as defined in 5.2.6. If an implementaiton of verification of a certificate request does not support the number of PsidGroupPermissions in certRequestPermissions, the implementation shall indicate that the signed SPDU is invalid in the sense of 4.2.2.3.2, that is, it is invalid in the sense that its validity cannot be established. A conformant implementation shall support certRequestPermissions fields containing at least eight entries. It may be the case that an implementation of verification does not support the number of entries in the certRequestPermissions field and the certRequestPermissions field is not relevant to the verification: this will occur, for example, if the certificate in question is the signing certificate for the SPDU and so the appPermissions field is relevant to the verification and the certRequestPermissions field is not. In this case, whether the implementation indicates that the signed SPDU is valid (because it could validate all relevant fields) or invalid (because it could not parse the entire certificate) is implementation-specific. >>> ```asn1 ToBeSignedCertificate ::= SEQUENCE { id CertificateId, cracaId HashedId3, crlSeries CrlSeries, validityPeriod ValidityPeriod, region GeographicRegion OPTIONAL, assuranceLevel SubjectAssurance OPTIONAL, appPermissions SequenceOfPsidSsp OPTIONAL, certIssuePermissions SequenceOfPsidGroupPermissions OPTIONAL, certRequestPermissions SequenceOfPsidGroupPermissions OPTIONAL, canRequestRollover NULL OPTIONAL, encryptionKey PublicEncryptionKey OPTIONAL, verifyKeyIndicator VerificationKeyIndicator, ..., flags BIT STRING {usesCubk (0)} (SIZE (8)) OPTIONAL, appExtensions SequenceOfAppExtensions, certIssueExtensions SequenceOfCertIssueExtensions, certRequestExtension SequenceOfCertRequestExtensions } (WITH COMPONENTS { ..., appPermissions PRESENT} | WITH COMPONENTS { ..., certIssuePermissions PRESENT} | WITH COMPONENTS { ..., certRequestPermissions PRESENT}) ``` ### CertificateId This structure contains information that is used to identify the certificate holder if necessary. Fields: * linkageData of type [**LinkageData**](#LinkageData)
is used to identify the certificate for revocation purposes in the case of certificates that appear on linked certificate CRLs. See 5.1.3 and 7.3 for further discussion. * name of type [**Hostname**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Hostname)
is used to identify the certificate holder in the case of non-anonymous certificates. The contents of this field are a matter of policy and are expected to be human-readable. * binaryId of type **OCTET STRING** (SIZE(1..64))
supports identifiers that are not human-readable. * none of type **NULL**
indicates that the certificate does not include an identifier. >>> NOTE: Critical information fields: - If present, this is a critical information field as defined in 5.2.6. An implementation that does not recognize the choice indicated in this field shall reject a signed SPDU as invalid. >>> ```asn1 CertificateId ::= CHOICE { linkageData LinkageData, name Hostname, binaryId OCTET STRING(SIZE(1..64)), none NULL, ... } ``` ### LinkageData This structure contains information that is matched against information obtained from a linkage ID-based CRL to determine whether the containing certificate has been revoked. See 5.1.3.4 and 7.3 for details of use. Fields: * iCert of type [**IValue**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#IValue)
* linkage-value of type [**LinkageValue**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#LinkageValue)
* group-linkage-value of type [**GroupLinkageValue**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#GroupLinkageValue) OPTIONAL
```asn1 LinkageData ::= SEQUENCE { iCert IValue, linkage-value LinkageValue, group-linkage-value GroupLinkageValue OPTIONAL } ``` ### PsidGroupPermissions This type indicates which type of permissions may appear in end-entity certificates the chain of whose permissions passes through the PsidGroupPermissions field containing this value. If app is indicated, the end-entity certificate may contain an appPermissions field. If enroll is indicated, the end-entity certificate may contain a certRequestPermissions field. This structure states the permissions that a certificate holder has with respect to issuing and requesting certificates for a particular set of PSIDs. For examples, see D.5.3 and D.5.4. Fields: * subjectPermissions of type [**SubjectPermissions**](#SubjectPermissions)
indicates PSIDs and SSP Ranges covered by this field. * minChainLength of type **INTEGER** DEFAULT 1
and chainLengthRange indicate how long the certificate chain from this certificate to the end-entity certificate is permitted to be. As specified in 5.1.2.1, the length of the certificate chain is the number of certificates "below" this certificate in the chain, down to and including the end-entity certificate. The length is permitted to be (a) greater than or equal to minChainLength certificates and (b) less than or equal to minChainLength + chainLengthRange certificates. A value of 0 for minChainLength is not permitted when this type appears in the certIssuePermissions field of a ToBeSignedCertificate; a certificate that has a value of 0 for this field is invalid. The value -1 for chainLengthRange is a special case: if the value of chainLengthRange is -1 it indicates that the certificate chain may be any length equal to or greater than minChainLength. See the examples below for further discussion. * chainLengthRange of type **INTEGER** DEFAULT 0
* eeType of type [**EndEntityType**](#EndEntityType) DEFAULT {app}
takes one or more of the values app and enroll and indicates the type of certificates or requests that this instance of PsidGroupPermissions in the certificate is entitled to authorize. Different instances of PsidGroupPermissions within a ToBeSignedCertificate may have different values for eeType. - If this field indicates app, the chain is allowed to end in an authorization certificate, i.e., a certficate in which these permissions appear in an appPermissions field (in other words, if the field does not indicate app and the chain ends in an authorization certificate, the chain shall be considered invalid). - If this field indicates enroll, the chain is allowed to end in an enrollment certificate, i.e., a certificate in which these permissions appear in a certReqPermissions permissions field (in other words, if the field does not indicate enroll and the chain ends in an enrollment certificate, the chain shall be considered invalid). ```asn1 PsidGroupPermissions ::= SEQUENCE { subjectPermissions SubjectPermissions, minChainLength INTEGER DEFAULT 1, chainLengthRange INTEGER DEFAULT 0, eeType EndEntityType DEFAULT {app} } ``` ### SequenceOfPsidGroupPermissions This type is used for clarity of definitions. ```asn1 SequenceOfPsidGroupPermissions ::= SEQUENCE OF PsidGroupPermissions ``` ### SubjectPermissions This indicates the PSIDs and associated SSPs for which certificate issuance or request permissions are granted by a PsidGroupPermissions structure. If this takes the value explicit, the enclosing PsidGroupPermissions structure grants certificate issuance or request permissions for the indicated PSIDs and SSP Ranges. If this takes the value all, the enclosing PsidGroupPermissions structure grants certificate issuance or request permissions for all PSIDs not indicated by other PsidGroupPermissions in the same certIssuePermissions or certRequestPermissions field. Fields: * explicit of type [**SequenceOfPsidSspRange**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#SequenceOfPsidSspRange)
* all of type **NULL**
>>> NOTE: Critical information fields: - If present, this is a critical information field as defined in 5.2.6. An implementation that does not recognize the indicated CHOICE when verifying a signed SPDU shall indicate that the signed SPDU is invalidin the sense of 4.2.2.3.2, that is, it is invalid in the sense that its validity cannot be established. - If present, explicit is a critical information field as defined in 5.2.6. An implementation that does not support the number of PsidSspRange in explicit when verifying a signed SPDU shall indicate that the signed SPDU is invalid in the sense of 4.2.2.3.2, that is, it is invalid in the sense that its validity cannot be established. A conformant implementation shall support explicit fields containing at least eight entries. >>> ```asn1 SubjectPermissions ::= CHOICE { explicit SequenceOfPsidSspRange, all NULL, ... } ``` ### VerificationKeyIndicator The contents of this field depend on whether the certificate is an implicit or an explicit certificate. Fields: * verificationKey of type [**PublicVerificationKey**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#PublicVerificationKey)
is included in explicit certificates. It contains the public key to be used to verify signatures generated by the holder of the Certificate. * reconstructionValue of type [**EccP256CurvePoint**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#EccP256CurvePoint)
is included in implicit certificates. It contains the reconstruction value, which is used to recover the public key as specified in SEC 4 and 5.3.2. >>> NOTE: Canonicalization: This data structure is subject to canonicalization for the relevant operations specified in 6.1.2. The canonicalization applies to the PublicVerificationKey and to the EccP256CurvePoint. The EccP256CurvePoint is encoded in compressed form, i.e., such that the choice indicated within the EccP256CurvePoint is compressed-y-0 or compressed-y-1. >>> ```asn1 VerificationKeyIndicator ::= CHOICE { verificationKey PublicVerificationKey, reconstructionValue EccP256CurvePoint, ... } ``` ### Ieee1609HeaderInfoExtensionId This structure uses the parameterized type Extension to define an Ieee1609ContributedHeaderInfoExtension as an open Extension Content field identified by an extension identifier. The extension identifier value is unique to extensions defined by ETSI and need not be unique among all extension identifier values defined by all contributing organizations. This is an integer used to identify an Ieee1609ContributedHeaderInfoExtension. ```asn1 Ieee1609HeaderInfoExtensionId ::= ExtId ``` ```asn1 p2pcd8ByteLearningRequestId Ieee1609HeaderInfoExtensionId ::= 1 ``` ### Ieee1609HeaderInfoExtensions This is the ASN.1 Information Object Class that associates IEEE 1609 HeaderInfo contributed extensions with the appropriate Ieee1609HeaderInfoExtensionId value. ```asn1 Ieee1609HeaderInfoExtensions EXT-TYPE ::= { {HashedId8 IDENTIFIED BY p2pcd8ByteLearningRequestId}, ... } ``` ### SequenceOfAppExtensions This structure contains any AppExtensions that apply to the certificate holder. As specified in 5.2.4.2.3, each individual AppExtension type is associated with consistency conditions, specific to that extension, that govern its consistency with SPDUs signed by the certificate holder and with the CertIssueExtensions in the CA certificates in that certificate holder’s chain. Those consistency conditions are specified for each individual AppExtension below. ```asn1 SequenceOfAppExtensions ::= SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF AppExtension ``` ### AppExtension This structure contains an individual AppExtension. AppExtensions specified in this standard are drawn from the ASN.1 Information Object Set SetCertExtensions. This set, and its use in the AppExtension type, is structured so that each AppExtension is associated with a CertIssueExtension and a CertRequestExtension and all are identified by the same id value. In this structure: Fields: * id of type [**CERT-EXT-TYPE**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#CERT-EXT-TYPE) .&id({SetCertExtensions})
identifies the extension type. * content of type [**CERT-EXT-TYPE**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#CERT-EXT-TYPE) .&App({SetCertExtensions}{@.id})
provides the content of the extension. ```asn1 AppExtension ::= SEQUENCE { id CERT-EXT-TYPE.&id({SetCertExtensions}), content CERT-EXT-TYPE.&App({SetCertExtensions}{@.id}) } ``` ### SequenceOfCertIssueExtensions This field contains any CertIssueExtensions that apply to the certificate holder. As specified in 5.2.4.2.3, each individual CertIssueExtension type is associated with consistency conditions, specific to that extension, that govern its consistency with AppExtensions in certificates issued by the certificate holder and with the CertIssueExtensions in the CA certificates in that certificate holder’s chain. Those consistency conditions are specified for each individual CertIssueExtension below. ```asn1 SequenceOfCertIssueExtensions ::= SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF CertIssueExtension ``` ### CertIssueExtension This field contains an individual CertIssueExtension. CertIssueExtensions specified in this standard are drawn from the ASN.1 Information Object Set SetCertExtensions. This set, and its use in the CertIssueExtension type, is structured so that each CertIssueExtension is associated with a AppExtension and a CertRequestExtension and all are identified by the same id value. In this structure: Fields: * id of type [**CERT-EXT-TYPE**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#CERT-EXT-TYPE) .&id({SetCertExtensions})
identifies the extension type. * permissions of type [**CHOICE**](#CHOICE) { specific CERT-EXT-TYPE.&Issue({SetCertExtensions}{@.id})
indicates the permissions. Within this field. - all indicates that the certificate is entitled to issue all values of the extension. - specific is used to specify which values of the extension may be issued in the case where all does not apply. * all of type **NULL**
```asn1 CertIssueExtension ::= SEQUENCE { id CERT-EXT-TYPE.&id({SetCertExtensions}), permissions CHOICE { specific CERT-EXT-TYPE.&Issue({SetCertExtensions}{@.id}), all NULL } } ``` ### SequenceOfCertRequestExtensions This field contains any CertRequestExtensions that apply to the certificate holder. As specified in 5.2.4.2.3, each individual CertRequestExtension type is associated with consistency conditions, specific to that extension, that govern its consistency with AppExtensions in certificates issued by the certificate holder and with the CertRequestExtensions in the CA certificates in that certificate holder’s chain. Those consistency conditions are specified for each individual CertRequestExtension below. ```asn1 SequenceOfCertRequestExtensions ::= SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF CertRequestExtension ``` ### CertRequestExtension This field contains an individual CertRequestExtension. CertRequestExtensions specified in this standard are drawn from the ASN.1 Information Object Set SetCertExtensions. This set, and its use in the CertRequestExtension type, is structured so that each CertRequestExtension is associated with a AppExtension and a CertRequestExtension and all are identified by the same id value. In this structure: Fields: * id of type [**CERT-EXT-TYPE**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#CERT-EXT-TYPE) .&id({SetCertExtensions})
identifies the extension type. * permissions of type [**CHOICE**](#CHOICE) { content CERT-EXT-TYPE.&Req({SetCertExtensions}{@.id})
indicates the permissions. Within this field. - all indicates that the certificate is entitled to issue all values of the extension. - specific is used to specify which values of the extension may be issued in the case where all does not apply. * all of type **NULL**
```asn1 CertRequestExtension ::= SEQUENCE { id CERT-EXT-TYPE.&id({SetCertExtensions}), permissions CHOICE { content CERT-EXT-TYPE.&Req({SetCertExtensions}{@.id}), all NULL } } ``` ### OperatingOrganizationId This type is the AppExtension used to identify an operating organization. The associated CertIssueExtension and CertRequestExtension are both of type OperatingOrganizationId. To determine consistency between this type and an SPDU, the SDEE specification for that SPDU is required to specify how the SPDU can be used to determine an OBJECT IDENTIFIER (for example, by including the full OBJECT IDENTIFIER in the SPDU, or by including a RELATIVE-OID with clear instructions about how a full OBJECT IDENTIFIER can be obtained from the RELATIVE-OID). The SPDU is then consistent with this type if the OBJECT IDENTIFIER determined from the SPDU is identical to the OBJECT IDENTIFIER contained in this field. This AppExtension does not have consistency conditions with a corresponding CertIssueExtension. It can appear in a certificate issued by any CA. ```asn1 OperatingOrganizationId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER ``` ```asn1 certExtId-OperatingOrganization ExtId ::= 1 ``` ```asn1 instanceOperatingOrganizationCertExtensions CERT-EXT-TYPE ::= { ID certExtId-OperatingOrganization APP OperatingOrganizationId ISSUE NULL REQUEST NULL } ``` ### SetCertExtensions This Information Object Set is a collection of Information Objects used to contain the AppExtension, CertIssueExtension, and CertRequestExtension types associated with a specific use of certificate extensions. In this version of this standard it only has a single entry instanceOperatingOrganizationCertExtensions. ```asn1 SetCertExtensions CERT-EXT-TYPE ::= { instanceOperatingOrganizationCertExtensions, ... } ``` This Information Object is an instance of the Information Object Class CERT-EXT-TYPE. It is defined to bind together the AppExtension, CertIssueExtension, and CertRequestExtension types associated with the use of an operating organization identifier, and to assocaute them all with the extension identifier value certExtId-OperatingOrganization. This Information Object Set is a collection of Information Objects used to contain the AppExtension, CertIssueExtension, and CertRequestExtension types associated with a specific use of certificate extensions. In this version of this standard it only has a single entry instanceOperatingOrganizationCertExtensions.