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ieee1609.2-ieee/ 0000775 0000000 0000000 00000000000 14326475135 0013364 5 ustar 00root root 0000000 0000000 ieee1609.2-ieee/.gitlab-ci.yml 0000775 0000000 0000000 00000000402 14326475135 0016017 0 ustar 00root root 0000000 0000000 include:
- project: 'forge-tools/asn2md'
file: '/gitlab-ci/base.yml'
variables:
ASN1_SRC: '*.asn'
validate:
extends: .validate
only:
changes:
- '*.asn'
documentation:
extends: .documentation
only:
changes:
- '*.asn'
ieee1609.2-ieee/Ieee1609Dot2.asn 0000664 0000000 0000000 00000200654 14326475135 0016016 0 ustar 00root root 0000000 0000000 --***************************************************************************--
-- IEEE Std 1609.2 --
--***************************************************************************--
/**
* @note Section references in this file are to clauses in IEEE Std
* 1609.2 unless indicated otherwise. Full forms of acronyms and
* abbreviations used in this file are specified in 3.2.
*/
Ieee1609Dot2 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111)
standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609)
dot2(2) base(1) schema(1) major-version-2(2) minor-version-6(6)}
DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS ::= BEGIN
IMPORTS
CERT-EXT-TYPE,
CrlSeries,
EccP256CurvePoint,
EcencP256EncryptedKey,
EciesP256EncryptedKey,
EncryptionKey,
EXT-TYPE,
Extension,
ExtId,
GeographicRegion,
GroupLinkageValue,
HashAlgorithm,
HashedId3,
HashedId8,
HashedId32,
HashedId48,
Hostname,
IValue,
LinkageValue,
Opaque,
Psid,
PsidSsp,
PsidSspRange,
PublicEncryptionKey,
PublicVerificationKey,
SequenceOfHashedId3,
SequenceOfPsidSsp,
SequenceOfPsidSspRange,
ServiceSpecificPermissions,
Signature,
SubjectAssurance,
SymmetricEncryptionKey,
ThreeDLocation,
Time64,
Uint3,
Uint8,
Uint16,
Uint32,
ValidityPeriod
FROM Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111)
standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2)
base(1) base-types(2) major-version-2(2) minor-version-4(4)}
WITH SUCCESSORS
EtsiOriginatingHeaderInfoExtension
FROM EtsiTs103097ExtensionModule {itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0)
itsDomain(5) wg5(5) secHeaders(103097) extension(2) major-version-1(1)
minor-version-0(0)}
WITH SUCCESSORS
;
--***************************************************************************--
-- Secured Data --
--***************************************************************************--
/**
* @brief This data type is used to contain the other data types in this
* clause. The fields in the Ieee1609Dot2Data have the following meanings:
*
* @param protocolVersion: contains the current version of the protocol. The
* version specified in this standard is version 3, represented by the
* integer 3. There are no major or minor version numbers.
*
* @param content: contains the content in the form of an Ieee1609Dot2Content.
*
* @note Canonicalization: This data structure is subject to canonicalization
* for the relevant operations specified in 6.1.2. The canonicalization
* applies to the Ieee1609Dot2Content.
*/
Ieee1609Dot2Data ::= SEQUENCE {
protocolVersion Uint8(3),
content Ieee1609Dot2Content
}
/**
* @brief In this structure:
*
* @param unsecuredData: indicates that the content is an OCTET STRING to be
* consumed outside the SDS.
*
* @param signedData: indicates that the content has been signed according to
* this standard.
*
* @param encryptedData: indicates that the content has been encrypted
* according to this standard.
*
* @param signedCertificateRequest: indicates that the content is a
* certificate request signed by an IEEE 1609.2 certificate or self-signed.
*
* @param signedX509CertificateRequest: indicates that the content is a
* certificate request signed by an ITU-T X.509 certificate.
*
* @note Canonicalization: This data structure is subject to canonicalization
* for the relevant operations specified in 6.1.2 if it is of type signedData.
* The canonicalization applies to the SignedData.
*/
Ieee1609Dot2Content ::= CHOICE {
unsecuredData Opaque,
signedData SignedData,
encryptedData EncryptedData,
signedCertificateRequest Opaque,
...,
signedX509CertificateRequest Opaque
}
/**
* @brief In this structure:
*
* @param hashId: indicates the hash algorithm to be used to generate the hash
* of the message for signing and verification.
*
* @param tbsData: contains the data that is hashed as input to the signature.
*
* @param signer: determines the keying material and hash algorithm used to
* sign the data.
*
* @param signature: contains the digital signature itself, calculated as
* specified in 5.3.1.
* - If signer indicates the choice self, then the signature calculation
* is parameterized as follows:
* - Data input is equal to the COER encoding of the tbsData field
* canonicalized according to the encoding considerations given in 6.3.6.
* - Verification type is equal to self.
* - Signer identifier input is equal to the empty string.
* - If signer indicates certificate or digest, then the signature
* calculation is parameterized as follows:
* - Data input is equal to the COER encoding of the tbsData field
* canonicalized according to the encoding considerations given in 6.3.6.
* - Verification type is equal to certificate.
* - Signer identifier input equal to the COER-encoding of the
* Certificate that is to be used to verify the SPDU, canonicalized according
* to the encoding considerations given in 6.4.3.
*
* @note Canonicalization: This data structure is subject to canonicalization
* for the relevant operations specified in 6.1.2. The canonicalization
* applies to the ToBeSignedData and the Signature.
*/
SignedData ::= SEQUENCE {
hashId HashAlgorithm,
tbsData ToBeSignedData,
signer SignerIdentifier,
signature Signature
}
/**
* @brief This structure contains the data to be hashed when generating or
* verifying a signature. See 6.3.4 for the specification of the input to the
* hash.
*
* @param payload: contains data that is provided by the entity that invokes
* the SDS.
*
* @param headerInfo: contains additional data that is inserted by the SDS.
* This structure is used as follows to determine the "data input" to the
* hash operation for signing or verification as specified in 5.3.1.2.2 or
* 5.3.1.3.
* - If payload does not contain the field omitted, the data input to the
* hash operation is the COER encoding of the ToBeSignedData.
* - If payload field in this ToBeSignedData instance contains the field
* omitted, the data input to the hash operation is the COER encoding of the
* ToBeSignedData, concatenated with the hash of the omitted payload. The hash
* of the omitted payload is calculated with the same hash algorithm that is
* used to calculate the hash of the data input for signing or verification.
* The data input to the hash operation is simply the COER enocding of the
* ToBeSignedData, concatenated with the hash of the omitted payload: there is
* no additional wrapping or length indication. As noted in 5.2.4.3.4, the
* means by which the signer and verifier establish the contents of the
* omitted payload are out of scope for this standard.
*
* @note Canonicalization: This data structure is subject to canonicalization
* for the relevant operations specified in 6.1.2. The canonicalization
* applies to the SignedDataPayload if it is of type data, and to the
* HeaderInfo.
*/
ToBeSignedData ::= SEQUENCE {
payload SignedDataPayload,
headerInfo HeaderInfo
}
/**
* @brief This structure contains the data payload of a ToBeSignedData. This
* structure contains at least one of the optional elements, and may contain
* more than one. See 5.2.4.3.4 for more details.
* The security profile in Annex C allows an implementation of this standard
* to state which forms of Signed¬Data¬Payload are supported by that
* implementation, and also how the signer and verifier are intended to obtain
* the external data for hashing. The specification of an SDEE that uses
* external data is expected to be explicit and unambiguous about how this
* data is obtained and how it is formatted prior to processing by the hash
* function.
*
* @param data: contains data that is explicitly transported within the
* structure.
*
* @param extDataHash: contains the hash of data that is not explicitly
* transported within the structure, and which the creator of the structure
* wishes to cryptographically bind to the signature.
*
* @param omitted: indicates that there is external data to be included in the
* hash calculation for the signature.The mechanism for including the external
* data in the hash calculation is specified in 6.3.6.
*
* @note Canonicalization: This data structure is subject to canonicalization
* for the relevant operations specified in 6.1.2. The canonicalization
* applies to the Ieee1609Dot2Data.
*/
SignedDataPayload ::= SEQUENCE {
data Ieee1609Dot2Data OPTIONAL,
extDataHash HashedData OPTIONAL,
...,
omitted NULL OPTIONAL
} (WITH COMPONENTS {..., data PRESENT} |
WITH COMPONENTS {..., extDataHash PRESENT} |
WITH COMPONENTS {..., omitted PRESENT})
/**
* @brief This structure contains the hash of some data with a specified hash
* algorithm. See 5.3.3 for specification of the permitted hash algorithms.
*
* @param sha256HashedData: indicates data hashed with SHA-256.
*
* @param sha384HashedData: indicates data hashed with SHA-384.
*
* @param sm3HashedData: indicates data hashed with SM3.
*
* @note Critical information fields: If present, this is a critical
* information field as defined in 5.2.6. An implementation that does not
* recognize the indicated CHOICE for this type when verifying a signed SPDU
* shall indicate that the signed SPDU is invalid in the sense of 4.2.2.3.2,
* that is, it is invalid in the sense that its validity cannot be established.
*/
HashedData::= CHOICE {
sha256HashedData HashedId32,
...,
sha384HashedData HashedId48,
sm3HashedData HashedId32
}
/**
* @brief This structure contains information that is used to establish
* validity by the criteria of 5.2.
*
* @param psid: indicates the application area with which the sender is
* claiming the payload is to be associated.
*
* @param generationTime: indicates the time at which the structure was
* generated. See 5.2.5.2.2 and 5.2.5.2.3 for discussion of the use of this
* field.
*
* @param expiryTime: if present, contains the time after which the data
* is no longer considered relevant. If both generationTime and
* expiryTime are present, the signed SPDU is invalid if generationTime is
* not strictly earlier than expiryTime.
*
* @param generationLocation: if present, contains the location at which the
* signature was generated.
*
* @param p2pcdLearningRequest: if present, is used by the SDS to request
* certificates for which it has seen identifiers and does not know the
* entire certificate. A specification of this peer-to-peer certificate
* distribution (P2PCD) mechanism is given in Clause 8. This field is used
* for the separate-certificate-pdu flavor of P2PCD and shall only be present
* if inlineP2pcdRequest is not present. The HashedId3 is calculated with the
* whole-certificate hash algorithm, determined as described in 6.4.3,
* applied to the COER-encoded certificate, canonicalized as defined in the
* definition of Certificate.
*
* @param missingCrlIdentifier: if present, is used by the SDS to request
* CRLs which it knows to have been issued and have not received. This is
* provided for future use and the associated mechanism is not defined in
* this version of this standard.
*
* @param encryptionKey: if present, is used to provide a key that is to
* be used to encrypt at least one response to this SPDU. The SDEE
* specification is expected to specify which response SPDUs are to be
* encrypted with this key. One possible use of this key to encrypt a
* response is specified in 6.3.35, 6.3.37, and 6.3.34. An encryptionKey
* field of type symmetric should only be used if the SignedData containing
* this field is securely encrypted by some means.
*
* @param inlineP2pcdRequest: if present, is used by the SDS to request
* unknown certificates per the inline peer-to-peer certificate distribution
* mechanism is given in Clause 8. This field shall only be present if
* p2pcdLearningRequest is not present. The HashedId3 is calculated with the
* whole-certificate hash algorithm, determined as described in 6.4.3, applied
* to the COER-encoded certificate, canonicalized as defined in the definition
* of Certificate.
*
* @param requestedCertificate: if present, is used by the SDS to provide
* certificates per the "inline" version of the peer-to-peer certificate
* distribution mechanism given in Clause 8.
*
* @param pduFunctionalType: if present, is used to indicate that the SPDU is
* to be consumed by a process other than an application process as defined
* in ISO 21177 [B14a]. See 6.3.23b for more details.
*
* @param contributedExtensions: if present, is used to contain additional
* extensions defined using the ContributedExtensionBlocks structure.
*
* @note Canonicalization: This data structure is subject to canonicalization
* for the relevant operations specified in 6.1.2. The canonicalization
* applies to the EncryptionKey. If encryptionKey is present, and indicates
* the choice public, and contains a BasePublicEncryptionKey that is an
* elliptic curve point (i.e., of type EccP256CurvePoint or
* EccP384CurvePoint), then the elliptic curve point is encoded in compressed
* form, i.e., such that the choice indicated within the Ecc*CurvePoint is
* compressed-y-0 or compressed-y-1.
* The canonicalization does not apply to any fields after the extension
* marker, including any fields in contributedExtensions.
*/
HeaderInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
psid Psid,
generationTime Time64 OPTIONAL,
expiryTime Time64 OPTIONAL,
generationLocation ThreeDLocation OPTIONAL,
p2pcdLearningRequest HashedId3 OPTIONAL,
missingCrlIdentifier MissingCrlIdentifier OPTIONAL,
encryptionKey EncryptionKey OPTIONAL,
...,
inlineP2pcdRequest SequenceOfHashedId3 OPTIONAL,
requestedCertificate Certificate OPTIONAL,
pduFunctionalType PduFunctionalType OPTIONAL,
contributedExtensions ContributedExtensionBlocks OPTIONAL
}
/**
* @brief This structure may be used to request a CRL that the SSME knows to
* have been issued and has not yet received. It is provided for future use
* and its use is not defined in this version of this standard.
*
* @param cracaId: is the HashedId3 of the CRACA, as defined in 5.1.3. The
* HashedId3 is calculated with the whole-certificate hash algorithm,
* determined as described in 6.4.3, applied to the COER-encoded certificate,
* canonicalized as defined in the definition of Certificate.
*
* @param crlSeries: is the requested CRL Series value. See 5.1.3 for more
* information.
*/
MissingCrlIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
cracaId HashedId3,
crlSeries CrlSeries,
...
}
/**
* @brief This data structure identifies the functional entity that is
* intended to consume an SPDU, for the case where that functional entity is
* not an application process, and are instead security support services for an
* application process. Further details and the intended use of this field are
* defined in ISO 21177 [B20].
*
* @param tlsHandshake: indicates that the Signed SPDU is not to be directly
* consumed as an application PDU and is to be used to provide information
* about the holder’s permissions to a Transport Layer Security (TLS)
* (IETF 5246 [B15], IETF 8446 [B16]) handshake process operating to secure
* communications to an application process. See IETF [B15] and ISO 21177
* [B20] for further information.
*
* @param iso21177ExtendedAuth: indicates that the Signed SPDU is not to be
* directly consumed as an application PDU and is to be used to provide
* additional information about the holder’s permissions to the ISO 21177
* Security Subsystem for an application process. See ISO 21177 [B20] for
* further information.
*
* @param iso21177SessionExtension: indicates that the Signed SPDU is not to
* be directly consumed as an application PDU and is to be used to extend an
* existing ISO 21177 secure session. This enables a secure session to
* persist beyond the lifetime of the certificates used to establish that
* session.
*/
PduFunctionalType ::= INTEGER (0..255)
tlsHandshake PduFunctionalType ::= 1
iso21177ExtendedAuth PduFunctionalType ::= 2
iso21177SessionExtension PduFunctionalType ::= 3
/**
* @brief This type is used for clarity of definitions.
*/
ContributedExtensionBlocks ::= SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF
ContributedExtensionBlock
/**
* @brief This data structure defines the format of an extension block
* provided by an identified contributor by using the temnplate provided
* in the class IEEE1609DOT2-HEADERINFO-CONTRIBUTED-EXTENSION constraint
* to the objects in the set Ieee1609Dot2HeaderInfoContributedExtensions.
*
* @param contributorId: uniquely identifies the contributor.
*
* @param extns: contains a list of extensions from that contributor.
* Extensions are expected and not required to follow the format specified
* in 6.5.
*/
ContributedExtensionBlock ::= SEQUENCE {
contributorId IEEE1609DOT2-HEADERINFO-CONTRIBUTED-EXTENSION.&id({
Ieee1609Dot2HeaderInfoContributedExtensions
}),
extns SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF
IEEE1609DOT2-HEADERINFO-CONTRIBUTED-EXTENSION.&Extn({
Ieee1609Dot2HeaderInfoContributedExtensions
}{@.contributorId})
}
/**
* @brief This Information Object Class defines the class that provides a
* template for defining extension blocks.
*/
IEEE1609DOT2-HEADERINFO-CONTRIBUTED-EXTENSION ::= CLASS {
&id HeaderInfoContributorId UNIQUE,
&Extn
} WITH SYNTAX {&Extn IDENTIFIED BY &id}
/**
* @brief This structure is an ASN.1 Information Object Set listing the
* defined contributed extension types and the associated
* HeaderInfoContributorId values. In this version of this standard two
* extension types are defined: Ieee1609ContributedHeaderInfoExtension and
* EtsiOriginatingHeaderInfoExtension.
*/
Ieee1609Dot2HeaderInfoContributedExtensions
IEEE1609DOT2-HEADERINFO-CONTRIBUTED-EXTENSION ::= {
{Ieee1609ContributedHeaderInfoExtension IDENTIFIED BY
ieee1609HeaderInfoContributorId} |
{EtsiOriginatingHeaderInfoExtension IDENTIFIED BY
etsiHeaderInfoContributorId},
...
}
/**
* @brief This is an integer used to identify a HeaderInfo extension
* contributing organization. In this version of this standard two values are
* defined:
* - ieee1609OriginatingExtensionId indicating extensions originating with
* IEEE 1609.
* - etsiOriginatingExtensionId indicating extensions originating with
* ETSI TC ITS.
*/
HeaderInfoContributorId ::= INTEGER (0..255)
ieee1609HeaderInfoContributorId HeaderInfoContributorId ::= 1
etsiHeaderInfoContributorId HeaderInfoContributorId ::= 2
/**
* @brief This structure allows the recipient of data to determine which
* keying material to use to authenticate the data. It also indicates the
* verification type to be used to generate the hash for verification, as
* specified in 5.3.1.
*
* @param digest: If the choice indicated is digest:
* - The structure contains the HashedId8 of the relevant certificate. The
* HashedId8 is calculated with the whole-certificate hash algorithm,
* determined as described in 6.4.3.
* - The verification type is certificate and the certificate data
* passed to the hash function as specified in 5.3.1 is the authorization
* certificate.
*
* @param certificate: If the choice indicated is certificate:
* - The structure contains one or more Certificate structures, in order
* such that the first certificate is the authorization certificate and each
* subsequent certificate is the issuer of the one before it.
* - The verification type is certificate and the certificate data
* passed to the hash function as specified in 5.3.1 is the authorization
* certificate.
*
* @param self: If the choice indicated is self:
* - The structure does not contain any data beyond the indication that
* the choice value is self.
* - The verification type is self-signed.
*
* @note Critical information fields:
* - If present, this is a critical information field as defined in 5.2.6.
* An implementation that does not recognize the CHOICE value for this type
* when verifying a signed SPDU shall indicate that the signed SPDU is invalid.
* - If present, certificate is a critical information field as defined in
* 5.2.6. An implementation that does not support the number of certificates
* in certificate when verifying a signed SPDU shall indicate that the signed
* SPDU is invalid. A compliant implementation shall support certificate
* fields containing at least one certificate.
*
* @note Canonicalization: This data structure is subject to canonicalization
* for the relevant operations specified in 6.1.2. The canonicalization
* applies to every Certificate in the certificate field.
*/
SignerIdentifier ::= CHOICE {
digest HashedId8,
certificate SequenceOfCertificate,
self NULL,
...
}
/**
* @brief This data structure is used to perform a countersignature over an
* already-signed SPDU. This is the profile of an Ieee1609Dot2Data containing
* a signedData. The tbsData within content is composed of a payload
* containing the hash (extDataHash) of the externally generated, pre-signed
* SPDU over which the countersignature is performed.
*/
Countersignature ::= Ieee1609Dot2Data (WITH COMPONENTS {...,
content (WITH COMPONENTS {...,
signedData (WITH COMPONENTS {...,
tbsData (WITH COMPONENTS {...,
payload (WITH COMPONENTS {...,
data ABSENT,
extDataHash PRESENT
}),
headerInfo(WITH COMPONENTS {...,
generationTime PRESENT,
expiryTime ABSENT,
generationLocation ABSENT,
p2pcdLearningRequest ABSENT,
missingCrlIdentifier ABSENT,
encryptionKey ABSENT
})
})
})
})
})
--***************************************************************************--
-- Encrypted Data --
--***************************************************************************--
/**
* @brief This data structure encodes data that has been encrypted to one or
* more recipients using the recipients’ public or symmetric keys as
* specified in 5.3.4.
*
* @param recipients: contains one or more RecipientInfos. These entries may
* be more than one RecipientInfo, and more than one type of RecipientInfo,
* as long as all entries are indicating or containing the same data encryption
* key.
*
* @param ciphertext: contains the encrypted data. This is the encryption of
* an encoded Ieee1609Dot2Data structure as specified in 5.3.4.2.
*
* @note Critical information fields:
* - If present, recipients is a critical information field as defined in
* 5.2.6. An implementation that does not support the number of RecipientInfo
* in recipients when decrypted shall indicate that the encrypted SPDU could
* not be decrypted due to unsupported critical information fields. A
* compliant implementation shall support recipients fields containing at
* least eight entries.
*
* @note If the plaintext is raw data, i.e., it has not been output from a
* previous operation of the SDS, then it is trivial to encapsulate it in an
* Ieee1609Dot2Data of type unsecuredData as noted in 4.2.2.2.2. For example,
* '03 80 08 01 23 45 67 89 AB CD EF' is the C-OER encoding of '01 23 45 67
* 89 AB CD EF' encapsulated in an Ieee1609Dot2Data of type unsecuredData.
* The first byte of the encoding 03 is the protocolVersion, the second byte
* 80 indicates the choice unsecuredData, and the third byte 08 is the length
* of the raw data '01 23 45 67 89 AB CD EF'.
*/
EncryptedData ::= SEQUENCE {
recipients SequenceOfRecipientInfo,
ciphertext SymmetricCiphertext
}
/**
* @brief This data structure is used to transfer the data encryption key to
* an individual recipient of an EncryptedData. The option pskRecipInfo is
* selected if the EncryptedData was encrypted using the static encryption
* key approach specified in 5.3.4. The other options are selected if the
* EncryptedData was encrypted using the ephemeral encryption key approach
* specified in 5.3.4. The meanings of the choices are:
*
* See Annex C.7 for guidance on when it may be appropriate to use
* each of these approaches.
*
* @param pskRecipInfo: The data was encrypted directly using a pre-shared
* symmetric key.
*
* @param symmRecipInfo: The data was encrypted with a data encryption key,
* and the data encryption key was encrypted using a symmetric key.
*
* @param certRecipInfo: The data was encrypted with a data encryption key,
* the data encryption key was encrypted using a public key encryption scheme,
* where the public encryption key was obtained from a certificate. In this
* case, the parameter P1 to ECIES as defined in 5.3.5 is the hash of the
* certificate, calculated with the whole-certificate hash algorithm,
* determined as described in 6.4.3, applied to the COER-encoded certificate,
* canonicalized as defined in the definition of Certificate.
*
* @note If the encryption algorithm is SM2, there is no equivalent of the
* parameter P1 and so no input to the encryption process that uses the hash
* of the certificate.
*
* @param signedDataRecipInfo: The data was encrypted with a data encryption
* key, the data encryption key was encrypted using a public key encryption
* scheme, where the public encryption key was obtained as the public response
* encryption key from a SignedData. In this case, if ECIES is the encryption
* algorithm, then the parameter P1 to ECIES as defined in 5.3.5 is the
* SHA-256 hash of the Ieee1609Dot2Data of type signedData containing the
* response encryption key, canonicalized as defined in the definition of
* Ieee1609Dot2Data.
*
* @note If the encryption algorithm is SM2, there is no equivalent of the
* parameter P1 and so no input to the encryption process that uses the hash
* of the Ieee1609Dot2Data.
*
* @param rekRecipInfo: The data was encrypted with a data encryption key,
* the data encryption key was encrypted using a public key encryption scheme,
* where the public encryption key was not obtained from a Signed-Data or a
* certificate. In this case, the SDEE specification is expected to specify
* how the public key is obtained, and if ECIES is the encryption algorithm,
* then the parameter P1 to ECIES as defined in 5.3.5 is the hash of the
* empty string.
*
* @note If the encryption algorithm is SM2, there is no equivalent of the
* parameter P1 and so no input to the encryption process that uses the hash
* of the empty string.
*
* @note The material input to encryption is the bytes of the encryption key
* with no headers, encapsulation, or length indication. Contrast this to
* encryption of data, where the data is encapsulated in an Ieee1609Dot2Data.
*/
RecipientInfo ::= CHOICE {
pskRecipInfo PreSharedKeyRecipientInfo,
symmRecipInfo SymmRecipientInfo,
certRecipInfo PKRecipientInfo,
signedDataRecipInfo PKRecipientInfo,
rekRecipInfo PKRecipientInfo
}
/**
* @brief This type is used for clarity of definitions.
*/
SequenceOfRecipientInfo ::= SEQUENCE OF RecipientInfo
/**
* @brief This data structure is used to indicate a symmetric key that may
* be used directly to decrypt a SymmetricCiphertext. It consists of the
* low-order 8 bytes of the hash of the COER encoding of a
* SymmetricEncryptionKey structure containing the symmetric key in question.
* The HashedId8 is calculated with the hash algorithm determined as
* specified in 5.3.9.3. The symmetric key may be established by any
* appropriate means agreed by the two parties to the exchange.
*/
PreSharedKeyRecipientInfo ::= HashedId8
/**
* @brief This data structure contains the following fields:
*
* @param recipientId: contains the hash of the symmetric key encryption key
* that may be used to decrypt the data encryption key. It consists of the
* low-order 8 bytes of the hash of the COER encoding of a
* SymmetricEncryptionKey structure containing the symmetric key in question.
* The HashedId8 is calculated with the hash algorithm determined as
* specified in 5.3.9.4. The symmetric key may be established by any
* appropriate means agreed by the two parties to the exchange.
*
* @param encKey: contains the encrypted data encryption key within a
* SymmetricCiphertext, where the data encryption key is input to the data
* encryption key encryption process with no headers, encapsulation, or
* length indication.
*/
SymmRecipientInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
recipientId HashedId8,
encKey SymmetricCiphertext
}
/**
* @brief This data structure contains the following fields:
*
* @param recipientId: contains the hash of the container for the encryption
* public key as specified in the definition of RecipientInfo. Specifically,
* depending on the choice indicated by the containing RecipientInfo structure:
* - If the containing RecipientInfo structure indicates certRecipInfo,
* this field contains the HashedId8 of the certificate. The HashedId8 is
* calculated with the whole-certificate hash algorithm, determined as
* described in 6.4.3, applied to the COER-encoded certificate, canonicalized
* as defined in the definition of Certificate.
* - If the containing RecipientInfo structure indicates
* signedDataRecipInfo, this field contains the HashedId8 of the
* Ieee1609Dot2Data of type signedData that contained the encryption key,
* with that Ieee¬¬1609¬Dot2¬¬Data canonicalized per 6.3.4. The HashedId8 is
* calculated with the hash algorithm determined as specified in 5.3.9.5.
* - If the containing RecipientInfo structure indicates rekRecipInfo, this
* field contains the HashedId8 of the COER encoding of a PublicEncryptionKey
* structure containing the response encryption key. The HashedId8 is
* calculated with the hash algorithm determined as specified in 5.3.9.5.
*
* @param encKey: contains the encrypted data encryption key, where the data
* encryption key is input to the data encryption key encryption process with
* no headers, encapsulation, or length indication.
*/
PKRecipientInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
recipientId HashedId8,
encKey EncryptedDataEncryptionKey
}
/**
* @brief This data structure contains an encrypted data encryption key,
* where the data encryption key is input to the data encryption key
* encryption process with no headers, encapsulation, or length indication.
*
* Critical information fields: If present and applicable to
* the receiving SDEE, this is a critical information field as defined in
* 5.2.6. If an implementation receives an encrypted SPDU and determines that
* one or more RecipientInfo fields are relevant to it, and if all of those
* RecipientInfos contain an EncryptedDataEncryptionKey such that the
* implementation does not recognize the indicated CHOICE, the implementation
* shall indicate that the encrypted SPDU is not decryptable.
*/
EncryptedDataEncryptionKey ::= CHOICE {
eciesNistP256 EciesP256EncryptedKey,
eciesBrainpoolP256r1 EciesP256EncryptedKey,
...,
ecencSm2256 EcencP256EncryptedKey
}
/**
* @brief This data structure encapsulates a ciphertext generated with an
* approved symmetric algorithm.
*
* @note Critical information fields: If present, this is a critical
* information field as defined in 5.2.6. An implementation that does not
* recognize the indicated CHOICE value for this type in an encrypted SPDU
* shall indicate that the signed SPDU is invalid in the sense of 4.2.2.3.2,
* that is, it is invalid in the sense that its validity cannot be established.
*/
SymmetricCiphertext ::= CHOICE {
aes128ccm One28BitCcmCiphertext,
...,
sm4Ccm One28BitCcmCiphertext
}
/**
* @brief This data structure encapsulates an encrypted ciphertext for any
* symmetric algorithm with 128-bit blocks in CCM mode. The ciphertext is
* 16 bytes longer than the corresponding plaintext due to the inclusion of
* the message authentication code (MAC). The plaintext resulting from a
* correct decryption of the ciphertext is either a COER-encoded
* Ieee1609Dot2Data structure (see 6.3.41), or a 16-byte symmetric key
* (see 6.3.44).
*
* The ciphertext is 16 bytes longer than the corresponding plaintext.
*
* The plaintext resulting from a correct decryption of the
* ciphertext is a COER-encoded Ieee1609Dot2Data structure.
*
* @param nonce: contains the nonce N as specified in 5.3.8.
*
* @param ccmCiphertext: contains the ciphertext C as specified in 5.3.8.
*
* @note In the name of this structure, "One28" indicates that the
* symmetric cipher block size is 128 bits. It happens to also be the case
* that the keys used for both AES-128-CCM and SM4-CCM are also 128 bits long.
* This is, however, not what “One28” refers to. Since the cipher is used in
* counter mode, i.e., as a stream cipher, the fact that that block size is 128
* bits affects only the size of the MAC and does not affect the size of the
* raw ciphertext.
*/
One28BitCcmCiphertext ::= SEQUENCE {
nonce OCTET STRING (SIZE (12)),
ccmCiphertext Opaque
}
/**
* @brief This type is defined only for backwards compatibility.
*/
Aes128CcmCiphertext ::= One28BitCcmCiphertext
--***************************************************************************--
-- Certificates and other Security Management --
--***************************************************************************--
/**
* @brief This structure is a profile of the structure CertificateBase which
* specifies the valid combinations of fields to transmit implicit and
* explicit certificates.
*
* @note Canonicalization: This data structure is subject to canonicalization
* for the relevant operations specified in 6.1.2. The canonicalization
* applies to the CertificateBase.
*/
Certificate ::=
CertificateBase (ImplicitCertificate | ExplicitCertificate)
TestCertificate ::= Certificate
/**
* @brief This type is used for clarity of definitions.
*/
SequenceOfCertificate ::= SEQUENCE OF Certificate
/**
* @brief The fields in this structure have the following meaning:
*
* @param version: contains the version of the certificate format. In this
* version of the data structures, this field is set to 3.
*
* @param type: states whether the certificate is implicit or explicit. This
* field is set to explicit for explicit certificates and to implicit for
* implicit certificates. See ExplicitCertificate and ImplicitCertificate for
* more details.
*
* @param issuer: identifies the issuer of the certificate.
*
* @param toBeSigned: is the certificate contents. This field is an input to
* the hash when generating or verifying signatures for an explicit
* certificate, or generating or verifying the public key from the
* reconstruction value for an implicit certificate. The details of how this
* field are encoded are given in the description of the
* ToBeSignedCertificate type.
*
* @param signature: is included in an ExplicitCertificate. It is the
* signature, calculated by the signer identified in the issuer field, over
* the hash of toBeSigned. The hash is calculated as specified in 5.3.1, where:
* - Data input is the encoding of toBeSigned following the COER.
* - Signer identifier input depends on the verification type, which in
* turn depends on the choice indicated by issuer. If the choice indicated by
* issuer is self, the verification type is self-signed and the signer
* identifier input is the empty string. If the choice indicated by issuer is
* not self, the verification type is certificate and the signer identifier
* input is the canonicalized COER encoding of the certificate indicated by
* issuer. The canonicalization is carried out as specified in the
* Canonicalization section of this subclause.
*
* @note Canonicalization: This data structure is subject to canonicalization
* for the relevant operations specified in 6.1.2. The canonicalization
* applies to the ToBeSignedCertificate and to the Signature.
*
* @note Whole-certificate hash: If the entirety of a certificate is hashed
* to calculate a HashedId3, HashedId8, or HashedId10, the algorithm used for
* this purpose is known as the whole-certificate hash. The method used to
* determine the whole-certificate hash algorithm is specified in 5.3.9.2.
*/
CertificateBase ::= SEQUENCE {
version Uint8(3),
type CertificateType,
issuer IssuerIdentifier,
toBeSigned ToBeSignedCertificate,
signature Signature OPTIONAL
}
/**
* @brief This enumerated type indicates whether a certificate is explicit or
* implicit.
*
* @note Critical information fields: If present, this is a critical
* information field as defined in 5.2.5. An implementation that does not
* recognize the indicated CHOICE for this type when verifying a signed SPDU
* shall indicate that the signed SPDU is invalid in the sense of 4.2.2.3.2,
* that is, it is invalid in the sense that its validity cannot be
* established.
*/
CertificateType ::= ENUMERATED {
explicit,
implicit,
...
}
/**
* @brief This is a profile of the CertificateBase structure providing all
* the fields necessary for an implicit certificate, and no others.
*/
ImplicitCertificate ::= CertificateBase (WITH COMPONENTS {...,
type(implicit),
toBeSigned(WITH COMPONENTS {...,
verifyKeyIndicator(WITH COMPONENTS {reconstructionValue})
}),
signature ABSENT
})
/**
* @brief This is a profile of the CertificateBase structure providing all
* the fields necessary for an explicit certificate, and no others.
*/
ExplicitCertificate ::= CertificateBase (WITH COMPONENTS {...,
type(explicit),
toBeSigned (WITH COMPONENTS {...,
verifyKeyIndicator(WITH COMPONENTS {verificationKey})
}),
signature PRESENT
})
/**
* @brief This structure allows the recipient of a certificate to determine
* which keying material to use to authenticate the certificate.
*
* If the choice indicated is sha256AndDigest, sha384AndDigest, or
* sm3AndDigest:
* - The structure contains the HashedId8 of the issuing certificate. The
* HashedId8 is calculated with the whole-certificate hash algorithm,
* determined as described in 6.4.3, applied to the COER-encoded certificate,
* canonicalized as defined in the definition of Certificate.
* - The hash algorithm to be used to generate the hash of the certificate
* for verification is SHA-256 (in the case of sha256AndDigest), SM3 (in the
* case of sm3AndDigest) or SHA-384 (in the case of sha384AndDigest).
* - The certificate is to be verified with the public key of the
* indicated issuing certificate.
*
* If the choice indicated is self:
* - The structure indicates what hash algorithm is to be used to generate
* the hash of the certificate for verification.
* - The certificate is to be verified with the public key indicated by
* the verifyKeyIndicator field in theToBeSignedCertificate.
*
* @note Critical information fields: If present, this is a critical
* information field as defined in 5.2.5. An implementation that does not
* recognize the indicated CHOICE for this type when verifying a signed SPDU
* shall indicate that the signed SPDU is invalid in the sense of 4.2.2.3.2,
* that is, it is invalid in the sense that its validity cannot be
* established.
*/
IssuerIdentifier ::= CHOICE {
sha256AndDigest HashedId8,
self HashAlgorithm,
...,
sha384AndDigest HashedId8,
sm3AndDigest HashedId8
}
/**
* @brief The fields in the ToBeSignedCertificate structure have the
* following meaning:
*
* For both implicit and explicit certificates, when the certificate
* is hashed to create or recover the public key (in the case of an implicit
* certificate) or to generate or verify the signature (in the case of an
* explicit certificate), the hash is Hash (Data input) || Hash (
* Signer identifier input), where:
* - Data input is the COER encoding of toBeSigned, canonicalized
* as described above.
* - Signer identifier input depends on the verification type,
* which in turn depends on the choice indicated by issuer. If the choice
* indicated by issuer is self, the verification type is self-signed and the
* signer identifier input is the empty string. If the choice indicated by
* issuer is not self, the verification type is certificate and the signer
* identifier input is the COER encoding of the canonicalization per 6.4.3 of
* the certificate indicated by issuer.
*
* In other words, for implicit certificates, the value H (CertU) in SEC 4,
* section 3, is for purposes of this standard taken to be H [H
* (canonicalized ToBeSignedCertificate from the subordinate certificate) ||
* H (entirety of issuer Certificate)]. See 5.3.2 for further discussion,
* including material differences between this standard and SEC 4 regarding
* how the hash function output is converted from a bit string to an integer.
*
* @param id: contains information that is used to identify the certificate
* holder if necessary.
*
* @param cracaId: identifies the Certificate Revocation Authorization CA
* (CRACA) responsible for certificate revocation lists (CRLs) on which this
* certificate might appear. Use of the cracaId is specified in 5.1.3. The
* HashedId3 is calculated with the whole-certificate hash algorithm,
* determined as described in 6.4.3, applied to the COER-encoded certificate,
* canonicalized as defined in the definition of Certificate.
*
* @param crlSeries: represents the CRL series relevant to a particular
* Certificate Revocation Authorization CA (CRACA) on which the certificate
* might appear. Use of this field is specified in 5.1.3.
*
* @param validityPeriod: contains the validity period of the certificate.
*
* @param region: if present, indicates the validity region of the
* certificate. If it is omitted the validity region is indicated as follows:
* - If enclosing certificate is self-signed, i.e., the choice indicated
* by the issuer field in the enclosing certificate structure is self, the
* certificate is valid worldwide.
* - Otherwise, the certificate has the same validity region as the
* certificate that issued it.
*
* @param assuranceLevel: indicates the assurance level of the certificate
* holder.
*
* @param appPermissions: indicates the permissions that the certificate
* holder has to sign application data with this certificate. A valid
* instance of appPermissions contains any particular Psid value in at most
* one entry.
*
* @param certIssuePermissions: indicates the permissions that the certificate
* holder has to sign certificates with this certificate. A valid instance of
* this array contains no more than one entry whose psidSspRange field
* indicates all. If the array has multiple entries and one entry has its
* psidSspRange field indicate all, then the entry indicating all specifies
* the permissions for all PSIDs other than the ones explicitly specified in
* the other entries. See the description of PsidGroupPermissions for further
* discussion.
*
* @param certRequestPermissions: indicates the permissions that the
* certificate holder can request in its certificate. A valid instance of this
* array contains no more than one entry whose psidSspRange field indicates
* all. If the array has multiple entries and one entry has its psidSspRange
* field indicate all, then the entry indicating all specifies the permissions
* for all PSIDs other than the ones explicitly specified in the other entries.
* See the description of PsidGroupPermissions for further discussion.
*
* @param canRequestRollover: indicates that the certificate may be used to
* sign a request for another certificate with the same permissions. This
* field is provided for future use and its use is not defined in this
* version of this standard.
*
* @param encryptionKey: contains a public key for encryption for which the
* certificate holder holds the corresponding private key.
*
* @param verifyKeyIndicator: contains material that may be used to recover
* the public key that may be used to verify data signed by this certificate.
*
* @param flags: indicates additional yes/no properties of the certificate
* holder. The only bit with defined semantics in this string in this version
* of this standard is usesCubk. If set, the usesCubk bit indicates that the
* certificate holder supports the compact unified butterfly key response.
* Further material about the compact unified butterfly key response can be
* found in IEEE Std 1609.2.1.
*
* @note usesCubk is only relevant for CA certificates, and the only
* functionality defined associated with this field is associated with
* consistency checks on received certificate responses. No functionality
* associated with communications between peer SDEEs is defined associated
* with this field.
*
* @param appExtensions: indicates additional permissions that may be applied
* to application activities that the certificate holder is carrying out.
*
* @param certIssueExtensions: indicates additional permissions to issue
* certificates containing endEntityExtensions.
*
* @param certRequestExtensions: indicates additional permissions to request
* certificates containing endEntityExtensions.
*
* @note Canonicalization: This data structure is subject to canonicalization
* for the relevant operations specified in 6.1.2. The canonicalization
* applies to the PublicEncryptionKey and to the VerificationKeyIndicator.
*
* If the PublicEncryptionKey contains a BasePublicEncryptionKey that is an
* elliptic curve point (i.e., of type EccP256CurvePoint or EccP384CurvePoint),
* then the elliptic curve point is encoded in compressed form, i.e., such
* that the choice indicated within the Ecc*CurvePoint is compressed-y-0 or
* compressed-y-1.
*
* @note Critical information fields:
* - If present, appPermissions is a critical information field as defined
* in 5.2.6. If an implementation of verification does not support the number
* of PsidSsp in the appPermissions field of a certificate that signed a
* signed SPDU, that implementation shall indicate that the signed SPDU is
* invalid in the sense of 4.2.2.3.2, that is, it is invalid in the sense
* that its validity cannot be established.. A conformant implementation
* shall support appPermissions fields containing at least eight entries.
* It may be the case that an implementation of verification does not support
* the number of entries in the appPermissions field and the appPermissions
* field is not relevant to the verification: this will occur, for example,
* if the certificate in question is a CA certificate and so the
* certIssuePermissions field is relevant to the verification and the
* appPermissions field is not. In this case, whether the implementation
* indicates that the signed SPDU is valid (because it could validate all
* relevant fields) or invalid (because it could not parse the entire
* certificate) is implementation-specific.
* - If present, certIssuePermissions is a critical information field as
* defined in 5.2.6. If an implementation of verification does not support
* the number of PsidGroupPermissions in the certIssuePermissions field of a
* CA certificate in the chain of a signed SPDU, the implementation shall
* indicate that the signed SPDU is invalid in the sense of 4.2.2.3.2, that
* is, it is invalid in the sense that its validity cannot be established.
* A conformant implementation shall support certIssuePermissions fields
* containing at least eight entries.
* It may be the case that an implementation of verification does not support
* the number of entries in the certIssuePermissions field and the
* certIssuePermissions field is not relevant to the verification: this will
* occur, for example, if the certificate in question is the signing
* certificate for the SPDU and so the appPermissions field is relevant to
* the verification and the certIssuePermissions field is not. In this case,
* whether the implementation indicates that the signed SPDU is valid
* (because it could validate all relevant fields) or invalid (because it
* could not parse the entire certificate) is implementation-specific.
* - If present, certRequestPermissions is a critical information field as
* defined in 5.2.6. If an implementaiton of verification of a certificate
* request does not support the number of PsidGroupPermissions in
* certRequestPermissions, the implementation shall indicate that the signed
* SPDU is invalid in the sense of 4.2.2.3.2, that is, it is invalid in the
* sense that its validity cannot be established. A conformant implementation
* shall support certRequestPermissions fields containing at least eight
* entries.
* It may be the case that an implementation of verification does not support
* the number of entries in the certRequestPermissions field and the
* certRequestPermissions field is not relevant to the verification: this will
* occur, for example, if the certificate in question is the signing
* certificate for the SPDU and so the appPermissions field is relevant to
* the verification and the certRequestPermissions field is not. In this
* case, whether the implementation indicates that the signed SPDU is valid
* (because it could validate all relevant fields) or invalid (because it
* could not parse the entire certificate) is implementation-specific.
*/
ToBeSignedCertificate ::= SEQUENCE {
id CertificateId,
cracaId HashedId3,
crlSeries CrlSeries,
validityPeriod ValidityPeriod,
region GeographicRegion OPTIONAL,
assuranceLevel SubjectAssurance OPTIONAL,
appPermissions SequenceOfPsidSsp OPTIONAL,
certIssuePermissions SequenceOfPsidGroupPermissions OPTIONAL,
certRequestPermissions SequenceOfPsidGroupPermissions OPTIONAL,
canRequestRollover NULL OPTIONAL,
encryptionKey PublicEncryptionKey OPTIONAL,
verifyKeyIndicator VerificationKeyIndicator,
...,
flags BIT STRING {usesCubk (0)} (SIZE (8)) OPTIONAL,
appExtensions SequenceOfAppExtensions,
certIssueExtensions SequenceOfCertIssueExtensions,
certRequestExtension SequenceOfCertRequestExtensions
}
(WITH COMPONENTS { ..., appPermissions PRESENT} |
WITH COMPONENTS { ..., certIssuePermissions PRESENT} |
WITH COMPONENTS { ..., certRequestPermissions PRESENT})
/**
* @brief This structure contains information that is used to identify the
* certificate holder if necessary.
*
* @param linkageData: is used to identify the certificate for revocation
* purposes in the case of certificates that appear on linked certificate
* CRLs. See 5.1.3 and 7.3 for further discussion.
*
* @param name: is used to identify the certificate holder in the case of
* non-anonymous certificates. The contents of this field are a matter of
* policy and are expected to be human-readable.
*
* @param binaryId: supports identifiers that are not human-readable.
*
* @param none: indicates that the certificate does not include an identifier.
*
* @note Critical information fields:
* - If present, this is a critical information field as defined in 5.2.6.
* An implementation that does not recognize the choice indicated in this
* field shall reject a signed SPDU as invalid.
*/
CertificateId ::= CHOICE {
linkageData LinkageData,
name Hostname,
binaryId OCTET STRING(SIZE(1..64)),
none NULL,
...
}
/**
* @brief This structure contains information that is matched against
* information obtained from a linkage ID-based CRL to determine whether the
* containing certificate has been revoked. See 5.1.3.4 and 7.3 for details
* of use.
*/
LinkageData ::= SEQUENCE {
iCert IValue,
linkage-value LinkageValue,
group-linkage-value GroupLinkageValue OPTIONAL
}
/**
* @brief This type indicates which type of permissions may appear in
* end-entity certificates the chain of whose permissions passes through the
* PsidGroupPermissions field containing this value. If app is indicated, the
* end-entity certificate may contain an appPermissions field. If enroll is
* indicated, the end-entity certificate may contain a certRequestPermissions
* field.
*/
EndEntityType ::=
BIT STRING {app (0), enrol (1) } (SIZE (8)) (ALL EXCEPT {})
/**
* @brief This structure states the permissions that a certificate holder has
* with respect to issuing and requesting certificates for a particular set
* of PSIDs. For examples, see D.5.3 and D.5.4.
*
* @param subjectPermissions: indicates PSIDs and SSP Ranges covered by this
* field.
*
* @param minChainLength: and chainLengthRange indicate how long the
* certificate chain from this certificate to the end-entity certificate is
* permitted to be. As specified in 5.1.2.1, the length of the certificate
* chain is the number of certificates "below" this certificate in the chain,
* down to and including the end-entity certificate. The length is permitted
* to be (a) greater than or equal to minChainLength certificates and (b)
* less than or equal to minChainLength + chainLengthRange certificates. A
* value of 0 for minChainLength is not permitted when this type appears in
* the certIssuePermissions field of a ToBeSignedCertificate; a certificate
* that has a value of 0 for this field is invalid. The value -1 for
* chainLengthRange is a special case: if the value of chainLengthRange is -1
* it indicates that the certificate chain may be any length equal to or
* greater than minChainLength. See the examples below for further discussion.
*
* @param eeType: takes one or more of the values app and enroll and indicates
* the type of certificates or requests that this instance of
* PsidGroupPermissions in the certificate is entitled to authorize.
* Different instances of PsidGroupPermissions within a ToBeSignedCertificate
* may have different values for eeType.
* - If this field indicates app, the chain is allowed to end in an
* authorization certificate, i.e., a certficate in which these permissions
* appear in an appPermissions field (in other words, if the field does not
* indicate app and the chain ends in an authorization certificate, the
* chain shall be considered invalid).
* - If this field indicates enroll, the chain is allowed to end in an
* enrollment certificate, i.e., a certificate in which these permissions
* appear in a certReqPermissions permissions field (in other words, if the
* field does not indicate enroll and the chain ends in an enrollment
* certificate, the chain shall be considered invalid).
*/
PsidGroupPermissions ::= SEQUENCE {
subjectPermissions SubjectPermissions,
minChainLength INTEGER DEFAULT 1,
chainLengthRange INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
eeType EndEntityType DEFAULT {app}
}
/**
* @brief This type is used for clarity of definitions.
*/
SequenceOfPsidGroupPermissions ::= SEQUENCE OF PsidGroupPermissions
/**
* @brief This indicates the PSIDs and associated SSPs for which certificate
* issuance or request permissions are granted by a PsidGroupPermissions
* structure. If this takes the value explicit, the enclosing
* PsidGroupPermissions structure grants certificate issuance or request
* permissions for the indicated PSIDs and SSP Ranges. If this takes the
* value all, the enclosing PsidGroupPermissions structure grants certificate
* issuance or request permissions for all PSIDs not indicated by other
* PsidGroupPermissions in the same certIssuePermissions or
* certRequestPermissions field.
*
* @note Critical information fields:
* - If present, this is a critical information field as defined in 5.2.6.
* An implementation that does not recognize the indicated CHOICE when
* verifying a signed SPDU shall indicate that the signed SPDU is
* invalidin the sense of 4.2.2.3.2, that is, it is invalid in the sense that
* its validity cannot be established.
* - If present, explicit is a critical information field as defined in
* 5.2.6. An implementation that does not support the number of PsidSspRange
* in explicit when verifying a signed SPDU shall indicate that the signed
* SPDU is invalid in the sense of 4.2.2.3.2, that is, it is invalid in the
* sense that its validity cannot be established. A conformant implementation
* shall support explicit fields containing at least eight entries.
*/
SubjectPermissions ::= CHOICE {
explicit SequenceOfPsidSspRange,
all NULL,
...
}
/**
* @brief The contents of this field depend on whether the certificate is an
* implicit or an explicit certificate.
*
* @param verificationKey: is included in explicit certificates. It contains
* the public key to be used to verify signatures generated by the holder of
* the Certificate.
*
* @param reconstructionValue: is included in implicit certificates. It
* contains the reconstruction value, which is used to recover the public key
* as specified in SEC 4 and 5.3.2.
*
* @note Critical information fields: If present, this is a critical
* information field as defined in 5.2.5. An implementation that does not
* recognize the indicated CHOICE for this type when verifying a signed SPDU
* shall indicate that the signed SPDU is invalid indicate that the signed
* SPDU is invalid in the sense of 4.2.2.3.2, that is, it is invalid in the
* sense that its validity cannot be established.
*
* @note Canonicalization: This data structure is subject to canonicalization
* for the relevant operations specified in 6.1.2. The canonicalization
* applies to the PublicVerificationKey and to the EccP256CurvePoint. The
* EccP256CurvePoint is encoded in compressed form, i.e., such that the
* choice indicated within the EccP256CurvePoint is compressed-y-0 or
* compressed-y-1.
*/
VerificationKeyIndicator ::= CHOICE {
verificationKey PublicVerificationKey,
reconstructionValue EccP256CurvePoint,
...
}
/**
* @brief This structure uses the parameterized type Extension to define an
* Ieee1609ContributedHeaderInfoExtension as an open Extension Content field
* identified by an extension identifier. The extension identifier value is
* unique to extensions defined by ETSI and need not be unique among all
* extension identifier values defined by all contributing organizations.
*/
Ieee1609ContributedHeaderInfoExtension ::=
Extension{{Ieee1609HeaderInfoExtensions}}
/**
* @brief This is an integer used to identify an
* Ieee1609ContributedHeaderInfoExtension.
*/
Ieee1609HeaderInfoExtensionId ::= ExtId
p2pcd8ByteLearningRequestId Ieee1609HeaderInfoExtensionId ::= 1
/**
* @brief This is the ASN.1 Information Object Class that associates IEEE
* 1609 HeaderInfo contributed extensions with the appropriate
* Ieee1609HeaderInfoExtensionId value.
*/
Ieee1609HeaderInfoExtensions EXT-TYPE ::= {
{HashedId8 IDENTIFIED BY p2pcd8ByteLearningRequestId},
...
}
/**
* @brief This structure contains any AppExtensions that apply to the
* certificate holder. As specified in 5.2.4.2.3, each individual
* AppExtension type is associated with consistency conditions, specific to
* that extension, that govern its consistency with SPDUs signed by the
* certificate holder and with the CertIssueExtensions in the CA certificates
* in that certificate holder’s chain. Those consistency conditions are
* specified for each individual AppExtension below.
*/
SequenceOfAppExtensions ::= SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF AppExtension
/**
* @brief This structure contains an individual AppExtension. AppExtensions
* specified in this standard are drawn from the ASN.1 Information Object Set
* SetCertExtensions. This set, and its use in the AppExtension type, is
* structured so that each AppExtension is associated with a
* CertIssueExtension and a CertRequestExtension and all are identified by
* the same id value. In this structure:
*
* @param id: identifies the extension type.
*
* @param content: provides the content of the extension.
*/
AppExtension ::= SEQUENCE {
id CERT-EXT-TYPE.&id({SetCertExtensions}),
content CERT-EXT-TYPE.&App({SetCertExtensions}{@.id})
}
/**
* @brief This field contains any CertIssueExtensions that apply to the
* certificate holder. As specified in 5.2.4.2.3, each individual
* CertIssueExtension type is associated with consistency conditions,
* specific to that extension, that govern its consistency with
* AppExtensions in certificates issued by the certificate holder and with
* the CertIssueExtensions in the CA certificates in that certificate
* holder’s chain. Those consistency conditions are specified for each
* individual CertIssueExtension below.
*/
SequenceOfCertIssueExtensions ::=
SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF CertIssueExtension
/**
* @brief This field contains an individual CertIssueExtension.
* CertIssueExtensions specified in this standard are drawn from the ASN.1
* Information Object Set SetCertExtensions. This set, and its use in the
* CertIssueExtension type, is structured so that each CertIssueExtension
* is associated with a AppExtension and a CertRequestExtension and all are
* identified by the same id value. In this structure:
*
* @param id: identifies the extension type.
*
* @param permissions: indicates the permissions. Within this field.
* - all indicates that the certificate is entitled to issue all values of
* the extension.
* - specific is used to specify which values of the extension may be
* issued in the case where all does not apply.
*/
CertIssueExtension ::= SEQUENCE {
id CERT-EXT-TYPE.&id({SetCertExtensions}),
permissions CHOICE {
specific CERT-EXT-TYPE.&Issue({SetCertExtensions}{@.id}),
all NULL
}
}
/**
* @brief This field contains any CertRequestExtensions that apply to the
* certificate holder. As specified in 5.2.4.2.3, each individual
* CertRequestExtension type is associated with consistency conditions,
* specific to that extension, that govern its consistency with
* AppExtensions in certificates issued by the certificate holder and with
* the CertRequestExtensions in the CA certificates in that certificate
* holder’s chain. Those consistency conditions are specified for each
* individual CertRequestExtension below.
*/
SequenceOfCertRequestExtensions ::= SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF CertRequestExtension
/**
* @brief This field contains an individual CertRequestExtension.
* CertRequestExtensions specified in this standard are drawn from the
* ASN.1 Information Object Set SetCertExtensions. This set, and its use in
* the CertRequestExtension type, is structured so that each
* CertRequestExtension is associated with a AppExtension and a
* CertRequestExtension and all are identified by the same id value. In this
* structure:
*
* @param id: identifies the extension type.
*
* @param permissions: indicates the permissions. Within this field.
* - all indicates that the certificate is entitled to issue all values of
* the extension.
* - specific is used to specify which values of the extension may be
* issued in the case where all does not apply.
*/
CertRequestExtension ::= SEQUENCE {
id CERT-EXT-TYPE.&id({SetCertExtensions}),
permissions CHOICE {
content CERT-EXT-TYPE.&Req({SetCertExtensions}{@.id}),
all NULL
}
}
/**
* @brief This type is the AppExtension used to identify an operating
* organization. The associated CertIssueExtension and CertRequestExtension
* are both of type OperatingOrganizationId.
* To determine consistency between this type and an SPDU, the SDEE
* specification for that SPDU is required to specify how the SPDU can be
* used to determine an OBJECT IDENTIFIER (for example, by including the
* full OBJECT IDENTIFIER in the SPDU, or by including a RELATIVE-OID with
* clear instructions about how a full OBJECT IDENTIFIER can be obtained from
* the RELATIVE-OID). The SPDU is then consistent with this type if the
* OBJECT IDENTIFIER determined from the SPDU is identical to the OBJECT
* IDENTIFIER contained in this field.
* This AppExtension does not have consistency conditions with a
* corresponding CertIssueExtension. It can appear in a certificate issued
* by any CA.
*/
OperatingOrganizationId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
certExtId-OperatingOrganization ExtId ::= 1
/**
* @brief This Information Object is an instance of the Information Object
* Class CERT-EXT-TYPE. It is defined to bind together the AppExtension,
* CertIssueExtension, and CertRequestExtension types associated with the
* use of an operating organization identifier, and to assocaute them all
* with the extension identifier value certExtId-OperatingOrganization.
*/
instanceOperatingOrganizationCertExtensions CERT-EXT-TYPE ::= {
ID certExtId-OperatingOrganization
APP OperatingOrganizationId
ISSUE NULL
REQUEST NULL
}
/**
* @brief This Information Object Set is a collection of Information Objects
* used to contain the AppExtension, CertIssueExtension, and
* CertRequestExtension types associated with a specific use of certificate
* extensions. In this version of this standard it only has a single entry
* instanceOperatingOrganizationCertExtensions.
*/
SetCertExtensions CERT-EXT-TYPE ::= {
instanceOperatingOrganizationCertExtensions,
...
}
END
ieee1609.2-ieee/Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.asn 0000664 0000000 0000000 00000166463 14326475135 0017647 0 ustar 00root root 0000000 0000000 --***************************************************************************--
-- IEEE Std 1609.2: Base Data Types --
--***************************************************************************--
/**
* @note Section references in this file are to clauses in IEEE Std
* 1609.2 unless indicated otherwise. Full forms of acronyms and
* abbreviations used in this file are specified in 3.2.
*/
Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111)
standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2)
base(1) base-types(2) major-version-2(2) minor-version-4(4)}
DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS ::= BEGIN
--***************************************************************************--
-- Integer Types --
--***************************************************************************--
/**
* @brief This atomic type is used in the definition of other data structures.
* It is for non-negative integers up to 7, i.e., (hex)07.
*/
Uint3 ::= INTEGER (0..7)
/**
* @brief This atomic type is used in the definition of other data structures.
* It is for non-negative integers up to 255, i.e., (hex)ff.
*/
Uint8 ::= INTEGER (0..255)
/**
* @brief This atomic type is used in the definition of other data structures.
* It is for non-negative integers up to 65,535, i.e., (hex)ff ff.
*/
Uint16 ::= INTEGER (0..65535)
/**
* @brief This atomic type is used in the definition of other data structures.
* It is for non-negative integers up to 4,294,967,295, i.e.,
* (hex)ff ff ff ff.
*/
Uint32 ::= INTEGER (0..4294967295)
/**
* @brief This atomic type is used in the definition of other data structures.
* It is for non-negative integers up to 18,446,744,073,709,551,615, i.e.,
* (hex)ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff.
*/
Uint64 ::= INTEGER (0..18446744073709551615)
/**
* @brief This type is used for clarity of definitions.
*/
SequenceOfUint8 ::= SEQUENCE OF Uint8
/**
* @brief This type is used for clarity of definitions.
*/
SequenceOfUint16 ::= SEQUENCE OF Uint16
--***************************************************************************--
-- OCTET STRING Types --
--***************************************************************************--
/**
* @brief This is a synonym for ASN.1 OCTET STRING, and is used in the
* definition of other data structures.
*/
Opaque ::= OCTET STRING
/**
* @brief This type contains the truncated hash of another data structure.
* The HashedId3 for a given data structure is calculated by calculating the
* hash of the encoded data structure and taking the low-order three bytes of
* the hash output. The low-order three bytes are the last three bytes of the
* 32-byte hash when represented in network byte order. If the data structure
* is subject to canonicalization it is canonicalized before hashing. See
* Example below.
*
* The hash algorithm to be used to calculate a HashedId3 within a
* structure depends on the context. In this standard, for each structure
* that includes a HashedId3 field, the corresponding text indicates how the
* hash algorithm is determined. See also the discussion in 5.3.9.
*
* Example: Consider the SHA-256 hash of the empty string:
*
* SHA-256("") =
* e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855
*
* The HashedId3 derived from this hash corresponds to the following:
*
* HashedId3 = 52b855.
*/
HashedId3 ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(3))
/**
* @brief This type is used for clarity of definitions.
*/
SequenceOfHashedId3 ::= SEQUENCE OF HashedId3
/**
* @brief This type contains the truncated hash of another data structure.
* The HashedId8 for a given data structure is calculated by calculating the
* hash of the encoded data structure and taking the low-order eight bytes of
* the hash output. The low-order eight bytes are the last eight bytes of the
* hash when represented in network byte order. If the data structure
* is subject to canonicalization it is canonicalized before hashing. See
* Example below.
*
* The hash algorithm to be used to calculate a HashedId8 within a
* structure depends on the context. In this standard, for each structure
* that includes a HashedId8 field, the corresponding text indicates how the
* hash algorithm is determined. See also the discussion in 5.3.9.
*
* Example: Consider the SHA-256 hash of the empty string:
*
* SHA-256("") =
* e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855
*
* The HashedId8 derived from this hash corresponds to the following:
*
* HashedId8 = a495991b7852b855.
*/
HashedId8 ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(8))
/**
* @brief This type contains the truncated hash of another data structure.
* The HashedId10 for a given data structure is calculated by calculating the
* hash of the encoded data structure and taking the low-order ten bytes of
* the hash output. The low-order ten bytes are the last ten bytes of the
* hash when represented in network byte order. If the data structure
* is subject to canonicalization it is canonicalized before hashing. See
* Example below.
*
* The hash algorithm to be used to calculate a HashedId10 within a
* structure depends on the context. In this standard, for each structure
* that includes a HashedId10 field, the corresponding text indicates how the
* hash algorithm is determined. See also the discussion in 5.3.9.
*
* Example: Consider the SHA-256 hash of the empty string:
*
* SHA-256("") =
* e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855
*
* The HashedId10 derived from this hash corresponds to the following:
*
* HashedId10 = 934ca495991b7852b855.
*/
HashedId10 ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(10))
/**
* @brief This data structure contains the truncated hash of another data
* structure. The HashedId32 for a given data structure is calculated by
* calculating the hash of the encoded data structure and taking the
* low-order 32 bytes of the hash output. The low-order 32 bytes are the last
* 32 bytes of the hash when represented in network byte order. If the data
* structure is subject to canonicalization it is canonicalized before
* hashing. See Example below.
*
* The hash algorithm to be used to calculate a HashedId32 within a
* structure depends on the context. In this standard, for each structure
* that includes a HashedId32 field, the corresponding text indicates how the
* hash algorithm is determined. See also the discussion in 5.3.9.
*
* Example: Consider the SHA-256 hash of the empty string:
*
* SHA-256("") =
* e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855
*
* The HashedId32 derived from this hash corresponds to the following:
*
* HashedId32 = e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b8
* 55.
*/
HashedId32 ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(32))
/**
* @brief This data structure contains the truncated hash of another data
* structure. The HashedId48 for a given data structure is calculated by
* calculating the hash of the encoded data structure and taking the
* low-order 48 bytes of the hash output. The low-order 48 bytes are the last
* 48 bytes of the hash when represented in network byte order. If the data
* structure is subject to canonicalization it is canonicalized before
* hashing. See Example below.
*
* The hash algorithm to be used to calculate a HashedId48 within a
* structure depends on the context. In this standard, for each structure
* that includes a HashedId48 field, the corresponding text indicates how the
* hash algorithm is determined. See also the discussion in 5.3.9.
*
* Example: Consider the SHA-384 hash of the empty string:
*
* SHA-384("") = 38b060a751ac96384cd9327eb1b1e36a21fdb71114be07434c0cc7bf63f6
* e1da274edebfe76f65fbd51ad2f14898b95b
*
* The HashedId48 derived from this hash corresponds to the following:
*
* HashedId48 = 38b060a751ac96384cd9327eb1b1e36a21fdb71114be07434c0cc7bf63f6e
* 1da274edebfe76f65fbd51ad2f14898b95b.
*/
HashedId48 ::= OCTET STRING(SIZE(48))
--***************************************************************************--
-- Time Structures --
--***************************************************************************--
/**
* @brief This type gives the number of (TAI) seconds since 00:00:00 UTC, 1
* January, 2004.
*/
Time32 ::= Uint32
/**
* @brief This data structure is a 64-bit integer giving an estimate of the
* number of (TAI) microseconds since 00:00:00 UTC, 1 January, 2004.
*/
Time64 ::= Uint64
/**
* @brief This type gives the validity period of a certificate. The start of
* the validity period is given by start and the end is given by
* start + duration.
*/
ValidityPeriod ::= SEQUENCE {
start Time32,
duration Duration
}
/**
* @brief This structure represents the duration of validity of a
* certificate. The Uint16 value is the duration, given in the units denoted
* by the indicated choice. A year is considered to be 31556952 seconds,
* which is the average number of seconds in a year.
*
* @note Years can be mapped more closely to wall-clock days using the hours
* choice for up to 7 years and the sixtyHours choice for up to 448 years.
*/
Duration ::= CHOICE {
microseconds Uint16,
milliseconds Uint16,
seconds Uint16,
minutes Uint16,
hours Uint16,
sixtyHours Uint16,
years Uint16
}
--***************************************************************************--
-- Location Structures --
--***************************************************************************--
/**
* @brief This structure represents a geographic region of a specified form.
* A certificate is not valid if any part of the region indicated in its
* scope field lies outside the region indicated in the scope of its issuer.
*
* @param circularRegion: contains a single instance of the CircularRegion
* structure.
*
* @param rectangularRegion: is an array of RectangularRegion structures
* containing at least one entry. This field is interpreted as a series of
* rectangles, which may overlap or be disjoint. The permitted region is any
* point within any of the rectangles.
*
* @param polygonalRegion: contains a single instance of the PolygonalRegion
* structure.
*
* @param identifiedRegion: is an array of IdentifiedRegion structures
* containing at least one entry. The permitted region is any point within
* any of the identified regions.
*
* @note Critical information fields:
* - If present, this is a critical information field as defined in 5.2.6.
* An implementation that does not recognize the indicated CHOICE when
* verifying a signed SPDU shall indicate that the signed SPDU is invalid in
* the sense of 4.2.2.3.2, that is, it is invalid in the sense that its
* validity cannot be established.
* - If selected, rectangularRegion is a critical information field as
* defined in 5.2.6. An implementation that does not support the number of
* RectangularRegion in rectangularRegions when verifying a signed SPDU shall
* indicate that the signed SPDU is invalid in the sense of 4.2.2.3.2, that
* is, it is invalid in the sense that its validity cannot be established.
* A conformant implementation shall support rectangularRegions fields
* containing at least eight entries.
* - If selected, identifiedRegion is a critical information field as
* defined in 5.2.6. An implementation that does not support the number of
* IdentifiedRegion in identifiedRegion shall reject the signed SPDU as
* invalid in the sense of 4.2.2.3.2, that is, it is invalid in the sense
* that its validity cannot be established. A conformant implementation shall
* support identifiedRegion fields containing at least eight entries.
*/
GeographicRegion ::= CHOICE {
circularRegion CircularRegion,
rectangularRegion SequenceOfRectangularRegion,
polygonalRegion PolygonalRegion,
identifiedRegion SequenceOfIdentifiedRegion,
...
}
/**
* @brief This structure specifies a circle with its center at center, its
* radius given in meters, and located tangential to the reference ellipsoid.
* The indicated region is all the points on the surface of the reference
* ellipsoid whose distance to the center point over the reference ellipsoid
* is less than or equal to the radius. A point which contains an elevation
* component is considered to be within the circular region if its horizontal
* projection onto the reference ellipsoid lies within the region.
*/
CircularRegion ::= SEQUENCE {
center TwoDLocation,
radius Uint16
}
/**
* @brief This structure specifies a “rectangle” on the surface of the WGS84 ellipsoid where the
* sides are given by lines of constant latitude or longitude.
* A point which contains an elevation component is considered to be within the rectangular region
* if its horizontal projection onto the reference ellipsoid lies within the region.
* A RectangularRegion is invalid if the northWest value is south of the southEast value, or if the
* latitude values in the two points are equal, or if the longitude values in the two points are
* equal; otherwise it is valid. A certificate that contains an invalid RectangularRegion is invalid.
*
* @param northWest: is the north-west corner of the rectangle.
*
* @param southEast is the south-east corner of the rectangle.
*/
RectangularRegion ::= SEQUENCE {
northWest TwoDLocation,
southEast TwoDLocation
}
/**
* @brief This type is used for clarity of definitions.
*/
SequenceOfRectangularRegion ::= SEQUENCE OF RectangularRegion
/**
* @brief This structure defines a region using a series of distinct
* geographic points, defined on the surface of the reference ellipsoid. The
* region is specified by connecting the points in the order they appear,
* with each pair of points connected by the geodesic on the reference
* ellipsoid. The polygon is completed by connecting the final point to the
* first point. The allowed region is the interior of the polygon and its
* boundary.
*
* A point which contains an elevation component is considered to be
* within the polygonal region if its horizontal projection onto the
* reference ellipsoid lies within the region.
*
* A valid PolygonalRegion contains at least three points. In a valid
* PolygonalRegion, the implied lines that make up the sides of the polygon
* do not intersect.
*
* @note This type does not support enclaves / exclaves. This might be
* addressed in a future version of this standard.
*
* @note Critical information fields: If present, this is a critical
* information field as defined in 5.2.6. An implementation that does not
* support the number of TwoDLocation in the PolygonalRegion when verifying a
* signed SPDU shall indicate that the signed SPDU is invalid. A compliant
* implementation shall support PolygonalRegions containing at least eight
* TwoDLocation entries.
*/
PolygonalRegion ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (3..MAX) OF TwoDLocation
/**
* @brief This structure is used to define validity regions for use in
* certificates. The latitude and longitude fields contain the latitude and
* longitude as defined above.
*
* @note This data structure is consistent with the location encoding
* used in SAE J2735, except that values 900 000 001 for latitude (used to
* indicate that the latitude was not available) and 1 800 000 001 for
* longitude (used to indicate that the longitude was not available) are not
* valid.
*/
TwoDLocation ::= SEQUENCE {
latitude Latitude,
longitude Longitude
}
/**
* @brief This structure indicates the region of validity of a certificate
* using region identifiers.
* A conformant implementation that supports this type shall support at least
* one of the possible CHOICE values. The Protocol Implementation Conformance
* Statement (PICS) provided in Annex A allows an implementation to state
* which CountryOnly values it recognizes.
*
* @param countryOnly: indicates that only a country (or a geographic entity
* included in a country list) is given.
*
* @param countryAndRegions: indicates that one or more top-level regions
* within a country (as defined by the region listing associated with that
* country) is given.
*
* @param countryAndSubregions: indicates that one or more regions smaller
* than the top-level regions within a country (as defined by the region
* listing associated with that country) is given.
*
* Critical information fields: If present, this is a critical
* information field as defined in 5.2.6. An implementation that does not
* recognize the indicated CHOICE when verifying a signed SPDU shall indicate
* that the signed SPDU is invalid in the sense of 4.2.2.3.2, that is, it is
* invalid in the sense that its validity cannot be established.
*/
IdentifiedRegion ::= CHOICE {
countryOnly UnCountryId,
countryAndRegions CountryAndRegions,
countryAndSubregions CountryAndSubregions,
...
}
/**
* @brief This type is used for clarity of definitions.
*/
SequenceOfIdentifiedRegion ::= SEQUENCE OF IdentifiedRegion
/**
* @brief This type contains the integer representation of the country or
* area identifier as defined by the United Nations Statistics Division in
* October 2013 (see normative references in Clause 0).
* A conformant implementation that implements IdentifiedRegion shall
* recognize (in the sense of “be able to determine whether a two dimensional
* location lies inside or outside the borders identified by”) at least one
* value of UnCountryId. The Protocol Implementation Conformance Statement
* (PICS) provided in Annex A allows an implementation to state which
* UnCountryId values it recognizes.
* Since 2013 and before the publication of this version of this standard,
* three changes have been made to the country code list, to define the
* region "sub-Saharan Africa" and remove the "developed regions", and
* "developing regions". A conformant implementation may recognize these
* region identifiers in the sense defined in the previous paragraph.
* If a verifying implementation is required to check that relevant
* geographic information in a signed SPDU is consistent with a certificate
* containing one or more instances of this type, then the SDS is permitted
* to indicate that the signed SPDU is valid even if some instances of this
* type are unrecognized in the sense defined above, so long as the
* recognized instances of this type completely contain the relevant
* geographic information. Informally, if the recognized values in the
* certificate allow the SDS to determine that the SPDU is valid, then it
* can make that determination even if there are also unrecognized values in
* the certificate. This field is therefore not a "critical information
* field" as defined in 5.2.6, because unrecognized values are permitted so
* long as the validity of the SPDU can be established with the recognized
* values. However, as discussed in 5.2.6, the presence of an unrecognized
* value in a certificate can make it impossible to determine whether the
* certificate and the SPDU are valid.
*/
UnCountryId ::= Uint16
/**
* @brief This type is defined only for backwards compatibility.
*/
CountryOnly ::= UnCountryId
/**
* @brief A conformant implementation that supports CountryAndRegions shall
* support a regions field containing at least eight entries.
* A conformant implementation that implements this type shall recognize
* (in the sense of "be able to determine whether a two dimensional location
* lies inside or outside the borders identified by") at least one value of
* UnCountryId and at least one value for a region within the country
* indicated by that recognized UnCountryId value. In this version of this
* standard, the only means to satisfy this is for a conformant
* implementation to recognize the value of UnCountryId indicating USA and
* at least one of the FIPS state codes for US states. The Protocol
* Implementation Conformance Statement (PICS) provided in Annex A allows
* an implementation to state which UnCountryId values it recognizes and
* which region values are recognized within that country.
* If a verifying implementation is required to check that an relevant
* geographic information in a signed SPDU is consistent with a certificate
* containing one or more instances of this type, then the SDS is permitted
* to indicate that the signed SPDU is valid even if some values of country
* or within regions are unrecognized in the sense defined above, so long
* as the recognized instances of this type completely contain the relevant
* geographic information. Informally, if the recognized values in the
* certificate allow the SDS to determine that the SPDU is valid, then it
* can make that determination even if there are also unrecognized values
* in the certificate. This field is therefore not a "critical information
* field" as defined in 5.2.6, because unrecognized values are permitted so
* long as the validity of the SPDU can be established with the recognized
* values. However, as discussed in 5.2.6, the presence of an unrecognized
* value in a certificate can make it impossible to determine whether the
* certificate is valid and so whether the SPDU is valid.
* In this type:
*
* @param countryOnly: is a UnCountryId as defined above.
*
* @param regions: identifies one or more regions within the country. If
* country indicates the United States of America, the values in this field
* identify the state or statistically equivalent entity using the integer
* version of the 2010 FIPS codes as provided by the U.S. Census Bureau
* (see normative references in Clause 0). For other values of country, the
* meaning of region is not defined in this version of this standard.
*/
CountryAndRegions ::= SEQUENCE {
countryOnly UnCountryId,
regions SequenceOfUint8
}
/**
* @brief A conformant implementation that supports CountryAndSubregions
* shall support a regionAndSubregions field containing at least eight
* entries.
* A conformant implementation that implements this type shall recognize
* (in the sense of “be able to determine whether a two dimensional location
* lies inside or outside the borders identified by”) at least one value of
* country and at least one value for a region within the country indicated
* by that recognized country value. In this version of this standard, the
* only means to satisfy this is for a conformant implementation to recognize
* the value of UnCountryId indicating USA and at least one of the FIPS state
* codes for US states. The Protocol Implementation Conformance Statement
* (PICS) provided in Annex A allows an implementation to state which
* UnCountryId values it recognizes and which region values are recognized
* within that country.
* If a verifying implementation is required to check that an relevant
* geographic information in a signed SPDU is consistent with a certificate
* containing one or more instances of this type, then the SDS is permitted
* to indicate that the signed SPDU is valid even if some values of country
* or within regionAndSubregions are unrecognized in the sense defined above,
* so long as the recognized instances of this type completely contain the
* relevant geographic information. Informally, if the recognized values in
* the certificate allow the SDS to determine that the SPDU is valid, then
* it can make that determination even if there are also unrecognized values
* in the certificate. This field is therefore not a "critical information
* field" as defined in 5.2.6, because unrecognized values are permitted so
* long as the validity of the SPDU can be established with the recognized
* values. However, as discussed in 5.2.6, the presence of an unrecognized
* value in a certificate can make it impossible to determine whether the
* certificate is valid and so whether the SPDU is valid.
* In this structure:
*
* @param countryOnly: is a UnCountryId as defined above.
*
* @param regionAndSubregions: identifies one or more subregions within
* country.
*/
CountryAndSubregions ::= SEQUENCE {
countryOnly UnCountryId,
regionAndSubregions SequenceOfRegionAndSubregions
}
/**
* @brief The meanings of the fields in this structure are to be interpreted
* in the context of a country within which the region is located, referred
* to as the "enclosing country". If this structure is used in a
* CountryAndSubregions structure, the enclosing country is the one indicated
* by the country field in the CountryAndSubregions structure. If other uses
* are defined for this structure in future, it is expected that that
* definition will include a specification of how the enclosing country can
* be determined.
* If the enclosing country is the United States of America:
* - The region field identifies the state or statistically equivalent
* entity using the integer version of the 2010 FIPS codes as provided by the
* U.S. Census Bureau (see normative references in Clause 0).
* - The values in the subregions field identify the county or county
* equivalent entity using the integer version of the 2010 FIPS codes as
* provided by the U.S. Census Bureau.
* If the enclosing country is a different country from the USA, the meaning
* of regionAndSubregions is not defined in this version of this standard.
* A conformant implementation that implements this type shall recognize (in
* the sense of "be able to determine whether a two-dimensional location lies
* inside or outside the borders identified by"), for at least one enclosing
* country, at least one value for a region within that country and at least
* one subregion for the indicated region. In this version of this standard,
* the only means to satisfy this is for a conformant implementation to
* recognize, for the USA, at least one of the FIPS state codes for US
* states, and at least one of the county codes in at least one of the
* recognized states. The Protocol Implementation Conformance Statement
* (PICS) provided in Annex A allows an implementation to state which
* UnCountryId values it recognizes and which region values are recognized
* within that country.
* If a verifying implementation is required to check that an relevant
* geographic information in a signed SPDU is consistent with a certificate
* containing one or more instances of this type, then the SDS is permitted
* to indicate that the signed SPDU is valid even if some values within
* subregions are unrecognized in the sense defined above, so long as the
* recognized instances of this type completely contain the relevant
* geographic information. Informally, if the recognized values in the
* certificate allow the SDS to determine that the SPDU is valid, then it
* can make that determination even if there are also unrecognized values
* in the certificate. This field is therefore not not a "critical
* information field" as defined in 5.2.6, because unrecognized values are
* permitted so long as the validity of the SPDU can be established with the
* recognized values. However, as discussed in 5.2.6, the presence of an
* unrecognized value in a certificate can make it impossible to determine
* whether the certificate is valid and so whether the SPDU is valid.
* In this structure:
*
* @param region: identifies a region within a country.
*
* @param subregions: identifies one or more subregions within region. A
* conformant implementation that supports RegionAndSubregions shall support
* a subregions field containing at least eight entries.
*/
RegionAndSubregions ::= SEQUENCE {
region Uint8,
subregions SequenceOfUint16
}
/**
* @brief This type is used for clarity of definitions.
*/
SequenceOfRegionAndSubregions ::= SEQUENCE OF RegionAndSubregions
/**
* @brief This structure contains an estimate of 3D location. The details of
* the structure are given in the definitions of the individual fields below.
*
* @note The units used in this data structure are consistent with the
* location data structures used in SAE J2735 [B26], though the encoding is
* incompatible.
*/
ThreeDLocation ::= SEQUENCE {
latitude Latitude,
longitude Longitude,
elevation Elevation
}
/**
* @brief This type contains an INTEGER encoding an estimate of the latitude
* with precision 1/10th microdegree relative to the World Geodetic System
* (WGS)-84 datum as defined in NIMA Technical Report TR8350.2.
* The integer in the latitude field is no more than 900 000 000 and no less
* than ?900 000 000, except that the value 900 000 001 is used to indicate
* the latitude was not available to the sender.
*/
Latitude ::= NinetyDegreeInt
/**
* @brief This type contains an INTEGER encoding an estimate of the longitude
* with precision 1/10th microdegree relative to the World Geodetic System
* (WGS)-84 datum as defined in NIMA Technical Report TR8350.2.
* The integer in the longitude field is no more than 1 800 000 000 and no
* less than ?1 799 999 999, except that the value 1 800 000 001 is used to
* indicate that the longitude was not available to the sender.
*/
Longitude ::= OneEightyDegreeInt
/**
* @brief This structure contains an estimate of the geodetic altitude above
* or below the WGS84 ellipsoid. The 16-bit value is interpreted as an
* integer number of decimeters representing the height above a minimum
* height of -409.5 m, with the maximum height being 6143.9 m.
*/
Elevation ::= Uint16
/**
* @brief The integer in the latitude field is no more than 900,000,000 and
* no less than -900,000,000, except that the value 900,000,001 is used to
* indicate the latitude was not available to the sender.
*/
NinetyDegreeInt ::= INTEGER {
min (-900000000),
max (900000000),
unknown (900000001)
} (-900000000..900000001)
/**
* @brief The known latitudes are from -900,000,000 to +900,000,000 in 0.1
* microdegree intervals.
*/
KnownLatitude ::= NinetyDegreeInt (min..max)
/**
* @brief The value 900,000,001 indicates that the latitude was not
* available to the sender.
*/
UnknownLatitude ::= NinetyDegreeInt (unknown)
/**
* @brief The integer in the longitude field is no more than 1,800,000,000
* and no less than -1,799,999,999, except that the value 1,800,000,001 is
* used to indicate that the longitude was not available to the sender.
*/
OneEightyDegreeInt ::= INTEGER {
min (-1799999999),
max (1800000000),
unknown (1800000001)
} (-1799999999..1800000001)
/**
* @brief The known longitudes are from -1,799,999,999 to +1,800,000,000 in
* 0.1 microdegree intervals.
*/
KnownLongitude ::= OneEightyDegreeInt (min..max)
/**
* @brief The value 1,800,000,001 indicates that the longitude was not
* available to the sender.
*/
UnknownLongitude ::= OneEightyDegreeInt (unknown)
--***************************************************************************--
-- Crypto Structures --
--***************************************************************************--
/**
* @brief This structure represents a signature for a supported public key
* algorithm. It may be contained within SignedData or Certificate.
*
* @note Critical information fields: If present, this is a critical
* information field as defined in 5.2.5. An implementation that does not
* recognize the indicated CHOICE for this type when verifying a signed SPDU
* shall indicate that the signed SPDU is invalid in the sense of 4.2.2.3.2,
* that is, it is invalid in the sense that its validity cannot be
* established.
*
* @note Canonicalization: This data structure is subject to canonicalization
* for the relevant operations specified in 6.1.2. The canonicalization
* applies to instances of this data structure of form EcdsaP256Signature
* and EcdsaP384Signature.
*/
Signature ::= CHOICE {
ecdsaNistP256Signature EcdsaP256Signature,
ecdsaBrainpoolP256r1Signature EcdsaP256Signature,
...,
ecdsaBrainpoolP384r1Signature EcdsaP384Signature,
ecdsaNistP384Signature EcdsaP384Signature,
sm2Signature EcsigP256Signature
}
/**
* @brief This structure represents an ECDSA signature. The signature is
* generated as specified in 5.3.1.
*
* If the signature process followed the specification of FIPS 186-4
* and output the integer r, r is represented as an EccP256CurvePoint
* indicating the selection x-only.
*
* If the signature process followed the specification of SEC 1 and
* output the elliptic curve point R to allow for fast verification, R is
* represented as an EccP256CurvePoint indicating the choice compressed-y-0,
* compressed-y-1, or uncompressed at the sender's discretion.
*
* @note Canonicalization: This data structure is subject to canonicalization
* for the relevant operations specified in 6.1.2. When this data structure
* is canonicalized, the EccP256CurvePoint in rSig is represented in the
* form x-only.
*
* @note When the signature is of form x-only, the x-value in rSig is
* an integer mod n, the order of the group; when the signature is of form
* compressed-y-\*, the x-value in rSig is an integer mod p, the underlying
* prime defining the finite field. In principle this means that to convert a
* signature from form compressed-y-\* to form x-only, the converter checks
* the x-value to see if it lies between n and p and reduces it mod n if so.
* In practice this check is unnecessary: Haase's Theorem states that
* difference between n and p is always less than 2*square-root(p), and so the
* chance that an integer lies between n and p, for a 256-bit curve, is
* bounded above by approximately square-root(p)/p or 2^(-128). For the
* 256-bit curves in this standard, the exact values of n and p in hexadecimal
* are:
*
* NISTp256:
* - p = FFFFFFFF00000001000000000000000000000000FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF
* - n = FFFFFFFF00000000FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFBCE6FAADA7179E84F3B9CAC2FC632551
*
* Brainpoolp256:
* - p = A9FB57DBA1EEA9BC3E660A909D838D726E3BF623D52620282013481D1F6E5377
* - n = A9FB57DBA1EEA9BC3E660A909D838D718C397AA3B561A6F7901E0E82974856A7
*/
EcdsaP256Signature ::= SEQUENCE {
rSig EccP256CurvePoint,
sSig OCTET STRING (SIZE (32))
}
/**
* @brief This structure represents an ECDSA signature. The signature is
* generated as specified in 5.3.1.
*
* If the signature process followed the specification of FIPS 186-4
* and output the integer r, r is represented as an EccP384CurvePoint
* indicating the selection x-only.
*
* If the signature process followed the specification of SEC 1 and
* output the elliptic curve point R to allow for fast verification, R is
* represented as an EccP384CurvePoint indicating the choice compressed-y-0,
* compressed-y-1, or uncompressed at the sender's discretion.
*
* @note Canonicalization: This data structure is subject to canonicalization
* for the relevant operations specified in 6.1.2. When this data structure
* is canonicalized, the EccP384CurvePoint in rSig is represented in the
* form x-only.
*
* @note When the signature is of form x-only, the x-value in rSig is
* an integer mod n, the order of the group; when the signature is of form
* compressed-y-\*, the x-value in rSig is an integer mod p, the underlying
* prime defining the finite field. In principle this means that to convert a
* signature from form compressed-y-* to form x-only, the converter checks the
* x-value to see if it lies between n and p and reduces it mod n if so. In
* practice this check is unnecessary: Haase's Theorem states that difference
* between n and p is always less than 2*square-root(p), and so the chance
* that an integer lies between n and p, for a 384-bit curve, is bounded
* above by approximately square-root(p)/p or 2^(-192). For the 384-bit curve
* in this standard, the exact values of n and p in hexadecimal are:
* - p = 8CB91E82A3386D280F5D6F7E50E641DF152F7109ED5456B412B1DA197FB71123
* ACD3A729901D1A71874700133107EC53
* - n = 8CB91E82A3386D280F5D6F7E50E641DF152F7109ED5456B31F166E6CAC0425A7
* CF3AB6AF6B7FC3103B883202E9046565
*/
EcdsaP384Signature ::= SEQUENCE {
rSig EccP384CurvePoint,
sSig OCTET STRING (SIZE (48))
}
/**
* @brief This structure represents a elliptic curve signature where the
* component r is constrained to be an integer. This structure supports SM2
* signatures as specified in 5.3.1.3.
*/
EcsigP256Signature ::= SEQUENCE {
rSig OCTET STRING (SIZE (32)),
sSig OCTET STRING (SIZE (32))
}
/**
* @brief This structure specifies a point on an elliptic curve in Weierstrass
* form defined over a 256-bit prime number. The curves supported in this
* standard are NIST p256 as defined in FIPS 186-4, Brainpool p256r1 as
* defined in RFC 5639, and the SM2 curve as defined in GB/T 32918.5-2017.
* The fields in this structure are OCTET STRINGS produced with the elliptic
* curve point encoding and decoding methods defined in subclause 5.5.6 of
* IEEE Std 1363-2000. The x-coordinate is encoded as an unsigned integer of
* length 32 octets in network byte order for all values of the CHOICE; the
* encoding of the y-coordinate y depends on whether the point is x-only,
* compressed, or uncompressed. If the point is x-only, y is omitted. If the
* point is compressed, the value of type depends on the least significant
* bit of y: if the least significant bit of y is 0, type takes the value
* compressed-y-0, and if the least significant bit of y is 1, type takes the
* value compressed-y-1. If the point is uncompressed, y is encoded explicitly
* as an unsigned integer of length 32 octets in network byte order.
*
* @note Canonicalization: This data structure is subject to canonicalization
* for the relevant operations specified in 6.1.2 if it appears in a
* HeaderInfo or in a ToBeSignedCertificate. See the definitions of HeaderInfo
* and ToBeSignedCertificate for a specification of the canonicalization
* operations.
*/
EccP256CurvePoint::= CHOICE {
x-only OCTET STRING (SIZE (32)),
fill NULL,
compressed-y-0 OCTET STRING (SIZE (32)),
compressed-y-1 OCTET STRING (SIZE (32)),
uncompressedP256 SEQUENCE {
x OCTET STRING (SIZE (32)),
y OCTET STRING (SIZE (32))
}
}
/**
* @brief This structure specifies a point on an elliptic curve in
* Weierstrass form defined over a 384-bit prime number. The only supported
* such curve in this standard is Brainpool p384r1 as defined in RFC 5639.
* The fields in this structure are octet strings produced with the elliptic
* curve point encoding and decoding methods defined in subclause 5.5.6 of
* IEEE Std 1363-2000. The x-coordinate is encoded as an unsigned integer of
* length 48 octets in network byte order for all values of the CHOICE; the
* encoding of the y-coordinate y depends on whether the point is x-only,
* compressed, or uncompressed. If the point is x-only, y is omitted. If the
* point is compressed, the value of type depends on the least significant
* bit of y: if the least significant bit of y is 0, type takes the value
* compressed-y-0, and if the least significant bit of y is 1, type takes the
* value compressed-y-1. If the point is uncompressed, y is encoded
* explicitly as an unsigned integer of length 48 octets in network byte order.
*
* @note Canonicalization: This data structure is subject to canonicalization
* for the relevant operations specified in 6.1.2 if it appears in a
* HeaderInfo or in a ToBeSignedCertificate. See the definitions of HeaderInfo
* and ToBeSignedCertificate for a specification of the canonicalization
* operations.
*/
EccP384CurvePoint::= CHOICE {
x-only OCTET STRING (SIZE (48)),
fill NULL,
compressed-y-0 OCTET STRING (SIZE (48)),
compressed-y-1 OCTET STRING (SIZE (48)),
uncompressedP384 SEQUENCE {
x OCTET STRING (SIZE (48)),
y OCTET STRING (SIZE (48))
}
}
/**
* @brief This enumerated value indicates supported symmetric algorithms. The
* algorithm identifier identifies both the algorithm itself and a specific
* mode of operation. The symmetric algorithms supported in this version of
* this standard are AES-128 and SM4. The only mode of operation supported is
* Counter Mode Encryption With Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication
* Code (CCM). Full details are given in 5.3.8.
*/
SymmAlgorithm ::= ENUMERATED {
aes128Ccm,
...,
sm4Ccm
}
/**
* @brief This structure identifies a hash algorithm. The value sha256,
* indicates SHA-256. The value sha384 indicates SHA-384. The value sm3
* indicates SM3. See 5.3.3 for more details.
*
* @note Critical information fields: This is a critical information field as
* defined in 5.2.6. An implementation that does not recognize the enumerated
* value of this type in a signed SPDU when verifying a signed SPDU shall
* indicate that the signed SPDU is invalid in the sense of 4.2.2.3.2, that
* is, it is invalid in the sense that its validity cannot be established.
*/
HashAlgorithm ::= ENUMERATED {
sha256,
...,
sha384,
sm3
}
/**
* @brief This data structure is used to transfer a 16-byte symmetric key
* encrypted using ECIES as specified in IEEE Std 1363a-2004. The symmetric
* key is input to the key encryption process with no headers, encapsulation,
* or length indication. Encryption and decryption are carried out as
* specified in 5.3.5.1.
*
* @param v: is the sender's ephemeral public key, which is the output V from
* encryption as specified in 5.3.5.1.
*
* @param c: is the encrypted symmetric key, which is the output C from
* encryption as specified in 5.3.5.1. The algorithm for the symmetric key
* is identified by the CHOICE indicated in the following SymmetricCiphertext.
* For ECIES this shall be AES-128.
*
* @param t: is the authentication tag, which is the output tag from
* encryption as specified in 5.3.5.1.
*/
EciesP256EncryptedKey ::= SEQUENCE {
v EccP256CurvePoint,
c OCTET STRING (SIZE (16)),
t OCTET STRING (SIZE (16))
}
/**
* @brief This data structure is used to transfer a 16-byte symmetric key
* encrypted using SM2 encryption as specified in 5.3.3. The symmetric key is
* input to the key encryption process with no headers, encapsulation, or
* length indication. Encryption and decryption are carried out as specified
* in 5.3.5.2.
*
* @param v: is the sender's ephemeral public key, which is the output V from
* encryption as specified in 5.3.5.2.
*
* @param c: is the encrypted symmetric key, which is the output C from
* encryption as specified in 5.3.5.2. The algorithm for the symmetric key
* is identified by the CHOICE indicated in the following SymmetricCiphertext.
* For SM2 this algorithm shall be SM4.
*
* @param t: is the authentication tag, which is the output tag from
* encryption as specified in 5.3.5.2.
*/
EcencP256EncryptedKey ::= SEQUENCE {
v EccP256CurvePoint,
c OCTET STRING (SIZE (16)),
t OCTET STRING (SIZE (32))
}
/**
* @brief This structure contains an encryption key, which may be a public or
* a symmetric key.
*
* @note Canonicalization: This data structure is subject to canonicalization
* for the relevant operations specified in 6.1.2 if it appears in a
* HeaderInfo or in a ToBeSignedCertificate. The canonicalization applies to
* the PublicEncryptionKey. See the definitions of HeaderInfo and
* ToBeSignedCertificate for a specification of the canonicalization
* operations.
*/
EncryptionKey ::= CHOICE {
public PublicEncryptionKey,
symmetric SymmetricEncryptionKey
}
/**
* @brief This structure specifies a public encryption key and the associated
* symmetric algorithm which is used for bulk data encryption when encrypting
* for that public key.
*
* @note Canonicalization: This data structure is subject to canonicalization
* for the relevant operations specified in 6.1.2 if it appears in a
* HeaderInfo or in a ToBeSignedCertificate. The canonicalization applies to
* the BasePublicEncryptionKey. See the definitions of HeaderInfo and
* ToBeSignedCertificate for a specification of the canonicalization
* operations.
*/
PublicEncryptionKey ::= SEQUENCE {
supportedSymmAlg SymmAlgorithm,
publicKey BasePublicEncryptionKey
}
/**
* @brief This structure specifies the bytes of a public encryption key for
* a particular algorithm. Supported public key encryption algorithms are
* defined in 5.3.5.
*
* @note Canonicalization: This data structure is subject to canonicalization
* for the relevant operations specified in 6.1.2 if it appears in a
* HeaderInfo or in a ToBeSignedCertificate. See the definitions of HeaderInfo
* and ToBeSignedCertificate for a specification of the canonicalization
* operations.
*/
BasePublicEncryptionKey ::= CHOICE {
eciesNistP256 EccP256CurvePoint,
eciesBrainpoolP256r1 EccP256CurvePoint,
...,
ecencSm2 EccP256CurvePoint
}
/**
* @brief This structure represents a public key and states with what
* algorithm the public key is to be used. Cryptographic mechanisms are
* defined in 5.3.
* An EccP256CurvePoint or EccP384CurvePoint within a PublicVerificationKey
* structure is invalid if it indicates the choice x-only.
*
* @note Critical information fields: If present, this is a critical
* information field as defined in 5.2.6. An implementation that does not
* recognize the indicated CHOICE when verifying a signed SPDU shall indicate
* that the signed SPDU is invalid indicate that the signed SPDU is invalid
* in the sense of 4.2.2.3.2, that is, it is invalid in the sense that its
* validity cannot be established.
*
* @note Canonicalization: This data structure is subject to canonicalization
* for the relevant operations specified in 6.1.2. The canonicalization
* applies to the EccP256CurvePoint and the Ecc384CurvePoint. Both forms of
* point are encoded in compressed form, i.e., such that the choice indicated
* within the Ecc*CurvePoint is compressed-y-0 or compressed-y-1.
*/
PublicVerificationKey ::= CHOICE {
ecdsaNistP256 EccP256CurvePoint,
ecdsaBrainpoolP256r1 EccP256CurvePoint,
... ,
ecdsaBrainpoolP384r1 EccP384CurvePoint,
ecdsaNistP384 EccP384CurvePoint,
ecsigSm2 EccP256CurvePoint
}
/**
* @brief This structure provides the key bytes for use with an identified
* symmetric algorithm. The supported symmetric algorithms are AES-128 and
* SM4 in CCM mode as specified in 5.3.8.
*/
SymmetricEncryptionKey ::= CHOICE {
aes128Ccm OCTET STRING(SIZE(16)),
...,
sm4Ccm OCTET STRING(SIZE(16))
}
--***************************************************************************--
-- PSID / ITS-AID --
--***************************************************************************--
/**
* @brief This structure represents the permissions that the certificate
* holder has with respect to activities for a single application area,
* identified by a Psid.
*
* @note The determination as to whether the activities are consistent with
* the permissions indicated by the PSID and ServiceSpecificPermissions is
* made by the SDEE and not by the SDS; the SDS provides the PSID and SSP
* information to the SDEE to enable the SDEE to make that determination.
* See 5.2.4.3.3 for more information.
*
* @note The SDEE specification is expected to specify what application
* activities are permitted by particular ServiceSpecificPermissions values.
* The SDEE specification is also expected EITHER to specify application
* activities that are permitted if the ServiceSpecificPermissions is
* omitted, OR to state that the ServiceSpecificPermissions need to always be
* present.
*
* @note Consistency with signed SPDU: As noted in 5.1.1,
* consistency between the SSP and the signed SPDU is defined by rules
* specific to the given PSID and is out of scope for this standard.
*
* @note Consistency with issuing certificate: If a certificate has an
* appPermissions entry A for which the ssp field is omitted, A is consistent
* with the issuing certificate if the issuing certificate contains a
* PsidSspRange P for which the following holds:
* - The psid field in P is equal to the psid field in A and one of the
* following is true:
* - The sspRange field in P indicates all.
* - The sspRange field in P indicates opaque and one of the entries in
* opaque is an OCTET STRING of length 0.
*
* For consistency rules for other forms of the ssp field, see the
* following subclauses.
*/
PsidSsp ::= SEQUENCE {
psid Psid,
ssp ServiceSpecificPermissions OPTIONAL
}
/**
* @brief This type is used for clarity of definitions.
*/
SequenceOfPsidSsp ::= SEQUENCE OF PsidSsp
/**
* @brief This type represents the PSID defined in IEEE Std 1609.12.
*/
Psid ::= INTEGER (0..MAX)
/**
* @brief This type is used for clarity of definitions.
*/
SequenceOfPsid ::= SEQUENCE OF Psid
/**
* @brief This structure represents the Service Specific Permissions (SSP)
* relevant to a given entry in a PsidSsp. The meaning of the SSP is specific
* to the associated Psid. SSPs may be PSID-specific octet strings or
* bitmap-based. See Annex C for further discussion of how application
* specifiers may choose which SSP form to use.
*
* @note Consistency with issuing certificate: If a certificate has an
* appPermissions entry A for which the ssp field is opaque, A is consistent
* with the issuing certificate if the issuing certificate contains one of
* the following:
* - (OPTION 1) A SubjectPermissions field indicating the choice all and
* no PsidSspRange field containing the psid field in A;
* - (OPTION 2) A PsidSspRange P for which the following holds:
* - The psid field in P is equal to the psid field in A and one of the
* following is true:
* - The sspRange field in P indicates all.
* - The sspRange field in P indicates opaque and one of the entries in
* the opaque field in P is an OCTET STRING identical to the opaque field in
* A.
*
* For consistency rules for other types of ServiceSpecificPermissions,
* see the following subclauses.
*/
ServiceSpecificPermissions ::= CHOICE {
opaque OCTET STRING (SIZE(0..MAX)),
...,
bitmapSsp BitmapSsp
}
/**
* @brief This structure represents a bitmap representation of a SSP. The
* mapping of the bits of the bitmap to constraints on the signed SPDU is
* PSID-specific.
*
* @note Consistency with issuing certificate: If a certificate has an
* appPermissions entry A for which the ssp field is bitmapSsp, A is
* consistent with the issuing certificate if the certificate contains one
* of the following:
* - (OPTION 1) A SubjectPermissions field indicating the choice all and
* no PsidSspRange field containing the psid field in A;
* - (OPTION 2) A PsidSspRange P for which the following holds:
* - The psid field in P is equal to the psid field in A and one of the
* following is true:
* - EITHER The sspRange field in P indicates all
* - OR The sspRange field in P indicates bitmapSspRange and for every
* bit set to 1 in the sspBitmask in P, the bit in the identical position in
* the sspValue in A is set equal to the bit in that position in the
* sspValue in P.
*
* @note A BitmapSsp B is consistent with a BitmapSspRange R if for every
* bit set to 1 in the sspBitmask in R, the bit in the identical position in
* B is set equal to the bit in that position in the sspValue in R. For each
* bit set to 0 in the sspBitmask in R, the corresponding bit in the
* identical position in B may be freely set to 0 or 1, i.e., if a bit is
* set to 0 in the sspBitmask in R, the value of corresponding bit in the
* identical position in B has no bearing on whether B and R are consistent.
*/
BitmapSsp ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(0..31))
/**
* @brief This structure represents the certificate issuing or requesting
* permissions of the certificate holder with respect to one particular set
* of application permissions.
*
* @param psid: identifies the application area.
*
* @param sspRange: identifies the SSPs associated with that PSID for which
* the holder may issue or request certificates. If sspRange is omitted, the
* holder may issue or request certificates for any SSP for that PSID.
*/
PsidSspRange ::= SEQUENCE {
psid Psid,
sspRange SspRange OPTIONAL
}
/**
* @brief This type is used for clarity of definitions.
*/
SequenceOfPsidSspRange ::= SEQUENCE OF PsidSspRange
/**
* @brief This structure identifies the SSPs associated with a PSID for
* which the holder may issue or request certificates.
*
* @note Consistency with issuing certificate: If a certificate has a
* PsidSspRange A for which the ssp field is opaque, A is consistent with
* the issuing certificate if the issuing certificate contains one of the
* following:
* - (OPTION 1) A SubjectPermissions field indicating the choice all and
* no PsidSspRange field containing the psid field in A;
* - (OPTION 2) A PsidSspRange P for which the following holds:
* - The psid field in P is equal to the psid field in A and one of the
* following is true:
* - The sspRange field in P indicates all.
* - The sspRange field in P indicates opaque, and the sspRange field in
* A indicates opaque, and every OCTET STRING within the opaque in A is a
* duplicate of an OCTET STRING within the opaque in P.
*
* If a certificate has a PsidSspRange A for which the ssp field is all,
* A is consistent with the issuing certificate if the issuing certificate
* contains a PsidSspRange P for which the following holds:
* - (OPTION 1) A SubjectPermissions field indicating the choice all and
* no PsidSspRange field containing the psid field in A;
* - (OPTION 2) A PsidSspRange P for which the psid field in P is equal to
* the psid field in A and the sspRange field in P indicates all.
*
* For consistency rules for other types of SspRange, see the following
* subclauses.
*
* @note The choice "all" may also be indicated by omitting the
* SspRange in the enclosing PsidSspRange structure. Omitting the SspRange is
* preferred to explicitly indicating "all".
*/
SspRange ::= CHOICE {
opaque SequenceOfOctetString,
all NULL,
...,
bitmapSspRange BitmapSspRange
}
/**
* @brief This structure represents a bitmap representation of a SSP. The
* sspValue indicates permissions. The sspBitmask contains an octet string
* used to permit or constrain sspValue fields in issued certificates. The
* sspValue and sspBitmask fields shall be of the same length.
*
* @note Consistency with issuing certificate: If a certificate has an
* PsidSspRange value P for which the sspRange field is bitmapSspRange,
* P is consistent with the issuing certificate if the issuing certificate
* contains one of the following:
* - (OPTION 1) A SubjectPermissions field indicating the choice all and
* no PsidSspRange field containing the psid field in P;
* - (OPTION 2) A PsidSspRange R for which the following holds:
* - The psid field in R is equal to the psid field in P and one of the
* following is true:
* - EITHER The sspRange field in R indicates all
* - OR The sspRange field in R indicates bitmapSspRange and for every
* bit set to 1 in the sspBitmask in R:
* - The bit in the identical position in the sspBitmask in P is set
* equal to 1, AND
* - The bit in the identical position in the sspValue in P is set equal
* to the bit in that position in the sspValue in R.
*
* Reference ETSI TS 103 097 for more information on bitmask SSPs.
*/
BitmapSspRange ::= SEQUENCE {
sspValue OCTET STRING (SIZE(1..32)),
sspBitmask OCTET STRING (SIZE(1..32))
}
/**
* @brief This type is used for clarity of definitions.
*/
SequenceOfOctetString ::=
SEQUENCE (SIZE (0..MAX)) OF OCTET STRING (SIZE(0..MAX))
--***************************************************************************--
-- Certificate Components --
--***************************************************************************--
/**
* @brief This field contains the certificate holder's assurance level, which
* indicates the security of both the platform and storage of secret keys as
* well as the confidence in this assessment.
*
* This field is encoded as defined in Table 1, where "A" denotes bit
* fields specifying an assurance level, "R" reserved bit fields, and "C" bit
* fields specifying the confidence.
*
* Table 1: Bitwise encoding of subject assurance
*
* | Bit number | 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 0 |
* | -------------- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
* | Interpretation | A | A | A | R | R | R | C | C |
*
* In Table 1, bit number 0 denotes the least significant bit. Bit 7
* to bit 5 denote the device's assurance levels, bit 4 to bit 2 are reserved
* for future use, and bit 1 and bit 0 denote the confidence.
*
* The specification of these assurance levels as well as the
* encoding of the confidence levels is outside the scope of the present
* standard. It can be assumed that a higher assurance value indicates that
* the holder is more trusted than the holder of a certificate with lower
* assurance value and the same confidence value.
*
* @note This field was originally specified in ETSI TS 103 097 and
* future uses of this field are anticipated to be consistent with future
* versions of that standard.
*/
SubjectAssurance ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(1))
/**
* @brief This integer identifies a series of CRLs issued under the authority
* of a particular CRACA.
*/
CrlSeries ::= Uint16
--***************************************************************************--
-- Pseudonym Linkage --
--***************************************************************************--
/**
* @brief This atomic type is used in the definition of other data structures.
*/
IValue ::= Uint16
/**
* @brief This is a UTF-8 string as defined in IETF RFC 3629. The contents
* are determined by policy.
*/
Hostname ::= UTF8String (SIZE(0..255))
/**
* @brief This is the individual linkage value. See 5.1.3 and 7.3 for details
* of use.
*/
LinkageValue ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(9))
/**
* @brief This is the group linkage value. See 5.1.3 and 7.3 for details of
* use.
*/
GroupLinkageValue ::= SEQUENCE {
jValue OCTET STRING (SIZE(4)),
value OCTET STRING (SIZE(9))
}
/**
* @brief This structure contains a LA Identifier for use in the algorithms
* specified in 5.1.3.4.
*/
LaId ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(2))
/**
* @brief This type is used for clarity of definitions.
*/
SequenceOfLinkageSeed ::= SEQUENCE OF LinkageSeed
/**
* @brief This structure contains a linkage seed value for use in the
* algorithms specified in 5.1.3.4.
*/
LinkageSeed ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(16))
--***************************************************************************--
-- Information Object Classes and Sets --
--***************************************************************************--
/**
* @brief This structure is the Information Object Class used to contain
* information about a set of certificate extensions that are associated with
* each other: an AppExtension, a CertIssueExtension, and a
* CertRequestExtension.
*/
CERT-EXT-TYPE ::= CLASS {
&id ExtId,
&App,
&Issue,
&Req
} WITH SYNTAX {ID &id APP &App ISSUE &Issue REQUEST &Req}
/**
* @brief This parameterized type represents a (id, content) pair drawn from
* the set ExtensionTypes, which is constrained to contain objects defined by
* the class EXT-TYPE.
*/
Extension {EXT-TYPE : ExtensionTypes} ::= SEQUENCE {
id EXT-TYPE.&extId({ExtensionTypes}),
content EXT-TYPE.&ExtContent({ExtensionTypes}{@.id})
}
/**
* @brief This class defines objects in a form suitable for import into the
* definition of HeaderInfo.
*/
EXT-TYPE ::= CLASS {
&extId ExtId,
&ExtContent
} WITH SYNTAX {&ExtContent IDENTIFIED BY &extId}
/**
* @brief This type is used as an identifier for instances of ExtContent
* within an EXT-TYPE.
*/
ExtId ::= INTEGER(0..255)
END
ieee1609.2-ieee/Ieee1609Dot2Crl.asn 0000775 0000000 0000000 00000004402 14326475135 0016453 0 ustar 00root root 0000000 0000000 --***************************************************************************--
-- IEEE Std 1609.2: CRL Data Types --
--***************************************************************************--
/**
* @note Section references in this file are to clauses in IEEE Std
* 1609.2 unless indicated otherwise. Full forms of acronyms and
* abbreviations used in this file are specified in 3.2.
*/
Ieee1609Dot2Crl {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111)
standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2)
crl(3) major-version-3(3) minor-version-2(2)}
DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS ::= BEGIN
IMPORTS
Ieee1609Dot2Data
FROM Ieee1609Dot2 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111)
standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609)
dot2(2) base(1) schema(1) major-version-2(2) minor-version-6(6)}
WITH SUCCESSORS
Opaque,
Psid
FROM Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111)
standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2)
base(1) base-types(2) major-version-2(2) minor-version-4(4)}
WITH SUCCESSORS
CrlContents
FROM Ieee1609Dot2CrlBaseTypes {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111)
standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2)
crl(3) base-types(2) major-version-3(3) minor-version-2(2)}
WITH SUCCESSORS
;
/**
* @brief This is the PSID for the CRL application.
*/
CrlPsid ::= Psid(256)
/**
* @brief This structure is the SPDU used to contain a signed CRL. A valid
* signed CRL meets the validity criteria of 7.4.
*/
SecuredCrl ::= Ieee1609Dot2Data (WITH COMPONENTS {...,
content (WITH COMPONENTS {
signedData (WITH COMPONENTS {...,
tbsData (WITH COMPONENTS {
payload (WITH COMPONENTS {...,
data (WITH COMPONENTS {...,
content (WITH COMPONENTS {
unsecuredData (CONTAINING CrlContents)
})
})
}),
headerInfo (WITH COMPONENTS {...,
psid (CrlPsid),
generationTime ABSENT,
expiryTime ABSENT,
generationLocation ABSENT,
p2pcdLearningRequest ABSENT,
missingCrlIdentifier ABSENT,
encryptionKey ABSENT
})
})
})
})
})
END
ieee1609.2-ieee/Ieee1609Dot2CrlBaseTypes.asn 0000775 0000000 0000000 00000041026 14326475135 0020276 0 ustar 00root root 0000000 0000000 --***************************************************************************--
-- IEEE Std 1609.2: CRL Base Data Types --
--***************************************************************************--
/**
* @note Section references in this file are to clauses in IEEE Std
* 1609.2 unless indicated otherwise. Full forms of acronyms and
* abbreviations used in this file are specified in 3.2.
*/
Ieee1609Dot2CrlBaseTypes {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111)
standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2)
crl(3) base-types(2) major-version-3(3) minor-version-2(2)}
DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS ::= BEGIN
IMPORTS
CrlSeries,
Duration,
GeographicRegion,
HashedId8,
HashedId10,
IValue,
LaId,
LinkageSeed,
Opaque,
Psid,
SequenceOfLinkageSeed,
Signature,
Time32,
Uint3,
Uint8,
Uint16,
Uint32,
ValidityPeriod
FROM Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111)
standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2)
base(1) base-types(2) major-version-2(2) minor-version-4(4)}
WITH SUCCESSORS
;
/**
* @brief The fields in this structure have the following meaning:
*
* @param version: is the version number of the CRL. For this version of this
* standard it is 1.
*
* @param crlSeries: represents the CRL series to which this CRL belongs. This
* is used to determine whether the revocation information in a CRL is relevant
* to a particular certificate as specified in 5.1.3.2.
*
* @param crlCraca: contains the low-order eight octets of the hash of the
* certificate of the Certificate Revocation Authorization CA (CRACA) that
* ultimately authorized the issuance of this CRL. This is used to determine
* whether the revocation information in a CRL is relevant to a particular
* certificate as specified in 5.1.3.2. In a valid signed CRL as specified in
* 7.4 the crlCraca is consistent with the associatedCraca field in the
* Service Specific Permissions as defined in 7.4.3.3. The HashedId8 is
* calculated with the whole-certificate hash algorithm, determined as
* described in 6.4.3, applied to the COER-encoded certificate, canonicalized
* as defined in the definition of Certificate.
*
* @param issueDate: specifies the time when the CRL was issued.
*
* @param nextCrl: contains the time when the next CRL with the same crlSeries
* and cracaId is expected to be issued. The CRL is invalid unless nextCrl is
* strictly after issueDate. This field is used to set the expected update time
* for revocation information associated with the (crlCraca, crlSeries) pair as
* specified in 5.1.3.6.
*
* @param priorityInfo: contains information that assists devices with limited
* storage space in determining which revocation information to retain and
* which to discard.
*
* @param typeSpecific: contains the CRL body.
*/
CrlContents ::= SEQUENCE {
version Uint8 (1),
crlSeries CrlSeries,
crlCraca HashedId8,
issueDate Time32,
nextCrl Time32,
priorityInfo CrlPriorityInfo,
typeSpecific TypeSpecificCrlContents
}
/**
* @brief This data structure contains information that assists devices with
* limited storage space in determining which revocation information to retain
* and which to discard.
*
* @param priority: indicates the priority of the revocation information
* relative to other CRLs issued for certificates with the same cracaId and
* crlSeries values. A higher value for this field indicates higher importance
* of this revocation information.
*
* @note This mechanism is for future use; details are not specified in this
* version of the standard.
*/
CrlPriorityInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
priority Uint8 OPTIONAL,
...
}
/**
* @brief This structure contains type-specific CRL contents.
*
* @param fullHashCrl: contains a full hash-based CRL, i.e., a listing of the
* hashes of all certificates that:
* - contain the indicated cracaId and crlSeries values, and
* - are revoked by hash, and
* - have been revoked, and
* - have not expired.
*
* @param deltaHashCrl: contains a delta hash-based CRL, i.e., a listing of
* the hashes of all certificates that:
* - contain the indicated cracaId and crlSeries values, and
* - are revoked by hash, and
* - have been revoked since the previous CRL that contained the indicated
* cracaId and crlSeries values.
*
* @param fullLinkedCrl and fullLinkedCrlWithAlg: contain a full linkage
* ID-based CRL, i.e., a listing of the individual and/or group linkage data
* for all certificates that:
* - contain the indicated cracaId and crlSeries values, and
* - are revoked by linkage value, and
* - have been revoked, and
* - have not expired.
* The difference between fullLinkedCrl and fullLinkedCrlWithAlg is in how
* the cryptographic algorithms to be used in the seed evolution function and
* linkage value generation function of 5.1.3.4 are communicated to the
* receiver of the CRL. See below in this subclause for details.
*
* @param deltaLinkedCrl and deltaLinkedCrlWithAlg: contain a delta linkage
* ID-based CRL, i.e., a listing of the individual and/or group linkage data
* for all certificates that:
* - contain the specified cracaId and crlSeries values, and
* - are revoked by linkage data, and
* - have been revoked since the previous CRL that contained the indicated
* cracaId and crlSeries values.
* The difference between deltaLinkedCrl and deltaLinkedCrlWithAlg is in how
* the cryptographic algorithms to be used in the seed evolution function
* and linkage value generation function of 5.1.3.4 are communicated to the
* receiver of the CRL. See below in this subclause for details.
*
* @note It is the intent of this standard that once a certificate is revoked,
* it remains revoked for the rest of its lifetime. CRL signers are expected
* to include a revoked certificate on all CRLs issued between the
* certificate's revocation and its expiry.
*
* @note Seed evolution function and linkage value generation function
* identification. In order to derive linkage values per the mechanisms given
* in 5.1.3.4, a receiver needs to know the seed evolution function and the
* linkage value generation function.
*
* If the contents of this structure is a
* ToBeSignedLinkageValueCrlWithAlgIdentifier, then the seed evolution function
* and linkage value generation function are given explicitly as specified in
* the specification of ToBeSignedLinkageValueCrlWithAlgIdentifier.
*
* If the contents of this structure is a ToBeSignedLinkageValueCrl, then the
* seed evolution function and linkage value generation function are obtained
* based on the crlCraca field in the CrlContents:
* - If crlCraca was obtained with SHA-256 or SHA-384, then
* seedEvolutionFunctionIdentifier is seedEvoFn1-sha256 and
* linkageValueGenerationFunctionIdentifier is lvGenFn1-aes128.
* - If crlCraca was obtained with SM3, then seedEvolutionFunctionIdentifier
* is seedEvoFn1-sm3 and linkageValueGenerationFunctionIdentifier is
* lvGenFn1-sm4.
*/
TypeSpecificCrlContents ::= CHOICE {
fullHashCrl ToBeSignedHashIdCrl,
deltaHashCrl ToBeSignedHashIdCrl,
fullLinkedCrl ToBeSignedLinkageValueCrl,
deltaLinkedCrl ToBeSignedLinkageValueCrl,
...,
fullLinkedCrlWithAlg ToBeSignedLinkageValueCrlWithAlgIdentifier,
deltaLinkedCrlWithAlg ToBeSignedLinkageValueCrlWithAlgIdentifier
}
/**
* @brief This data structure represents information about a revoked
* certificate.
*
* @param crlSerial: is a counter that increments by 1 every time a new full
* or delta CRL is issued for the indicated crlCraca and crlSeries values.
*
* @param entries: contains the individual revocation information items.
*
* @note To indicate that a hash-based CRL contains no individual revocation
* information items, the recommended approach is for the SEQUENCE OF in the
* SequenceOfHashBasedRevocationInfo in this field to indicate zero entries.
*/
ToBeSignedHashIdCrl ::= SEQUENCE {
crlSerial Uint32,
entries SequenceOfHashBasedRevocationInfo,
...
}
/**
* @brief This type is used for clarity of definitions.
*/
SequenceOfHashBasedRevocationInfo ::=
SEQUENCE OF HashBasedRevocationInfo
/**
* @brief In this structure:
*
* @param id: is the HashedId10 identifying the revoked certificate. The
* HashedId10 is calculated with the whole-certificate hash algorithm,
* determined as described in 6.4.3, applied to the COER-encoded certificate,
* canonicalized as defined in the definition of Certificate.
*
* @param expiry: is the value computed from the validity period's start and
* duration values in that certificate.
*/
HashBasedRevocationInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
id HashedId10,
expiry Time32,
...
}
/**
* @brief In this structure:
*
* @param iRev: is the value iRev used in the algorithm given in 5.1.3.4. This
* value applies to all linkage-based revocation information included within
* either indvidual or groups.
*
* @param indexWithinI: is a counter that is set to 0 for the first CRL issued
* for the indicated combination of crlCraca, crlSeries, and iRev, and
* increments by 1 every time a new full or delta CRL is issued for the
* indicated crlCraca and crlSeries values without changing iRev.
*
* @param individual: contains individual linkage data.
*
* @note To indicate that a linkage ID-based CRL contains no individual
* linkage data, the recommended approach is for the SEQUENCE OF in the
* SequenceOfJMaxGroup in this field to indicate zero entries.
*
* @param groups: contains group linkage data.
*
* @note To indicate that a linkage ID-based CRL contains no group linkage
* data, the recommended approach is for the SEQUENCE OF in the
* SequenceOfGroupCrlEntry in this field to indicate zero entries.
*
* @param groupsSingleSeed: contains group linkage data generated with a single
* seed.
*/
ToBeSignedLinkageValueCrl ::= SEQUENCE {
iRev IValue,
indexWithinI Uint8,
individual SequenceOfJMaxGroup OPTIONAL,
groups SequenceOfGroupCrlEntry OPTIONAL,
...,
groupsSingleSeed SequenceOfGroupSingleSeedCrlEntry OPTIONAL
} (WITH COMPONENTS {..., individual PRESENT} |
WITH COMPONENTS {..., groups PRESENT} |
WITH COMPONENTS {..., groupsSingleSeed PRESENT})
/**
* @brief This type is used for clarity of definitions.
*/
SequenceOfJMaxGroup ::= SEQUENCE OF JMaxGroup
/**
* @brief In this structure:
*
* @param jMax: is the value jMax used in the algorithm given in 5.1.3.4. This
* value applies to all linkage-based revocation information included within
* contents.
*
* @param contents: contains individual linkage data.
*/
JMaxGroup ::= SEQUENCE {
jmax Uint8,
contents SequenceOfLAGroup,
...
}
/**
* @brief This type is used for clarity of definitions.
*/
SequenceOfLAGroup ::= SEQUENCE OF LAGroup
/**
* @brief In this structure:
*
* @param la1Id: is the value LinkageAuthorityIdentifier1 used in the
* algorithm given in 5.1.3.4. This value applies to all linkage-based
* revocation information included within contents.
*
* @param la2Id: is the value LinkageAuthorityIdentifier2 used in the
* algorithm given in 5.1.3.4. This value applies to all linkage-based
* revocation information included within contents.
*
* @param contents: contains individual linkage data.
*/
LAGroup ::= SEQUENCE {
la1Id LaId,
la2Id LaId,
contents SequenceOfIMaxGroup,
...
}
/**
* @brief This type is used for clarity of definitions.
*/
SequenceOfIMaxGroup ::= SEQUENCE OF IMaxGroup
/**
* @brief In this structure:
*
* @param iMax indicates that for the entries in contents, revocation
* information need no longer be calculated once iCert > iMax as the holder
* is known to have no more valid certs at that point. iMax is not directly
* used in the calculation of the linkage values, it is used to determine
* when revocation information can safely be deleted.
*
* @param contents contains individual linkage data for certificates that are
* revoked using two seeds, per the algorithm given in per the mechanisms
* given in 5.1.3.4 and with seedEvolutionFunctionIdentifier and
* linkageValueGenerationFunctionIdentifier obtained as specified in 7.3.3.
*
* @param singleSeed contains individual linkage data for certificates that
* are revoked using a single seed, per the algorithm given in per the
* mechanisms given in 5.1.3.4 and with seedEvolutionFunctionIdentifier and
* linkageValueGenerationFunctionIdentifier obtained as specified in 7.3.3.
*/
IMaxGroup ::= SEQUENCE {
iMax Uint16,
contents SequenceOfIndividualRevocation,
...,
singleSeed SequenceOfLinkageSeed OPTIONAL
}
/**
* @brief This type is used for clarity of definitions.
*/
SequenceOfIndividualRevocation ::=
SEQUENCE (SIZE(0..MAX)) OF IndividualRevocation
/**
* @brief In this structure:
*
* @param linkageSeed1 is the value LinkageSeed1 used in the algorithm given
* in 5.1.3.4.
*
* @param linkageSeed2 is the value LinkageSeed2 used in the algorithm given
* in 5.1.3.4.
*/
IndividualRevocation ::= SEQUENCE {
linkageSeed1 LinkageSeed,
linkageSeed2 LinkageSeed,
...
}
/**
* @brief This type is used for clarity of definitions.
*/
SequenceOfGroupCrlEntry ::= SEQUENCE OF GroupCrlEntry
/**
* @brief In this structure:
*
* @param iMax: indicates that for these certificates, revocation information
* need no longer be calculated once iCert > iMax as the holders are known
* to have no more valid certs for that (crlCraca, crlSeries) at that point.
*
* @param la1Id: is the value LinkageAuthorityIdentifier1 used in the
* algorithm given in 5.1.3.4. This value applies to all linkage-based
* revocation information included within contents.
*
* @param linkageSeed1: is the value LinkageSeed1 used in the algorithm given
* in 5.1.3.4.
*
* @param la2Id: is the value LinkageAuthorityIdentifier2 used in the
* algorithm given in 5.1.3.4. This value applies to all linkage-based
* revocation information included within contents.
*
* @param linkageSeed2: is the value LinkageSeed2 used in the algorithm given
* in 5.1.3.4.
*/
GroupCrlEntry ::= SEQUENCE {
iMax Uint16,
la1Id LaId,
linkageSeed1 LinkageSeed,
la2Id LaId,
linkageSeed2 LinkageSeed,
...
}
/**
* @brief In this structure:
*
* @param iRev is the value iRev used in the algorithm given in 5.1.3.4. This
* value applies to all linkage-based revocation information included within
* either indvidual or groups.
*
* @param indexWithinI is a counter that is set to 0 for the first CRL issued
* for the indicated combination of crlCraca, crlSeries, and iRev, and increments by 1 every time a new full or delta CRL is issued for the indicated crlCraca and crlSeries values without changing iRev.
*
* @param seedEvolution contains an identifier for the seed evolution
* function, used as specified in 5.1.3.4.
*
* @param lvGeneration contains an identifier for the linkage value
* generation function, used as specified in 5.1.3.4.
*
* @param individual contains individual linkage data.
*
* @param groups contains group linkage data for linkage value generation
* with two seeds.
*
* @param groupsSingleSeed contains group linkage data for linkage value
* generation with one seed.
*/
ToBeSignedLinkageValueCrlWithAlgIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
iRev IValue,
indexWithinI Uint8,
seedEvolution SeedEvolutionFunctionIdentifier,
lvGeneration LvGenerationFunctionIdentifier,
individual SequenceOfJMaxGroup OPTIONAL,
groups SequenceOfGroupCrlEntry OPTIONAL,
groupsSingleSeed SequenceOfGroupSingleSeedCrlEntry OPTIONAL,
...
} (WITH COMPONENTS {..., individual PRESENT} |
WITH COMPONENTS {..., groups PRESENT} |
WITH COMPONENTS {..., groupsSingleSeed PRESENT})
/**
* @brief This type is used for clarity of definitions.
*/
SequenceOfGroupSingleSeedCrlEntry ::=
SEQUENCE OF GroupSingleSeedCrlEntry
/**
* @brief This structure contains the linkage seed for group revocation with
* a single seed. The seed is used as specified in the algorithms in 5.1.3.4.
*/
GroupSingleSeedCrlEntry ::= SEQUENCE {
iMax Uint16,
laId LaId,
linkageSeed LinkageSeed
}
/**
* @brief This structure contains an identifier for the algorithms specified
* in 5.1.3.4.
*/
ExpansionAlgorithmIdentifier ::= ENUMERATED {
sha256ForI-aesForJ,
sm3ForI-sm4ForJ,
...
}
/**
* @brief This is the identifier for the seed evolution function. See 5.1.3
* for details of use.
*/
SeedEvolutionFunctionIdentifier ::= NULL
/**
* @brief This is the identifier for the linkage value generation function.
* See 5.1.3 for details of use.
*/
LvGenerationFunctionIdentifier ::= NULL
END
ieee1609.2-ieee/README.md 0000664 0000000 0000000 00000000405 14326475135 0014642 0 ustar 00root root 0000000 0000000 # ASN.1 module for IEEE 1609.2
The module was published as a part of delivery **[ETSI TS 103 097 v2.1.1](http://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_ts/103000_103099/103097/02.01.01_60/ts_103097v020101p.pdf)**
The module contains extensions published with IEEE 1609.2.1
ieee1609.2-ieee/asn2md.py 0000775 0000000 0000000 00000030235 14326475135 0015130 0 ustar 00root root 0000000 0000000 #!/usr/bin/env python
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
import argparse # parse arguments
import os.path # getting extension from file
import sys # output and stuff
import re # for regular expressions
import copy # for copy
if (sys.version_info > (3, 0)):
import urllib.parse #
else:
import urllib #
## extract doxygen-tag namespace
RE_MODULE = re.compile( r'^\s*([A-Z][\w-]*)\s*({.*?})?\s*DEFINITIONS.*?::=\s*?BEGIN(.*)END', re.VERBOSE | re.MULTILINE | re.DOTALL)
RE_SPACES = re.compile(r'\s+')
RE_COMMENTS = re.compile(r'^\s*--.*?\n|--.*?(?:--|$)|/\*.*?\*/[\t ]*\n?', re.MULTILINE|re.DOTALL)
RE_BASIC_TYPES = re.compile(r'^OCTET\s+STRING|BIT\s+STRING|BOOLEAN|INTEGER|FLOAT|SEQUENCE|SET|NULL')
#RE_TYPE_BODY_1 = re.compile(r'.*?{(.*)}\s*WITH', re.MULTILINE|re.DOTALL)
#RE_TYPE_BODY_2 = re.compile(r'.*?{(.*)}\s*(?:WITH.*|\(.*?\)|\s*$)', re.MULTILINE|re.DOTALL)
RE_TYPE_BODY = re.compile(r'.*?{(.*)}\s*(?:WITH.*|\(.*?\)|\s*$)', re.MULTILINE|re.DOTALL)
#RE_FIELDS = re.compile(r'^\s*(?:/\*\*.*?\*/)|^\s*([\w-]+?)\s+(OCTET\s+STRING|BIT\s+STRING|[A-Z][.\w-]+)?(.*?)(?:,((?:\s*--!?<.*?\n)*)|((?:--!?<.*?\n)*)$)', re.MULTILINE | re.DOTALL| re.VERBOSE)
RE_FIELDS = re.compile(r'^\s*/\*.*?\*/|^\s*--\!.*?\n|^[\s&]*([\w-]+)\s+(OCTET\s+STRING|BIT\s+STRING|[A-Z][\w-]+)?((?:{[^}]*}|\([^)]*\)|.)*?)(?:,|(--)|$)', re.MULTILINE | re.DOTALL)
RE_EXPORTS = re.compile(r'^\s*EXPORTS.*?;', re.DOTALL | re.MULTILINE)
RE_IMPORTS = re.compile(r'^\s*IMPORTS\s*(.*?);', re.DOTALL | re.MULTILINE)
RE_IMPORT_ELEMENTS = re.compile(r'^([,\s\w-]*?)FROM\s*([\w-]+)\s*({[^}]*}(?:\s+WITH\s+SUCCESSORS)?)?', re.MULTILINE)
RE_IMPORT_ELEMENT_TYPE = re.compile(r'[^,\s]+')
RE_DOXY_ASN_COMMENTS = re.compile(r'^\s*--[-!#](:?$|\s(.*))', re.MULTILINE)
RE_DOXY_C_COMMENTS = re.compile(r'^\s*/\*\*\s(.*?)\*/', re.MULTILINE | re.DOTALL)
RE_DOXY_C_COMMENTS_I = re.compile(r'\s*\*+')
RE_STRIPSTAR = re.compile(r'^\s*\*', re.MULTILINE)
RE_POWER_SIGN = re.compile('\^(-?\w+|\(.*?\))')
RE_GREATEQ_SIGN = re.compile(r'(?<=\s)>=(?=\s)')
RE_LESSEQ_SIGN = re.compile(r'(?<=\s)<=(?=\s)')
RE_REFERENCE_NUMBER = re.compile(r'\[(?:i\.)?\d+\]')
RE_DOXY_REF = re.compile(r'@ref\s+([\w-]+)')
RE_DOXY_CLASS = re.compile(r'@(?:class|struct|details):?\s+([\w-]+)')
RE_DOXY_DETAILS = re.compile(r'@details:?\s+[\w-]+')
RE_DOXY_STRIP_SINGLE_TAG = re.compile(r'@(?:brief|url)\s+')
RE_DOXY_STRIP_TAG = re.compile(r'\s*@(?:class|struct|details):?\s+[\w-]+')
RE_DOXY_UNIT = re.compile(r'^\s*@unit:?\s+(.+)\n', re.MULTILINE)
RE_DOXY_REVISION = re.compile(r'^\s*@revision:?\s+(.+)\n', re.MULTILINE)
RE_DOXY_BRIEF = re.compile(r'^\s*@brief[\s:]+(.+)\n', re.MULTILINE)
RE_DOXY_CATEGORY = re.compile(r'^\s*@category[\s:]+(.+)\n', re.MULTILINE)
RE_DOXY_PARAM = re.compile(r'^\s*@(?:param|field):?\s+([\w-]+)\s*(.*?)\n\s*$', re.MULTILINE | re.DOTALL)
RE_DOXY_SECTION = re.compile(r"^\s*@(brief|note|(class|struct|param|field|details)\s+([-\w]+)):?(.*?)(?=\n\s*@|\n\s*\n|\Z)", re.MULTILINE | re.DOTALL)
RE_NOTE_SECTION = re.compile(r"^\s*@(note):?(.*?)(?=\n\s*@|\n\s*\n|\Z)", re.MULTILINE | re.DOTALL)
# RE_TYPE = re.compile(r'(([A-Z][\w-]*)\s*::=[\w \t]+(?:{+(.*?)}+)?.*?)\n\s*\n', re.MULTILINE | re.DOTALL)
RE_TYPE = re.compile(r'^\s*([A-Z][\w-]*)?\s*([{} \t:\w-]*?)?::=([\w \t]+.*?)\n\s*\n', re.MULTILINE | re.DOTALL)
RE_OPTIONS = re.compile(r'^\s*@options[\s:]+(.+)', re.MULTILINE)
extTypes = {}
cpos = 0
o_args = []
m_options = []
def urlquote(s):
if (sys.version_info > (3, 0)):
return urllib.parse.quote_plus(s)
else:
return urllib.quote_plus(s)
def indentLines(content:str, indent):
ret=''
lines = content.splitlines()
for l in lines:
ret += ''.ljust(indent or 0) + l +'\n'
return ret
def parseText(content, indent=None):
def repl_ref(m):
return '[**{0}**]({1}#{0})'.format(m.group(1), extTypes.get(m.group(1),''))
content = RE_DOXY_REF.sub(repl_ref, content)
content = RE_DOXY_STRIP_TAG.sub('', content)
content = RE_DOXY_STRIP_SINGLE_TAG.sub('', content)
content = RE_POWER_SIGN.sub('\\1', content)
content = RE_LESSEQ_SIGN.sub('≤', content)
content = RE_GREATEQ_SIGN.sub('≥', content)
content = RE_REFERENCE_NUMBER.sub('[\\g<0>](#references)', content)
return indentLines(content, indent)
def parseInlineComments(content:str, indent=None):
# keep into account only '--<' comments
lines = content.splitlines()
content = ''
for l in lines:
l = l.lstrip()
if l.startswith('--< '):
content += l[4:] + '\n'
elif l.startswith('--!< '):
content += l[5:] + '\n'
else:
continue
return parseText(content, indent)
def parseDoxyComments(content:str):
# keep only '--! ' and /** */ comments
# convert '--! ' comments to C-style
content = RE_DOXY_ASN_COMMENTS.sub('/** *\g<1>*/', content)
ret = ''
for m in RE_DOXY_C_COMMENTS.finditer(content):
ret += RE_STRIPSTAR.sub('', m.group(1))
return ret
def parseOptions(doc, opts):
def repl_options(m):
if m.group(1) is not None:
for o in m.group(1).split(','):
setattr(opts, o.strip(), True)
return ''
return RE_OPTIONS.sub(repl_options, doc)
def parseModule(mname, content):
global cpos
cpos = 0
ret = ''
m = RE_IMPORTS.search(content)
if m is not None:
pos = 0
if m.group(1) is not None:
ret += '## Imports:\n'
s = m.group(1)
for fm in RE_IMPORT_ELEMENTS.finditer(s):
imName = fm.group(2)
for im in RE_IMPORT_ELEMENT_TYPE.finditer(fm.group(1)):
extTypes[im.group(0)] = imName+'.md'
ret += ' * **[{0}]({0}.md)** *{1}*
\n'.format(imName, RE_SPACES.sub(' ', fm.group(3) or ''))
ret += parseText(parseDoxyComments(s[pos:fm.start()])+'\n', 2)
pos = fm.end()
ret += parseText(parseDoxyComments(s[pos:]))
cpos = m.end()
m = RE_EXPORTS.search(content)
if m is not None:
if cpos < m.end():
cpos = m.end()
# parse types
def repl_type (m, doc):
global m_options
title = t = m.group(1) # type name
f_params = {}
s_unit = ''
s_category = ''
s_note = ''
s_revision = ''
options = copy.copy(m_options)
if doc : # doc is the prepending comment. Check if not None and not Empty
doc = parseDoxyComments(doc)
# parse options
doc = parseOptions(doc, options)
def repl_section (m):
nonlocal title
nonlocal t
nonlocal f_params
nonlocal s_note
ret = ''
l = m.group(4).lstrip(":, \t").lstrip('\n')
if m.group(2) is not None:
# this can be class|struct|details|param|field
if m.group(3) == t:
ret = parseText(l)
else:
if len(l):
if len(f_params) == 0:
ret = '--((FIELDS))--'
f_params[m.group(3)] = parseText(l, 2)
elif m.group(1) == 'brief':
if options.brief_as_title:
title = parseText(l)
else:
ret = parseText(l)
elif m.group(1) == 'note':
s_note = '\n>>>\n' + 'NOTE: ' + parseText(l).rstrip() + '\n>>>\n'
else:
ret = m.string[m.start():m.end()]
return ret
doc = RE_DOXY_SECTION.sub(repl_section, doc)
def repl_category(m):
nonlocal s_category
s_category = '\n **Categories:** '
for l in m.group(1).split(','):
# s_category += '[{0}](#{1}) '.format(l.strip(), urlquote(l.strip()))
s_category += parseText(l).strip() + ' '
s_category += '\n'
return ''
doc = RE_DOXY_CATEGORY.sub(repl_category, doc)
def repl_unit(m):
nonlocal s_unit
s_unit = '\n **Unit:** _' + parseText(m.group(1)).strip() + '_\n'
return ''
doc = RE_DOXY_UNIT.sub(repl_unit, doc)
def repl_revision(m):
nonlocal s_revision
s_revision = '\n **Revision:** _' + parseText(m.group(1)).strip() + '_\n'
return ''
doc = RE_DOXY_REVISION.sub(repl_revision, doc)
else:
doc = ''
doc = [x.strip() for x in doc.split('--((FIELDS))--')]
ret = ''
if t is not None:
fields = ''
ret = '\n### {1}\n'.format(t, title) + parseText(doc[0])
# parse fields and get out fields descriptions
if m.group(3) is not None:
# check if contain fields
fm = RE_TYPE_BODY.search(m.group(3))
if fm is not None and fm.group(1) is not None:
typeBody = fm.group(1).strip()
if typeBody is not None:
fTitle = ''
field = ''
pos = 0
for fm in RE_FIELDS.finditer(typeBody):
if fm.group(1) is not None:
# add description to the previous type
if len(field):
fields += parseInlineComments(fm.string[pos:fm.start()], 3)
field = ''
f = fm.group(1).strip()
ext = fm.group(3) or ''
if f in f_params:
field = f_params.pop(f) + '\n\n'
if fm.group(2) is not None:
fTitle = 'Fields:\n'
if len(field) or not options.no_auto_fields:
t = fm.group(2).strip()
if RE_BASIC_TYPES.match(t) is not None:
field = '* {0} of type **{1}** {2}
\n'.format(f, t, ext) + field
else:
field = '* {0} of type [**{1}**]({2}#{1}) {3}
\n'.format(f, t, extTypes.get(t,''), ext) + field
else:
fTitle = 'Values:\n'
if len(field) or not options.no_auto_values:
field = '* **{0}** {1}
\n'.format(f, ext) + field
if len(field):
field += parseText(fm.string[pos:fm.start()], 3)
pos = fm.end()
if fm.group(4) is not None:
# keep '--' for the next round
pos -= 2
if len(field):
fields += field
if len(field):
fields += parseInlineComments(typeBody[pos:], 3)
# add all other fields defined as @params
if 'force-all-fields' in options:
for f in f_params:
fields += '* {}
\n{}\n\n'.format(f, f_params[f])
if 'no-fields-header' in options:
fTitle = ''
if len(fields):
ret = ret.strip() + '\n\n' + fTitle + fields
else:
if title:
ret = '### {}\n\n'.format(title)
l = parseText(parseDoxyComments(doc[0]))
if len(l):
ret += l + '\n\n'
for p in f_params:
ret += '* `{0}` {1}\n'.format(p, f_params[p])
try:
if len(doc[1]):
ret += doc[1] + '\n'
except:
pass
return ret + s_unit + s_category + s_revision + s_note + '```asn1\n' + RE_COMMENTS.sub('', m.group(0).strip()) +'\n```\n\n'
pos = 0
ret += '## Data Elements:\n'
for m in RE_TYPE.finditer(content[cpos:]):
ret += repl_type (m, m.string[pos:m.start()])
pos = m.end()
v = parseText(parseOptions(parseDoxyComments(content[pos:]), m_options))
if len(v):
def repl_note (m):
return '\n>>>\n' + 'NOTE: ' + m.group(2).lstrip(":, \t").lstrip('\n').rstrip() + '\n>>>\n'
ret += '\n\n' + RE_NOTE_SECTION.sub(repl_note, v).strip() +'\n'
return ret
def parseAsn(outDir, content) :
# iterate modules in the file
global m_options
pos= 0
cnt = 0
m_options = copy.copy(o_args)
for m in RE_MODULE.finditer(content):
ret = '# ASN.1 module {}\n OID: _{}_\n'.format(m.group(1), RE_SPACES.sub(' ', m.group(2)))
ret += parseText(parseOptions(parseDoxyComments(content[pos:m.start()]), m_options)) + '\n'
if m.group(3) is not None:
ret += parseModule(m.group(1), m.group(3))
ret += '\n\n'
open(outDir + '/' + m.group(1) + '.md', "w",encoding='utf-8').write(ret)
pos = m.end()
cnt += 1
return cnt
def main():
global o_args
ap = argparse.ArgumentParser(description='ASN.1 to markdown converter')
ap.add_argument('--out', '-o', type=str, default='.', help='output directory')
ap.add_argument('--brief-as-title', '-B', default=False, action='store_true', help='Do not treat @brief line as type header')
ap.add_argument('--force-all-fields', '-f', default=False,action='store_true', help='Add all fields in the list even if empty')
ap.add_argument('--no-auto-fields', '-F', default=False,action='store_true', help='Add fields only if @param or @field is defined')
ap.add_argument('--no-auto-values', '-V', default=False,action='store_true', help='Do not add named values or enums')
ap.add_argument('--no-fields-header', '-H', default=False,action='store_true', help='Do not add fields and values header')
ap.add_argument('modules', action='store', nargs='+', help='ASN.1 files')
o_args = ap.parse_args()
if not o_args.modules:
ap.print_help()
exit(1)
cnt = 0
for a in o_args.modules:
try:
content = open(a, mode="r", encoding='latin-1').read()
cnt += parseAsn(o_args.out, content)
except IOError as e:
sys.stderr.write(e[1]+"\n")
print("{} modules porcessed\n".format(cnt))
if __name__ == '__main__':
main()
ieee1609.2-ieee/docs/ 0000775 0000000 0000000 00000000000 14326475135 0014314 5 ustar 00root root 0000000 0000000 ieee1609.2-ieee/docs/Ieee1609Dot2.md 0000664 0000000 0000000 00000210352 14326475135 0016561 0 ustar 00root root 0000000 0000000 # ASN.1 module Ieee1609Dot2
OID: _{iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) base(1) schema(1) major-version-2(2) minor-version-6(6)}_
@note Section references in this file are to clauses in IEEE Std
1609.2 unless indicated otherwise. Full forms of acronyms and
abbreviations used in this file are specified in 3.2.
## Imports:
* **[Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md)** *{iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) base(1) base-types(2) major-version-2(2) minor-version-4(4)} WITH SUCCESSORS*
* **[EtsiTs103097ExtensionModule](EtsiTs103097ExtensionModule.md)** *{itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) itsDomain(5) wg5(5) secHeaders(103097) extension(2) major-version-1(1) minor-version-0(0)} WITH SUCCESSORS*
## Data Elements:
### Ieee1609Dot2Data
This data type is used to contain the other data types in this
clause. The fields in the Ieee1609Dot2Data have the following meanings:
Fields:
* protocolVersion of type [**Uint8**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Uint8) (3)
contains the current version of the protocol. The
version specified in this standard is version 3, represented by the
integer 3. There are no major or minor version numbers.
* content of type [**Ieee1609Dot2Content**](#Ieee1609Dot2Content)
contains the content in the form of an Ieee1609Dot2Content.
>>>
NOTE: Canonicalization: This data structure is subject to canonicalization
for the relevant operations specified in 6.1.2. The canonicalization
applies to the Ieee1609Dot2Content.
>>>
```asn1
Ieee1609Dot2Data ::= SEQUENCE {
protocolVersion Uint8(3),
content Ieee1609Dot2Content
}
```
### Ieee1609Dot2Content
In this structure:
Fields:
* unsecuredData of type [**Opaque**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Opaque)
indicates that the content is an OCTET STRING to be
consumed outside the SDS.
* signedData of type [**SignedData**](#SignedData)
indicates that the content has been signed according to
this standard.
* encryptedData of type [**EncryptedData**](#EncryptedData)
indicates that the content has been encrypted
according to this standard.
* signedCertificateRequest of type [**Opaque**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Opaque)
indicates that the content is a
certificate request signed by an IEEE 1609.2 certificate or self-signed.
* signedX509CertificateRequest of type [**Opaque**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Opaque)
indicates that the content is a
certificate request signed by an ITU-T X.509 certificate.
...,
>>>
NOTE: Canonicalization: This data structure is subject to canonicalization
for the relevant operations specified in 6.1.2 if it is of type signedData.
The canonicalization applies to the SignedData.
>>>
```asn1
Ieee1609Dot2Content ::= CHOICE {
unsecuredData Opaque,
signedData SignedData,
encryptedData EncryptedData,
signedCertificateRequest Opaque,
...,
signedX509CertificateRequest Opaque
}
```
### SignedData
In this structure:
Fields:
* hashId of type [**HashAlgorithm**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#HashAlgorithm)
indicates the hash algorithm to be used to generate the hash
of the message for signing and verification.
* tbsData of type [**ToBeSignedData**](#ToBeSignedData)
contains the data that is hashed as input to the signature.
* signer of type [**SignerIdentifier**](#SignerIdentifier)
determines the keying material and hash algorithm used to
sign the data.
* signature of type [**Signature**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Signature)
contains the digital signature itself, calculated as
specified in 5.3.1.
- If signer indicates the choice self, then the signature calculation
is parameterized as follows:
- Data input is equal to the COER encoding of the tbsData field
canonicalized according to the encoding considerations given in 6.3.6.
- Verification type is equal to self.
- Signer identifier input is equal to the empty string.
- If signer indicates certificate or digest, then the signature
calculation is parameterized as follows:
- Data input is equal to the COER encoding of the tbsData field
canonicalized according to the encoding considerations given in 6.3.6.
- Verification type is equal to certificate.
- Signer identifier input equal to the COER-encoding of the
Certificate that is to be used to verify the SPDU, canonicalized according
to the encoding considerations given in 6.4.3.
>>>
NOTE: Canonicalization: This data structure is subject to canonicalization
for the relevant operations specified in 6.1.2. The canonicalization
applies to the ToBeSignedData and the Signature.
>>>
```asn1
SignedData ::= SEQUENCE {
hashId HashAlgorithm,
tbsData ToBeSignedData,
signer SignerIdentifier,
signature Signature
}
```
### ToBeSignedData
This structure contains the data to be hashed when generating or
verifying a signature. See 6.3.4 for the specification of the input to the
hash.
Fields:
* payload of type [**SignedDataPayload**](#SignedDataPayload)
contains data that is provided by the entity that invokes
the SDS.
* headerInfo of type [**HeaderInfo**](#HeaderInfo)
contains additional data that is inserted by the SDS.
This structure is used as follows to determine the "data input" to the
hash operation for signing or verification as specified in 5.3.1.2.2 or
5.3.1.3.
- If payload does not contain the field omitted, the data input to the
hash operation is the COER encoding of the ToBeSignedData.
- If payload field in this ToBeSignedData instance contains the field
omitted, the data input to the hash operation is the COER encoding of the
ToBeSignedData, concatenated with the hash of the omitted payload. The hash
of the omitted payload is calculated with the same hash algorithm that is
used to calculate the hash of the data input for signing or verification.
The data input to the hash operation is simply the COER enocding of the
ToBeSignedData, concatenated with the hash of the omitted payload: there is
no additional wrapping or length indication. As noted in 5.2.4.3.4, the
means by which the signer and verifier establish the contents of the
omitted payload are out of scope for this standard.
>>>
NOTE: Canonicalization: This data structure is subject to canonicalization
for the relevant operations specified in 6.1.2. The canonicalization
applies to the SignedDataPayload if it is of type data, and to the
HeaderInfo.
>>>
```asn1
ToBeSignedData ::= SEQUENCE {
payload SignedDataPayload,
headerInfo HeaderInfo
}
```
### SignedDataPayload
This structure contains the data payload of a ToBeSignedData. This
structure contains at least one of the optional elements, and may contain
more than one. See 5.2.4.3.4 for more details.
The security profile in Annex C allows an implementation of this standard
to state which forms of Signed¬Data¬Payload are supported by that
implementation, and also how the signer and verifier are intended to obtain
the external data for hashing. The specification of an SDEE that uses
external data is expected to be explicit and unambiguous about how this
data is obtained and how it is formatted prior to processing by the hash
function.
Fields:
* data of type [**Ieee1609Dot2Data**](#Ieee1609Dot2Data) OPTIONAL
contains data that is explicitly transported within the
structure.
* extDataHash of type [**HashedData**](#HashedData) OPTIONAL
contains the hash of data that is not explicitly
transported within the structure, and which the creator of the structure
wishes to cryptographically bind to the signature.
* omitted of type **NULL** OPTIONAL
indicates that there is external data to be included in the
hash calculation for the signature.The mechanism for including the external
data in the hash calculation is specified in 6.3.6.
...,
>>>
NOTE: Canonicalization: This data structure is subject to canonicalization
for the relevant operations specified in 6.1.2. The canonicalization
applies to the Ieee1609Dot2Data.
>>>
```asn1
SignedDataPayload ::= SEQUENCE {
data Ieee1609Dot2Data OPTIONAL,
extDataHash HashedData OPTIONAL,
...,
omitted NULL OPTIONAL
} (WITH COMPONENTS {..., data PRESENT} |
WITH COMPONENTS {..., extDataHash PRESENT} |
WITH COMPONENTS {..., omitted PRESENT})
```
### HashedData
This structure contains the hash of some data with a specified hash
algorithm. See 5.3.3 for specification of the permitted hash algorithms.
Fields:
* sha256HashedData of type [**HashedId32**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#HashedId32)
indicates data hashed with SHA-256.
* sha384HashedData of type [**HashedId48**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#HashedId48)
indicates data hashed with SHA-384.
...,
* sm3HashedData of type [**HashedId32**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#HashedId32)
indicates data hashed with SM3.
>>>
NOTE: Critical information fields: If present, this is a critical
information field as defined in 5.2.6. An implementation that does not
recognize the indicated CHOICE for this type when verifying a signed SPDU
shall indicate that the signed SPDU is invalid in the sense of 4.2.2.3.2,
that is, it is invalid in the sense that its validity cannot be established.
>>>
```asn1
HashedData::= CHOICE {
sha256HashedData HashedId32,
...,
sha384HashedData HashedId48,
sm3HashedData HashedId32
}
```
### HeaderInfo
This structure contains information that is used to establish
validity by the criteria of 5.2.
Fields:
* psid of type [**Psid**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Psid)
indicates the application area with which the sender is
claiming the payload is to be associated.
* generationTime of type [**Time64**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Time64) OPTIONAL
indicates the time at which the structure was
generated. See 5.2.5.2.2 and 5.2.5.2.3 for discussion of the use of this
field.
* expiryTime of type [**Time64**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Time64) OPTIONAL
if present, contains the time after which the data
is no longer considered relevant. If both generationTime and
expiryTime are present, the signed SPDU is invalid if generationTime is
not strictly earlier than expiryTime.
* generationLocation of type [**ThreeDLocation**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#ThreeDLocation) OPTIONAL
if present, contains the location at which the
signature was generated.
* p2pcdLearningRequest of type [**HashedId3**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#HashedId3) OPTIONAL
if present, is used by the SDS to request
certificates for which it has seen identifiers and does not know the
entire certificate. A specification of this peer-to-peer certificate
distribution (P2PCD) mechanism is given in Clause 8. This field is used
for the separate-certificate-pdu flavor of P2PCD and shall only be present
if inlineP2pcdRequest is not present. The HashedId3 is calculated with the
whole-certificate hash algorithm, determined as described in 6.4.3,
applied to the COER-encoded certificate, canonicalized as defined in the
definition of Certificate.
* missingCrlIdentifier of type [**MissingCrlIdentifier**](#MissingCrlIdentifier) OPTIONAL
if present, is used by the SDS to request
CRLs which it knows to have been issued and have not received. This is
provided for future use and the associated mechanism is not defined in
this version of this standard.
* encryptionKey of type [**EncryptionKey**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#EncryptionKey) OPTIONAL
if present, is used to provide a key that is to
be used to encrypt at least one response to this SPDU. The SDEE
specification is expected to specify which response SPDUs are to be
encrypted with this key. One possible use of this key to encrypt a
response is specified in 6.3.35, 6.3.37, and 6.3.34. An encryptionKey
field of type symmetric should only be used if the SignedData containing
this field is securely encrypted by some means.
* inlineP2pcdRequest of type [**SequenceOfHashedId3**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#SequenceOfHashedId3) OPTIONAL
if present, is used by the SDS to request
unknown certificates per the inline peer-to-peer certificate distribution
mechanism is given in Clause 8. This field shall only be present if
p2pcdLearningRequest is not present. The HashedId3 is calculated with the
whole-certificate hash algorithm, determined as described in 6.4.3, applied
to the COER-encoded certificate, canonicalized as defined in the definition
of Certificate.
...,
* requestedCertificate of type [**Certificate**](#Certificate) OPTIONAL
if present, is used by the SDS to provide
certificates per the "inline" version of the peer-to-peer certificate
distribution mechanism given in Clause 8.
* pduFunctionalType of type [**PduFunctionalType**](#PduFunctionalType) OPTIONAL
if present, is used to indicate that the SPDU is
to be consumed by a process other than an application process as defined
in ISO 21177 [B14a]. See 6.3.23b for more details.
* contributedExtensions of type [**ContributedExtensionBlocks**](#ContributedExtensionBlocks) OPTIONAL
if present, is used to contain additional
extensions defined using the ContributedExtensionBlocks structure.
>>>
NOTE: Canonicalization: This data structure is subject to canonicalization
for the relevant operations specified in 6.1.2. The canonicalization
applies to the EncryptionKey. If encryptionKey is present, and indicates
the choice public, and contains a BasePublicEncryptionKey that is an
elliptic curve point (i.e., of type EccP256CurvePoint or
EccP384CurvePoint), then the elliptic curve point is encoded in compressed
form, i.e., such that the choice indicated within the Ecc*CurvePoint is
compressed-y-0 or compressed-y-1.
The canonicalization does not apply to any fields after the extension
marker, including any fields in contributedExtensions.
>>>
```asn1
HeaderInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
psid Psid,
generationTime Time64 OPTIONAL,
expiryTime Time64 OPTIONAL,
generationLocation ThreeDLocation OPTIONAL,
p2pcdLearningRequest HashedId3 OPTIONAL,
missingCrlIdentifier MissingCrlIdentifier OPTIONAL,
encryptionKey EncryptionKey OPTIONAL,
...,
inlineP2pcdRequest SequenceOfHashedId3 OPTIONAL,
requestedCertificate Certificate OPTIONAL,
pduFunctionalType PduFunctionalType OPTIONAL,
contributedExtensions ContributedExtensionBlocks OPTIONAL
}
```
### MissingCrlIdentifier
This structure may be used to request a CRL that the SSME knows to
have been issued and has not yet received. It is provided for future use
and its use is not defined in this version of this standard.
Fields:
* cracaId of type [**HashedId3**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#HashedId3)
is the HashedId3 of the CRACA, as defined in 5.1.3. The
HashedId3 is calculated with the whole-certificate hash algorithm,
determined as described in 6.4.3, applied to the COER-encoded certificate,
canonicalized as defined in the definition of Certificate.
* crlSeries of type [**CrlSeries**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#CrlSeries)
is the requested CRL Series value. See 5.1.3 for more
information.
```asn1
MissingCrlIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
cracaId HashedId3,
crlSeries CrlSeries,
...
}
```
### PduFunctionalType
This data structure identifies the functional entity that is
intended to consume an SPDU, for the case where that functional entity is
not an application process, and are instead security support services for an
application process. Further details and the intended use of this field are
defined in ISO 21177 [B20].
```asn1
PduFunctionalType ::= INTEGER (0..255)
```
```asn1
tlsHandshake PduFunctionalType ::= 1
iso21177ExtendedAuth PduFunctionalType ::= 2
iso21177SessionExtension PduFunctionalType ::= 3
```
### ContributedExtensionBlocks
This type is used for clarity of definitions.
```asn1
ContributedExtensionBlocks ::= SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF
ContributedExtensionBlock
```
### ContributedExtensionBlock
This data structure defines the format of an extension block
provided by an identified contributor by using the temnplate provided
in the class IEEE1609DOT2-HEADERINFO-CONTRIBUTED-EXTENSION constraint
to the objects in the set Ieee1609Dot2HeaderInfoContributedExtensions.
Fields:
* contributorId of type [**IEEE1609DOT2-HEADERINFO-CONTRIBUTED-EXTENSION**](#IEEE1609DOT2-HEADERINFO-CONTRIBUTED-EXTENSION) .&id({
Ieee1609Dot2HeaderInfoContributedExtensions
})
uniquely identifies the contributor.
* extns of type **SEQUENCE** (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF
contains a list of extensions from that contributor.
Extensions are expected and not required to follow the format specified
in 6.5.
```asn1
ContributedExtensionBlock ::= SEQUENCE {
contributorId IEEE1609DOT2-HEADERINFO-CONTRIBUTED-EXTENSION.&id({
Ieee1609Dot2HeaderInfoContributedExtensions
}),
extns SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF
IEEE1609DOT2-HEADERINFO-CONTRIBUTED-EXTENSION.&Extn({
Ieee1609Dot2HeaderInfoContributedExtensions
}{@.contributorId})
}
```
### IEEE1609DOT2-HEADERINFO-CONTRIBUTED-EXTENSION
This Information Object Class defines the class that provides a
template for defining extension blocks.
Fields:
* id of type [**HeaderInfoContributorId**](#HeaderInfoContributorId) UNIQUE
```asn1
IEEE1609DOT2-HEADERINFO-CONTRIBUTED-EXTENSION ::= CLASS {
&id HeaderInfoContributorId UNIQUE,
&Extn
} WITH SYNTAX {&Extn IDENTIFIED BY &id}
```
### Ieee1609Dot2HeaderInfoContributedExtensions
This structure is an ASN.1 Information Object Set listing the
defined contributed extension types and the associated
HeaderInfoContributorId values. In this version of this standard two
extension types are defined: Ieee1609ContributedHeaderInfoExtension and
EtsiOriginatingHeaderInfoExtension.
```asn1
Ieee1609Dot2HeaderInfoContributedExtensions
IEEE1609DOT2-HEADERINFO-CONTRIBUTED-EXTENSION ::= {
{Ieee1609ContributedHeaderInfoExtension IDENTIFIED BY
ieee1609HeaderInfoContributorId} |
{EtsiOriginatingHeaderInfoExtension IDENTIFIED BY
etsiHeaderInfoContributorId},
...
}
```
### HeaderInfoContributorId
This is an integer used to identify a HeaderInfo extension
contributing organization. In this version of this standard two values are
defined:
- ieee1609OriginatingExtensionId indicating extensions originating with
IEEE 1609.
- etsiOriginatingExtensionId indicating extensions originating with
ETSI TC ITS.
```asn1
HeaderInfoContributorId ::= INTEGER (0..255)
```
```asn1
ieee1609HeaderInfoContributorId HeaderInfoContributorId ::= 1
etsiHeaderInfoContributorId HeaderInfoContributorId ::= 2
```
### SignerIdentifier
This structure allows the recipient of data to determine which
keying material to use to authenticate the data. It also indicates the
verification type to be used to generate the hash for verification, as
specified in 5.3.1.
Fields:
* digest of type [**HashedId8**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#HashedId8)
If the choice indicated is digest:
- The structure contains the HashedId8 of the relevant certificate. The
HashedId8 is calculated with the whole-certificate hash algorithm,
determined as described in 6.4.3.
- The verification type is certificate and the certificate data
passed to the hash function as specified in 5.3.1 is the authorization
certificate.
* certificate of type [**SequenceOfCertificate**](#SequenceOfCertificate)
If the choice indicated is certificate:
- The structure contains one or more Certificate structures, in order
such that the first certificate is the authorization certificate and each
subsequent certificate is the issuer of the one before it.
- The verification type is certificate and the certificate data
passed to the hash function as specified in 5.3.1 is the authorization
certificate.
* self of type **NULL**
If the choice indicated is self:
- The structure does not contain any data beyond the indication that
the choice value is self.
- The verification type is self-signed.
>>>
NOTE: Canonicalization: This data structure is subject to canonicalization
for the relevant operations specified in 6.1.2. The canonicalization
applies to every Certificate in the certificate field.
>>>
```asn1
SignerIdentifier ::= CHOICE {
digest HashedId8,
certificate SequenceOfCertificate,
self NULL,
...
}
```
### Countersignature
This data structure is used to perform a countersignature over an
already-signed SPDU. This is the profile of an Ieee1609Dot2Data containing
a signedData. The tbsData within content is composed of a payload
containing the hash (extDataHash) of the externally generated, pre-signed
SPDU over which the countersignature is performed.
```asn1
Countersignature ::= Ieee1609Dot2Data (WITH COMPONENTS {...,
content (WITH COMPONENTS {...,
signedData (WITH COMPONENTS {...,
tbsData (WITH COMPONENTS {...,
payload (WITH COMPONENTS {...,
data ABSENT,
extDataHash PRESENT
}),
headerInfo(WITH COMPONENTS {...,
generationTime PRESENT,
expiryTime ABSENT,
generationLocation ABSENT,
p2pcdLearningRequest ABSENT,
missingCrlIdentifier ABSENT,
encryptionKey ABSENT
})
})
})
})
})
```
### EncryptedData
This data structure encodes data that has been encrypted to one or
more recipients using the recipientsÂ’ public or symmetric keys as
specified in 5.3.4.
Fields:
* recipients of type [**SequenceOfRecipientInfo**](#SequenceOfRecipientInfo)
contains one or more RecipientInfos. These entries may
be more than one RecipientInfo, and more than one type of RecipientInfo,
as long as all entries are indicating or containing the same data encryption
key.
* ciphertext of type [**SymmetricCiphertext**](#SymmetricCiphertext)
contains the encrypted data. This is the encryption of
an encoded Ieee1609Dot2Data structure as specified in 5.3.4.2.
>>>
NOTE: If the plaintext is raw data, i.e., it has not been output from a
previous operation of the SDS, then it is trivial to encapsulate it in an
Ieee1609Dot2Data of type unsecuredData as noted in 4.2.2.2.2. For example,
'03 80 08 01 23 45 67 89 AB CD EF' is the C-OER encoding of '01 23 45 67
89 AB CD EF' encapsulated in an Ieee1609Dot2Data of type unsecuredData.
The first byte of the encoding 03 is the protocolVersion, the second byte
80 indicates the choice unsecuredData, and the third byte 08 is the length
of the raw data '01 23 45 67 89 AB CD EF'.
>>>
```asn1
EncryptedData ::= SEQUENCE {
recipients SequenceOfRecipientInfo,
ciphertext SymmetricCiphertext
}
```
### RecipientInfo
This data structure is used to transfer the data encryption key to
an individual recipient of an EncryptedData. The option pskRecipInfo is
selected if the EncryptedData was encrypted using the static encryption
key approach specified in 5.3.4. The other options are selected if the
EncryptedData was encrypted using the ephemeral encryption key approach
specified in 5.3.4. The meanings of the choices are:
See Annex C.7 for guidance on when it may be appropriate to use
each of these approaches.
Fields:
* pskRecipInfo of type [**PreSharedKeyRecipientInfo**](#PreSharedKeyRecipientInfo)
The data was encrypted directly using a pre-shared
symmetric key.
* symmRecipInfo of type [**SymmRecipientInfo**](#SymmRecipientInfo)
The data was encrypted with a data encryption key,
and the data encryption key was encrypted using a symmetric key.
* certRecipInfo of type [**PKRecipientInfo**](#PKRecipientInfo)
The data was encrypted with a data encryption key,
the data encryption key was encrypted using a public key encryption scheme,
where the public encryption key was obtained from a certificate. In this
case, the parameter P1 to ECIES as defined in 5.3.5 is the hash of the
certificate, calculated with the whole-certificate hash algorithm,
determined as described in 6.4.3, applied to the COER-encoded certificate,
canonicalized as defined in the definition of Certificate.
* signedDataRecipInfo of type [**PKRecipientInfo**](#PKRecipientInfo)
The data was encrypted with a data encryption
key, the data encryption key was encrypted using a public key encryption
scheme, where the public encryption key was obtained as the public response
encryption key from a SignedData. In this case, if ECIES is the encryption
algorithm, then the parameter P1 to ECIES as defined in 5.3.5 is the
SHA-256 hash of the Ieee1609Dot2Data of type signedData containing the
response encryption key, canonicalized as defined in the definition of
Ieee1609Dot2Data.
* rekRecipInfo of type [**PKRecipientInfo**](#PKRecipientInfo)
The data was encrypted with a data encryption key,
the data encryption key was encrypted using a public key encryption scheme,
where the public encryption key was not obtained from a Signed-Data or a
certificate. In this case, the SDEE specification is expected to specify
how the public key is obtained, and if ECIES is the encryption algorithm,
then the parameter P1 to ECIES as defined in 5.3.5 is the hash of the
empty string.
>>>
NOTE: The material input to encryption is the bytes of the encryption key
with no headers, encapsulation, or length indication. Contrast this to
encryption of data, where the data is encapsulated in an Ieee1609Dot2Data.
>>>
```asn1
RecipientInfo ::= CHOICE {
pskRecipInfo PreSharedKeyRecipientInfo,
symmRecipInfo SymmRecipientInfo,
certRecipInfo PKRecipientInfo,
signedDataRecipInfo PKRecipientInfo,
rekRecipInfo PKRecipientInfo
}
```
### SequenceOfRecipientInfo
This type is used for clarity of definitions.
```asn1
SequenceOfRecipientInfo ::= SEQUENCE OF RecipientInfo
```
### PreSharedKeyRecipientInfo
This data structure is used to indicate a symmetric key that may
be used directly to decrypt a SymmetricCiphertext. It consists of the
low-order 8 bytes of the hash of the COER encoding of a
SymmetricEncryptionKey structure containing the symmetric key in question.
The HashedId8 is calculated with the hash algorithm determined as
specified in 5.3.9.3. The symmetric key may be established by any
appropriate means agreed by the two parties to the exchange.
```asn1
PreSharedKeyRecipientInfo ::= HashedId8
```
### SymmRecipientInfo
This data structure contains the following fields:
Fields:
* recipientId of type [**HashedId8**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#HashedId8)
contains the hash of the symmetric key encryption key
that may be used to decrypt the data encryption key. It consists of the
low-order 8 bytes of the hash of the COER encoding of a
SymmetricEncryptionKey structure containing the symmetric key in question.
The HashedId8 is calculated with the hash algorithm determined as
specified in 5.3.9.4. The symmetric key may be established by any
appropriate means agreed by the two parties to the exchange.
* encKey of type [**SymmetricCiphertext**](#SymmetricCiphertext)
contains the encrypted data encryption key within a
SymmetricCiphertext, where the data encryption key is input to the data
encryption key encryption process with no headers, encapsulation, or
length indication.
```asn1
SymmRecipientInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
recipientId HashedId8,
encKey SymmetricCiphertext
}
```
### PKRecipientInfo
This data structure contains the following fields:
Fields:
* recipientId of type [**HashedId8**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#HashedId8)
contains the hash of the container for the encryption
public key as specified in the definition of RecipientInfo. Specifically,
depending on the choice indicated by the containing RecipientInfo structure:
- If the containing RecipientInfo structure indicates certRecipInfo,
this field contains the HashedId8 of the certificate. The HashedId8 is
calculated with the whole-certificate hash algorithm, determined as
described in 6.4.3, applied to the COER-encoded certificate, canonicalized
as defined in the definition of Certificate.
- If the containing RecipientInfo structure indicates
signedDataRecipInfo, this field contains the HashedId8 of the
Ieee1609Dot2Data of type signedData that contained the encryption key,
with that Ieee¬¬1609¬Dot2¬¬Data canonicalized per 6.3.4. The HashedId8 is
calculated with the hash algorithm determined as specified in 5.3.9.5.
- If the containing RecipientInfo structure indicates rekRecipInfo, this
field contains the HashedId8 of the COER encoding of a PublicEncryptionKey
structure containing the response encryption key. The HashedId8 is
calculated with the hash algorithm determined as specified in 5.3.9.5.
* encKey of type [**EncryptedDataEncryptionKey**](#EncryptedDataEncryptionKey)
contains the encrypted data encryption key, where the data
encryption key is input to the data encryption key encryption process with
no headers, encapsulation, or length indication.
```asn1
PKRecipientInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
recipientId HashedId8,
encKey EncryptedDataEncryptionKey
}
```
### EncryptedDataEncryptionKey
This data structure contains an encrypted data encryption key,
where the data encryption key is input to the data encryption key
encryption process with no headers, encapsulation, or length indication.
Critical information fields: If present and applicable to
the receiving SDEE, this is a critical information field as defined in
5.2.6. If an implementation receives an encrypted SPDU and determines that
one or more RecipientInfo fields are relevant to it, and if all of those
RecipientInfos contain an EncryptedDataEncryptionKey such that the
implementation does not recognize the indicated CHOICE, the implementation
shall indicate that the encrypted SPDU is not decryptable.
Fields:
* eciesNistP256 of type [**EciesP256EncryptedKey**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#EciesP256EncryptedKey)
* eciesBrainpoolP256r1 of type [**EciesP256EncryptedKey**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#EciesP256EncryptedKey)
* ecencSm2256 of type [**EcencP256EncryptedKey**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#EcencP256EncryptedKey)
...,
```asn1
EncryptedDataEncryptionKey ::= CHOICE {
eciesNistP256 EciesP256EncryptedKey,
eciesBrainpoolP256r1 EciesP256EncryptedKey,
...,
ecencSm2256 EcencP256EncryptedKey
}
```
### SymmetricCiphertext
This data structure encapsulates a ciphertext generated with an
approved symmetric algorithm.
Fields:
* aes128ccm of type [**One28BitCcmCiphertext**](#One28BitCcmCiphertext)
* sm4Ccm of type [**One28BitCcmCiphertext**](#One28BitCcmCiphertext)
...,
>>>
NOTE: Critical information fields: If present, this is a critical
information field as defined in 5.2.6. An implementation that does not
recognize the indicated CHOICE value for this type in an encrypted SPDU
shall indicate that the signed SPDU is invalid in the sense of 4.2.2.3.2,
that is, it is invalid in the sense that its validity cannot be established.
>>>
```asn1
SymmetricCiphertext ::= CHOICE {
aes128ccm One28BitCcmCiphertext,
...,
sm4Ccm One28BitCcmCiphertext
}
```
### One28BitCcmCiphertext
This data structure encapsulates an encrypted ciphertext for any
symmetric algorithm with 128-bit blocks in CCM mode. The ciphertext is
16 bytes longer than the corresponding plaintext due to the inclusion of
the message authentication code (MAC). The plaintext resulting from a
correct decryption of the ciphertext is either a COER-encoded
Ieee1609Dot2Data structure (see 6.3.41), or a 16-byte symmetric key
(see 6.3.44).
The ciphertext is 16 bytes longer than the corresponding plaintext.
The plaintext resulting from a correct decryption of the
ciphertext is a COER-encoded Ieee1609Dot2Data structure.
Fields:
* nonce of type **OCTET STRING** (SIZE (12))
contains the nonce N as specified in 5.3.8.
* ccmCiphertext of type [**Opaque**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Opaque)
contains the ciphertext C as specified in 5.3.8.
>>>
NOTE: In the name of this structure, "One28" indicates that the
symmetric cipher block size is 128 bits. It happens to also be the case
that the keys used for both AES-128-CCM and SM4-CCM are also 128 bits long.
This is, however, not what “One28” refers to. Since the cipher is used in
counter mode, i.e., as a stream cipher, the fact that that block size is 128
bits affects only the size of the MAC and does not affect the size of the
raw ciphertext.
>>>
```asn1
One28BitCcmCiphertext ::= SEQUENCE {
nonce OCTET STRING (SIZE (12)),
ccmCiphertext Opaque
}
```
### Aes128CcmCiphertext
This type is defined only for backwards compatibility.
```asn1
Aes128CcmCiphertext ::= One28BitCcmCiphertext
```
### TestCertificate
This structure is a profile of the structure CertificateBase which
specifies the valid combinations of fields to transmit implicit and
explicit certificates.
>>>
NOTE: Canonicalization: This data structure is subject to canonicalization
for the relevant operations specified in 6.1.2. The canonicalization
applies to the CertificateBase.
>>>
```asn1
TestCertificate ::= Certificate
```
### SequenceOfCertificate
This type is used for clarity of definitions.
```asn1
SequenceOfCertificate ::= SEQUENCE OF Certificate
```
### CertificateBase
The fields in this structure have the following meaning:
Fields:
* version of type [**Uint8**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Uint8) (3)
contains the version of the certificate format. In this
version of the data structures, this field is set to 3.
* type of type [**CertificateType**](#CertificateType)
states whether the certificate is implicit or explicit. This
field is set to explicit for explicit certificates and to implicit for
implicit certificates. See ExplicitCertificate and ImplicitCertificate for
more details.
* issuer of type [**IssuerIdentifier**](#IssuerIdentifier)
identifies the issuer of the certificate.
* toBeSigned of type [**ToBeSignedCertificate**](#ToBeSignedCertificate)
is the certificate contents. This field is an input to
the hash when generating or verifying signatures for an explicit
certificate, or generating or verifying the public key from the
reconstruction value for an implicit certificate. The details of how this
field are encoded are given in the description of the
ToBeSignedCertificate type.
* signature of type [**Signature**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Signature) OPTIONAL
is included in an ExplicitCertificate. It is the
signature, calculated by the signer identified in the issuer field, over
the hash of toBeSigned. The hash is calculated as specified in 5.3.1, where:
- Data input is the encoding of toBeSigned following the COER.
- Signer identifier input depends on the verification type, which in
turn depends on the choice indicated by issuer. If the choice indicated by
issuer is self, the verification type is self-signed and the signer
identifier input is the empty string. If the choice indicated by issuer is
not self, the verification type is certificate and the signer identifier
input is the canonicalized COER encoding of the certificate indicated by
issuer. The canonicalization is carried out as specified in the
Canonicalization section of this subclause.
>>>
NOTE: Whole-certificate hash: If the entirety of a certificate is hashed
to calculate a HashedId3, HashedId8, or HashedId10, the algorithm used for
this purpose is known as the whole-certificate hash. The method used to
determine the whole-certificate hash algorithm is specified in 5.3.9.2.
>>>
```asn1
CertificateBase ::= SEQUENCE {
version Uint8(3),
type CertificateType,
issuer IssuerIdentifier,
toBeSigned ToBeSignedCertificate,
signature Signature OPTIONAL
}
```
### CertificateType
This enumerated type indicates whether a certificate is explicit or
implicit.
>>>
NOTE: Critical information fields: If present, this is a critical
information field as defined in 5.2.5. An implementation that does not
recognize the indicated CHOICE for this type when verifying a signed SPDU
shall indicate that the signed SPDU is invalid in the sense of 4.2.2.3.2,
that is, it is invalid in the sense that its validity cannot be
established.
>>>
```asn1
CertificateType ::= ENUMERATED {
explicit,
implicit,
...
}
```
### ImplicitCertificate
This is a profile of the CertificateBase structure providing all
the fields necessary for an implicit certificate, and no others.
```asn1
ImplicitCertificate ::= CertificateBase (WITH COMPONENTS {...,
type(implicit),
toBeSigned(WITH COMPONENTS {...,
verifyKeyIndicator(WITH COMPONENTS {reconstructionValue})
}),
signature ABSENT
})
```
### ExplicitCertificate
This is a profile of the CertificateBase structure providing all
the fields necessary for an explicit certificate, and no others.
```asn1
ExplicitCertificate ::= CertificateBase (WITH COMPONENTS {...,
type(explicit),
toBeSigned (WITH COMPONENTS {...,
verifyKeyIndicator(WITH COMPONENTS {verificationKey})
}),
signature PRESENT
})
```
### IssuerIdentifier
This structure allows the recipient of a certificate to determine
which keying material to use to authenticate the certificate.
If the choice indicated is sha256AndDigest, sha384AndDigest, or
sm3AndDigest:
- The structure contains the HashedId8 of the issuing certificate. The
HashedId8 is calculated with the whole-certificate hash algorithm,
determined as described in 6.4.3, applied to the COER-encoded certificate,
canonicalized as defined in the definition of Certificate.
- The hash algorithm to be used to generate the hash of the certificate
for verification is SHA-256 (in the case of sha256AndDigest), SM3 (in the
case of sm3AndDigest) or SHA-384 (in the case of sha384AndDigest).
- The certificate is to be verified with the public key of the
indicated issuing certificate.
If the choice indicated is self:
- The structure indicates what hash algorithm is to be used to generate
the hash of the certificate for verification.
- The certificate is to be verified with the public key indicated by
the verifyKeyIndicator field in theToBeSignedCertificate.
Fields:
* sha256AndDigest of type [**HashedId8**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#HashedId8)
* self of type [**HashAlgorithm**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#HashAlgorithm)
* sha384AndDigest of type [**HashedId8**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#HashedId8)
...,
* sm3AndDigest of type [**HashedId8**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#HashedId8)
>>>
NOTE: Critical information fields: If present, this is a critical
information field as defined in 5.2.5. An implementation that does not
recognize the indicated CHOICE for this type when verifying a signed SPDU
shall indicate that the signed SPDU is invalid in the sense of 4.2.2.3.2,
that is, it is invalid in the sense that its validity cannot be
established.
>>>
```asn1
IssuerIdentifier ::= CHOICE {
sha256AndDigest HashedId8,
self HashAlgorithm,
...,
sha384AndDigest HashedId8,
sm3AndDigest HashedId8
}
```
### ToBeSignedCertificate
The fields in the ToBeSignedCertificate structure have the
following meaning:
For both implicit and explicit certificates, when the certificate
is hashed to create or recover the public key (in the case of an implicit
certificate) or to generate or verify the signature (in the case of an
explicit certificate), the hash is Hash (Data input) || Hash (
Signer identifier input), where:
- Data input is the COER encoding of toBeSigned, canonicalized
as described above.
- Signer identifier input depends on the verification type,
which in turn depends on the choice indicated by issuer. If the choice
indicated by issuer is self, the verification type is self-signed and the
signer identifier input is the empty string. If the choice indicated by
issuer is not self, the verification type is certificate and the signer
identifier input is the COER encoding of the canonicalization per 6.4.3 of
the certificate indicated by issuer.
In other words, for implicit certificates, the value H (CertU) in SEC 4,
section 3, is for purposes of this standard taken to be H [H
(canonicalized ToBeSignedCertificate from the subordinate certificate) ||
H (entirety of issuer Certificate)]. See 5.3.2 for further discussion,
including material differences between this standard and SEC 4 regarding
how the hash function output is converted from a bit string to an integer.
Fields:
* id of type [**CertificateId**](#CertificateId)
contains information that is used to identify the certificate
holder if necessary.
* cracaId of type [**HashedId3**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#HashedId3)
identifies the Certificate Revocation Authorization CA
(CRACA) responsible for certificate revocation lists (CRLs) on which this
certificate might appear. Use of the cracaId is specified in 5.1.3. The
HashedId3 is calculated with the whole-certificate hash algorithm,
determined as described in 6.4.3, applied to the COER-encoded certificate,
canonicalized as defined in the definition of Certificate.
* crlSeries of type [**CrlSeries**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#CrlSeries)
represents the CRL series relevant to a particular
Certificate Revocation Authorization CA (CRACA) on which the certificate
might appear. Use of this field is specified in 5.1.3.
* validityPeriod of type [**ValidityPeriod**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#ValidityPeriod)
contains the validity period of the certificate.
* region of type [**GeographicRegion**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#GeographicRegion) OPTIONAL
if present, indicates the validity region of the
certificate. If it is omitted the validity region is indicated as follows:
- If enclosing certificate is self-signed, i.e., the choice indicated
by the issuer field in the enclosing certificate structure is self, the
certificate is valid worldwide.
- Otherwise, the certificate has the same validity region as the
certificate that issued it.
* assuranceLevel of type [**SubjectAssurance**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#SubjectAssurance) OPTIONAL
indicates the assurance level of the certificate
holder.
* appPermissions of type [**SequenceOfPsidSsp**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#SequenceOfPsidSsp) OPTIONAL
indicates the permissions that the certificate
holder has to sign application data with this certificate. A valid
instance of appPermissions contains any particular Psid value in at most
one entry.
* certIssuePermissions of type [**SequenceOfPsidGroupPermissions**](#SequenceOfPsidGroupPermissions) OPTIONAL
indicates the permissions that the certificate
holder has to sign certificates with this certificate. A valid instance of
this array contains no more than one entry whose psidSspRange field
indicates all. If the array has multiple entries and one entry has its
psidSspRange field indicate all, then the entry indicating all specifies
the permissions for all PSIDs other than the ones explicitly specified in
the other entries. See the description of PsidGroupPermissions for further
discussion.
* certRequestPermissions of type [**SequenceOfPsidGroupPermissions**](#SequenceOfPsidGroupPermissions) OPTIONAL
indicates the permissions that the
certificate holder can request in its certificate. A valid instance of this
array contains no more than one entry whose psidSspRange field indicates
all. If the array has multiple entries and one entry has its psidSspRange
field indicate all, then the entry indicating all specifies the permissions
for all PSIDs other than the ones explicitly specified in the other entries.
See the description of PsidGroupPermissions for further discussion.
* canRequestRollover of type **NULL** OPTIONAL
indicates that the certificate may be used to
sign a request for another certificate with the same permissions. This
field is provided for future use and its use is not defined in this
version of this standard.
* encryptionKey of type [**PublicEncryptionKey**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#PublicEncryptionKey) OPTIONAL
contains a public key for encryption for which the
certificate holder holds the corresponding private key.
* verifyKeyIndicator of type [**VerificationKeyIndicator**](#VerificationKeyIndicator)
contains material that may be used to recover
the public key that may be used to verify data signed by this certificate.
* flags of type **BIT STRING** {usesCubk (0)} (SIZE (8)) OPTIONAL
indicates additional yes/no properties of the certificate
holder. The only bit with defined semantics in this string in this version
of this standard is usesCubk. If set, the usesCubk bit indicates that the
certificate holder supports the compact unified butterfly key response.
Further material about the compact unified butterfly key response can be
found in IEEE Std 1609.2.1.
...,
* appExtensions of type [**SequenceOfAppExtensions**](#SequenceOfAppExtensions)
indicates additional permissions that may be applied
to application activities that the certificate holder is carrying out.
* certIssueExtensions of type [**SequenceOfCertIssueExtensions**](#SequenceOfCertIssueExtensions)
indicates additional permissions to issue
certificates containing endEntityExtensions.
* certRequestExtension of type [**SequenceOfCertRequestExtensions**](#SequenceOfCertRequestExtensions)
If the PublicEncryptionKey contains a BasePublicEncryptionKey that is an
elliptic curve point (i.e., of type EccP256CurvePoint or EccP384CurvePoint),
then the elliptic curve point is encoded in compressed form, i.e., such
that the choice indicated within the Ecc*CurvePoint is compressed-y-0 or
compressed-y-1.
>>>
NOTE: Critical information fields:
- If present, appPermissions is a critical information field as defined
in 5.2.6. If an implementation of verification does not support the number
of PsidSsp in the appPermissions field of a certificate that signed a
signed SPDU, that implementation shall indicate that the signed SPDU is
invalid in the sense of 4.2.2.3.2, that is, it is invalid in the sense
that its validity cannot be established.. A conformant implementation
shall support appPermissions fields containing at least eight entries.
It may be the case that an implementation of verification does not support
the number of entries in the appPermissions field and the appPermissions
field is not relevant to the verification: this will occur, for example,
if the certificate in question is a CA certificate and so the
certIssuePermissions field is relevant to the verification and the
appPermissions field is not. In this case, whether the implementation
indicates that the signed SPDU is valid (because it could validate all
relevant fields) or invalid (because it could not parse the entire
certificate) is implementation-specific.
- If present, certIssuePermissions is a critical information field as
defined in 5.2.6. If an implementation of verification does not support
the number of PsidGroupPermissions in the certIssuePermissions field of a
CA certificate in the chain of a signed SPDU, the implementation shall
indicate that the signed SPDU is invalid in the sense of 4.2.2.3.2, that
is, it is invalid in the sense that its validity cannot be established.
A conformant implementation shall support certIssuePermissions fields
containing at least eight entries.
It may be the case that an implementation of verification does not support
the number of entries in the certIssuePermissions field and the
certIssuePermissions field is not relevant to the verification: this will
occur, for example, if the certificate in question is the signing
certificate for the SPDU and so the appPermissions field is relevant to
the verification and the certIssuePermissions field is not. In this case,
whether the implementation indicates that the signed SPDU is valid
(because it could validate all relevant fields) or invalid (because it
could not parse the entire certificate) is implementation-specific.
- If present, certRequestPermissions is a critical information field as
defined in 5.2.6. If an implementaiton of verification of a certificate
request does not support the number of PsidGroupPermissions in
certRequestPermissions, the implementation shall indicate that the signed
SPDU is invalid in the sense of 4.2.2.3.2, that is, it is invalid in the
sense that its validity cannot be established. A conformant implementation
shall support certRequestPermissions fields containing at least eight
entries.
It may be the case that an implementation of verification does not support
the number of entries in the certRequestPermissions field and the
certRequestPermissions field is not relevant to the verification: this will
occur, for example, if the certificate in question is the signing
certificate for the SPDU and so the appPermissions field is relevant to
the verification and the certRequestPermissions field is not. In this
case, whether the implementation indicates that the signed SPDU is valid
(because it could validate all relevant fields) or invalid (because it
could not parse the entire certificate) is implementation-specific.
>>>
```asn1
ToBeSignedCertificate ::= SEQUENCE {
id CertificateId,
cracaId HashedId3,
crlSeries CrlSeries,
validityPeriod ValidityPeriod,
region GeographicRegion OPTIONAL,
assuranceLevel SubjectAssurance OPTIONAL,
appPermissions SequenceOfPsidSsp OPTIONAL,
certIssuePermissions SequenceOfPsidGroupPermissions OPTIONAL,
certRequestPermissions SequenceOfPsidGroupPermissions OPTIONAL,
canRequestRollover NULL OPTIONAL,
encryptionKey PublicEncryptionKey OPTIONAL,
verifyKeyIndicator VerificationKeyIndicator,
...,
flags BIT STRING {usesCubk (0)} (SIZE (8)) OPTIONAL,
appExtensions SequenceOfAppExtensions,
certIssueExtensions SequenceOfCertIssueExtensions,
certRequestExtension SequenceOfCertRequestExtensions
}
(WITH COMPONENTS { ..., appPermissions PRESENT} |
WITH COMPONENTS { ..., certIssuePermissions PRESENT} |
WITH COMPONENTS { ..., certRequestPermissions PRESENT})
```
### CertificateId
This structure contains information that is used to identify the
certificate holder if necessary.
Fields:
* linkageData of type [**LinkageData**](#LinkageData)
is used to identify the certificate for revocation
purposes in the case of certificates that appear on linked certificate
CRLs. See 5.1.3 and 7.3 for further discussion.
* name of type [**Hostname**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Hostname)
is used to identify the certificate holder in the case of
non-anonymous certificates. The contents of this field are a matter of
policy and are expected to be human-readable.
* binaryId of type **OCTET STRING** (SIZE(1..64))
supports identifiers that are not human-readable.
* none of type **NULL**
indicates that the certificate does not include an identifier.
>>>
NOTE: Critical information fields:
- If present, this is a critical information field as defined in 5.2.6.
An implementation that does not recognize the choice indicated in this
field shall reject a signed SPDU as invalid.
>>>
```asn1
CertificateId ::= CHOICE {
linkageData LinkageData,
name Hostname,
binaryId OCTET STRING(SIZE(1..64)),
none NULL,
...
}
```
### LinkageData
This structure contains information that is matched against
information obtained from a linkage ID-based CRL to determine whether the
containing certificate has been revoked. See 5.1.3.4 and 7.3 for details
of use.
Fields:
* iCert of type [**IValue**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#IValue)
* linkage-value of type [**LinkageValue**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#LinkageValue)
* group-linkage-value of type [**GroupLinkageValue**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#GroupLinkageValue) OPTIONAL
```asn1
LinkageData ::= SEQUENCE {
iCert IValue,
linkage-value LinkageValue,
group-linkage-value GroupLinkageValue OPTIONAL
}
```
### PsidGroupPermissions
This type indicates which type of permissions may appear in
end-entity certificates the chain of whose permissions passes through the
PsidGroupPermissions field containing this value. If app is indicated, the
end-entity certificate may contain an appPermissions field. If enroll is
indicated, the end-entity certificate may contain a certRequestPermissions
field.
This structure states the permissions that a certificate holder has
with respect to issuing and requesting certificates for a particular set
of PSIDs. For examples, see D.5.3 and D.5.4.
Fields:
* subjectPermissions of type [**SubjectPermissions**](#SubjectPermissions)
indicates PSIDs and SSP Ranges covered by this
field.
* minChainLength of type **INTEGER** DEFAULT 1
and chainLengthRange indicate how long the
certificate chain from this certificate to the end-entity certificate is
permitted to be. As specified in 5.1.2.1, the length of the certificate
chain is the number of certificates "below" this certificate in the chain,
down to and including the end-entity certificate. The length is permitted
to be (a) greater than or equal to minChainLength certificates and (b)
less than or equal to minChainLength + chainLengthRange certificates. A
value of 0 for minChainLength is not permitted when this type appears in
the certIssuePermissions field of a ToBeSignedCertificate; a certificate
that has a value of 0 for this field is invalid. The value -1 for
chainLengthRange is a special case: if the value of chainLengthRange is -1
it indicates that the certificate chain may be any length equal to or
greater than minChainLength. See the examples below for further discussion.
* chainLengthRange of type **INTEGER** DEFAULT 0
* eeType of type [**EndEntityType**](#EndEntityType) DEFAULT {app}
takes one or more of the values app and enroll and indicates
the type of certificates or requests that this instance of
PsidGroupPermissions in the certificate is entitled to authorize.
Different instances of PsidGroupPermissions within a ToBeSignedCertificate
may have different values for eeType.
- If this field indicates app, the chain is allowed to end in an
authorization certificate, i.e., a certficate in which these permissions
appear in an appPermissions field (in other words, if the field does not
indicate app and the chain ends in an authorization certificate, the
chain shall be considered invalid).
- If this field indicates enroll, the chain is allowed to end in an
enrollment certificate, i.e., a certificate in which these permissions
appear in a certReqPermissions permissions field (in other words, if the
field does not indicate enroll and the chain ends in an enrollment
certificate, the chain shall be considered invalid).
```asn1
PsidGroupPermissions ::= SEQUENCE {
subjectPermissions SubjectPermissions,
minChainLength INTEGER DEFAULT 1,
chainLengthRange INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
eeType EndEntityType DEFAULT {app}
}
```
### SequenceOfPsidGroupPermissions
This type is used for clarity of definitions.
```asn1
SequenceOfPsidGroupPermissions ::= SEQUENCE OF PsidGroupPermissions
```
### SubjectPermissions
This indicates the PSIDs and associated SSPs for which certificate
issuance or request permissions are granted by a PsidGroupPermissions
structure. If this takes the value explicit, the enclosing
PsidGroupPermissions structure grants certificate issuance or request
permissions for the indicated PSIDs and SSP Ranges. If this takes the
value all, the enclosing PsidGroupPermissions structure grants certificate
issuance or request permissions for all PSIDs not indicated by other
PsidGroupPermissions in the same certIssuePermissions or
certRequestPermissions field.
Fields:
* explicit of type [**SequenceOfPsidSspRange**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#SequenceOfPsidSspRange)
* all of type **NULL**
>>>
NOTE: Critical information fields:
- If present, this is a critical information field as defined in 5.2.6.
An implementation that does not recognize the indicated CHOICE when
verifying a signed SPDU shall indicate that the signed SPDU is
invalidin the sense of 4.2.2.3.2, that is, it is invalid in the sense that
its validity cannot be established.
- If present, explicit is a critical information field as defined in
5.2.6. An implementation that does not support the number of PsidSspRange
in explicit when verifying a signed SPDU shall indicate that the signed
SPDU is invalid in the sense of 4.2.2.3.2, that is, it is invalid in the
sense that its validity cannot be established. A conformant implementation
shall support explicit fields containing at least eight entries.
>>>
```asn1
SubjectPermissions ::= CHOICE {
explicit SequenceOfPsidSspRange,
all NULL,
...
}
```
### VerificationKeyIndicator
The contents of this field depend on whether the certificate is an
implicit or an explicit certificate.
Fields:
* verificationKey of type [**PublicVerificationKey**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#PublicVerificationKey)
is included in explicit certificates. It contains
the public key to be used to verify signatures generated by the holder of
the Certificate.
* reconstructionValue of type [**EccP256CurvePoint**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#EccP256CurvePoint)
is included in implicit certificates. It
contains the reconstruction value, which is used to recover the public key
as specified in SEC 4 and 5.3.2.
>>>
NOTE: Canonicalization: This data structure is subject to canonicalization
for the relevant operations specified in 6.1.2. The canonicalization
applies to the PublicVerificationKey and to the EccP256CurvePoint. The
EccP256CurvePoint is encoded in compressed form, i.e., such that the
choice indicated within the EccP256CurvePoint is compressed-y-0 or
compressed-y-1.
>>>
```asn1
VerificationKeyIndicator ::= CHOICE {
verificationKey PublicVerificationKey,
reconstructionValue EccP256CurvePoint,
...
}
```
### Ieee1609HeaderInfoExtensionId
This structure uses the parameterized type Extension to define an
Ieee1609ContributedHeaderInfoExtension as an open Extension Content field
identified by an extension identifier. The extension identifier value is
unique to extensions defined by ETSI and need not be unique among all
extension identifier values defined by all contributing organizations.
This is an integer used to identify an
Ieee1609ContributedHeaderInfoExtension.
```asn1
Ieee1609HeaderInfoExtensionId ::= ExtId
```
```asn1
p2pcd8ByteLearningRequestId Ieee1609HeaderInfoExtensionId ::= 1
```
### Ieee1609HeaderInfoExtensions
This is the ASN.1 Information Object Class that associates IEEE
1609 HeaderInfo contributed extensions with the appropriate
Ieee1609HeaderInfoExtensionId value.
```asn1
Ieee1609HeaderInfoExtensions EXT-TYPE ::= {
{HashedId8 IDENTIFIED BY p2pcd8ByteLearningRequestId},
...
}
```
### SequenceOfAppExtensions
This structure contains any AppExtensions that apply to the
certificate holder. As specified in 5.2.4.2.3, each individual
AppExtension type is associated with consistency conditions, specific to
that extension, that govern its consistency with SPDUs signed by the
certificate holder and with the CertIssueExtensions in the CA certificates
in that certificate holderÂ’s chain. Those consistency conditions are
specified for each individual AppExtension below.
```asn1
SequenceOfAppExtensions ::= SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF AppExtension
```
### AppExtension
This structure contains an individual AppExtension. AppExtensions
specified in this standard are drawn from the ASN.1 Information Object Set
SetCertExtensions. This set, and its use in the AppExtension type, is
structured so that each AppExtension is associated with a
CertIssueExtension and a CertRequestExtension and all are identified by
the same id value. In this structure:
Fields:
* id of type [**CERT-EXT-TYPE**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#CERT-EXT-TYPE) .&id({SetCertExtensions})
identifies the extension type.
* content of type [**CERT-EXT-TYPE**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#CERT-EXT-TYPE) .&App({SetCertExtensions}{@.id})
provides the content of the extension.
```asn1
AppExtension ::= SEQUENCE {
id CERT-EXT-TYPE.&id({SetCertExtensions}),
content CERT-EXT-TYPE.&App({SetCertExtensions}{@.id})
}
```
### SequenceOfCertIssueExtensions
This field contains any CertIssueExtensions that apply to the
certificate holder. As specified in 5.2.4.2.3, each individual
CertIssueExtension type is associated with consistency conditions,
specific to that extension, that govern its consistency with
AppExtensions in certificates issued by the certificate holder and with
the CertIssueExtensions in the CA certificates in that certificate
holderÂ’s chain. Those consistency conditions are specified for each
individual CertIssueExtension below.
```asn1
SequenceOfCertIssueExtensions ::=
SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF CertIssueExtension
```
### CertIssueExtension
This field contains an individual CertIssueExtension.
CertIssueExtensions specified in this standard are drawn from the ASN.1
Information Object Set SetCertExtensions. This set, and its use in the
CertIssueExtension type, is structured so that each CertIssueExtension
is associated with a AppExtension and a CertRequestExtension and all are
identified by the same id value. In this structure:
Fields:
* id of type [**CERT-EXT-TYPE**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#CERT-EXT-TYPE) .&id({SetCertExtensions})
identifies the extension type.
* permissions of type [**CHOICE**](#CHOICE) {
specific CERT-EXT-TYPE.&Issue({SetCertExtensions}{@.id})
indicates the permissions. Within this field.
- all indicates that the certificate is entitled to issue all values of
the extension.
- specific is used to specify which values of the extension may be
issued in the case where all does not apply.
* all of type **NULL**
```asn1
CertIssueExtension ::= SEQUENCE {
id CERT-EXT-TYPE.&id({SetCertExtensions}),
permissions CHOICE {
specific CERT-EXT-TYPE.&Issue({SetCertExtensions}{@.id}),
all NULL
}
}
```
### SequenceOfCertRequestExtensions
This field contains any CertRequestExtensions that apply to the
certificate holder. As specified in 5.2.4.2.3, each individual
CertRequestExtension type is associated with consistency conditions,
specific to that extension, that govern its consistency with
AppExtensions in certificates issued by the certificate holder and with
the CertRequestExtensions in the CA certificates in that certificate
holderÂ’s chain. Those consistency conditions are specified for each
individual CertRequestExtension below.
```asn1
SequenceOfCertRequestExtensions ::= SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF CertRequestExtension
```
### CertRequestExtension
This field contains an individual CertRequestExtension.
CertRequestExtensions specified in this standard are drawn from the
ASN.1 Information Object Set SetCertExtensions. This set, and its use in
the CertRequestExtension type, is structured so that each
CertRequestExtension is associated with a AppExtension and a
CertRequestExtension and all are identified by the same id value. In this
structure:
Fields:
* id of type [**CERT-EXT-TYPE**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#CERT-EXT-TYPE) .&id({SetCertExtensions})
identifies the extension type.
* permissions of type [**CHOICE**](#CHOICE) {
content CERT-EXT-TYPE.&Req({SetCertExtensions}{@.id})
indicates the permissions. Within this field.
- all indicates that the certificate is entitled to issue all values of
the extension.
- specific is used to specify which values of the extension may be
issued in the case where all does not apply.
* all of type **NULL**
```asn1
CertRequestExtension ::= SEQUENCE {
id CERT-EXT-TYPE.&id({SetCertExtensions}),
permissions CHOICE {
content CERT-EXT-TYPE.&Req({SetCertExtensions}{@.id}),
all NULL
}
}
```
### OperatingOrganizationId
This type is the AppExtension used to identify an operating
organization. The associated CertIssueExtension and CertRequestExtension
are both of type OperatingOrganizationId.
To determine consistency between this type and an SPDU, the SDEE
specification for that SPDU is required to specify how the SPDU can be
used to determine an OBJECT IDENTIFIER (for example, by including the
full OBJECT IDENTIFIER in the SPDU, or by including a RELATIVE-OID with
clear instructions about how a full OBJECT IDENTIFIER can be obtained from
the RELATIVE-OID). The SPDU is then consistent with this type if the
OBJECT IDENTIFIER determined from the SPDU is identical to the OBJECT
IDENTIFIER contained in this field.
This AppExtension does not have consistency conditions with a
corresponding CertIssueExtension. It can appear in a certificate issued
by any CA.
```asn1
OperatingOrganizationId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
```
```asn1
certExtId-OperatingOrganization ExtId ::= 1
```
```asn1
instanceOperatingOrganizationCertExtensions CERT-EXT-TYPE ::= {
ID certExtId-OperatingOrganization
APP OperatingOrganizationId
ISSUE NULL
REQUEST NULL
}
```
### SetCertExtensions
This Information Object Set is a collection of Information Objects
used to contain the AppExtension, CertIssueExtension, and
CertRequestExtension types associated with a specific use of certificate
extensions. In this version of this standard it only has a single entry
instanceOperatingOrganizationCertExtensions.
```asn1
SetCertExtensions CERT-EXT-TYPE ::= {
instanceOperatingOrganizationCertExtensions,
...
}
```
This Information Object is an instance of the Information Object
Class CERT-EXT-TYPE. It is defined to bind together the AppExtension,
CertIssueExtension, and CertRequestExtension types associated with the
use of an operating organization identifier, and to assocaute them all
with the extension identifier value certExtId-OperatingOrganization.
This Information Object Set is a collection of Information Objects
used to contain the AppExtension, CertIssueExtension, and
CertRequestExtension types associated with a specific use of certificate
extensions. In this version of this standard it only has a single entry
instanceOperatingOrganizationCertExtensions.
ieee1609.2-ieee/docs/Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md 0000664 0000000 0000000 00000172522 14326475135 0020407 0 ustar 00root root 0000000 0000000 # ASN.1 module Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes
OID: _{iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) base(1) base-types(2) major-version-2(2) minor-version-4(4)}_
@note Section references in this file are to clauses in IEEE Std
1609.2 unless indicated otherwise. Full forms of acronyms and
abbreviations used in this file are specified in 3.2.
## Data Elements:
### Uint3
This atomic type is used in the definition of other data structures.
It is for non-negative integers up to 7, i.e., (hex)07.
```asn1
Uint3 ::= INTEGER (0..7)
```
### Uint8
This atomic type is used in the definition of other data structures.
It is for non-negative integers up to 255, i.e., (hex)ff.
```asn1
Uint8 ::= INTEGER (0..255)
```
### Uint16
This atomic type is used in the definition of other data structures.
It is for non-negative integers up to 65,535, i.e., (hex)ff ff.
```asn1
Uint16 ::= INTEGER (0..65535)
```
### Uint32
This atomic type is used in the definition of other data structures.
It is for non-negative integers up to 4,294,967,295, i.e.,
(hex)ff ff ff ff.
```asn1
Uint32 ::= INTEGER (0..4294967295)
```
### Uint64
This atomic type is used in the definition of other data structures.
It is for non-negative integers up to 18,446,744,073,709,551,615, i.e.,
(hex)ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff.
```asn1
Uint64 ::= INTEGER (0..18446744073709551615)
```
### SequenceOfUint8
This type is used for clarity of definitions.
```asn1
SequenceOfUint8 ::= SEQUENCE OF Uint8
```
### SequenceOfUint16
This type is used for clarity of definitions.
```asn1
SequenceOfUint16 ::= SEQUENCE OF Uint16
```
### Opaque
This is a synonym for ASN.1 OCTET STRING, and is used in the
definition of other data structures.
```asn1
Opaque ::= OCTET STRING
```
### HashedId3
This type contains the truncated hash of another data structure.
The HashedId3 for a given data structure is calculated by calculating the
hash of the encoded data structure and taking the low-order three bytes of
the hash output. The low-order three bytes are the last three bytes of the
32-byte hash when represented in network byte order. If the data structure
is subject to canonicalization it is canonicalized before hashing. See
Example below.
The hash algorithm to be used to calculate a HashedId3 within a
structure depends on the context. In this standard, for each structure
that includes a HashedId3 field, the corresponding text indicates how the
hash algorithm is determined. See also the discussion in 5.3.9.
Example: Consider the SHA-256 hash of the empty string:
SHA-256("") =
e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855
The HashedId3 derived from this hash corresponds to the following:
HashedId3 = 52b855.
```asn1
HashedId3 ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(3))
```
### SequenceOfHashedId3
This type is used for clarity of definitions.
```asn1
SequenceOfHashedId3 ::= SEQUENCE OF HashedId3
```
### HashedId8
This type contains the truncated hash of another data structure.
The HashedId8 for a given data structure is calculated by calculating the
hash of the encoded data structure and taking the low-order eight bytes of
the hash output. The low-order eight bytes are the last eight bytes of the
hash when represented in network byte order. If the data structure
is subject to canonicalization it is canonicalized before hashing. See
Example below.
The hash algorithm to be used to calculate a HashedId8 within a
structure depends on the context. In this standard, for each structure
that includes a HashedId8 field, the corresponding text indicates how the
hash algorithm is determined. See also the discussion in 5.3.9.
Example: Consider the SHA-256 hash of the empty string:
SHA-256("") =
e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855
The HashedId8 derived from this hash corresponds to the following:
HashedId8 = a495991b7852b855.
```asn1
HashedId8 ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(8))
```
### HashedId10
This type contains the truncated hash of another data structure.
The HashedId10 for a given data structure is calculated by calculating the
hash of the encoded data structure and taking the low-order ten bytes of
the hash output. The low-order ten bytes are the last ten bytes of the
hash when represented in network byte order. If the data structure
is subject to canonicalization it is canonicalized before hashing. See
Example below.
The hash algorithm to be used to calculate a HashedId10 within a
structure depends on the context. In this standard, for each structure
that includes a HashedId10 field, the corresponding text indicates how the
hash algorithm is determined. See also the discussion in 5.3.9.
Example: Consider the SHA-256 hash of the empty string:
SHA-256("") =
e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855
The HashedId10 derived from this hash corresponds to the following:
HashedId10 = 934ca495991b7852b855.
```asn1
HashedId10 ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(10))
```
### HashedId32
This data structure contains the truncated hash of another data
structure. The HashedId32 for a given data structure is calculated by
calculating the hash of the encoded data structure and taking the
low-order 32 bytes of the hash output. The low-order 32 bytes are the last
32 bytes of the hash when represented in network byte order. If the data
structure is subject to canonicalization it is canonicalized before
hashing. See Example below.
The hash algorithm to be used to calculate a HashedId32 within a
structure depends on the context. In this standard, for each structure
that includes a HashedId32 field, the corresponding text indicates how the
hash algorithm is determined. See also the discussion in 5.3.9.
Example: Consider the SHA-256 hash of the empty string:
SHA-256("") =
e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855
The HashedId32 derived from this hash corresponds to the following:
HashedId32 = e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b8
55.
```asn1
HashedId32 ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(32))
```
### HashedId48
This data structure contains the truncated hash of another data
structure. The HashedId48 for a given data structure is calculated by
calculating the hash of the encoded data structure and taking the
low-order 48 bytes of the hash output. The low-order 48 bytes are the last
48 bytes of the hash when represented in network byte order. If the data
structure is subject to canonicalization it is canonicalized before
hashing. See Example below.
The hash algorithm to be used to calculate a HashedId48 within a
structure depends on the context. In this standard, for each structure
that includes a HashedId48 field, the corresponding text indicates how the
hash algorithm is determined. See also the discussion in 5.3.9.
Example: Consider the SHA-384 hash of the empty string:
SHA-384("") = 38b060a751ac96384cd9327eb1b1e36a21fdb71114be07434c0cc7bf63f6
e1da274edebfe76f65fbd51ad2f14898b95b
The HashedId48 derived from this hash corresponds to the following:
HashedId48 = 38b060a751ac96384cd9327eb1b1e36a21fdb71114be07434c0cc7bf63f6e
1da274edebfe76f65fbd51ad2f14898b95b.
```asn1
HashedId48 ::= OCTET STRING(SIZE(48))
```
### Time32
This type gives the number of (TAI) seconds since 00:00:00 UTC, 1
January, 2004.
```asn1
Time32 ::= Uint32
```
### Time64
This data structure is a 64-bit integer giving an estimate of the
number of (TAI) microseconds since 00:00:00 UTC, 1 January, 2004.
```asn1
Time64 ::= Uint64
```
### ValidityPeriod
This type gives the validity period of a certificate. The start of
the validity period is given by start and the end is given by
start + duration.
Fields:
* start of type [**Time32**](#Time32)
* duration of type [**Duration**](#Duration)
```asn1
ValidityPeriod ::= SEQUENCE {
start Time32,
duration Duration
}
```
### Duration
This structure represents the duration of validity of a
certificate. The Uint16 value is the duration, given in the units denoted
by the indicated choice. A year is considered to be 31556952 seconds,
which is the average number of seconds in a year.
Fields:
* microseconds of type [**Uint16**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Uint16)
* milliseconds of type [**Uint16**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Uint16)
* seconds of type [**Uint16**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Uint16)
* minutes of type [**Uint16**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Uint16)
* hours of type [**Uint16**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Uint16)
* sixtyHours of type [**Uint16**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Uint16)
* years of type [**Uint16**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Uint16)
>>>
NOTE: Years can be mapped more closely to wall-clock days using the hours
choice for up to 7 years and the sixtyHours choice for up to 448 years.
>>>
```asn1
Duration ::= CHOICE {
microseconds Uint16,
milliseconds Uint16,
seconds Uint16,
minutes Uint16,
hours Uint16,
sixtyHours Uint16,
years Uint16
}
```
### GeographicRegion
This structure represents a geographic region of a specified form.
A certificate is not valid if any part of the region indicated in its
scope field lies outside the region indicated in the scope of its issuer.
Fields:
* circularRegion of type [**CircularRegion**](#CircularRegion)
contains a single instance of the CircularRegion
structure.
* rectangularRegion of type [**SequenceOfRectangularRegion**](#SequenceOfRectangularRegion)
is an array of RectangularRegion structures
containing at least one entry. This field is interpreted as a series of
rectangles, which may overlap or be disjoint. The permitted region is any
point within any of the rectangles.
* polygonalRegion of type [**PolygonalRegion**](#PolygonalRegion)
contains a single instance of the PolygonalRegion
structure.
* identifiedRegion of type [**SequenceOfIdentifiedRegion**](#SequenceOfIdentifiedRegion)
is an array of IdentifiedRegion structures
containing at least one entry. The permitted region is any point within
any of the identified regions.
>>>
NOTE: Critical information fields:
- If present, this is a critical information field as defined in 5.2.6.
An implementation that does not recognize the indicated CHOICE when
verifying a signed SPDU shall indicate that the signed SPDU is invalid in
the sense of 4.2.2.3.2, that is, it is invalid in the sense that its
validity cannot be established.
- If selected, rectangularRegion is a critical information field as
defined in 5.2.6. An implementation that does not support the number of
RectangularRegion in rectangularRegions when verifying a signed SPDU shall
indicate that the signed SPDU is invalid in the sense of 4.2.2.3.2, that
is, it is invalid in the sense that its validity cannot be established.
A conformant implementation shall support rectangularRegions fields
containing at least eight entries.
- If selected, identifiedRegion is a critical information field as
defined in 5.2.6. An implementation that does not support the number of
IdentifiedRegion in identifiedRegion shall reject the signed SPDU as
invalid in the sense of 4.2.2.3.2, that is, it is invalid in the sense
that its validity cannot be established. A conformant implementation shall
support identifiedRegion fields containing at least eight entries.
>>>
```asn1
GeographicRegion ::= CHOICE {
circularRegion CircularRegion,
rectangularRegion SequenceOfRectangularRegion,
polygonalRegion PolygonalRegion,
identifiedRegion SequenceOfIdentifiedRegion,
...
}
```
### CircularRegion
This structure specifies a circle with its center at center, its
radius given in meters, and located tangential to the reference ellipsoid.
The indicated region is all the points on the surface of the reference
ellipsoid whose distance to the center point over the reference ellipsoid
is less than or equal to the radius. A point which contains an elevation
component is considered to be within the circular region if its horizontal
projection onto the reference ellipsoid lies within the region.
Fields:
* center of type [**TwoDLocation**](#TwoDLocation)
* radius of type [**Uint16**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Uint16)
```asn1
CircularRegion ::= SEQUENCE {
center TwoDLocation,
radius Uint16
}
```
### RectangularRegion
This structure specifies a “rectangle” on the surface of the WGS84 ellipsoid where the
sides are given by lines of constant latitude or longitude.
A point which contains an elevation component is considered to be within the rectangular region
if its horizontal projection onto the reference ellipsoid lies within the region.
A RectangularRegion is invalid if the northWest value is south of the southEast value, or if the
latitude values in the two points are equal, or if the longitude values in the two points are
equal; otherwise it is valid. A certificate that contains an invalid RectangularRegion is invalid.
Fields:
* northWest of type [**TwoDLocation**](#TwoDLocation)
is the north-west corner of the rectangle.
* southEast of type [**TwoDLocation**](#TwoDLocation)
is the south-east corner of the rectangle.
```asn1
RectangularRegion ::= SEQUENCE {
northWest TwoDLocation,
southEast TwoDLocation
}
```
### SequenceOfRectangularRegion
This type is used for clarity of definitions.
```asn1
SequenceOfRectangularRegion ::= SEQUENCE OF RectangularRegion
```
### PolygonalRegion
This structure defines a region using a series of distinct
geographic points, defined on the surface of the reference ellipsoid. The
region is specified by connecting the points in the order they appear,
with each pair of points connected by the geodesic on the reference
ellipsoid. The polygon is completed by connecting the final point to the
first point. The allowed region is the interior of the polygon and its
boundary.
A point which contains an elevation component is considered to be
within the polygonal region if its horizontal projection onto the
reference ellipsoid lies within the region.
A valid PolygonalRegion contains at least three points. In a valid
PolygonalRegion, the implied lines that make up the sides of the polygon
do not intersect.
>>>
NOTE: Critical information fields: If present, this is a critical
information field as defined in 5.2.6. An implementation that does not
support the number of TwoDLocation in the PolygonalRegion when verifying a
signed SPDU shall indicate that the signed SPDU is invalid. A compliant
implementation shall support PolygonalRegions containing at least eight
TwoDLocation entries.
>>>
```asn1
PolygonalRegion ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (3..MAX) OF TwoDLocation
```
### TwoDLocation
This structure is used to define validity regions for use in
certificates. The latitude and longitude fields contain the latitude and
longitude as defined above.
Fields:
* latitude of type [**Latitude**](#Latitude)
* longitude of type [**Longitude**](#Longitude)
>>>
NOTE: This data structure is consistent with the location encoding
used in SAE J2735, except that values 900 000 001 for latitude (used to
indicate that the latitude was not available) and 1 800 000 001 for
longitude (used to indicate that the longitude was not available) are not
valid.
>>>
```asn1
TwoDLocation ::= SEQUENCE {
latitude Latitude,
longitude Longitude
}
```
### IdentifiedRegion
This structure indicates the region of validity of a certificate
using region identifiers.
A conformant implementation that supports this type shall support at least
one of the possible CHOICE values. The Protocol Implementation Conformance
Statement (PICS) provided in Annex A allows an implementation to state
which CountryOnly values it recognizes.
Fields:
* countryOnly of type [**UnCountryId**](#UnCountryId)
indicates that only a country (or a geographic entity
included in a country list) is given.
* countryAndRegions of type [**CountryAndRegions**](#CountryAndRegions)
indicates that one or more top-level regions
within a country (as defined by the region listing associated with that
country) is given.
* countryAndSubregions of type [**CountryAndSubregions**](#CountryAndSubregions)
indicates that one or more regions smaller
than the top-level regions within a country (as defined by the region
listing associated with that country) is given.
Critical information fields: If present, this is a critical
information field as defined in 5.2.6. An implementation that does not
recognize the indicated CHOICE when verifying a signed SPDU shall indicate
that the signed SPDU is invalid in the sense of 4.2.2.3.2, that is, it is
invalid in the sense that its validity cannot be established.
```asn1
IdentifiedRegion ::= CHOICE {
countryOnly UnCountryId,
countryAndRegions CountryAndRegions,
countryAndSubregions CountryAndSubregions,
...
}
```
### SequenceOfIdentifiedRegion
This type is used for clarity of definitions.
```asn1
SequenceOfIdentifiedRegion ::= SEQUENCE OF IdentifiedRegion
```
### UnCountryId
This type contains the integer representation of the country or
area identifier as defined by the United Nations Statistics Division in
October 2013 (see normative references in Clause 0).
A conformant implementation that implements IdentifiedRegion shall
recognize (in the sense of “be able to determine whether a two dimensional
location lies inside or outside the borders identified by”) at least one
value of UnCountryId. The Protocol Implementation Conformance Statement
(PICS) provided in Annex A allows an implementation to state which
UnCountryId values it recognizes.
Since 2013 and before the publication of this version of this standard,
three changes have been made to the country code list, to define the
region "sub-Saharan Africa" and remove the "developed regions", and
"developing regions". A conformant implementation may recognize these
region identifiers in the sense defined in the previous paragraph.
If a verifying implementation is required to check that relevant
geographic information in a signed SPDU is consistent with a certificate
containing one or more instances of this type, then the SDS is permitted
to indicate that the signed SPDU is valid even if some instances of this
type are unrecognized in the sense defined above, so long as the
recognized instances of this type completely contain the relevant
geographic information. Informally, if the recognized values in the
certificate allow the SDS to determine that the SPDU is valid, then it
can make that determination even if there are also unrecognized values in
the certificate. This field is therefore not a "critical information
field" as defined in 5.2.6, because unrecognized values are permitted so
long as the validity of the SPDU can be established with the recognized
values. However, as discussed in 5.2.6, the presence of an unrecognized
value in a certificate can make it impossible to determine whether the
certificate and the SPDU are valid.
```asn1
UnCountryId ::= Uint16
```
### CountryOnly
This type is defined only for backwards compatibility.
```asn1
CountryOnly ::= UnCountryId
```
### CountryAndRegions
A conformant implementation that supports CountryAndRegions shall
support a regions field containing at least eight entries.
A conformant implementation that implements this type shall recognize
(in the sense of "be able to determine whether a two dimensional location
lies inside or outside the borders identified by") at least one value of
UnCountryId and at least one value for a region within the country
indicated by that recognized UnCountryId value. In this version of this
standard, the only means to satisfy this is for a conformant
implementation to recognize the value of UnCountryId indicating USA and
at least one of the FIPS state codes for US states. The Protocol
Implementation Conformance Statement (PICS) provided in Annex A allows
an implementation to state which UnCountryId values it recognizes and
which region values are recognized within that country.
If a verifying implementation is required to check that an relevant
geographic information in a signed SPDU is consistent with a certificate
containing one or more instances of this type, then the SDS is permitted
to indicate that the signed SPDU is valid even if some values of country
or within regions are unrecognized in the sense defined above, so long
as the recognized instances of this type completely contain the relevant
geographic information. Informally, if the recognized values in the
certificate allow the SDS to determine that the SPDU is valid, then it
can make that determination even if there are also unrecognized values
in the certificate. This field is therefore not a "critical information
field" as defined in 5.2.6, because unrecognized values are permitted so
long as the validity of the SPDU can be established with the recognized
values. However, as discussed in 5.2.6, the presence of an unrecognized
value in a certificate can make it impossible to determine whether the
certificate is valid and so whether the SPDU is valid.
In this type:
Fields:
* countryOnly of type [**UnCountryId**](#UnCountryId)
is a UnCountryId as defined above.
* regions of type [**SequenceOfUint8**](#SequenceOfUint8)
identifies one or more regions within the country. If
country indicates the United States of America, the values in this field
identify the state or statistically equivalent entity using the integer
version of the 2010 FIPS codes as provided by the U.S. Census Bureau
(see normative references in Clause 0). For other values of country, the
meaning of region is not defined in this version of this standard.
```asn1
CountryAndRegions ::= SEQUENCE {
countryOnly UnCountryId,
regions SequenceOfUint8
}
```
### CountryAndSubregions
A conformant implementation that supports CountryAndSubregions
shall support a regionAndSubregions field containing at least eight
entries.
A conformant implementation that implements this type shall recognize
(in the sense of “be able to determine whether a two dimensional location
lies inside or outside the borders identified by”) at least one value of
country and at least one value for a region within the country indicated
by that recognized country value. In this version of this standard, the
only means to satisfy this is for a conformant implementation to recognize
the value of UnCountryId indicating USA and at least one of the FIPS state
codes for US states. The Protocol Implementation Conformance Statement
(PICS) provided in Annex A allows an implementation to state which
UnCountryId values it recognizes and which region values are recognized
within that country.
If a verifying implementation is required to check that an relevant
geographic information in a signed SPDU is consistent with a certificate
containing one or more instances of this type, then the SDS is permitted
to indicate that the signed SPDU is valid even if some values of country
or within regionAndSubregions are unrecognized in the sense defined above,
so long as the recognized instances of this type completely contain the
relevant geographic information. Informally, if the recognized values in
the certificate allow the SDS to determine that the SPDU is valid, then
it can make that determination even if there are also unrecognized values
in the certificate. This field is therefore not a "critical information
field" as defined in 5.2.6, because unrecognized values are permitted so
long as the validity of the SPDU can be established with the recognized
values. However, as discussed in 5.2.6, the presence of an unrecognized
value in a certificate can make it impossible to determine whether the
certificate is valid and so whether the SPDU is valid.
In this structure:
Fields:
* countryOnly of type [**UnCountryId**](#UnCountryId)
is a UnCountryId as defined above.
* regionAndSubregions of type [**SequenceOfRegionAndSubregions**](#SequenceOfRegionAndSubregions)
identifies one or more subregions within
country.
```asn1
CountryAndSubregions ::= SEQUENCE {
countryOnly UnCountryId,
regionAndSubregions SequenceOfRegionAndSubregions
}
```
### RegionAndSubregions
The meanings of the fields in this structure are to be interpreted
in the context of a country within which the region is located, referred
to as the "enclosing country". If this structure is used in a
CountryAndSubregions structure, the enclosing country is the one indicated
by the country field in the CountryAndSubregions structure. If other uses
are defined for this structure in future, it is expected that that
definition will include a specification of how the enclosing country can
be determined.
If the enclosing country is the United States of America:
- The region field identifies the state or statistically equivalent
entity using the integer version of the 2010 FIPS codes as provided by the
U.S. Census Bureau (see normative references in Clause 0).
- The values in the subregions field identify the county or county
equivalent entity using the integer version of the 2010 FIPS codes as
provided by the U.S. Census Bureau.
If the enclosing country is a different country from the USA, the meaning
of regionAndSubregions is not defined in this version of this standard.
A conformant implementation that implements this type shall recognize (in
the sense of "be able to determine whether a two-dimensional location lies
inside or outside the borders identified by"), for at least one enclosing
country, at least one value for a region within that country and at least
one subregion for the indicated region. In this version of this standard,
the only means to satisfy this is for a conformant implementation to
recognize, for the USA, at least one of the FIPS state codes for US
states, and at least one of the county codes in at least one of the
recognized states. The Protocol Implementation Conformance Statement
(PICS) provided in Annex A allows an implementation to state which
UnCountryId values it recognizes and which region values are recognized
within that country.
If a verifying implementation is required to check that an relevant
geographic information in a signed SPDU is consistent with a certificate
containing one or more instances of this type, then the SDS is permitted
to indicate that the signed SPDU is valid even if some values within
subregions are unrecognized in the sense defined above, so long as the
recognized instances of this type completely contain the relevant
geographic information. Informally, if the recognized values in the
certificate allow the SDS to determine that the SPDU is valid, then it
can make that determination even if there are also unrecognized values
in the certificate. This field is therefore not not a "critical
information field" as defined in 5.2.6, because unrecognized values are
permitted so long as the validity of the SPDU can be established with the
recognized values. However, as discussed in 5.2.6, the presence of an
unrecognized value in a certificate can make it impossible to determine
whether the certificate is valid and so whether the SPDU is valid.
In this structure:
Fields:
* region of type [**Uint8**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Uint8)
identifies a region within a country.
* subregions of type [**SequenceOfUint16**](#SequenceOfUint16)
identifies one or more subregions within region. A
conformant implementation that supports RegionAndSubregions shall support
a subregions field containing at least eight entries.
```asn1
RegionAndSubregions ::= SEQUENCE {
region Uint8,
subregions SequenceOfUint16
}
```
### SequenceOfRegionAndSubregions
This type is used for clarity of definitions.
```asn1
SequenceOfRegionAndSubregions ::= SEQUENCE OF RegionAndSubregions
```
### ThreeDLocation
This structure contains an estimate of 3D location. The details of
the structure are given in the definitions of the individual fields below.
Fields:
* latitude of type [**Latitude**](#Latitude)
* longitude of type [**Longitude**](#Longitude)
* elevation of type [**Elevation**](#Elevation)
>>>
NOTE: The units used in this data structure are consistent with the
location data structures used in SAE J2735 [B26], though the encoding is
incompatible.
>>>
```asn1
ThreeDLocation ::= SEQUENCE {
latitude Latitude,
longitude Longitude,
elevation Elevation
}
```
### Latitude
This type contains an INTEGER encoding an estimate of the latitude
with precision 1/10th microdegree relative to the World Geodetic System
(WGS)-84 datum as defined in NIMA Technical Report TR8350.2.
The integer in the latitude field is no more than 900 000 000 and no less
than ?900 000 000, except that the value 900 000 001 is used to indicate
the latitude was not available to the sender.
```asn1
Latitude ::= NinetyDegreeInt
```
### Longitude
This type contains an INTEGER encoding an estimate of the longitude
with precision 1/10th microdegree relative to the World Geodetic System
(WGS)-84 datum as defined in NIMA Technical Report TR8350.2.
The integer in the longitude field is no more than 1 800 000 000 and no
less than ?1 799 999 999, except that the value 1 800 000 001 is used to
indicate that the longitude was not available to the sender.
```asn1
Longitude ::= OneEightyDegreeInt
```
### Elevation
This structure contains an estimate of the geodetic altitude above
or below the WGS84 ellipsoid. The 16-bit value is interpreted as an
integer number of decimeters representing the height above a minimum
height of -409.5 m, with the maximum height being 6143.9 m.
```asn1
Elevation ::= Uint16
```
### NinetyDegreeInt
The integer in the latitude field is no more than 900,000,000 and
no less than -900,000,000, except that the value 900,000,001 is used to
indicate the latitude was not available to the sender.
```asn1
NinetyDegreeInt ::= INTEGER {
min (-900000000),
max (900000000),
unknown (900000001)
} (-900000000..900000001)
```
### KnownLatitude
The known latitudes are from -900,000,000 to +900,000,000 in 0.1
microdegree intervals.
```asn1
KnownLatitude ::= NinetyDegreeInt (min..max)
```
### UnknownLatitude
The value 900,000,001 indicates that the latitude was not
available to the sender.
```asn1
UnknownLatitude ::= NinetyDegreeInt (unknown)
```
### OneEightyDegreeInt
The integer in the longitude field is no more than 1,800,000,000
and no less than -1,799,999,999, except that the value 1,800,000,001 is
used to indicate that the longitude was not available to the sender.
```asn1
OneEightyDegreeInt ::= INTEGER {
min (-1799999999),
max (1800000000),
unknown (1800000001)
} (-1799999999..1800000001)
```
### KnownLongitude
The known longitudes are from -1,799,999,999 to +1,800,000,000 in
0.1 microdegree intervals.
```asn1
KnownLongitude ::= OneEightyDegreeInt (min..max)
```
### UnknownLongitude
The value 1,800,000,001 indicates that the longitude was not
available to the sender.
```asn1
UnknownLongitude ::= OneEightyDegreeInt (unknown)
```
### Signature
This structure represents a signature for a supported public key
algorithm. It may be contained within SignedData or Certificate.
Fields:
* ecdsaNistP256Signature of type [**EcdsaP256Signature**](#EcdsaP256Signature)
* ecdsaBrainpoolP256r1Signature of type [**EcdsaP256Signature**](#EcdsaP256Signature)
* ecdsaBrainpoolP384r1Signature of type [**EcdsaP384Signature**](#EcdsaP384Signature)
...,
* ecdsaNistP384Signature of type [**EcdsaP384Signature**](#EcdsaP384Signature)
* sm2Signature of type [**EcsigP256Signature**](#EcsigP256Signature)
>>>
NOTE: Canonicalization: This data structure is subject to canonicalization
for the relevant operations specified in 6.1.2. The canonicalization
applies to instances of this data structure of form EcdsaP256Signature
and EcdsaP384Signature.
>>>
```asn1
Signature ::= CHOICE {
ecdsaNistP256Signature EcdsaP256Signature,
ecdsaBrainpoolP256r1Signature EcdsaP256Signature,
...,
ecdsaBrainpoolP384r1Signature EcdsaP384Signature,
ecdsaNistP384Signature EcdsaP384Signature,
sm2Signature EcsigP256Signature
}
```
### EcdsaP256Signature
This structure represents an ECDSA signature. The signature is
generated as specified in 5.3.1.
If the signature process followed the specification of FIPS 186-4
and output the integer r, r is represented as an EccP256CurvePoint
indicating the selection x-only.
If the signature process followed the specification of SEC 1 and
output the elliptic curve point R to allow for fast verification, R is
represented as an EccP256CurvePoint indicating the choice compressed-y-0,
compressed-y-1, or uncompressed at the sender's discretion.
NISTp256:
- p = FFFFFFFF00000001000000000000000000000000FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF
- n = FFFFFFFF00000000FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFBCE6FAADA7179E84F3B9CAC2FC632551
Brainpoolp256:
- p = A9FB57DBA1EEA9BC3E660A909D838D726E3BF623D52620282013481D1F6E5377
- n = A9FB57DBA1EEA9BC3E660A909D838D718C397AA3B561A6F7901E0E82974856A7
Fields:
* rSig of type [**EccP256CurvePoint**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#EccP256CurvePoint)
* sSig of type **OCTET STRING** (SIZE (32))
>>>
NOTE: When the signature is of form x-only, the x-value in rSig is
an integer mod n, the order of the group; when the signature is of form
compressed-y-\*, the x-value in rSig is an integer mod p, the underlying
prime defining the finite field. In principle this means that to convert a
signature from form compressed-y-\* to form x-only, the converter checks
the x-value to see if it lies between n and p and reduces it mod n if so.
In practice this check is unnecessary: Haase's Theorem states that
difference between n and p is always less than 2*square-root(p), and so the
chance that an integer lies between n and p, for a 256-bit curve, is
bounded above by approximately square-root(p)/p or 2(-128). For the
256-bit curves in this standard, the exact values of n and p in hexadecimal
are:
>>>
```asn1
EcdsaP256Signature ::= SEQUENCE {
rSig EccP256CurvePoint,
sSig OCTET STRING (SIZE (32))
}
```
### EcdsaP384Signature
This structure represents an ECDSA signature. The signature is
generated as specified in 5.3.1.
If the signature process followed the specification of FIPS 186-4
and output the integer r, r is represented as an EccP384CurvePoint
indicating the selection x-only.
If the signature process followed the specification of SEC 1 and
output the elliptic curve point R to allow for fast verification, R is
represented as an EccP384CurvePoint indicating the choice compressed-y-0,
compressed-y-1, or uncompressed at the sender's discretion.
Fields:
* rSig of type [**EccP384CurvePoint**](#EccP384CurvePoint)
* sSig of type **OCTET STRING** (SIZE (48))
>>>
NOTE: When the signature is of form x-only, the x-value in rSig is
an integer mod n, the order of the group; when the signature is of form
compressed-y-\*, the x-value in rSig is an integer mod p, the underlying
prime defining the finite field. In principle this means that to convert a
signature from form compressed-y-* to form x-only, the converter checks the
x-value to see if it lies between n and p and reduces it mod n if so. In
practice this check is unnecessary: Haase's Theorem states that difference
between n and p is always less than 2*square-root(p), and so the chance
that an integer lies between n and p, for a 384-bit curve, is bounded
above by approximately square-root(p)/p or 2(-192). For the 384-bit curve
in this standard, the exact values of n and p in hexadecimal are:
- p = 8CB91E82A3386D280F5D6F7E50E641DF152F7109ED5456B412B1DA197FB71123
ACD3A729901D1A71874700133107EC53
- n = 8CB91E82A3386D280F5D6F7E50E641DF152F7109ED5456B31F166E6CAC0425A7
CF3AB6AF6B7FC3103B883202E9046565
>>>
```asn1
EcdsaP384Signature ::= SEQUENCE {
rSig EccP384CurvePoint,
sSig OCTET STRING (SIZE (48))
}
```
### EcsigP256Signature
This structure represents a elliptic curve signature where the
component r is constrained to be an integer. This structure supports SM2
signatures as specified in 5.3.1.3.
Fields:
* rSig of type **OCTET STRING** (SIZE (32))
* sSig of type **OCTET STRING** (SIZE (32))
```asn1
EcsigP256Signature ::= SEQUENCE {
rSig OCTET STRING (SIZE (32)),
sSig OCTET STRING (SIZE (32))
}
```
### EccP256CurvePoint
This structure specifies a point on an elliptic curve in Weierstrass
form defined over a 256-bit prime number. The curves supported in this
standard are NIST p256 as defined in FIPS 186-4, Brainpool p256r1 as
defined in RFC 5639, and the SM2 curve as defined in GB/T 32918.5-2017.
The fields in this structure are OCTET STRINGS produced with the elliptic
curve point encoding and decoding methods defined in subclause 5.5.6 of
IEEE Std 1363-2000. The x-coordinate is encoded as an unsigned integer of
length 32 octets in network byte order for all values of the CHOICE; the
encoding of the y-coordinate y depends on whether the point is x-only,
compressed, or uncompressed. If the point is x-only, y is omitted. If the
point is compressed, the value of type depends on the least significant
bit of y: if the least significant bit of y is 0, type takes the value
compressed-y-0, and if the least significant bit of y is 1, type takes the
value compressed-y-1. If the point is uncompressed, y is encoded explicitly
as an unsigned integer of length 32 octets in network byte order.
Fields:
* x-only of type **OCTET STRING** (SIZE (32))
* fill of type **NULL**
* compressed-y-0 of type **OCTET STRING** (SIZE (32))
* compressed-y-1 of type **OCTET STRING** (SIZE (32))
* uncompressedP256 of type **SEQUENCE** {
x OCTET STRING (SIZE (32)),
y OCTET STRING (SIZE (32))
}
>>>
NOTE: Canonicalization: This data structure is subject to canonicalization
for the relevant operations specified in 6.1.2 if it appears in a
HeaderInfo or in a ToBeSignedCertificate. See the definitions of HeaderInfo
and ToBeSignedCertificate for a specification of the canonicalization
operations.
>>>
```asn1
EccP256CurvePoint::= CHOICE {
x-only OCTET STRING (SIZE (32)),
fill NULL,
compressed-y-0 OCTET STRING (SIZE (32)),
compressed-y-1 OCTET STRING (SIZE (32)),
uncompressedP256 SEQUENCE {
x OCTET STRING (SIZE (32)),
y OCTET STRING (SIZE (32))
}
}
```
### EccP384CurvePoint
This structure specifies a point on an elliptic curve in
Weierstrass form defined over a 384-bit prime number. The only supported
such curve in this standard is Brainpool p384r1 as defined in RFC 5639.
The fields in this structure are octet strings produced with the elliptic
curve point encoding and decoding methods defined in subclause 5.5.6 of
IEEE Std 1363-2000. The x-coordinate is encoded as an unsigned integer of
length 48 octets in network byte order for all values of the CHOICE; the
encoding of the y-coordinate y depends on whether the point is x-only,
compressed, or uncompressed. If the point is x-only, y is omitted. If the
point is compressed, the value of type depends on the least significant
bit of y: if the least significant bit of y is 0, type takes the value
compressed-y-0, and if the least significant bit of y is 1, type takes the
value compressed-y-1. If the point is uncompressed, y is encoded
explicitly as an unsigned integer of length 48 octets in network byte order.
Fields:
* x-only of type **OCTET STRING** (SIZE (48))
* fill of type **NULL**
* compressed-y-0 of type **OCTET STRING** (SIZE (48))
* compressed-y-1 of type **OCTET STRING** (SIZE (48))
* uncompressedP384 of type **SEQUENCE** {
x OCTET STRING (SIZE (48)),
y OCTET STRING (SIZE (48))
}
>>>
NOTE: Canonicalization: This data structure is subject to canonicalization
for the relevant operations specified in 6.1.2 if it appears in a
HeaderInfo or in a ToBeSignedCertificate. See the definitions of HeaderInfo
and ToBeSignedCertificate for a specification of the canonicalization
operations.
>>>
```asn1
EccP384CurvePoint::= CHOICE {
x-only OCTET STRING (SIZE (48)),
fill NULL,
compressed-y-0 OCTET STRING (SIZE (48)),
compressed-y-1 OCTET STRING (SIZE (48)),
uncompressedP384 SEQUENCE {
x OCTET STRING (SIZE (48)),
y OCTET STRING (SIZE (48))
}
}
```
### SymmAlgorithm
This enumerated value indicates supported symmetric algorithms. The
algorithm identifier identifies both the algorithm itself and a specific
mode of operation. The symmetric algorithms supported in this version of
this standard are AES-128 and SM4. The only mode of operation supported is
Counter Mode Encryption With Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication
Code (CCM). Full details are given in 5.3.8.
```asn1
SymmAlgorithm ::= ENUMERATED {
aes128Ccm,
...,
sm4Ccm
}
```
### HashAlgorithm
This structure identifies a hash algorithm. The value sha256,
indicates SHA-256. The value sha384 indicates SHA-384. The value sm3
indicates SM3. See 5.3.3 for more details.
>>>
NOTE: Critical information fields: This is a critical information field as
defined in 5.2.6. An implementation that does not recognize the enumerated
value of this type in a signed SPDU when verifying a signed SPDU shall
indicate that the signed SPDU is invalid in the sense of 4.2.2.3.2, that
is, it is invalid in the sense that its validity cannot be established.
>>>
```asn1
HashAlgorithm ::= ENUMERATED {
sha256,
...,
sha384,
sm3
}
```
### EciesP256EncryptedKey
This data structure is used to transfer a 16-byte symmetric key
encrypted using ECIES as specified in IEEE Std 1363a-2004. The symmetric
key is input to the key encryption process with no headers, encapsulation,
or length indication. Encryption and decryption are carried out as
specified in 5.3.5.1.
Fields:
* v of type [**EccP256CurvePoint**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#EccP256CurvePoint)
is the sender's ephemeral public key, which is the output V from
encryption as specified in 5.3.5.1.
* c of type **OCTET STRING** (SIZE (16))
is the encrypted symmetric key, which is the output C from
encryption as specified in 5.3.5.1. The algorithm for the symmetric key
is identified by the CHOICE indicated in the following SymmetricCiphertext.
For ECIES this shall be AES-128.
* t of type **OCTET STRING** (SIZE (16))
is the authentication tag, which is the output tag from
encryption as specified in 5.3.5.1.
```asn1
EciesP256EncryptedKey ::= SEQUENCE {
v EccP256CurvePoint,
c OCTET STRING (SIZE (16)),
t OCTET STRING (SIZE (16))
}
```
### EcencP256EncryptedKey
This data structure is used to transfer a 16-byte symmetric key
encrypted using SM2 encryption as specified in 5.3.3. The symmetric key is
input to the key encryption process with no headers, encapsulation, or
length indication. Encryption and decryption are carried out as specified
in 5.3.5.2.
Fields:
* v of type [**EccP256CurvePoint**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#EccP256CurvePoint)
is the sender's ephemeral public key, which is the output V from
encryption as specified in 5.3.5.2.
* c of type **OCTET STRING** (SIZE (16))
is the encrypted symmetric key, which is the output C from
encryption as specified in 5.3.5.2. The algorithm for the symmetric key
is identified by the CHOICE indicated in the following SymmetricCiphertext.
For SM2 this algorithm shall be SM4.
* t of type **OCTET STRING** (SIZE (32))
is the authentication tag, which is the output tag from
encryption as specified in 5.3.5.2.
```asn1
EcencP256EncryptedKey ::= SEQUENCE {
v EccP256CurvePoint,
c OCTET STRING (SIZE (16)),
t OCTET STRING (SIZE (32))
}
```
### EncryptionKey
This structure contains an encryption key, which may be a public or
a symmetric key.
Fields:
* public of type [**PublicEncryptionKey**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#PublicEncryptionKey)
* symmetric of type [**SymmetricEncryptionKey**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#SymmetricEncryptionKey)
>>>
NOTE: Canonicalization: This data structure is subject to canonicalization
for the relevant operations specified in 6.1.2 if it appears in a
HeaderInfo or in a ToBeSignedCertificate. The canonicalization applies to
the PublicEncryptionKey. See the definitions of HeaderInfo and
ToBeSignedCertificate for a specification of the canonicalization
operations.
>>>
```asn1
EncryptionKey ::= CHOICE {
public PublicEncryptionKey,
symmetric SymmetricEncryptionKey
}
```
### PublicEncryptionKey
This structure specifies a public encryption key and the associated
symmetric algorithm which is used for bulk data encryption when encrypting
for that public key.
Fields:
* supportedSymmAlg of type [**SymmAlgorithm**](#SymmAlgorithm)
* publicKey of type [**BasePublicEncryptionKey**](#BasePublicEncryptionKey)
>>>
NOTE: Canonicalization: This data structure is subject to canonicalization
for the relevant operations specified in 6.1.2 if it appears in a
HeaderInfo or in a ToBeSignedCertificate. The canonicalization applies to
the BasePublicEncryptionKey. See the definitions of HeaderInfo and
ToBeSignedCertificate for a specification of the canonicalization
operations.
>>>
```asn1
PublicEncryptionKey ::= SEQUENCE {
supportedSymmAlg SymmAlgorithm,
publicKey BasePublicEncryptionKey
}
```
### BasePublicEncryptionKey
This structure specifies the bytes of a public encryption key for
a particular algorithm. Supported public key encryption algorithms are
defined in 5.3.5.
Fields:
* eciesNistP256 of type [**EccP256CurvePoint**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#EccP256CurvePoint)
* eciesBrainpoolP256r1 of type [**EccP256CurvePoint**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#EccP256CurvePoint)
* ecencSm2 of type [**EccP256CurvePoint**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#EccP256CurvePoint)
...,
>>>
NOTE: Canonicalization: This data structure is subject to canonicalization
for the relevant operations specified in 6.1.2 if it appears in a
HeaderInfo or in a ToBeSignedCertificate. See the definitions of HeaderInfo
and ToBeSignedCertificate for a specification of the canonicalization
operations.
>>>
```asn1
BasePublicEncryptionKey ::= CHOICE {
eciesNistP256 EccP256CurvePoint,
eciesBrainpoolP256r1 EccP256CurvePoint,
...,
ecencSm2 EccP256CurvePoint
}
```
### PublicVerificationKey
This structure represents a public key and states with what
algorithm the public key is to be used. Cryptographic mechanisms are
defined in 5.3.
An EccP256CurvePoint or EccP384CurvePoint within a PublicVerificationKey
structure is invalid if it indicates the choice x-only.
Fields:
* ecdsaNistP256 of type [**EccP256CurvePoint**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#EccP256CurvePoint)
* ecdsaBrainpoolP256r1 of type [**EccP256CurvePoint**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#EccP256CurvePoint)
* ecdsaBrainpoolP384r1 of type [**EccP384CurvePoint**](#EccP384CurvePoint)
... ,
* ecdsaNistP384 of type [**EccP384CurvePoint**](#EccP384CurvePoint)
* ecsigSm2 of type [**EccP256CurvePoint**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#EccP256CurvePoint)
>>>
NOTE: Canonicalization: This data structure is subject to canonicalization
for the relevant operations specified in 6.1.2. The canonicalization
applies to the EccP256CurvePoint and the Ecc384CurvePoint. Both forms of
point are encoded in compressed form, i.e., such that the choice indicated
within the Ecc*CurvePoint is compressed-y-0 or compressed-y-1.
>>>
```asn1
PublicVerificationKey ::= CHOICE {
ecdsaNistP256 EccP256CurvePoint,
ecdsaBrainpoolP256r1 EccP256CurvePoint,
... ,
ecdsaBrainpoolP384r1 EccP384CurvePoint,
ecdsaNistP384 EccP384CurvePoint,
ecsigSm2 EccP256CurvePoint
}
```
### SymmetricEncryptionKey
This structure provides the key bytes for use with an identified
symmetric algorithm. The supported symmetric algorithms are AES-128 and
SM4 in CCM mode as specified in 5.3.8.
Fields:
* aes128Ccm of type **OCTET STRING** (SIZE(16))
* sm4Ccm of type **OCTET STRING** (SIZE(16))
...,
```asn1
SymmetricEncryptionKey ::= CHOICE {
aes128Ccm OCTET STRING(SIZE(16)),
...,
sm4Ccm OCTET STRING(SIZE(16))
}
```
### PsidSsp
This structure represents the permissions that the certificate
holder has with respect to activities for a single application area,
identified by a Psid.
For consistency rules for other forms of the ssp field, see the
following subclauses.
Fields:
* psid of type [**Psid**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Psid)
* ssp of type [**ServiceSpecificPermissions**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#ServiceSpecificPermissions) OPTIONAL
>>>
NOTE: Consistency with issuing certificate: If a certificate has an
appPermissions entry A for which the ssp field is omitted, A is consistent
with the issuing certificate if the issuing certificate contains a
PsidSspRange P for which the following holds:
- The psid field in P is equal to the psid field in A and one of the
following is true:
- The sspRange field in P indicates all.
- The sspRange field in P indicates opaque and one of the entries in
opaque is an OCTET STRING of length 0.
>>>
```asn1
PsidSsp ::= SEQUENCE {
psid Psid,
ssp ServiceSpecificPermissions OPTIONAL
}
```
### SequenceOfPsidSsp
This type is used for clarity of definitions.
```asn1
SequenceOfPsidSsp ::= SEQUENCE OF PsidSsp
```
### Psid
This type represents the PSID defined in IEEE Std 1609.12.
```asn1
Psid ::= INTEGER (0..MAX)
```
### SequenceOfPsid
This type is used for clarity of definitions.
```asn1
SequenceOfPsid ::= SEQUENCE OF Psid
```
### ServiceSpecificPermissions
This structure represents the Service Specific Permissions (SSP)
relevant to a given entry in a PsidSsp. The meaning of the SSP is specific
to the associated Psid. SSPs may be PSID-specific octet strings or
bitmap-based. See Annex C for further discussion of how application
specifiers may choose which SSP form to use.
For consistency rules for other types of ServiceSpecificPermissions,
see the following subclauses.
Fields:
* opaque of type **OCTET STRING** (SIZE(0..MAX))
* bitmapSsp of type [**BitmapSsp**](#BitmapSsp)
...,
>>>
NOTE: Consistency with issuing certificate: If a certificate has an
appPermissions entry A for which the ssp field is opaque, A is consistent
with the issuing certificate if the issuing certificate contains one of
the following:
- (OPTION 1) A SubjectPermissions field indicating the choice all and
no PsidSspRange field containing the psid field in A;
- (OPTION 2) A PsidSspRange P for which the following holds:
- The psid field in P is equal to the psid field in A and one of the
following is true:
- The sspRange field in P indicates all.
- The sspRange field in P indicates opaque and one of the entries in
the opaque field in P is an OCTET STRING identical to the opaque field in
A.
>>>
```asn1
ServiceSpecificPermissions ::= CHOICE {
opaque OCTET STRING (SIZE(0..MAX)),
...,
bitmapSsp BitmapSsp
}
```
### BitmapSsp
This structure represents a bitmap representation of a SSP. The
mapping of the bits of the bitmap to constraints on the signed SPDU is
PSID-specific.
>>>
NOTE: A BitmapSsp B is consistent with a BitmapSspRange R if for every
bit set to 1 in the sspBitmask in R, the bit in the identical position in
B is set equal to the bit in that position in the sspValue in R. For each
bit set to 0 in the sspBitmask in R, the corresponding bit in the
identical position in B may be freely set to 0 or 1, i.e., if a bit is
set to 0 in the sspBitmask in R, the value of corresponding bit in the
identical position in B has no bearing on whether B and R are consistent.
>>>
```asn1
BitmapSsp ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(0..31))
```
### PsidSspRange
This structure represents the certificate issuing or requesting
permissions of the certificate holder with respect to one particular set
of application permissions.
Fields:
* psid of type [**Psid**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Psid)
identifies the application area.
* sspRange of type [**SspRange**](#SspRange) OPTIONAL
identifies the SSPs associated with that PSID for which
the holder may issue or request certificates. If sspRange is omitted, the
holder may issue or request certificates for any SSP for that PSID.
```asn1
PsidSspRange ::= SEQUENCE {
psid Psid,
sspRange SspRange OPTIONAL
}
```
### SequenceOfPsidSspRange
This type is used for clarity of definitions.
```asn1
SequenceOfPsidSspRange ::= SEQUENCE OF PsidSspRange
```
### SspRange
This structure identifies the SSPs associated with a PSID for
which the holder may issue or request certificates.
If a certificate has a PsidSspRange A for which the ssp field is all,
A is consistent with the issuing certificate if the issuing certificate
contains a PsidSspRange P for which the following holds:
- (OPTION 1) A SubjectPermissions field indicating the choice all and
no PsidSspRange field containing the psid field in A;
- (OPTION 2) A PsidSspRange P for which the psid field in P is equal to
the psid field in A and the sspRange field in P indicates all.
For consistency rules for other types of SspRange, see the following
subclauses.
Fields:
* opaque of type [**SequenceOfOctetString**](#SequenceOfOctetString)
* all of type **NULL**
* bitmapSspRange of type [**BitmapSspRange**](#BitmapSspRange)
...,
>>>
NOTE: The choice "all" may also be indicated by omitting the
SspRange in the enclosing PsidSspRange structure. Omitting the SspRange is
preferred to explicitly indicating "all".
>>>
```asn1
SspRange ::= CHOICE {
opaque SequenceOfOctetString,
all NULL,
...,
bitmapSspRange BitmapSspRange
}
```
### BitmapSspRange
This structure represents a bitmap representation of a SSP. The
sspValue indicates permissions. The sspBitmask contains an octet string
used to permit or constrain sspValue fields in issued certificates. The
sspValue and sspBitmask fields shall be of the same length.
Reference ETSI TS 103 097 for more information on bitmask SSPs.
Fields:
* sspValue of type **OCTET STRING** (SIZE(1..32))
* sspBitmask of type **OCTET STRING** (SIZE(1..32))
>>>
NOTE: Consistency with issuing certificate: If a certificate has an
PsidSspRange value P for which the sspRange field is bitmapSspRange,
P is consistent with the issuing certificate if the issuing certificate
contains one of the following:
- (OPTION 1) A SubjectPermissions field indicating the choice all and
no PsidSspRange field containing the psid field in P;
- (OPTION 2) A PsidSspRange R for which the following holds:
- The psid field in R is equal to the psid field in P and one of the
following is true:
- EITHER The sspRange field in R indicates all
- OR The sspRange field in R indicates bitmapSspRange and for every
bit set to 1 in the sspBitmask in R:
- The bit in the identical position in the sspBitmask in P is set
equal to 1, AND
- The bit in the identical position in the sspValue in P is set equal
to the bit in that position in the sspValue in R.
>>>
```asn1
BitmapSspRange ::= SEQUENCE {
sspValue OCTET STRING (SIZE(1..32)),
sspBitmask OCTET STRING (SIZE(1..32))
}
```
### SubjectAssurance
This type is used for clarity of definitions.
This field contains the certificate holder's assurance level, which
indicates the security of both the platform and storage of secret keys as
well as the confidence in this assessment.
This field is encoded as defined in Table 1, where "A" denotes bit
fields specifying an assurance level, "R" reserved bit fields, and "C" bit
fields specifying the confidence.
Table 1: Bitwise encoding of subject assurance
| Bit number | 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 0 |
| -------------- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Interpretation | A | A | A | R | R | R | C | C |
In Table 1, bit number 0 denotes the least significant bit. Bit 7
to bit 5 denote the device's assurance levels, bit 4 to bit 2 are reserved
for future use, and bit 1 and bit 0 denote the confidence.
The specification of these assurance levels as well as the
encoding of the confidence levels is outside the scope of the present
standard. It can be assumed that a higher assurance value indicates that
the holder is more trusted than the holder of a certificate with lower
assurance value and the same confidence value.
>>>
NOTE: This field was originally specified in ETSI TS 103 097 and
future uses of this field are anticipated to be consistent with future
versions of that standard.
>>>
```asn1
SubjectAssurance ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(1))
```
### CrlSeries
This integer identifies a series of CRLs issued under the authority
of a particular CRACA.
```asn1
CrlSeries ::= Uint16
```
### IValue
This atomic type is used in the definition of other data structures.
```asn1
IValue ::= Uint16
```
### Hostname
This is a UTF-8 string as defined in IETF RFC 3629. The contents
are determined by policy.
```asn1
Hostname ::= UTF8String (SIZE(0..255))
```
### LinkageValue
This is the individual linkage value. See 5.1.3 and 7.3 for details
of use.
```asn1
LinkageValue ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(9))
```
### GroupLinkageValue
This is the group linkage value. See 5.1.3 and 7.3 for details of
use.
Fields:
* jValue of type **OCTET STRING** (SIZE(4))
* value of type **OCTET STRING** (SIZE(9))
```asn1
GroupLinkageValue ::= SEQUENCE {
jValue OCTET STRING (SIZE(4)),
value OCTET STRING (SIZE(9))
}
```
### LaId
This structure contains a LA Identifier for use in the algorithms
specified in 5.1.3.4.
```asn1
LaId ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(2))
```
### SequenceOfLinkageSeed
This type is used for clarity of definitions.
```asn1
SequenceOfLinkageSeed ::= SEQUENCE OF LinkageSeed
```
### LinkageSeed
This structure contains a linkage seed value for use in the
algorithms specified in 5.1.3.4.
```asn1
LinkageSeed ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(16))
```
### CERT-EXT-TYPE
This structure is the Information Object Class used to contain
information about a set of certificate extensions that are associated with
each other: an AppExtension, a CertIssueExtension, and a
CertRequestExtension.
Fields:
* id of type [**ExtId**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#ExtId)
```asn1
CERT-EXT-TYPE ::= CLASS {
&id ExtId,
&App,
&Issue,
&Req
} WITH SYNTAX {ID &id APP &App ISSUE &Issue REQUEST &Req}
```
### Extension
This parameterized type represents a (id, content) pair drawn from
the set ExtensionTypes, which is constrained to contain objects defined by
the class EXT-TYPE.
Fields:
* id of type [**EXT-TYPE**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#EXT-TYPE) .&extId({ExtensionTypes})
* content of type [**EXT-TYPE**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#EXT-TYPE) .&ExtContent({ExtensionTypes}{@.id})
```asn1
Extension {EXT-TYPE : ExtensionTypes} ::= SEQUENCE {
id EXT-TYPE.&extId({ExtensionTypes}),
content EXT-TYPE.&ExtContent({ExtensionTypes}{@.id})
}
```
### EXT-TYPE
This class defines objects in a form suitable for import into the
definition of HeaderInfo.
Fields:
* extId of type [**ExtId**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#ExtId)
```asn1
EXT-TYPE ::= CLASS {
&extId ExtId,
&ExtContent
} WITH SYNTAX {&ExtContent IDENTIFIED BY &extId}
```
### ExtId
This type is used as an identifier for instances of ExtContent
within an EXT-TYPE.
```asn1
ExtId ::= INTEGER(0..255)
```
ieee1609.2-ieee/docs/Ieee1609Dot2Crl.md 0000664 0000000 0000000 00000004162 14326475135 0017222 0 ustar 00root root 0000000 0000000 # ASN.1 module Ieee1609Dot2Crl
OID: _{iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) crl(3) major-version-3(3) minor-version-2(2)}_
@note Section references in this file are to clauses in IEEE Std
1609.2 unless indicated otherwise. Full forms of acronyms and
abbreviations used in this file are specified in 3.2.
## Imports:
* **[Ieee1609Dot2](Ieee1609Dot2.md)** *{iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) base(1) schema(1) major-version-2(2) minor-version-6(6)} WITH SUCCESSORS*
* **[Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md)** *{iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) base(1) base-types(2) major-version-2(2) minor-version-4(4)} WITH SUCCESSORS*
* **[Ieee1609Dot2CrlBaseTypes](Ieee1609Dot2CrlBaseTypes.md)** *{iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) crl(3) base-types(2) major-version-3(3) minor-version-2(2)} WITH SUCCESSORS*
## Data Elements:
### CrlPsid
This is the PSID for the CRL application.
```asn1
CrlPsid ::= Psid(256)
```
### SecuredCrl
This structure is the SPDU used to contain a signed CRL. A valid
signed CRL meets the validity criteria of 7.4.
```asn1
SecuredCrl ::= Ieee1609Dot2Data (WITH COMPONENTS {...,
content (WITH COMPONENTS {
signedData (WITH COMPONENTS {...,
tbsData (WITH COMPONENTS {
payload (WITH COMPONENTS {...,
data (WITH COMPONENTS {...,
content (WITH COMPONENTS {
unsecuredData (CONTAINING CrlContents)
})
})
}),
headerInfo (WITH COMPONENTS {...,
psid (CrlPsid),
generationTime ABSENT,
expiryTime ABSENT,
generationLocation ABSENT,
p2pcdLearningRequest ABSENT,
missingCrlIdentifier ABSENT,
encryptionKey ABSENT
})
})
})
})
})
```
ieee1609.2-ieee/docs/Ieee1609Dot2CrlBaseTypes.md 0000664 0000000 0000000 00000050353 14326475135 0021045 0 ustar 00root root 0000000 0000000 # ASN.1 module Ieee1609Dot2CrlBaseTypes
OID: _{iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) crl(3) base-types(2) major-version-3(3) minor-version-2(2)}_
@note Section references in this file are to clauses in IEEE Std
1609.2 unless indicated otherwise. Full forms of acronyms and
abbreviations used in this file are specified in 3.2.
## Imports:
* **[Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md)** *{iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) base(1) base-types(2) major-version-2(2) minor-version-4(4)} WITH SUCCESSORS*
## Data Elements:
### CrlContents
The fields in this structure have the following meaning:
Fields:
* version of type [**Uint8**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Uint8) (1)
is the version number of the CRL. For this version of this
standard it is 1.
* crlSeries of type [**CrlSeries**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#CrlSeries)
represents the CRL series to which this CRL belongs. This
is used to determine whether the revocation information in a CRL is relevant
to a particular certificate as specified in 5.1.3.2.
* crlCraca of type [**HashedId8**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#HashedId8)
contains the low-order eight octets of the hash of the
certificate of the Certificate Revocation Authorization CA (CRACA) that
ultimately authorized the issuance of this CRL. This is used to determine
whether the revocation information in a CRL is relevant to a particular
certificate as specified in 5.1.3.2. In a valid signed CRL as specified in
7.4 the crlCraca is consistent with the associatedCraca field in the
Service Specific Permissions as defined in 7.4.3.3. The HashedId8 is
calculated with the whole-certificate hash algorithm, determined as
described in 6.4.3, applied to the COER-encoded certificate, canonicalized
as defined in the definition of Certificate.
* issueDate of type [**Time32**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Time32)
specifies the time when the CRL was issued.
* nextCrl of type [**Time32**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Time32)
contains the time when the next CRL with the same crlSeries
and cracaId is expected to be issued. The CRL is invalid unless nextCrl is
strictly after issueDate. This field is used to set the expected update time
for revocation information associated with the (crlCraca, crlSeries) pair as
specified in 5.1.3.6.
* priorityInfo of type [**CrlPriorityInfo**](#CrlPriorityInfo)
contains information that assists devices with limited
storage space in determining which revocation information to retain and
which to discard.
* typeSpecific of type [**TypeSpecificCrlContents**](#TypeSpecificCrlContents)
contains the CRL body.
```asn1
CrlContents ::= SEQUENCE {
version Uint8 (1),
crlSeries CrlSeries,
crlCraca HashedId8,
issueDate Time32,
nextCrl Time32,
priorityInfo CrlPriorityInfo,
typeSpecific TypeSpecificCrlContents
}
```
### CrlPriorityInfo
This data structure contains information that assists devices with
limited storage space in determining which revocation information to retain
and which to discard.
Fields:
* priority of type [**Uint8**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Uint8) OPTIONAL
indicates the priority of the revocation information
relative to other CRLs issued for certificates with the same cracaId and
crlSeries values. A higher value for this field indicates higher importance
of this revocation information.
>>>
NOTE: This mechanism is for future use; details are not specified in this
version of the standard.
>>>
```asn1
CrlPriorityInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
priority Uint8 OPTIONAL,
...
}
```
### TypeSpecificCrlContents
This structure contains type-specific CRL contents.
Fields:
* fullHashCrl of type [**ToBeSignedHashIdCrl**](#ToBeSignedHashIdCrl)
contains a full hash-based CRL, i.e., a listing of the
hashes of all certificates that:
- contain the indicated cracaId and crlSeries values, and
- are revoked by hash, and
- have been revoked, and
- have not expired.
* deltaHashCrl of type [**ToBeSignedHashIdCrl**](#ToBeSignedHashIdCrl)
contains a delta hash-based CRL, i.e., a listing of
the hashes of all certificates that:
- contain the indicated cracaId and crlSeries values, and
- are revoked by hash, and
- have been revoked since the previous CRL that contained the indicated
cracaId and crlSeries values.
* fullLinkedCrl of type [**ToBeSignedLinkageValueCrl**](#ToBeSignedLinkageValueCrl)
and fullLinkedCrlWithAlg: contain a full linkage
ID-based CRL, i.e., a listing of the individual and/or group linkage data
for all certificates that:
- contain the indicated cracaId and crlSeries values, and
- are revoked by linkage value, and
- have been revoked, and
- have not expired.
The difference between fullLinkedCrl and fullLinkedCrlWithAlg is in how
the cryptographic algorithms to be used in the seed evolution function and
linkage value generation function of 5.1.3.4 are communicated to the
receiver of the CRL. See below in this subclause for details.
* deltaLinkedCrl of type [**ToBeSignedLinkageValueCrl**](#ToBeSignedLinkageValueCrl)
and deltaLinkedCrlWithAlg: contain a delta linkage
ID-based CRL, i.e., a listing of the individual and/or group linkage data
for all certificates that:
- contain the specified cracaId and crlSeries values, and
- are revoked by linkage data, and
- have been revoked since the previous CRL that contained the indicated
cracaId and crlSeries values.
The difference between deltaLinkedCrl and deltaLinkedCrlWithAlg is in how
the cryptographic algorithms to be used in the seed evolution function
and linkage value generation function of 5.1.3.4 are communicated to the
receiver of the CRL. See below in this subclause for details.
* fullLinkedCrlWithAlg of type [**ToBeSignedLinkageValueCrlWithAlgIdentifier**](#ToBeSignedLinkageValueCrlWithAlgIdentifier)
...,
* deltaLinkedCrlWithAlg of type [**ToBeSignedLinkageValueCrlWithAlgIdentifier**](#ToBeSignedLinkageValueCrlWithAlgIdentifier)
If the contents of this structure is a
ToBeSignedLinkageValueCrlWithAlgIdentifier, then the seed evolution function
and linkage value generation function are given explicitly as specified in
the specification of ToBeSignedLinkageValueCrlWithAlgIdentifier.
If the contents of this structure is a ToBeSignedLinkageValueCrl, then the
seed evolution function and linkage value generation function are obtained
based on the crlCraca field in the CrlContents:
- If crlCraca was obtained with SHA-256 or SHA-384, then
seedEvolutionFunctionIdentifier is seedEvoFn1-sha256 and
linkageValueGenerationFunctionIdentifier is lvGenFn1-aes128.
- If crlCraca was obtained with SM3, then seedEvolutionFunctionIdentifier
is seedEvoFn1-sm3 and linkageValueGenerationFunctionIdentifier is
lvGenFn1-sm4.
>>>
NOTE: Seed evolution function and linkage value generation function
identification. In order to derive linkage values per the mechanisms given
in 5.1.3.4, a receiver needs to know the seed evolution function and the
linkage value generation function.
>>>
```asn1
TypeSpecificCrlContents ::= CHOICE {
fullHashCrl ToBeSignedHashIdCrl,
deltaHashCrl ToBeSignedHashIdCrl,
fullLinkedCrl ToBeSignedLinkageValueCrl,
deltaLinkedCrl ToBeSignedLinkageValueCrl,
...,
fullLinkedCrlWithAlg ToBeSignedLinkageValueCrlWithAlgIdentifier,
deltaLinkedCrlWithAlg ToBeSignedLinkageValueCrlWithAlgIdentifier
}
```
### ToBeSignedHashIdCrl
This data structure represents information about a revoked
certificate.
Fields:
* crlSerial of type [**Uint32**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Uint32)
is a counter that increments by 1 every time a new full
or delta CRL is issued for the indicated crlCraca and crlSeries values.
* entries of type [**SequenceOfHashBasedRevocationInfo**](#SequenceOfHashBasedRevocationInfo)
contains the individual revocation information items.
>>>
NOTE: To indicate that a hash-based CRL contains no individual revocation
information items, the recommended approach is for the SEQUENCE OF in the
SequenceOfHashBasedRevocationInfo in this field to indicate zero entries.
>>>
```asn1
ToBeSignedHashIdCrl ::= SEQUENCE {
crlSerial Uint32,
entries SequenceOfHashBasedRevocationInfo,
...
}
```
### SequenceOfHashBasedRevocationInfo
This type is used for clarity of definitions.
```asn1
SequenceOfHashBasedRevocationInfo ::=
SEQUENCE OF HashBasedRevocationInfo
```
### HashBasedRevocationInfo
In this structure:
Fields:
* id of type [**HashedId10**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#HashedId10)
is the HashedId10 identifying the revoked certificate. The
HashedId10 is calculated with the whole-certificate hash algorithm,
determined as described in 6.4.3, applied to the COER-encoded certificate,
canonicalized as defined in the definition of Certificate.
* expiry of type [**Time32**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Time32)
is the value computed from the validity period's start and
duration values in that certificate.
```asn1
HashBasedRevocationInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
id HashedId10,
expiry Time32,
...
}
```
### ToBeSignedLinkageValueCrl
In this structure:
Fields:
* iRev of type [**IValue**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#IValue)
is the value iRev used in the algorithm given in 5.1.3.4. This
value applies to all linkage-based revocation information included within
either indvidual or groups.
* indexWithinI of type [**Uint8**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Uint8)
is a counter that is set to 0 for the first CRL issued
for the indicated combination of crlCraca, crlSeries, and iRev, and
increments by 1 every time a new full or delta CRL is issued for the
indicated crlCraca and crlSeries values without changing iRev.
* individual of type [**SequenceOfJMaxGroup**](#SequenceOfJMaxGroup) OPTIONAL
contains individual linkage data.
* groups of type [**SequenceOfGroupCrlEntry**](#SequenceOfGroupCrlEntry) OPTIONAL
contains group linkage data.
* groupsSingleSeed of type [**SequenceOfGroupSingleSeedCrlEntry**](#SequenceOfGroupSingleSeedCrlEntry) OPTIONAL
contains group linkage data generated with a single
seed.
...,
>>>
NOTE: To indicate that a linkage ID-based CRL contains no group linkage
data, the recommended approach is for the SEQUENCE OF in the
SequenceOfGroupCrlEntry in this field to indicate zero entries.
>>>
```asn1
ToBeSignedLinkageValueCrl ::= SEQUENCE {
iRev IValue,
indexWithinI Uint8,
individual SequenceOfJMaxGroup OPTIONAL,
groups SequenceOfGroupCrlEntry OPTIONAL,
...,
groupsSingleSeed SequenceOfGroupSingleSeedCrlEntry OPTIONAL
} (WITH COMPONENTS {..., individual PRESENT} |
WITH COMPONENTS {..., groups PRESENT} |
WITH COMPONENTS {..., groupsSingleSeed PRESENT})
```
### SequenceOfJMaxGroup
This type is used for clarity of definitions.
```asn1
SequenceOfJMaxGroup ::= SEQUENCE OF JMaxGroup
```
### JMaxGroup
In this structure:
Fields:
* jmax of type [**Uint8**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Uint8)
* contents of type [**SequenceOfLAGroup**](#SequenceOfLAGroup)
contains individual linkage data.
```asn1
JMaxGroup ::= SEQUENCE {
jmax Uint8,
contents SequenceOfLAGroup,
...
}
```
### SequenceOfLAGroup
This type is used for clarity of definitions.
```asn1
SequenceOfLAGroup ::= SEQUENCE OF LAGroup
```
### LAGroup
In this structure:
Fields:
* la1Id of type [**LaId**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#LaId)
is the value LinkageAuthorityIdentifier1 used in the
algorithm given in 5.1.3.4. This value applies to all linkage-based
revocation information included within contents.
* la2Id of type [**LaId**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#LaId)
is the value LinkageAuthorityIdentifier2 used in the
algorithm given in 5.1.3.4. This value applies to all linkage-based
revocation information included within contents.
* contents of type [**SequenceOfIMaxGroup**](#SequenceOfIMaxGroup)
contains individual linkage data.
```asn1
LAGroup ::= SEQUENCE {
la1Id LaId,
la2Id LaId,
contents SequenceOfIMaxGroup,
...
}
```
### SequenceOfIMaxGroup
This type is used for clarity of definitions.
```asn1
SequenceOfIMaxGroup ::= SEQUENCE OF IMaxGroup
```
### IMaxGroup
In this structure:
Fields:
* iMax of type [**Uint16**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Uint16)
indicates that for the entries in contents, revocation
information need no longer be calculated once iCert > iMax as the holder
is known to have no more valid certs at that point. iMax is not directly
used in the calculation of the linkage values, it is used to determine
when revocation information can safely be deleted.
* contents of type [**SequenceOfIndividualRevocation**](#SequenceOfIndividualRevocation)
contains individual linkage data for certificates that are
revoked using two seeds, per the algorithm given in per the mechanisms
given in 5.1.3.4 and with seedEvolutionFunctionIdentifier and
linkageValueGenerationFunctionIdentifier obtained as specified in 7.3.3.
* singleSeed of type [**SequenceOfLinkageSeed**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#SequenceOfLinkageSeed) OPTIONAL
contains individual linkage data for certificates that
are revoked using a single seed, per the algorithm given in per the
mechanisms given in 5.1.3.4 and with seedEvolutionFunctionIdentifier and
linkageValueGenerationFunctionIdentifier obtained as specified in 7.3.3.
...,
```asn1
IMaxGroup ::= SEQUENCE {
iMax Uint16,
contents SequenceOfIndividualRevocation,
...,
singleSeed SequenceOfLinkageSeed OPTIONAL
}
```
### SequenceOfIndividualRevocation
This type is used for clarity of definitions.
```asn1
SequenceOfIndividualRevocation ::=
SEQUENCE (SIZE(0..MAX)) OF IndividualRevocation
```
### IndividualRevocation
In this structure:
Fields:
* linkageSeed1 of type [**LinkageSeed**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#LinkageSeed)
is the value LinkageSeed1 used in the algorithm given
in 5.1.3.4.
* linkageSeed2 of type [**LinkageSeed**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#LinkageSeed)
is the value LinkageSeed2 used in the algorithm given
in 5.1.3.4.
```asn1
IndividualRevocation ::= SEQUENCE {
linkageSeed1 LinkageSeed,
linkageSeed2 LinkageSeed,
...
}
```
### SequenceOfGroupCrlEntry
This type is used for clarity of definitions.
```asn1
SequenceOfGroupCrlEntry ::= SEQUENCE OF GroupCrlEntry
```
### GroupCrlEntry
In this structure:
Fields:
* iMax of type [**Uint16**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Uint16)
indicates that for these certificates, revocation information
need no longer be calculated once iCert > iMax as the holders are known
to have no more valid certs for that (crlCraca, crlSeries) at that point.
* la1Id of type [**LaId**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#LaId)
is the value LinkageAuthorityIdentifier1 used in the
algorithm given in 5.1.3.4. This value applies to all linkage-based
revocation information included within contents.
* linkageSeed1 of type [**LinkageSeed**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#LinkageSeed)
is the value LinkageSeed1 used in the algorithm given
in 5.1.3.4.
* la2Id of type [**LaId**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#LaId)
is the value LinkageAuthorityIdentifier2 used in the
algorithm given in 5.1.3.4. This value applies to all linkage-based
revocation information included within contents.
* linkageSeed2 of type [**LinkageSeed**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#LinkageSeed)
is the value LinkageSeed2 used in the algorithm given
in 5.1.3.4.
```asn1
GroupCrlEntry ::= SEQUENCE {
iMax Uint16,
la1Id LaId,
linkageSeed1 LinkageSeed,
la2Id LaId,
linkageSeed2 LinkageSeed,
...
}
```
### ToBeSignedLinkageValueCrlWithAlgIdentifier
In this structure:
Fields:
* iRev of type [**IValue**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#IValue)
is the value iRev used in the algorithm given in 5.1.3.4. This
value applies to all linkage-based revocation information included within
either indvidual or groups.
* indexWithinI of type [**Uint8**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Uint8)
is a counter that is set to 0 for the first CRL issued
for the indicated combination of crlCraca, crlSeries, and iRev, and increments by 1 every time a new full or delta CRL is issued for the indicated crlCraca and crlSeries values without changing iRev.
* seedEvolution of type [**SeedEvolutionFunctionIdentifier**](#SeedEvolutionFunctionIdentifier)
contains an identifier for the seed evolution
function, used as specified in 5.1.3.4.
* lvGeneration of type [**LvGenerationFunctionIdentifier**](#LvGenerationFunctionIdentifier)
contains an identifier for the linkage value
generation function, used as specified in 5.1.3.4.
* individual of type [**SequenceOfJMaxGroup**](#SequenceOfJMaxGroup) OPTIONAL
contains individual linkage data.
* groups of type [**SequenceOfGroupCrlEntry**](#SequenceOfGroupCrlEntry) OPTIONAL
contains group linkage data for linkage value generation
with two seeds.
* groupsSingleSeed of type [**SequenceOfGroupSingleSeedCrlEntry**](#SequenceOfGroupSingleSeedCrlEntry) OPTIONAL
contains group linkage data for linkage value
generation with one seed.
```asn1
ToBeSignedLinkageValueCrlWithAlgIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
iRev IValue,
indexWithinI Uint8,
seedEvolution SeedEvolutionFunctionIdentifier,
lvGeneration LvGenerationFunctionIdentifier,
individual SequenceOfJMaxGroup OPTIONAL,
groups SequenceOfGroupCrlEntry OPTIONAL,
groupsSingleSeed SequenceOfGroupSingleSeedCrlEntry OPTIONAL,
...
} (WITH COMPONENTS {..., individual PRESENT} |
WITH COMPONENTS {..., groups PRESENT} |
WITH COMPONENTS {..., groupsSingleSeed PRESENT})
```
### SequenceOfGroupSingleSeedCrlEntry
This type is used for clarity of definitions.
```asn1
SequenceOfGroupSingleSeedCrlEntry ::=
SEQUENCE OF GroupSingleSeedCrlEntry
```
### GroupSingleSeedCrlEntry
This structure contains the linkage seed for group revocation with
a single seed. The seed is used as specified in the algorithms in 5.1.3.4.
Fields:
* iMax of type [**Uint16**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Uint16)
* laId of type [**LaId**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#LaId)
* linkageSeed of type [**LinkageSeed**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#LinkageSeed)
```asn1
GroupSingleSeedCrlEntry ::= SEQUENCE {
iMax Uint16,
laId LaId,
linkageSeed LinkageSeed
}
```
### ExpansionAlgorithmIdentifier
This structure contains an identifier for the algorithms specified
in 5.1.3.4.
```asn1
ExpansionAlgorithmIdentifier ::= ENUMERATED {
sha256ForI-aesForJ,
sm3ForI-sm4ForJ,
...
}
```
### SeedEvolutionFunctionIdentifier
This is the identifier for the seed evolution function. See 5.1.3
for details of use.
```asn1
SeedEvolutionFunctionIdentifier ::= NULL
```
### LvGenerationFunctionIdentifier
This is the identifier for the linkage value generation function.
See 5.1.3 for details of use.
```asn1
LvGenerationFunctionIdentifier ::= NULL
```
This is the identifier for the seed evolution function. See 5.1.3
for details of use.
This is the identifier for the linkage value generation function.
See 5.1.3 for details of use.