From 8650af5834aa9f2c117fa757eae49c71338f2d12 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Denis Filatov Date: Wed, 4 Aug 2021 14:49:27 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 1/8] use dedicated version of 1609.2 --- .gitmodules | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/.gitmodules b/.gitmodules index d04d319..1b1d594 100644 --- a/.gitmodules +++ b/.gitmodules @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ [submodule "ieee1609dot2"] path = ieee1609dot2 url = https://forge.etsi.org/rep/ITS/asn1/ieee1609.2.git + branch = 1609.2.1_synch -- GitLab From f29a6edd8680ee406fa742c9ccf77fc971357b2a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Denis Filatov Date: Wed, 4 Aug 2021 16:42:41 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 2/8] use dedicated version of 1609.2 --- ieee1609dot2 | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/ieee1609dot2 b/ieee1609dot2 index 2baf229..ddf554e 160000 --- a/ieee1609dot2 +++ b/ieee1609dot2 @@ -1 +1 @@ -Subproject commit 2baf229cc00512fdd806e4c5de38b9a245896aac +Subproject commit ddf554e5e23398d578b9519f0e19682e3f058cfe -- GitLab From 631df14d8194ea74f839c8a5d7009f4b03f7507a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Denis Filatov Date: Mon, 6 Sep 2021 12:02:09 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 3/8] update to the March package --- Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaEeInterface.asn | 5 +++-- Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaLaInterface.asn | 3 ++- Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaMaInterface.asn | 3 ++- Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaRaInterface.asn | 6 +++-- Ieee1609Dot2Dot1Acpc.asn | 2 ++ Ieee1609Dot2Dot1CamRaInterface.asn | 1 + Ieee1609Dot2Dot1CertManagement.asn | 6 ++++- Ieee1609Dot2Dot1EcaEeInterface.asn | 3 +++ Ieee1609Dot2Dot1EeMaInterface.asn | 3 ++- Ieee1609Dot2Dot1EeRaInterface.asn | 9 +++++--- Ieee1609Dot2Dot1LaMaInterface.asn | 3 ++- Ieee1609Dot2Dot1LaRaInterface.asn | 3 ++- Ieee1609Dot2Dot1MaRaInterface.asn | 3 ++- Ieee1609Dot2Dot1Protocol.asn | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++------- 14 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-) diff --git a/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaEeInterface.asn b/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaEeInterface.asn index 19c226a..e0920ab 100755 --- a/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaEeInterface.asn +++ b/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaEeInterface.asn @@ -11,8 +11,7 @@ Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaEeInterface {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) aca-ee(1) major-version-2(2) - minor-version-2(2) -} + minor-version-2(2)} DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS ::= BEGIN @@ -24,11 +23,13 @@ IMPORTS FROM Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) base(1) base-types(2) major-version-2(2) minor-version-3(3)} +WITH SUCCESSORS Certificate FROM Ieee1609Dot2 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) base(1) schema(1) major-version-2(2) minor-version-4(4)} +WITH SUCCESSORS ; /** diff --git a/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaLaInterface.asn b/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaLaInterface.asn index 09672dc..037623d 100755 --- a/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaLaInterface.asn +++ b/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaLaInterface.asn @@ -10,7 +10,8 @@ Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaLaInterface {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) - extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) aca-la(2) major-version-2(2)} + extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) aca-la(2) major-version-2(2) + minor-version-1(1)} DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS ::= BEGIN diff --git a/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaMaInterface.asn b/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaMaInterface.asn index efb2b91..a681456 100755 --- a/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaMaInterface.asn +++ b/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaMaInterface.asn @@ -10,7 +10,8 @@ Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaMaInterface {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) - extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) aca-ma(3) major-version-2(2)} + extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) aca-ma(3) major-version-2(2) + minor-version-1(1)} DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS ::= BEGIN diff --git a/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaRaInterface.asn b/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaRaInterface.asn index d4c99ab..766e54d 100755 --- a/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaRaInterface.asn +++ b/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaRaInterface.asn @@ -11,8 +11,7 @@ Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaRaInterface {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) aca-ra(4) major-version-2(2) - minor-version-2(2) -} + minor-version-2(2)} DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS ::= BEGIN @@ -28,12 +27,14 @@ IMPORTS FROM Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) base(1) base-types(2) major-version-2(2) minor-version-3(3)} +WITH SUCCESSORS CertificateType, ToBeSignedCertificate FROM Ieee1609Dot2 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) base(1) schema(1) major-version-2(2) minor-version-4(4)} +WITH SUCCESSORS AcaEeCertResponsePlainSpdu, AcaEeCertResponsePrivateSpdu, @@ -43,6 +44,7 @@ FROM Ieee1609Dot2Dot1Protocol {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) protocol(17) major-version-2(2) minor-version-2(2)} +WITH SUCCESSORS ; /** diff --git a/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1Acpc.asn b/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1Acpc.asn index 50444ad..fe68497 100755 --- a/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1Acpc.asn +++ b/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1Acpc.asn @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ IMPORTS FROM Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) base(1) base-types(2) major-version-2(2) minor-version-3(3)} +WITH SUCCESSORS Ieee1609Dot2Data-Unsecured, Ieee1609Dot2Data-Signed @@ -34,6 +35,7 @@ FROM Ieee1609Dot2Dot1Protocol {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) protocol(17) major-version-2(2) minor-version-2(2)} +WITH SUCCESSORS ; /** diff --git a/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1CamRaInterface.asn b/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1CamRaInterface.asn index 290be9c..8baf182 100755 --- a/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1CamRaInterface.asn +++ b/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1CamRaInterface.asn @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ IMPORTS FROM Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) base(1) base-types(2) major-version-2(2) minor-version-3(3)} +WITH SUCCESSORS ; /** diff --git a/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1CertManagement.asn b/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1CertManagement.asn index d7a58d3..e2a7ff4 100755 --- a/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1CertManagement.asn +++ b/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1CertManagement.asn @@ -25,23 +25,26 @@ IMPORTS FROM Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) base(1) base-types(2) major-version-2(2) minor-version-3(3)} +WITH SUCCESSORS Certificate, SequenceOfCertificate FROM Ieee1609Dot2 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) base(1) schema(1) major-version-2(2) minor-version-4(4)} +WITH SUCCESSORS CrlSeries FROM Ieee1609Dot2CrlBaseTypes {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) crl(3) base-types(2) major-version-2(2) minor-version-2(2)} +WITH SUCCESSORS SecuredCrl FROM Ieee1609Dot2Crl {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) crl(3) protocol(1) major-version-2(2) minor-version-2(2)} - +WITH SUCCESSORS CtlSignatureSpdu, MultiSignedCtlSpdu, @@ -50,6 +53,7 @@ FROM Ieee1609Dot2Dot1Protocol {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) protocol(17) major-version-2(2) minor-version-2(2)} +WITH SUCCESSORS ; /** diff --git a/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1EcaEeInterface.asn b/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1EcaEeInterface.asn index e82fc0c..a76fea5 100755 --- a/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1EcaEeInterface.asn +++ b/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1EcaEeInterface.asn @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ IMPORTS FROM Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) base(1) base-types(2) major-version-2(2) minor-version-3(3)} +WITH SUCCESSORS Certificate, CertificateType, @@ -33,6 +34,7 @@ FROM Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) FROM Ieee1609Dot2 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) base (1) schema (1) major-version-2(2) minor-version-4(4)} +WITH SUCCESSORS PublicVerificationKey, ToBeSignedCertificate @@ -40,6 +42,7 @@ FROM Ieee1609Dot2Dot1Protocol {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) protocol(17) major-version-2(2) minor-version-2(2)} +WITH SUCCESSORS ; /** diff --git a/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1EeMaInterface.asn b/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1EeMaInterface.asn index 24d81bf..0182858 100755 --- a/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1EeMaInterface.asn +++ b/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1EeMaInterface.asn @@ -10,7 +10,8 @@ Ieee1609Dot2Dot1EeMaInterface {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) - extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) ee-ma(10) major-version-2(2)} + extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) ee-ma(10) major-version-2(2) + minor-version-1(1)} DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS ::= BEGIN diff --git a/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1EeRaInterface.asn b/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1EeRaInterface.asn index 0d6586a..6a9f922 100755 --- a/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1EeRaInterface.asn +++ b/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1EeRaInterface.asn @@ -11,8 +11,7 @@ Ieee1609Dot2Dot1EeRaInterface {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) ee-ra(11) major-version-2(2) - minor-version-2(2) -} + minor-version-2(2)} DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS ::= BEGIN @@ -27,11 +26,13 @@ IMPORTS FROM Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) base(1) base-types(2) major-version-2(2) minor-version-3(3)} +WITH SUCCESSORS CertificateType -FROM Ieee1609Dot2 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) + FROM Ieee1609Dot2 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) base(1) schema(1) major-version-2(2) minor-version-4(4)} +WITH SUCCESSORS EeEcaCertRequestSpdu, PublicVerificationKey, @@ -40,12 +41,14 @@ FROM Ieee1609Dot2Dot1Protocol {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) protocol(17) major-version-2(2) minor-version-2(2)} +WITH SUCCESSORS AcpcTreeId FROM Ieee1609Dot2Dot1Acpc {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) acpc(18) major-version-1(1) minor-version-2(2)} +WITH SUCCESSORS ; /** diff --git a/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1LaMaInterface.asn b/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1LaMaInterface.asn index 7f5a74e..d223a1c 100755 --- a/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1LaMaInterface.asn +++ b/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1LaMaInterface.asn @@ -10,7 +10,8 @@ Ieee1609Dot2Dot1LaMaInterface {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) - extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) la-ma(12) major-version-2(2)} + extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) la-ma(12) major-version-2(2) + minor-version-1(1)} DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS ::= BEGIN diff --git a/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1LaRaInterface.asn b/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1LaRaInterface.asn index 0418193..a726f48 100755 --- a/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1LaRaInterface.asn +++ b/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1LaRaInterface.asn @@ -10,7 +10,8 @@ Ieee1609Dot2Dot1LaRaInterface {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) - extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) la-ra(13) major-version-2(2)} + extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) la-ra(13) major-version-2(2) + minor-version-1(1)} DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS ::= BEGIN diff --git a/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1MaRaInterface.asn b/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1MaRaInterface.asn index 3f048bc..958f41d 100755 --- a/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1MaRaInterface.asn +++ b/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1MaRaInterface.asn @@ -10,7 +10,8 @@ Ieee1609Dot2Dot1MaRaInterface {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) - extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) ma-ra(14) major-version-2(2)} + extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) ma-ra(14) major-version-2(2) + minor-version-1(1)} DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS ::= BEGIN diff --git a/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1Protocol.asn b/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1Protocol.asn index b12d2c8..99d4408 100755 --- a/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1Protocol.asn +++ b/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1Protocol.asn @@ -51,72 +51,91 @@ FROM Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) FROM Ieee1609Dot2 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) base(1) schema(1) major-version-2(2) minor-version-4(4)} +WITH SUCCESSORS AcaEeInterfacePdu FROM Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaEeInterface {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) aca-ee(1) major-version-2(2) minor-version-2(2)} +WITH SUCCESSORS AcaLaInterfacePdu FROM Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaLaInterface {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) - aca-la(2) major-version-2(2)} + aca-la(2) major-version-2(2) minor-version-1(1)} +WITH SUCCESSORS AcaMaInterfacePdu FROM Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaMaInterface {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) - aca-ma(3) major-version-2(2)} + aca-ma(3) major-version-2(2) minor-version-1(1)} +WITH SUCCESSORS AcaRaInterfacePdu FROM Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaRaInterface {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) aca-ra(4) major-version-2(2) minor-version-2(2)} +WITH SUCCESSORS AcpcTreeId FROM Ieee1609Dot2Dot1Acpc {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) - extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) acpc(18) major-version-1(1) minor-version-2(2)} + extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) acpc(18) major-version-1(1) + minor-version-2(2)} +WITH SUCCESSORS CertManagementPdu FROM Ieee1609Dot2Dot1CertManagement{iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) cert-management(7) major-version-2(2) minor-version-2(2)} +WITH SUCCESSORS EcaEeInterfacePdu FROM Ieee1609Dot2Dot1EcaEeInterface {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) eca-ee(9) major-version-2(2) minor-version-2(2)} +WITH SUCCESSORS EeMaInterfacePdu FROM Ieee1609Dot2Dot1EeMaInterface {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) - extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) ee-ma(10) major-version-2(2)} + extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) ee-ma(10) major-version-2(2) + minor-version-1(1)} +WITH SUCCESSORS EeRaInterfacePdu FROM Ieee1609Dot2Dot1EeRaInterface {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) - extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) ee-ra(11) major-version-2(2) minor-version-2(2)} + extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) ee-ra(11) major-version-2(2) + minor-version-2(2)} +WITH SUCCESSORS LaMaInterfacePdu FROM Ieee1609Dot2Dot1LaMaInterface {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) - extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) la-ma(12) major-version-2(2)} + extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) la-ma(12) major-version-2(2) + minor-version-1(1)} +WITH SUCCESSORS LaRaInterfacePdu FROM Ieee1609Dot2Dot1LaRaInterface {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) - extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) la-ra(13) major-version-2(2)} + extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) la-ra(13) major-version-2(2) + minor-version-1(1)} +WITH SUCCESSORS MaRaInterfacePdu FROM Ieee1609Dot2Dot1MaRaInterface {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) - extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) ma-ra(14) major-version-2(2)} + extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) ma-ra(14) major-version-2(2) + minor-version-1(1)} +WITH SUCCESSORS ; /** -- GitLab From 6a7c851a7c950cc06bb61be34ea03ca7624c3d21 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Denis Filatov Date: Mon, 6 Sep 2021 12:07:00 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 4/8] update to the March package --- .gitmodules | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/.gitmodules b/.gitmodules index 1b1d594..0c327b8 100644 --- a/.gitmodules +++ b/.gitmodules @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ [submodule "ieee1609dot2"] path = ieee1609dot2 url = https://forge.etsi.org/rep/ITS/asn1/ieee1609.2.git - branch = 1609.2.1_synch + branch = release2 -- GitLab From 7e73a4406c9fcc986840bd998505d6c8765cfab3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Denis Filatov Date: Thu, 27 Oct 2022 14:53:54 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 5/8] version 2022-D13 --- .gitlab-ci.yml | 19 + .gitmodules | 2 +- Ieee1609Dot2Crl.asn | 57 - Ieee1609Dot2CrlBaseTypes.asn | 130 -- Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaEeInterface.asn | 193 +- Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaLaInterface.asn | 54 +- Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaMaInterface.asn | 54 +- Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaRaInterface.asn | 547 +++--- Ieee1609Dot2Dot1Acpc.asn | 423 +++-- Ieee1609Dot2Dot1CamRaInterface.asn | 189 +- Ieee1609Dot2Dot1CertManagement.asn | 867 +++++---- Ieee1609Dot2Dot1EcaEeInterface.asn | 352 ++-- Ieee1609Dot2Dot1EeMaInterface.asn | 54 +- Ieee1609Dot2Dot1EeRaInterface.asn | 633 ++++--- Ieee1609Dot2Dot1LaMaInterface.asn | 54 +- Ieee1609Dot2Dot1LaRaInterface.asn | 54 +- Ieee1609Dot2Dot1MaRaInterface.asn | 54 +- Ieee1609Dot2Dot1Protocol.asn | 2705 +++++++++++++--------------- asn2md.py | 363 ++++ ieee1609dot2 | 2 +- 20 files changed, 3350 insertions(+), 3456 deletions(-) create mode 100755 .gitlab-ci.yml delete mode 100755 Ieee1609Dot2Crl.asn delete mode 100755 Ieee1609Dot2CrlBaseTypes.asn create mode 100755 asn2md.py diff --git a/.gitlab-ci.yml b/.gitlab-ci.yml new file mode 100755 index 0000000..0c94885 --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitlab-ci.yml @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +include: + - project: 'forge-tools/asn2md' + file: '/gitlab-ci/base.yml' + +variables: + ASN1_SRC: '*.asn ieee1609dot2/*.asn' + +validate: + extends: .validate + only: + changes: + - '*.asn' + + +documentation: + extends: .documentation + only: + changes: + - '*.asn' diff --git a/.gitmodules b/.gitmodules index 0c327b8..728eea4 100644 --- a/.gitmodules +++ b/.gitmodules @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ [submodule "ieee1609dot2"] path = ieee1609dot2 url = https://forge.etsi.org/rep/ITS/asn1/ieee1609.2.git - branch = release2 + branch = 2022 diff --git a/Ieee1609Dot2Crl.asn b/Ieee1609Dot2Crl.asn deleted file mode 100755 index 0b80569..0000000 --- a/Ieee1609Dot2Crl.asn +++ /dev/null @@ -1,57 +0,0 @@ -Ieee1609Dot2Crl {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) -standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) -dot2(2) crl(3) protocol(1) major-version-2(2) minor-version-2(2)} - -DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS ::= BEGIN - -EXPORTS ALL; - -IMPORTS - - Ieee1609Dot2Data -FROM Ieee1609Dot2 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) - standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) - dot2(2) base (1) schema (1) major-version-2 (2) minor-version-4(4)} - - Opaque, - Psid -FROM Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) - standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) - dot2(2) base(1) base-types(2) major-version-2 (2) minor-version-3(3)} - - CrlContents -FROM Ieee1609Dot2CrlBaseTypes {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) - standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) - dot2(2) crl(3) base-types(2) major-version-2 (2) minor-version-2(2)} - -; - -CrlPsid ::= Psid(256) -- PSID = 0x100, 0p8080 - -SecuredCrl ::= Ieee1609Dot2Data (WITH COMPONENTS {..., - content (WITH COMPONENTS { - signedData (WITH COMPONENTS {..., - tbsData (WITH COMPONENTS { - payload (WITH COMPONENTS {..., - data (WITH COMPONENTS {..., - content (WITH COMPONENTS { - unsecuredData (CONTAINING CrlContents) - }) - }) - }), - headerInfo (WITH COMPONENTS {..., - psid (CrlPsid), - generationTime ABSENT, - expiryTime ABSENT, - generationLocation ABSENT, - p2pcdLearningRequest ABSENT, - missingCrlIdentifier ABSENT, - encryptionKey ABSENT - }) - }) - }) - }) -}) - - -END diff --git a/Ieee1609Dot2CrlBaseTypes.asn b/Ieee1609Dot2CrlBaseTypes.asn deleted file mode 100755 index 9d2208d..0000000 --- a/Ieee1609Dot2CrlBaseTypes.asn +++ /dev/null @@ -1,130 +0,0 @@ -Ieee1609Dot2CrlBaseTypes {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) -standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) -dot2(2) crl(3) base-types(2) major-version-2(2) minor-version-2(2)} - -DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS ::= BEGIN - -EXPORTS ALL; - -IMPORTS - CrlSeries, - GeographicRegion, - HashedId8, - HashedId10, - IValue, - LaId, - LinkageSeed, - Opaque, - Psid, - Signature, - Time32, - Uint3, - Uint8, - Uint16, - Uint32, - ValidityPeriod -FROM Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) - standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) - dot2(2) base(1) base-types(2) major-version-2 (2) minor-version-3(3)} -; - --- --- --- CRL contents --- --- - -CrlContents ::= SEQUENCE { - version Uint8 (1), - crlSeries CrlSeries, - cracaId HashedId8, - issueDate Time32, - nextCrl Time32, - priorityInfo CrlPriorityInfo, - typeSpecific CHOICE { - fullHashCrl ToBeSignedHashIdCrl, - deltaHashCrl ToBeSignedHashIdCrl, - fullLinkedCrl ToBeSignedLinkageValueCrl, - deltaLinkedCrl ToBeSignedLinkageValueCrl, - ... - } -} - -CrlPriorityInfo ::= SEQUENCE { - priority Uint8 OPTIONAL, - ... -} - - -ToBeSignedHashIdCrl ::= SEQUENCE { - crlSerial Uint32, - entries SequenceOfHashBasedRevocationInfo, - ... -} - -HashBasedRevocationInfo ::= SEQUENCE { - id HashedId10, - expiry Time32 -} - -SequenceOfHashBasedRevocationInfo ::= - SEQUENCE OF HashBasedRevocationInfo - - -ToBeSignedLinkageValueCrl ::= SEQUENCE { - iRev IValue, - indexWithinI Uint8, - individual SequenceOfJMaxGroup OPTIONAL, - groups SequenceOfGroupCrlEntry OPTIONAL, - ... -} -(WITH COMPONENTS {..., individual PRESENT} | - WITH COMPONENTS {..., groups PRESENT}) - - -JMaxGroup ::= SEQUENCE { - jmax Uint8, - contents SequenceOfLAGroup, - ... -} - - -SequenceOfJMaxGroup ::= SEQUENCE OF JMaxGroup - -LAGroup ::= SEQUENCE { - la1Id LaId, - la2Id LaId, - contents SequenceOfIMaxGroup, - ... -} - -SequenceOfLAGroup ::= SEQUENCE OF LAGroup - -IMaxGroup ::= SEQUENCE { - iMax Uint16, - contents SequenceOfIndividualRevocation, - ... -} - -SequenceOfIMaxGroup ::= SEQUENCE OF IMaxGroup - -IndividualRevocation ::= SEQUENCE { - linkage-seed1 LinkageSeed, - linkage-seed2 LinkageSeed, - ... -} - -SequenceOfIndividualRevocation ::= SEQUENCE OF IndividualRevocation - -GroupCrlEntry ::= SEQUENCE { - iMax Uint16, - la1Id LaId, - linkageSeed1 LinkageSeed, - la2Id LaId, - linkageSeed2 LinkageSeed, - ... -} - -SequenceOfGroupCrlEntry ::= SEQUENCE OF GroupCrlEntry - -END diff --git a/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaEeInterface.asn b/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaEeInterface.asn index e0920ab..c83e0e3 100755 --- a/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaEeInterface.asn +++ b/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaEeInterface.asn @@ -1,101 +1,92 @@ ---***************************************************************************-- --- IEEE Std 1609.2.1: ACA - EE Interface -- ---***************************************************************************-- - -/** - * @brief NOTE: Section references in this file are to clauses in IEEE Std - * 1609.2.1 unless indicated otherwise. Full forms of acronyms and - * abbreviations used in this file are specified in 3.2. - */ - -Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaEeInterface {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) - standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) - extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) aca-ee(1) major-version-2(2) - minor-version-2(2)} - -DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS ::= BEGIN - -EXPORTS ALL; - -IMPORTS - Time32, - Uint8 -FROM Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) - standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) - base(1) base-types(2) major-version-2(2) minor-version-3(3)} -WITH SUCCESSORS - - Certificate -FROM Ieee1609Dot2 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) - standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) - base(1) schema(1) major-version-2(2) minor-version-4(4)} -WITH SUCCESSORS -; - -/** - * @class AcaEeInterfacePdu - * - * @brief This is the parent structure for all structures exchanged between - * the ACA and the EE. The ACA – EE interface is a logical interface rather - * than a direct communications interface in that there is no direct message - * flow between the ACA and the EE: Messages from the ACA are stored - * by the RA and subsequently forwarded to the EE. The PDUs are identified as - * ACA-EE PDUs even though the RA acts as a forwarder for them because those - * PDUs are created by the ACA and encrypted for the EE, and not modified and - * frequently not read by the RA. An overview of this structure is as follows: - * - * @param acaEeCertResponse contains the ACA's response to - * RaAcaCertRequestSPDU, which is meant for the EE and sent via the RA. - */ - AcaEeInterfacePdu ::= CHOICE { - acaEeCertResponse AcaEeCertResponse, - ... - } - -/** - * @class AcaEeCertResponse - * - * @brief This structure contains a certificate and associated data as - * generated by the ACA for the EE that will be the holder of that - * certificate. An overview of this structure is as follows: - * - *

NOTE: In the case where the butterfly expansion function is used - * to set certEncKey in RaAcaCertRequest, the value j is not communicated to - * the ACA. However, the EE that receives the certificate response can only - * decrypt the response if it knows j. The RA is therefore anticipated to - * store j so that it can be associated with the appropriate certificate - * response. The RA encodes j in the filename. - * - * @param version contains the current version of the structure. - * - * @param generationTime contains the generation time of AcaEeCertResponse. - * - * @param certificate contains an authorization certificate generated by the - * ACA. It is of the type indicated by the type field in the corresponding - * request (if the requester requested an incorrect type, the response would - * be an error not an instance of this structure). - * - * @param privateKeyInfo is an optional field that is as follows: - *
    - *
  1. Present and contains the private key randomization value, if the - * field certificate.type is explicit and the butterfly key mechanism was used - * to generate the certificate. This is used by the EE in deriving the - * butterfly private key for explicit certificates as specified in 9.3.
    2. - * - *
  2. Present and contains the private key reconstruction value, if the - * field certificate.type is implicit. This is used by the EE as specified in - * 5.3.2 of IEEE Std 1609.2a-2017 (also 9.3 if the butterfly key mechanism is - * used).
    3. - * - *
  3. Absent otherwise.
    4. - *
- */ - AcaEeCertResponse ::= SEQUENCE { - version Uint8 (2), - generationTime Time32, - certificate Certificate, - privateKeyInfo OCTET STRING (SIZE (32)) OPTIONAL, - ... - } - -END \ No newline at end of file +--***************************************************************************-- +-- IEEE Std 1609.2.1: ACA - EE Interface -- +--***************************************************************************-- + +/** + * @note Section references in this file are to clauses in IEEE Std + * 1609.2.1 unless indicated otherwise. Full forms of acronyms and + * abbreviations used in this file are specified in 3.2. + */ + +Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaEeInterface {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) + standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) + extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) aca-ee(1) major-version-2(2) + minor-version-3(3)} + +DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS ::= BEGIN + +EXPORTS ALL; + +IMPORTS + Certificate +FROM Ieee1609Dot2 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) + standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) + dot2(2) base(1) schema(1) major-version-2(2) minor-version-5(5)} +WITH SUCCESSORS + + Time32, + Uint8 +FROM Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) + standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) + base(1) base-types(2) major-version-2(2) minor-version-3(3)} +WITH SUCCESSORS +; + +/** + * @brief This is the parent structure for all structures exchanged between + * the ACA and the EE. The ACA - EE interface is a logical interface rather + * than a direct communications interface in that there is no direct message + * flow between the ACA and the EE: Messages from the ACA are stored + * by the RA and subsequently forwarded to the EE. The PDUs are identified as + * ACA-EE PDUs even though the RA acts as a forwarder for them because those + * PDUs are created by the ACA and encrypted for the EE, and not modified and + * frequently not read by the RA. An overview of this structure is as follows: + * + * @param acaEeCertResponse: contains the ACA's response to + * RaAcaCertRequestSPDU, which is meant for the EE and sent via the RA. + */ +AcaEeInterfacePdu ::= CHOICE { + acaEeCertResponse AcaEeCertResponse, + ... +} + +/** + * @brief This structure contains a certificate and associated data as + * generated by the ACA for the EE that will be the holder of that + * certificate. An overview of this structure is as follows: + * + * @note In the case where the butterfly expansion function is used + * to set certEncKey in RaAcaCertRequest, the value j is not communicated to + * the ACA. However, the EE that receives the certificate response can only + * decrypt the response if it knows j. The RA is therefore anticipated to + * store j so that it can be associated with the appropriate certificate + * response. The RA encodes j in the filename. + * + * @param version: contains the current version of the structure. + * + * @param generationTime: contains the generation time of AcaEeCertResponse. + * + * @param certificate: contains an authorization certificate generated by the + * ACA. It is of the type indicated by the type field in the corresponding + * request (if the requester requested an incorrect type, the response would + * be an error not an instance of this structure). + * + * @param privateKeyInfo: shall be: + * - Present and contain the private key randomization value, if the field + * certificate.type is explicit and the butterfly key mechanism was used to + * generate the certificate. This is used by the EE in deriving the butterfly + * private key for explicit certificates as specified in 9.3. + * - Present and contain the private key reconstruction value, if the field + * certificate.type is implicit. This is used by the EE as specified in 5.3.2 + * of IEEE Std 1609.2a-2017 (also 9.3 if the butterfly key mechanism is used). + * - Absent otherwise. + */ +AcaEeCertResponse ::= SEQUENCE { + version Uint8 (2), + generationTime Time32, + certificate Certificate, + privateKeyInfo OCTET STRING (SIZE (32)) OPTIONAL, + ... +} + +END diff --git a/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaLaInterface.asn b/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaLaInterface.asn index 037623d..26dee61 100755 --- a/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaLaInterface.asn +++ b/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaLaInterface.asn @@ -1,28 +1,26 @@ ---***************************************************************************-- --- IEEE Std 1609.2.1: ACA - LA Interface -- ---***************************************************************************-- - -/** - * @brief NOTE: Section references in this file are to clauses in IEEE Std - * 1609.2.1 unless indicated otherwise. Full forms of acronyms and - * abbreviations used in this file are specified in 3.2. - */ - -Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaLaInterface {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) - standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) - extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) aca-la(2) major-version-2(2) - minor-version-1(1)} - -DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS ::= BEGIN - -EXPORTS ALL; - -/** - * @class AcaLaInterfacePdu - * - * @brief This structure is not used by EEs, so it is defined as NULL for - * purposes of this document. - */ - AcaLaInterfacePdu ::= NULL - -END \ No newline at end of file +--***************************************************************************-- +-- IEEE Std 1609.2.1: ACA - LA Interface -- +--***************************************************************************-- + +/** + * @note Section references in this file are to clauses in IEEE Std + * 1609.2.1 unless indicated otherwise. Full forms of acronyms and + * abbreviations used in this file are specified in 3.2. + */ + +Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaLaInterface {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) + standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) + extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) aca-la(2) major-version-2(2) + minor-version-1(1)} + +DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS ::= BEGIN + +EXPORTS ALL; + +/** + * @brief This structure is not used by EEs, so it is defined as NULL for + * purposes of this document. + */ +AcaLaInterfacePdu ::= NULL + +END diff --git a/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaMaInterface.asn b/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaMaInterface.asn index a681456..5a1c9fe 100755 --- a/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaMaInterface.asn +++ b/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaMaInterface.asn @@ -1,28 +1,26 @@ ---***************************************************************************-- --- IEEE Std 1609.2.1: ACA - MA Interface -- ---***************************************************************************-- - -/** - * @brief NOTE: Section references in this file are to clauses in IEEE Std - * 1609.2.1 unless indicated otherwise. Full forms of acronyms and - * abbreviations used in this file are specified in 3.2. - */ - -Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaMaInterface {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) - standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) - extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) aca-ma(3) major-version-2(2) - minor-version-1(1)} - -DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS ::= BEGIN - -EXPORTS ALL; - -/** - * @class AcaMaInterfacePdu - * - * @brief This structure is not used by EEs, so it is defined as NULL for - * purposes of this document. - */ - AcaMaInterfacePdu ::= NULL - -END \ No newline at end of file +--***************************************************************************-- +-- IEEE Std 1609.2.1: ACA - MA Interface -- +--***************************************************************************-- + +/** + * @note Section references in this file are to clauses in IEEE Std + * 1609.2.1 unless indicated otherwise. Full forms of acronyms and + * abbreviations used in this file are specified in 3.2. + */ + +Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaMaInterface {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) + standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) + extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) aca-ma(3) major-version-2(2) + minor-version-1(1)} + +DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS ::= BEGIN + +EXPORTS ALL; + +/** + * @brief This structure is not used by EEs, so it is defined as NULL for + * purposes of this document. + */ +AcaMaInterfacePdu ::= NULL + +END diff --git a/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaRaInterface.asn b/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaRaInterface.asn index 766e54d..1235651 100755 --- a/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaRaInterface.asn +++ b/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaRaInterface.asn @@ -1,286 +1,261 @@ ---***************************************************************************-- --- IEEE Std 1609.2.1: ACA - RA Interface -- ---***************************************************************************-- - -/** - * @brief NOTE: Section references in this file are to clauses in IEEE Std - * 1609.2.1 unless indicated otherwise. Full forms of acronyms and - * abbreviations used in this file are specified in 3.2. - */ - -Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaRaInterface {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) - standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) - extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) aca-ra(4) major-version-2(2) - minor-version-2(2)} - -DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS ::= BEGIN - -EXPORTS ALL; - -IMPORTS - HashAlgorithm, - HashedId8, - LaId, - PublicEncryptionKey, - Time32, - Uint8 -FROM Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) - standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) - base(1) base-types(2) major-version-2(2) minor-version-3(3)} -WITH SUCCESSORS - - CertificateType, - ToBeSignedCertificate -FROM Ieee1609Dot2 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) - standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) - base(1) schema(1) major-version-2(2) minor-version-4(4)} -WITH SUCCESSORS - - AcaEeCertResponsePlainSpdu, - AcaEeCertResponsePrivateSpdu, - AcaEeCertResponseCubkSpdu, - Ieee1609Dot2Data-SymmEncryptedSingleRecipient -FROM Ieee1609Dot2Dot1Protocol {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) - standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) - extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) protocol(17) - major-version-2(2) minor-version-2(2)} -WITH SUCCESSORS -; - -/** - * @class AcaRaInterfacePDU - * - * @brief This is the parent structure for all structures exchanged between - * the ACA and the RA. An overview of this structure is as follows: - * - * @param raAcaCertRequest contains the request for an authorization - * certificate from the RA to the ACA on behalf of the EE. - * - * @param acaRaCertResponse contains the ACA's response to RaAcaCertRequest. - */ - AcaRaInterfacePdu ::= CHOICE { - raAcaCertRequest RaAcaCertRequest, - acaRaCertResponse AcaRaCertResponse, - ... - } - -/** - * @class RaAcaCertRequest - * - * @brief This structure contains parameters needed to request an individual - * authorization certificate. An overview of this structure is as follows: - * - *

NOTE 1: In the case where the butterfly key mechanism is used to set - * certEncKey, the value of j is not communicated to the ACA. However, the EE - * that receives the certificate response can only decrypt the response if it - * knows j. The RA is therefore anticipated to store j so that it can be - * associated with the appropriate certificate response. - * - *

NOTE 2: The cracaId and crlSeries are set to the indicated values - * in the request. The ACA replaces these values with the appropriate values - * in the response. - * - *

NOTE 3: The ACA is not bound by the contents of the request and can - * issue certificates that are different from those requested, if so directed - * by policy. - * - * @param version contains the current version of the structure. - * - * @param generationTime contains the generation time of RaAcaCertRequest. - * - * @param type indicates whether the request is for an explicit or implicit - * certificate (see 4.1.1, 4.1.3.3.1). - * - * @param flags contains the flags related to the use of the butterfly key - * mechanism, and provides the following instructions to the ACA as to how - * to generate the response: - *
    - *
  1. If the flag butterflyExplicit is set, the request is valid only if - * the type field is set to explicit. In this case, the ACA uses the - * butterfly key derivation for explicit certificates as specified in 9.3. - * The field tbsCert.verifyKeyIndicator.verificationKey is used by the ACA as - * the cocoon public key for signing. The field privateKeyInfo in the - * corresponding AcaEeCertResponse is used by the EE as the random integer to - * recover the butterfly private key for signing.
    2. - * - *
  2. If the flag cubk is set, the request is valid only if the certEncKey - * field is absent. In this case, the ACA uses the compact unified variation - * of the butterfly key mechanism as specified in 9.3. This means that the - * ACA generates an AcaEeCertResponseCubkSpdu instead of an - * AcaEeCertResponsePrivateSpdu, and the response is valid only if the ACA - * certificate has the flag cubk set.
    3. - *
- * - * @param linkageInfo contains the encrypted prelinkage values needed to - * generate the linkage value for the certificate. If linkageInfo is present, - * the field tbsCert.id is of type LinkageData, where the iCert field is set - * to the actual i-period value and the linkage-value field is set to a dummy - * value to be replaced by the ACA with the actual linkage value. The - * encrypted prelinkage values are encrypted for the ACA by the LAs. - * - * @param certEncKey is used in combination with flags.cubk to indicate - * the type of response that is expected from the ACA. It is as follows: - *
    - *
  1. Absent and flags.cubk is not set if the ACA's response doesn't need - * to be encrypted. In this case, the ACA responds with - * AcaEeCertResponsePlainSpdu.
    2. - * - *
  2. Absent and flags.cubk is set if the ACA's response is to be encrypted - * with the verification key from the request and not signed. In this case, - * the ACA responds with AcaEeCertResponseCubkSpdu.
    3. - * - *
  3. Present and flags.cubk is not set if the ACA's response is to be - * encrypted with certEncKey and then signed by the ACA. In this case, the - * ACA responds with AcaEeCertResponsePrivateSpdu.
    4. - *
- * - * @param tbsCert contains parameters of the requested certificate. The - * certificate type depends on the field type, as follows: - *
    - *
  1. If type is explicit, the request is valid only if - * tbsCert.verifyKeyIndicator is a verificationKey.
    2. - * - *
  2. If type is implicit, the request is valid only if - * tbsCert.verifyKeyIndicator is a reconstructionValue.
    3. - *
- */ - RaAcaCertRequest ::= SEQUENCE { - version Uint8 (2), - generationTime Time32, - type CertificateType, - flags RaAcaCertRequestFlags, - linkageInfo LinkageInfo OPTIONAL, - certEncKey PublicEncryptionKey OPTIONAL, - tbsCert ToBeSignedCertificate (WITH COMPONENTS { - ..., - cracaId ('000000'H), - crlSeries (0), - appPermissions PRESENT, - certIssuePermissions ABSENT, - certRequestPermissions ABSENT - }), - ... - } - -/** - * @class RaAcaCertRequestFlags - * - * @brief This structure is used to convey information from the RA to the ACA - * about operations to be carried out when generating the certificate. For - * more details see the specification of RaAcaCertRequest. An overview of - * this structure is as follows: - */ - RaAcaCertRequestFlags ::= - BIT STRING {butterflyExplicit (0), cubk (1)} (SIZE (8)) - -/** - * @class LinkageInfo - * - * @brief This structure contains parameters needed to generate a linkage - * value for a given (EE, i, j). An overview of this structure is as follows: - * - *

NOTE: See Annex D for further discussion of LAs. - * - * @param encPlv1 contains the EncryptedIndividualPLV from one of the LAs. - * - * @param encPlv2 contains the EncryptedIndividualPLV from the other LA. - */ - LinkageInfo ::= SEQUENCE { - encPlv1 EncryptedIndividualPLV, - encPlv2 EncryptedIndividualPLV, - ... - } - -/** - * @class EncryptedIndividualPLV - * - * @brief This structure contains an individual prelinkage value encrypted by - * the LA for the ACA using the shared secret key. An overview of this - * structure is as follows: - * - *

NOTE: How the ACA obtains the shared symmetric key and how the RA - * associates the encPlv1 and encPlv2 with the correct certificate request are - * outside the scope of this document. - * - * @param version contains the current version of the structure. - * - * @param laId contains the ID of the LA that created the prelinkage value. - * See Annex D for further discussion of LA IDs. - * - * @param encPlv contains the encrypted individual prelinkage value, that is, - * the ciphertext field decrypts to a PreLinkageValue. It contains a pointer - * (hash of the shared symmetric key) to the used shared secret encryption key. - */ - EncryptedIndividualPLV ::= SEQUENCE { - version Uint8 (2), - laId LaId, - encPlv Ieee1609Dot2Data-SymmEncryptedSingleRecipient { - PreLinkageValue - } - } - -/** - * @class PreLinkageValue - * - * @brief This structure contains an individual prelinkage value. It is an - * octet string of length 9 octets. - */ - PreLinkageValue ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(9)) - -/** - * @class AcaRaCertResponse - * - * @brief This structure contains a certificate response by the ACA, - * encapsulated for consumption by the EE, as well as associated data for - * consumption by the RA. The response is of form AcaEeCertResponsePlainSpdu, - * AcaEeCertResponsePrivateSpdu, or AcaEeCertResponseCubkSpdu, and is - * generated in response to a successful RaAcaCertRequestSpdu. In this - * structure: - * - * @param version contains the current version of the structure. - * - * @param generationTime contains the generation time of AcaRaCertResponse. - * - * @param requestHash contains the hash of the corresponding - * RaAcaCertRequestSPDU. - * - * @param acaResponse contains the certificate for the EE in a suitable form - * as determined from the corresponding RaAcaCertRequestSPDU. - */ - AcaRaCertResponse ::= SEQUENCE { - version Uint8 (2), - generationTime Time32, - requestHash HashedId8, - acaResponse AcaResponse, - ... - } - -/** - * @class AcaResponse - * - * @brief This structure contains the certificate for the EE in a suitable - * form as determined from the corresponding RaAcaCertRequestSPDU. In this - * structure: - * - * @param plain contains the certificate for the EE in plain, that is, without - * encryption or signature. This choice is used only when the field - * certEncKey is absent and flags.cubk is not set in the corresponding - * RaAcaCertRequest. - * - * @param private contains the certificate for the EE in an encrypted then - * signed form to protect the EE's privacy from the RA. This choice is used - * only when the field certEncKey is present and flags.cubk is not set in the - * corresponding RaAcaCertRequest. - * - * @param cubk contains the certificate for the EE in an encrypted form. This - * choice is used only when the field certEncKey is absent and flags.cubk is - * set in the corresponding RaAcaCertRequest. - */ - AcaResponse ::= CHOICE { - plain AcaEeCertResponsePlainSpdu, - private AcaEeCertResponsePrivateSpdu, - cubk AcaEeCertResponseCubkSpdu, - ... - } - -END \ No newline at end of file +--***************************************************************************-- +-- IEEE Std 1609.2.1: ACA - RA Interface -- +--***************************************************************************-- + +/** + * @note Section references in this file are to clauses in IEEE Std + * 1609.2.1 unless indicated otherwise. Full forms of acronyms and + * abbreviations used in this file are specified in 3.2. + */ + +Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaRaInterface {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) + standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) + extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) aca-ra(4) major-version-3(3) + minor-version-1(1)} + +DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS ::= BEGIN + +EXPORTS ALL; + +IMPORTS + CertificateType, + ToBeSignedCertificate +FROM Ieee1609Dot2 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) + standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) + dot2(2) base(1) schema(1) major-version-2(2) minor-version-5(5)} +WITH SUCCESSORS + + HashAlgorithm, + HashedId8, + LaId, + PublicEncryptionKey, + Time32, + Uint8 +FROM Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) + standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) + base(1) base-types(2) major-version-2(2) minor-version-3(3)} +WITH SUCCESSORS + + AcaEeCertResponsePlainSpdu, + AcaEeCertResponsePrivateSpdu, + AcaEeCertResponseCubkSpdu, + Ieee1609Dot2Data-SymmEncryptedSingleRecipient +FROM Ieee1609Dot2Dot1Protocol {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) + standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) + extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) protocol(17) + major-version-3(3) minor-version-1(1)} +WITH SUCCESSORS +; + +/** + * @brief This is the parent structure for all structures exchanged between + * the ACA and the RA. An overview of this structure is as follows: + * + * @param raAcaCertRequest: contains the request for an authorization + * certificate from the RA to the ACA on behalf of the EE. + * + * @param acaRaCertResponse: contains the ACA's response to RaAcaCertRequest. + */ +AcaRaInterfacePdu ::= CHOICE { + raAcaCertRequest RaAcaCertRequest, + acaRaCertResponse AcaRaCertResponse, + ... +} + +/** + * @brief This structure contains parameters needed to request an individual + * authorization certificate. An overview of this structure is as follows: + * + * @note: + * - In the case where the butterfly key mechanism is used to set + * certEncKey, the value of j is not communicated to the ACA. However, the EE + * that receives the certificate response can only decrypt the response if it + * knows j. The RA is therefore anticipated to store j so that it can be + * associated with the appropriate certificate response. + * + * - The cracaId and crlSeries are set to the indicated values + * in the request. The ACA replaces these values with the appropriate values + * in the response. + * + * - The ACA is not bound by the contents of the request and can + * issue certificates that are different from those requested, if so directed + * by policy. + * + * @param version: contains the current version of the structure. + * + * @param generationTime: contains the generation time of RaAcaCertRequest. + * + * @param type: indicates whether the request is for an explicit or implicit + * certificate (see 4.1.1, 4.1.3.3.1). + * + * @param flags: contains the flags related to the use of the butterfly key + * mechanism, and provides the following instructions to the ACA as to how + * to generate the response: + * - If the flag butterflyExplicit is set, the request is valid only if + * the type field is set to explicit. In this case, the ACA uses the + * butterfly key derivation for explicit certificates as specified in 9.3. + * The field tbsCert.verifyKeyIndicator.verificationKey is used by the ACA as + * the cocoon public key for signing. The field privateKeyInfo in the + * corresponding AcaEeCertResponse is used by the EE as the random integer to + * recover the butterfly private key for signing. + * - If the flag cubk is set, the request is valid only if the certEncKey + * field is absent. In this case, the ACA uses the compact unified variation + * of the butterfly key mechanism as specified in 9.3. This means that the + * ACA generates an AcaEeCertResponseCubkSpdu instead of an + * AcaEeCertResponsePrivateSpdu, and the response is valid only if the ACA + * certificate has the flag cubk set. + * + * @param linkageInfo: contains the encrypted prelinkage values needed to + * generate the linkage value for the certificate. If linkageInfo is present, + * the field tbsCert.id is of type LinkageData, where the iCert field is set + * to the actual i-period value and the linkage-value field is set to a dummy + * value to be replaced by the ACA with the actual linkage value. The + * encrypted prelinkage values are encrypted for the ACA by the LAs. + * + * @param certEncKey: is used in combination with flags.cubk to indicate + * the type of response that is expected from the ACA. It is as follows: + * - Absent and flags.cubk is not set if the ACA's response doesn't need + * to be encrypted. In this case, the ACA responds with + * AcaEeCertResponsePlainSpdu. + * - Absent and flags.cubk is set if the ACA's response is to be encrypted + * with the verification key from the request and not signed. In this case, + * the ACA responds with AcaEeCertResponseCubkSpdu. + * - Present and flags.cubk is not set if the ACA's response is to be + * encrypted with certEncKey and then signed by the ACA. In this case, the + * ACA responds with AcaEeCertResponsePrivateSpdu. + * + * @param tbsCert: contains parameters of the requested certificate. The + * certificate type depends on the field type, as follows: + * - If type is explicit, the request is valid only if + * tbsCert.verifyKeyIndicator is a verificationKey. + * - If type is implicit, the request is valid only if + * tbsCert.verifyKeyIndicator is a reconstructionValue. + */ +RaAcaCertRequest ::= SEQUENCE { + version Uint8 (2), + generationTime Time32, + type CertificateType, + flags RaAcaCertRequestFlags, + linkageInfo LinkageInfo OPTIONAL, + certEncKey PublicEncryptionKey OPTIONAL, + tbsCert ToBeSignedCertificate (WITH COMPONENTS { + ..., + cracaId ('000000'H), + crlSeries (0), + appPermissions PRESENT, + certIssuePermissions ABSENT, + certRequestPermissions ABSENT + }), + ... +} + +/** + * @brief This structure is used to convey information from the RA to the ACA + * about operations to be carried out when generating the certificate. For + * more details see the specification of RaAcaCertRequest. An overview of + * this structure is as follows: + */ +RaAcaCertRequestFlags ::= + BIT STRING {butterflyExplicit (0), cubk (1)} (SIZE (8)) + +/** + * @brief This structure contains parameters needed to generate a linkage + * value for a given (EE, i, j). An overview of this structure is as follows: + * + * @note See Annex D for further discussion of LAs. + * + * @param encPlv1: contains the EncryptedIndividualPLV from one of the LAs. + * + * @param encPlv2: contains the EncryptedIndividualPLV from the other LA. + */ +LinkageInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + encPlv1 EncryptedIndividualPLV, + encPlv2 EncryptedIndividualPLV, + ... +} + +/** + * @brief This structure contains an individual prelinkage value encrypted by + * the LA for the ACA using the shared secret key. An overview of this + * structure is as follows: + * + * @note How the ACA obtains the shared symmetric key and how the RA + * associates the encPlv1 and encPlv2 with the correct certificate request are + * outside the scope of this document. + * + * @param version: contains the current version of the structure. + * + * @param laId: contains the ID of the LA that created the prelinkage value. + * See Annex D for further discussion of LA IDs. + * + * @param encPlv: contains the encrypted individual prelinkage value, that is, + * the ciphertext field decrypts to a PreLinkageValue. It contains a pointer + * (hash of the shared symmetric key) to the used shared secret encryption key. + */ +EncryptedIndividualPLV ::= SEQUENCE { + version Uint8 (2), + laId LaId, + encPlv Ieee1609Dot2Data-SymmEncryptedSingleRecipient { + PreLinkageValue + } +} + +/** + * @brief This structure contains an individual prelinkage value. It is an + * octet string of length 9 octets. + */ +PreLinkageValue ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(9)) + +/** + * @brief This structure contains a certificate response by the ACA, + * encapsulated for consumption by the EE, as well as associated data for + * consumption by the RA. The response is of form AcaEeCertResponsePlainSpdu, + * AcaEeCertResponsePrivateSpdu, or AcaEeCertResponseCubkSpdu, and is + * generated in response to a successful RaAcaCertRequestSpdu. In this + * structure: + * + * @param version: contains the current version of the structure. + * + * @param generationTime: contains the generation time of AcaRaCertResponse. + * + * @param requestHash: contains the hash of the corresponding + * RaAcaCertRequestSPDU. + * + * @param acaResponse: contains the certificate for the EE in a suitable form + * as determined from the corresponding RaAcaCertRequestSPDU. + */ +AcaRaCertResponse ::= SEQUENCE { + version Uint8 (2), + generationTime Time32, + requestHash HashedId8, + acaResponse AcaResponse, + ... +} + +/** + * @brief This structure contains the certificate for the EE in a suitable + * form as determined from the corresponding RaAcaCertRequestSPDU. In this + * structure: + * + * @param plain: contains the certificate for the EE in plain, that is, without + * encryption or signature. This choice is used only when the field + * certEncKey is absent and flags.cubk is not set in the corresponding + * RaAcaCertRequest. + * + * @param private: contains the certificate for the EE in an encrypted then + * signed form to protect the EE's privacy from the RA. This choice is used + * only when the field certEncKey is present and flags.cubk is not set in the + * corresponding RaAcaCertRequest. + * + * @param cubk: contains the certificate for the EE in an encrypted form. This + * choice is used only when the field certEncKey is absent and flags.cubk is + * set in the corresponding RaAcaCertRequest. + */ +AcaResponse ::= CHOICE { + plain AcaEeCertResponsePlainSpdu, + private AcaEeCertResponsePrivateSpdu, + cubk AcaEeCertResponseCubkSpdu, + ... +} + +END diff --git a/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1Acpc.asn b/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1Acpc.asn index fe68497..a658f22 100755 --- a/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1Acpc.asn +++ b/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1Acpc.asn @@ -1,218 +1,205 @@ ---***************************************************************************-- --- IEEE Std 1609.2.1: ACPC -- ---***************************************************************************-- - -/** - * @brief NOTE: Section references in this file are to clauses in IEEE Std - * 1609.2.1 unless indicated otherwise. Full forms of acronyms and - * abbreviations used in this file are specified in 3.2. - */ - -Ieee1609Dot2Dot1Acpc {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) - standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) - extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) acpc(18) major-version-1(1) - minor-version-2(2) -} - -DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS ::= BEGIN - -EXPORTS ALL; - -IMPORTS - HashAlgorithm, - IValue, - Psid, - Time32, - Uint8 -FROM Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) - standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) - dot2(2) base(1) base-types(2) major-version-2(2) minor-version-3(3)} -WITH SUCCESSORS - - Ieee1609Dot2Data-Unsecured, - Ieee1609Dot2Data-Signed -FROM Ieee1609Dot2Dot1Protocol {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) - standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) - extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) protocol(17) - major-version-2(2) minor-version-2(2)} -WITH SUCCESSORS -; - -/** - * @class AcpcPdu - * - * @brief This structure contains an APrV structure produced by the CAM. An - * overview of this structure is as follows: - * - * @param tree contains an AprvBinaryTree. - * - * @param aprv contains a single IndividualAprv. - */ - AcpcPdu ::= CHOICE { - tree AprvBinaryTree, - aprv IndividualAprv, - ... - } - -/** - * @class AprvBinaryTree - * - * @brief This structure encodes a binary tree. An overview of this structure - * is as follows: - * - * @param version contains the current version of the structure. - * - * @param generationTime contains the generation time of AprvBinaryTree. - * - * @param currentI contains the i-value associated with the batch of - * certificates. - * - * @param acpcTreeId contains an identifier for the CAM creating this binary - * tree. - * - * @param hashAlgorithmId contains the identifier of the hash algorithm used - * inside the binary tree. - * - * @param tree contains a bit string indicating which nodes of the tree are - * present. It is calculated as specified in 9.5.4.2, and can be used by the - * EE to determine which entry in nodeValueList to use to derive that EE's - * APrV as specified in 9.5.2. - * - * @param nodeValueList contains the values of the nodes that are present in - * the order indicated by tree. - */ - AprvBinaryTree ::= SEQUENCE { - version Uint8 (2), - generationTime Time32, - currentI IValue, - acpcTreeId AcpcTreeId, - hashAlgorithmId HashAlgorithm, - tree BIT STRING, - nodeValueList SEQUENCE (SIZE (1..MAX)) OF AcpcNodeValue, - ... - } - -/** - * @class AcpcPsid - * - * @brief This is the PSID used to indicate activities in ACPC as specified in - * this document. - */ - AcpcPsid ::= Psid(2113696) - -/** - * @class UnsecuredAprvBinaryTree - * - * @brief This is used to wrap an AprvBinaryTree in an Ieee1609Dot2Data for - * transmission if the policy is that the AprvBinaryTree need not be signed. - * See 9.5.6 for discussion. - */ - UnsecuredAprvBinaryTree ::= Ieee1609Dot2Data-Unsecured { - AcpcPdu (WITH COMPONENTS {tree}) - } - -/** - * @class SignedAprvBinaryTree - * - * @brief This is used to wrap an AprvBinaryTree in an Ieee1609Dot2Data for - * transmission if the policy is that the AprvBinaryTree be signed. See 9.5.6 - * for discussion. - */ - SignedAprvBinaryTree ::= Ieee1609Dot2Data-Signed { - AcpcPdu (WITH COMPONENTS {tree}), AcpcPsid - } - -/** - * @class IndividualAprv - * - * @brief This structure contains an individual APrV. An overview of this - * structure is as follows: - * - * @param version contains the current version of the structure. - * - * @param generationTime contains the generation time of IndividualAprv. - * - * @param currentI contains the i-value associated with the batch of - * certificates. - * - * @param acpcTreeId contains an identifier for the CAM creating this binary - * tree. - * - * @param nodeId contains the identifier of the node. - * - * @param nodeValue contains the value of the node. - */ - IndividualAprv ::= SEQUENCE { - version Uint8 (2), - generationTime Time32, - currentI IValue, - acpcTreeId AcpcTreeId, - nodeId BIT STRING, - nodeValue AcpcNodeValue, - ... - } - -/** - * @class SignedIndividualAprv - * - * @brief This is used to wrap an IndividualAprv in an Ieee1609Dot2Data for - * transmission if the policy is that the IndividualAprv be signed. See 9.5.6 - * for discussion. - */ - SignedIndividualAprv ::= Ieee1609Dot2Data-Signed { - AcpcPdu (WITH COMPONENTS {aprv}), AcpcPsid - } - -/** - * @class AcpcTreeId - * - * @brief This is an 8 byte string that identifies an ACPC tree series. It is - * required to be globally unique within the system and is the same for all - * ACPC tree instances within the ACPC tree series. Registration of AcpcTreeId - * values is managed by the IEEE RA; see http://standards.ieee.org/regauth. A - * list of assigned AcpcTreeId values is provided in L.2. - */ - AcpcTreeId ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(8)) - -/** - * @class AcpcNodeValue - * - * @brief This is a 16 byte string that represents the value of a node in the - * ACPC tree. - */ - AcpcNodeValue ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(16)) - -/** - * @class AprvHashCalculationInput - * - * @brief This structure, C-OER encoded, is the input to the hash function to - * calculate child node values from a parent node. By including the ID fields - * it "firewalls" the hash function so that an attacker who inverts the hash - * has only found the hash preimage for a specific node, in a specific tree, - * for a specific time period. An overview of this structure is as follows: - * - * @param version contains the current version of the structure. - * - * @param acpcTreeId contains an identifier for this ACPC tree series. - * - * @param acpcPeriod contains an identifier for the time period for this tree. - * If the certificates for which this set of APrVs are intended have an IValue - * field, acpcPeriod in this structure shall be equal to the IValue field in - * the certificates. How the RA and the CAM synchronize on this value is - * outside the scope of this document. - * - * @param childNodeId contains a bit string of length l encoding the node - * location within the l'th level. - * - * @param parentNodeValue contains the value of the parent node. - */ - AprvHashCalculationInput ::= SEQUENCE { - version Uint8 (2), - acpcTreeId AcpcTreeId, - acpcPeriod IValue, - childNodeId BIT STRING, - parentNodeValue OCTET STRING (SIZE(16)), - ... - } - -END \ No newline at end of file +--***************************************************************************-- +-- IEEE Std 1609.2.1: ACPC -- +--***************************************************************************-- + +/** + * @note Section references in this file are to clauses in IEEE Std + * 1609.2.1 unless indicated otherwise. Full forms of acronyms and + * abbreviations used in this file are specified in 3.2. + */ + +Ieee1609Dot2Dot1Acpc {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) + standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) + extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) acpc(18) major-version-3(3) + minor-version-1(1)} + +DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS ::= BEGIN + +EXPORTS ALL; + +IMPORTS + HashAlgorithm, + IValue, + Psid, + Time32, + Uint8 +FROM Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) + standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) + base(1) base-types(2) major-version-2(2) minor-version-3(3)} +WITH SUCCESSORS + + Ieee1609Dot2Data-Unsecured, + Ieee1609Dot2Data-Signed +FROM Ieee1609Dot2Dot1Protocol {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) + standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) + extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) protocol(17) + major-version-3(3) minor-version-1(1)} +WITH SUCCESSORS +; + +/** + * @brief This structure contains an APrV structure produced by the CAM. An + * overview of this structure is as follows: + * + * @param tree: contains an AprvBinaryTree. + * + * @param aprv: contains a single IndividualAprv. + */ +AcpcPdu ::= CHOICE { + tree AprvBinaryTree, + aprv IndividualAprv, + ... +} + +/** + * @brief This structure encodes a binary tree. An overview of this structure + * is as follows: + * + * @param version: contains the current version of the structure. + * + * @param generationTime: contains the generation time of AprvBinaryTree. + * + * @param currentI: contains the i-value associated with the batch of + * certificates. + * + * @param acpcTreeId: contains an identifier for the CAM creating this binary + * tree. + * + * @param hashAlgorithmId: contains the identifier of the hash algorithm used + * inside the binary tree. + * + * @param tree: contains a bit string indicating which nodes of the tree are + * present. It is calculated as specified in 9.5.4.2, and can be used by the + * EE to determine which entry in nodeValueList to use to derive that EE's + * APrV as specified in 9.5.2. + * + * @param nodeValueList: contains the values of the nodes that are present in + * the order indicated by tree. + */ +AprvBinaryTree ::= SEQUENCE { + version Uint8 (2), + generationTime Time32, + currentI IValue, + acpcTreeId AcpcTreeId, + hashAlgorithmId HashAlgorithm, + tree BIT STRING, + nodeValueList SEQUENCE (SIZE (1..MAX)) OF AcpcNodeValue, + ... +} + +/** + * @brief This is the PSID used to indicate activities in ACPC as specified in + * this document. + */ +AcpcPsid ::= Psid(2113696) + +/** + * @brief This is used to wrap an AprvBinaryTree in an Ieee1609Dot2Data for + * transmission if the policy is that the AprvBinaryTree need not be signed. + * See 9.5.6 for discussion. + */ +UnsecuredAprvBinaryTree ::= Ieee1609Dot2Data-Unsecured { + AcpcPdu (WITH COMPONENTS { + tree + }) +} + +/** + * @brief This is used to wrap an AprvBinaryTree in an Ieee1609Dot2Data for + * transmission if the policy is that the AprvBinaryTree be signed. See 9.5.6 + * for discussion. + */ +SignedAprvBinaryTree ::= Ieee1609Dot2Data-Signed { + AcpcPdu (WITH COMPONENTS { + tree + }), + AcpcPsid +} + +/** + * @brief This structure contains an individual APrV. An overview of this + * structure is as follows: + * + * @param version: contains the current version of the structure. + * + * @param generationTime: contains the generation time of IndividualAprv. + * + * @param currentI: contains the i-value associated with the batch of + * certificates. + * + * @param acpcTreeId: contains an identifier for the CAM creating this binary + * tree. + * + * @param nodeId: contains the identifier of the node. + * + * @param nodeValue: contains the value of the node. + */ +IndividualAprv ::= SEQUENCE { + version Uint8 (2), + generationTime Time32, + currentI IValue, + acpcTreeId AcpcTreeId, + nodeId BIT STRING, + nodeValue AcpcNodeValue, + ... +} + +/** + * @brief This is used to wrap an IndividualAprv in an Ieee1609Dot2Data for + * transmission if the policy is that the IndividualAprv be signed. See 9.5.6 + * for discussion. + */ +SignedIndividualAprv ::= Ieee1609Dot2Data-Signed { + AcpcPdu (WITH COMPONENTS { + aprv + }), + AcpcPsid +} + +/** + * @brief This is an 8 byte string that identifies an ACPC tree series. It is + * required to be globally unique within the system and is the same for all + * ACPC tree instances within the ACPC tree series. Registration of AcpcTreeId + * values is managed by the IEEE RA; see http://standards.ieee.org/regauth. A + * list of assigned AcpcTreeId values is provided in L.2. + */ +AcpcTreeId ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(8)) + +/** + * @brief This is a 16 byte string that represents the value of a node in the + * ACPC tree. + */ +AcpcNodeValue ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(16)) + +/** + * @brief This structure, C-OER encoded, is the input to the hash function to + * calculate child node values from a parent node. By including the ID fields + * it "firewalls" the hash function so that an attacker who inverts the hash + * has only found the hash preimage for a specific node, in a specific tree, + * for a specific time period. An overview of this structure is as follows: + * + * @param version: contains the current version of the structure. + * + * @param acpcTreeId: contains an identifier for this ACPC tree series. + * + * @param acpcPeriod: contains an identifier for the time period for this tree. + * If the certificates for which this set of APrVs are intended have an IValue + * field, acpcPeriod in this structure shall be the IValue field in the + * certificates. How the RA and the CAM synchronize on this value is outside + * the scope of this document. + * + * @param childNodeId: contains a bit string of length l encoding the node + * location within the l'th level. + * + * @param parentNodeValue: contains the value of the parent node. + */ +AprvHashCalculationInput ::= SEQUENCE { + version Uint8 (2), + acpcTreeId AcpcTreeId, + acpcPeriod IValue, + childNodeId BIT STRING, + parentNodeValue OCTET STRING (SIZE(16)), + ... +} + +END diff --git a/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1CamRaInterface.asn b/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1CamRaInterface.asn index 8baf182..f49c3bc 100755 --- a/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1CamRaInterface.asn +++ b/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1CamRaInterface.asn @@ -1,99 +1,90 @@ ---***************************************************************************-- --- IEEE Std 1609.2.1: CAM - RA Interface -- ---***************************************************************************-- - -/** - * @brief NOTE: Section references in this file are to clauses in IEEE Std - * 1609.2.1 unless indicated otherwise. Full forms of acronyms and - * abbreviations used in this file are specified in 3.2. - */ - -Ieee1609Dot2Dot1CamRaInterface {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) - standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) - extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) cam-ra(19) major-version-2(2) - minor-version-2(2) -} - -DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS ::= BEGIN - -EXPORTS ALL; - -IMPORTS - EccP256CurvePoint, - HashedId8, - IValue, - Uint8 -FROM Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) - standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) - base(1) base-types(2) major-version-2(2) minor-version-3(3)} -WITH SUCCESSORS -; - -/** - * @class CamRaInterfacePDU - * - * @brief This is the parent structure for all structures exchanged between - * the CAM and the RA during ACPC enrollment. An overview of this structure - * is as follows: - * - * @param raCamBatchRequest contains the ACPC blinded key batch request sent - * by the RA to the CAM. - * - * @param camRaBatchResponse contains the CAM's response to RaCamBatchRequest. - */ - CamRaInterfacePdu ::= CHOICE { - raCamBatchRequest RaCamBatchRequest, - camRaBatchResponse CamRaBatchResponse, - ... - } - -/** - * @class RaCamBatchRequest - * - * @brief This structure contains parameters needed to request a blinded batch - * of keys for the EE during ACPC enrollment. An overview of this structure - * is as follows: - * - * @param version contains the current version of the structure. - * - * @param eeId contains the EE's ID generated by the RA for the production of - * ACPC batch keys by the CAM. - * - * @param periodList contains the list of i-periods covered by the batch. - */ - RaCamBatchRequest ::= SEQUENCE { - version Uint8 (2), - eeId OCTET STRING (SIZE(5)), - periodList SEQUENCE OF IValue, - ... - } - -/** - * @class CamRaBatchResponse - * - * @brief This structure contains a blinded batch of keys for the EE during - * ACPC enrollment. An overview of this structure is as follows: - * - * @param version contains the current version of the structure. - * - * @param requestHash contains the hash of the corresponding request - * RaCamBatchRequest. - * - * @param batch contains a sequence of blinded keys, each mapped to one - * IValue from the periodList field of the request. - */ - CamRaBatchResponse ::= SEQUENCE { - version Uint8 (2), - requestHash HashedId8, - batch SEQUENCE OF BlindedKey, - ... - } - -/** - * @class BlindedKey - * - * @brief This is a blinded ACPC encryption key produced by the CAM. - */ - BlindedKey ::= EccP256CurvePoint - -END \ No newline at end of file +--***************************************************************************-- +-- IEEE Std 1609.2.1: CAM - RA Interface -- +--***************************************************************************-- + +/** + * @note Section references in this file are to clauses in IEEE Std + * 1609.2.1 unless indicated otherwise. Full forms of acronyms and + * abbreviations used in this file are specified in 3.2. + */ + +Ieee1609Dot2Dot1CamRaInterface {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) + standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) + extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) cam-ra(19) major-version-2(2) + minor-version-2(2)} + +DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS ::= BEGIN + +EXPORTS ALL; + +IMPORTS + EccP256CurvePoint, + HashedId8, + IValue, + Uint8 +FROM Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) + standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) + base(1) base-types(2) major-version-2(2) minor-version-3(3)} +WITH SUCCESSORS +; + +/** + * @brief This is the parent structure for all structures exchanged between + * the CAM and the RA during ACPC enrollment. An overview of this structure + * is as follows: + * + * @param raCamBatchRequest: contains the ACPC blinded key batch request sent + * by the RA to the CAM. + * + * @param camRaBatchResponse: contains the CAM's response to RaCamBatchRequest. + */ +CamRaInterfacePdu ::= CHOICE { + raCamBatchRequest RaCamBatchRequest, + camRaBatchResponse CamRaBatchResponse, + ... +} + +/** + * @brief This structure contains parameters needed to request a blinded batch + * of keys for the EE during ACPC enrollment. An overview of this structure + * is as follows: + * + * @param version: contains the current version of the structure. + * + * @param eeId: contains the EE's ID generated by the RA for the production of + * ACPC batch keys by the CAM. + * + * @param periodList: contains the list of i-periods covered by the batch. + */ +RaCamBatchRequest ::= SEQUENCE { + version Uint8 (2), + eeId OCTET STRING (SIZE(5)), + periodList SEQUENCE OF IValue, + ... +} + +/** + * @brief This structure contains a blinded batch of keys for the EE during + * ACPC enrollment. An overview of this structure is as follows: + * + * @param version: contains the current version of the structure. + * + * @param requestHash: contains the hash of the corresponding request + * RaCamBatchRequest. + * + * @param batch: contains a sequence of blinded keys, each mapped to one + * IValue from the periodList field of the request. + */ +CamRaBatchResponse ::= SEQUENCE { + version Uint8 (2), + requestHash HashedId8, + batch SEQUENCE OF BlindedKey, + ... +} + +/** + * @brief This is a blinded ACPC encryption key produced by the CAM. + */ +BlindedKey ::= EccP256CurvePoint + +END diff --git a/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1CertManagement.asn b/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1CertManagement.asn index e2a7ff4..5115efe 100755 --- a/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1CertManagement.asn +++ b/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1CertManagement.asn @@ -1,455 +1,412 @@ ---***************************************************************************-- --- IEEE Std 1609.2.1: Certificate Management -- ---***************************************************************************-- - -/** - * @brief NOTE: Section references in this file are to clauses in IEEE Std - * 1609.2.1 unless indicated otherwise. Full forms of acronyms and - * abbreviations used in this file are specified in 3.2. - */ - -Ieee1609Dot2Dot1CertManagement {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) - standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) - extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) cert-management(7) - major-version-2(2) minor-version-2(2)} - -DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS ::= BEGIN - -EXPORTS ALL; - -IMPORTS - HashedId8, - HashedId32, - Time32, - Uint8 -FROM Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) - standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) - dot2(2) base(1) base-types(2) major-version-2(2) minor-version-3(3)} -WITH SUCCESSORS - - Certificate, - SequenceOfCertificate -FROM Ieee1609Dot2 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) - standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) - dot2(2) base(1) schema(1) major-version-2(2) minor-version-4(4)} -WITH SUCCESSORS - - CrlSeries -FROM Ieee1609Dot2CrlBaseTypes {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) - standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) - crl(3) base-types(2) major-version-2(2) minor-version-2(2)} -WITH SUCCESSORS - - SecuredCrl -FROM Ieee1609Dot2Crl {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) - standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) - crl(3) protocol(1) major-version-2(2) minor-version-2(2)} -WITH SUCCESSORS - - CtlSignatureSpdu, - MultiSignedCtlSpdu, - SequenceOfPsid -FROM Ieee1609Dot2Dot1Protocol {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) - standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) - extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) protocol(17) - major-version-2(2) minor-version-2(2)} -WITH SUCCESSORS -; - -/** - * @class HashedId48 - * - * @brief This data structure contains the hash of another data structure, - * calculated with a hash function with at least 48 bytes of output length. - * The HashedId48 for a given data structure is calculated by calculating the - * hash of the encoded data structure and taking the low-order 48 bytes of - * the hash output if necessary. If the data structure is subject to - * canonicalization it is canonicalized before hashing. - */ - HashedId48 ::= OCTET STRING(SIZE(48)) - -/** - * @class CertManagementPdu - * - * @brief This is the parent structure for all SCMS component certificate - * management structures. An overview of this structure is as follows: - * - * @param compositeCrl contains zero or more SecuredCrl as defined in IEEE - * Std 1609.2, and the CTL. - * - * @param certificateChain contains a collection of certificates and the CTL. - * - * @param multiSignedCtl contains the CTL signed by multiple - * signers, the electors. - * - * @param tbsCtlSignature contains the CTL-instance-specific information used - * to generate a signature on the CTL. - */ - CertManagementPdu ::= CHOICE { - compositeCrl CompositeCrl, - certificateChain CertificateChain, - multiSignedCtl MultiSignedCtl, - tbsCtlSignature ToBeSignedCtlSignature, - infoStatus CertificateManagementInfoStatus, - ... - } - -/** - * @class CompositeCrl - * - * @brief This structure is used to encapsulate CRLs and a CTL. An overview - * of this structure is as follows: - * - * @param crl contains a list of signed CRLs for different (CRACA ID, CRL - * series) pairs. The CRLs are signed individually, and this document does not - * specify the order in which they should appear. - * - * @param homeCtl contains a CTL. If the composite CRL was requested via the - * mechanisms given in 6.3.5.8, the ElectorGroupId in this CTL is the same as - * the ElectorGroupId provided in the request. The intent is that this is the - * “home” CTL of the requester, but this field can in practice be used to - * provide any CTL with any ElectorGroupId value. - */ - CompositeCrl ::= SEQUENCE { - crl SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF SecuredCrl, - homeCtl MultiSignedCtlSpdu, - ... - } - -/** - * @class CertificateChain - * - * @brief This structure is used to encapsulate certificates and a CTL. An - * overview of this structure is as follows: - * - * @param homeCtl contains a CTL. If the certificate chain was requested via - * the mechanisms given in 6.3.5.7, the ElectorGroupId in this CTL is the - * same as the ElectorGroupId provided in the request. The intent is that - * this is the “home” CTL of the requester, but this field can in practice be - * used to provide any CTL. - * - * @param others contains additional valid certificates of the CAs and the - * MAs chosen by means outside the scope of this document. - */ - CertificateChain ::= SEQUENCE { - homeCtl MultiSignedCtlSpdu, - others SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF Certificate, - ... - } - -/** - * @class MultiSignedCtl - * - * @brief This structure a certificate trust list (CTL) signed by multiple - * signers, the electors. An overview of this structure is as follows: - * - * @param type contains the type of the multi-signed CTL. Only one type of - * multi-signed CTL is supported in this version of this document. - * - * @param tbsCtl contains the CTL contents. - * - * @param unsigned contains data that are associated with the CTL and that - * are not included directly in tbsCtl. For example, if the type is - * fullIeeeCtlType, the FullIeeeTbsCtl contains the hashes of the - * certificates, and the certificates themselves are contained in unsigned. - * - * @param signatures contains the signatures. How the signatures are - * calculated is specified in the definition of ToBeSignedCtlSignature. The - * number of signatures shall be no more than the number of electors. Each - * signature shall have been generated by a distinct elector. - */ - MultiSignedCtl ::= SEQUENCE { - type IEEE-1609-2-1-MSCTL.&type({Ieee1609dot2dot1Ctls}), - tbsCtl IEEE-1609-2-1-MSCTL.&TbsCtl({Ieee1609dot2dot1Ctls}{@.type}), - unsigned IEEE-1609-2-1-MSCTL.&UnsignedCtlMaterial({ - Ieee1609dot2dot1Ctls}{@.type}), - signatures SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF CtlSignatureSpdu - } - -/** - * @class IEEE-1609-2-1-MSCTL - * - * @brief This is the ASN.1 Information Object Class used to associate - * multisigned CTL type identifiers, CTL contents, and unsigned material. In - * this structure: - * - * @param type contains the type, an Ieee1609dot2dot1MsctlType. - * - * @param TbsCtl contains the CTL contents. - * - * @param UnsignedCtlMaterial contains unsigned material associated with the - * CTL, as specified in 7.3.11. - */ - IEEE-1609-2-1-MSCTL ::= CLASS { - &type Ieee1609dot2dot1MsctlType, - &TbsCtl, - &UnsignedCtlMaterial - } WITH SYNTAX {&TbsCtl IDENTIFIED BY &type USING &UnsignedCtlMaterial} - -/** - * @class Ieee1609dot2dot1Ctls - * - * @brief This is the Information Object Set containing the instances of the - * IEEE-1609-2-1-MSCTL class that are specified for use. Only one instance is - * specified for use in this version of this document. - */ - Ieee1609dot2dot1Ctls IEEE-1609-2-1-MSCTL ::= { - {FullIeeeTbsCtl IDENTIFIED BY fullIeeeCtl USING SequenceOfCertificate} - , ... - } - -/** - * @class Ieee1609dot2dot1MsctlType - * - * @brief This is the integer used to identify the type of the CTL. - */ - Ieee1609dot2dot1MsctlType ::= INTEGER (0..255) - fullIeeeCtl Ieee1609dot2dot1MsctlType ::= 1 - -/** - * @class FullIeeeTbsCtl - * - * @brief This structure specifies a CTL that contains information about the - * complete set of certificates trusted by the electors that sign the CTL. An - * overview of this structure is as follows: - * - *

NOTE 1: If in future CTL types are defined that contain the same - * information as, or a subset of the information in, the fullIeeeCtl, those - * types are anticipated to contain the same sequence number as the - * corresponding fullIeeeCtl. - * - *

NOTE 2: Any root CA or elector certificate that is not on the CTL is - * not trusted. The electorRemove and rootCaRemove are intended to be used - * only if the SCMS manager wants to explicitly indicate that a previously - * trusted entity (elector or root CA) is now not trusted even though that - * entity's certificate is still within its validity period. In practice, it - * is anticipated that the remove fields (electorRemove and rootCaRemove) - * will almost always be sequences of length 0. - * - * @param type contains the type of the CTL. It is identical to the type - * field that appears in the enclosing MultiSignedCtl. The field is included - * here as well to provide the simplest mechanism to help ensure that the - * type is included in the calculated CTL hash. - * - * @param electorGroupId contains the group of electors that have signed the - * CTL. It plays a role similar to CrlSeries in a CRL. This field is intended - * to be globally unique in the universe of all systems that use the - * MultiSignedCtl. See the specification of ElectorGroupId for discussion of - * a convention that can be followed to enable uniqueness. - * - * @param sequenceNumber contains the sequence number of the CTL. This is - * incremented by 1 every time a new FullIeeeTbsCtl is issued. - * - * @param effectiveDate contains the time when the CTL is to take effect. - * This is to be greater than or equal to the effectiveDate field in the CTL - * with the same electorGroupId and the previous sequence number. - * - * @param electorApprove contains the list of hashes of the elector - * certificates that are approved as of the effective date. The hash is - * calculated with the same hash algorithm that is used to hash the elector - * certificate for signing. - * - * @param electorRemove contains the list of hashes of the elector - * certificates that are valid (that is, not expired) on the effective date and - * are not approved, as of the effective date, to sign a CTL. The hash is - * calculated with the same hash algorithm that is used to hash the elector - * certificate for signing. This field is to be considered informational as a - * certificate that is not included in electorApprove is not valid even if it - * does not appear in electorRemove. - * - * @param rootCaApprove contains the list of root CA certificates that are - * approved as of the effective date. The hash is calculated with the same - * hash algorithm that is used to hash the root certificate for signing. If - * the root certificate is signed with a hash function with a 48 octet - * output, this is truncated to the low-order 32 bytes for inclusion in the - * CTL. - * - * @param rootCaRemove contains the list of root CA certificates that are - * valid (that is, not expired) on the effective date and are not approved, as - * of the effective date, to issue certificates or carry out other - * activities. If the root certificate is signed with a hash function - * with a 48 octet output, this is truncated to the low-order 32 bytes for - * inclusion in the CTL. This field is to be considered informational as a - * certificate that is not included in rootCaApprove is not valid even if it - * does not appear in rootCaRemove. - * - * @param quorum contains the quorum, that is, the number of the electors - * required to sign the next CTL with the same ElectorGroupId value for that - * CTL to be trusted. If this field is absent, the quorum for the next CTL is - * equal to the quorum for the current CTL. - */ - FullIeeeTbsCtl ::= SEQUENCE { - type Ieee1609dot2dot1MsctlType(fullIeeeCtl), - electorGroupId ElectorGroupId, - sequenceNumber CtlSequenceNumber, - effectiveDate Time32, - electorApprove SEQUENCE OF CtlElectorEntry, - electorRemove SEQUENCE OF CtlElectorEntry, - rootCaApprove SEQUENCE OF CtlRootCaEntry, - rootCaRemove SEQUENCE OF CtlRootCaEntry, - ..., - quorum INTEGER - } - -/** - * @class ElectorGroupId - * - * @brief This structure identifies a group of electors that sign a series of - * CTLs for a specific purpose. Registration of ElectorGroupId values is - * managed by the IEEE RA; see http://standards.ieee.org/regauth. A list of - * assigned ElectorGroupId values is provided in K.1. - */ - ElectorGroupId ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(8)) - -/** - * @class CtlSequenceNumber - * - * @brief This structure is used to encode the CTL sequence number. This - * document does not specify semantics of this type once it reaches its - * maximum value. - */ - CtlSequenceNumber ::= INTEGER(0..65535) - -/** - * @class CtlElectorEntry - * - * @brief This structure contains the hash of an elector certificate. - */ - CtlElectorEntry ::= HashedId48 - -/** - * @class CtlRootCaEntry - * - * @brief This structure contains the hash of a root CA certificate. - */ - CtlRootCaEntry ::= HashedId32 - -/** - * @class ToBeSignedCtlSignature - * - * @brief This structure contains the CTL-instance-specific information used - * to generate a signature on the CTL. An overview of this structure is as - * follows: - * - * @param electorGroupId contains the ElectorGroupId that appears in the CTL. - * - * @param ctlType identifies the type of the CTL. - * - * @param sequenceNumber contains the sequence number of the CTL being signed. - * - * @param tbsCtlHash contains the hash of the C-OER encoded tbsCtl field - * in the MultiSignedCtl. The hash is calculated using the same hash - * algorithm that is used to generate the signature on this structure when it - * is contained in a CtlSignatureSpdu. This algorithm can be determined from - * the headers of the CtlSignatureSpdu. - */ - ToBeSignedCtlSignature ::= SEQUENCE { - electorGroupId ElectorGroupId, - ctlType Ieee1609dot2dot1MsctlType, - sequenceNumber CtlSequenceNumber, - tbsCtlHash HashedId48 - } - -/** - * @class CertificateManagementInfoStatus - * - * @brief This structure contains the status of different certificate - * management information, including CRLs, CTLs, and individual certificates - * of CAs, MAs, and the RA. - * - * @param crl contains the status information for CRLs. - * - * @param ctl contains the status information for CTLs. - * - * @param caCcf contains the time of the last update of any of the CA - * certificates in the CCF. - * - * @param ma contains the status information for MA certificates. - * - * @param ra contains the time of the last update of the RA's certificate. - * It is omitted if this structure is not sent by an RA. - */ - CertificateManagementInfoStatus ::= SEQUENCE { - crl SequenceOfCrlInfoStatus, - ctl SequenceOfCtlInfoStatus, - caCcf Time32, - ma SequenceOfMaInfoStatus, - ra Time32 OPTIONAL, - ... - } - -/** - * @class SequenceOfCtlInfoStatus - * - * @brief This type is used for clarity of definitions. - */ - SequenceOfCtlInfoStatus ::= SEQUENCE OF CtlInfoStatus - -/** - * @class CtlInfoStatus - * - * @brief This structure contains the status information for a CTL. - * - * @param electorGroupId contains the elector group ID of the CTL. - * - * @param sequenceNumber contains the sequence number of the CTL. - * - * @param lastUpdate contains the time of the last update of the CTL. - */ - CtlInfoStatus ::= SEQUENCE { - electorGroupId ElectorGroupId, - sequenceNumber CtlSequenceNumber, - lastUpdate Time32, - ... -} - -/** - * @class SequenceOfCrlInfoStatus - * - * @brief This type is used for clarity of definitions. - */ - SequenceOfCrlInfoStatus ::= SEQUENCE OF CrlInfoStatus - -/** - * @class SequenceOfCrlInfoStatus - * - * @brief This structure contains the status information for a CRL. - * - * @param cracaId contains the CRACA ID of the CRL. - * - * @param series contains the CRL series of the CRL. - * - * @param issueDate contains the time of the last update of the CRL. - */ - CrlInfoStatus ::= SEQUENCE { - cracaId HashedId8, - series CrlSeries, - issueDate Time32, - ... -} - -/** - * @class SequenceOfMaInfoStatus - * - * @brief This type is used for clarity of definitions. - */ - SequenceOfMaInfoStatus ::= SEQUENCE OF MaInfoStatus - -/** - * @class MaInfoStatus - * - * @brief This structure contains the status information for an MA's - * certificate. - * - * @param psids contains the PSIDs associated with the misbehavior that is to - * be reported to that MA. - * - * @param updated contains the time of the last update of the MA's certificate. - */ - MaInfoStatus ::= SEQUENCE { - psids SequenceOfPsid, - updated Time32, - ... - } - -END \ No newline at end of file +--***************************************************************************-- +-- IEEE Std 1609.2.1: Certificate Management -- +--***************************************************************************-- + +/** + * @note Section references in this file are to clauses in IEEE Std + * 1609.2.1 unless indicated otherwise. Full forms of acronyms and + * abbreviations used in this file are specified in 3.2. + */ + +Ieee1609Dot2Dot1CertManagement {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) + standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) + extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) cert-management(7) + major-version-3(3) minor-version-1(1)} + +DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS ::= BEGIN + +EXPORTS ALL; + +IMPORTS + Certificate, + SequenceOfCertificate +FROM Ieee1609Dot2 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) + standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) + dot2(2) base(1) schema(1) major-version-2(2) minor-version-5(5)} +WITH SUCCESSORS + + HashedId8, + HashedId32, + HashedId48, + Time32, + Uint8 +FROM Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) + standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) + base(1) base-types(2) major-version-2(2) minor-version-3(3)} +WITH SUCCESSORS + + CrlSeries +FROM Ieee1609Dot2CrlBaseTypes {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) + standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) + crl(3) base-types(2) major-version-3(3) minor-version-1(1)} +WITH SUCCESSORS + + SecuredCrl +FROM Ieee1609Dot2Crl {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) + standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) + crl(3) major-version-3(3) minor-version-1(1)} +WITH SUCCESSORS + + CtlSignatureSpdu, + MultiSignedCtlSpdu, + SequenceOfPsid +FROM Ieee1609Dot2Dot1Protocol {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) + standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) + extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) protocol(17) + major-version-3(3) minor-version-1(1)} +WITH SUCCESSORS +; + +/** + * @brief This is the parent structure for all SCMS component certificate + * management structures. An overview of this structure is as follows: + * + * @param compositeCrl: contains zero or more SecuredCrl as defined in IEEE + * Std 1609.2, and the CTL. + * + * @param certificateChain: contains a collection of certificates and the CTL. + * + * @param multiSignedCtl: contains the CTL signed by multiple + * signers, the electors. + * + * @param tbsCtlSignature: contains the CTL-instance-specific information used + * to generate a signature on the CTL. + */ +CertManagementPdu ::= CHOICE { + compositeCrl CompositeCrl, + certificateChain CertificateChain, + multiSignedCtl MultiSignedCtl, + tbsCtlSignature ToBeSignedCtlSignature, + infoStatus CertificateManagementInfoStatus, + ... +} + +/** + * @brief This structure is used to encapsulate CRLs and a CTL. An overview + * of this structure is as follows: + * + * @param crl: contains a list of signed CRLs for different (CRACA ID, CRL + * series) pairs. The CRLs are signed individually, and this document does not + * specify the order in which they should appear. + * + * @param homeCtl: contains a CTL. If the composite CRL was requested via the + * mechanisms given in 6.3.5.8, the CtlSeriesId in this CTL is the same as + * the CtlSeriesId provided in the request. The intent is that this is the + * "home" CTL of the requester, but this field can in practice be used to + * provide any CTL with any CtlSeriesId value. + */ +CompositeCrl ::= SEQUENCE { + crl SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF SecuredCrl, + homeCtl MultiSignedCtlSpdu, + ... +} + +/** + * @brief This structure is used to encapsulate certificates and a CTL. An + * overview of this structure is as follows: + * + * @param homeCtl: contains a CTL. If the certificate chain was requested via + * the mechanisms given in 6.3.5.7, the CtlSeriesId in this CTL is the + * same as the CtlSeriesId provided in the request. The intent is that + * this is the "home" CTL of the requester, but this field can in practice be + * used to provide any CTL. + * + * @param others: contains additional valid certificates of the CAs and the + * MAs chosen by means outside the scope of this document. + */ +CertificateChain ::= SEQUENCE { + homeCtl MultiSignedCtlSpdu, + others SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF Certificate, + ... +} + +/** + * @brief This structure a certificate trust list (CTL) signed by multiple + * signers, the electors. An overview of this structure is as follows: + * + * @param type: contains the type of the multi-signed CTL. Only one type of + * multi-signed CTL is supported in this version of this document. + * + * @param tbsCtl: contains the CTL contents. + * + * @param unsigned: contains data that are associated with the CTL and that + * are not included directly in tbsCtl. For example, if the type is + * fullIeeeCtlType, the FullIeeeTbsCtl contains the hashes of the + * certificates, and the certificates themselves are contained in unsigned. + * + * @param signatures: contains the signatures. How the signatures are + * calculated is specified in the definition of ToBeSignedCtlSignature. The + * number of signatures shall be no more than the number of electors. Each + * signature shall have been generated by a distinct elector. + */ +MultiSignedCtl ::= SEQUENCE { + type IEEE-1609-2-1-MSCTL.&type({ + Ieee1609dot2dot1Ctls + }), + tbsCtl IEEE-1609-2-1-MSCTL.&TbsCtl({ + Ieee1609dot2dot1Ctls + }{@.type}), + unsigned IEEE-1609-2-1-MSCTL.&UnsignedCtlMaterial({ + Ieee1609dot2dot1Ctls + }{@.type}), + signatures SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF CtlSignatureSpdu +} + +/** + * @brief This is the ASN.1 Information Object Class used to associate + * multisigned CTL type identifiers, CTL contents, and unsigned material. In + * this structure: + * + * @param type: contains the type, an Ieee1609dot2dot1MsctlType. + * + * @param TbsCtl: contains the CTL contents. + * + * @param UnsignedCtlMaterial: contains unsigned material associated with the + * CTL, as specified in 7.3.11. + */ +IEEE-1609-2-1-MSCTL ::= CLASS { + &type Ieee1609dot2dot1MsctlType, + &TbsCtl, + &UnsignedCtlMaterial +} WITH SYNTAX {&TbsCtl IDENTIFIED BY &type USING &UnsignedCtlMaterial} + +/** + * @brief This is the Information Object Set containing the instances of the + * IEEE-1609-2-1-MSCTL class that are specified for use. Only one instance is + * specified for use in this version of this document. + */ +Ieee1609dot2dot1Ctls IEEE-1609-2-1-MSCTL ::= { + {FullIeeeTbsCtl IDENTIFIED BY + fullIeeeCtl USING SequenceOfCertificate}, + ... +} + +/** + * @brief This is the integer used to identify the type of the CTL. + */ +Ieee1609dot2dot1MsctlType ::= INTEGER (0..255) + +fullIeeeCtl Ieee1609dot2dot1MsctlType ::= 1 + +/** + * @brief This structure specifies a CTL that contains information about the + * complete set of certificates trusted by the electors that sign the CTL. An + * overview of this structure is as follows: + * + * @note: + * - If in future CTL types are defined that contain the same + * information as, or a subset of the information in, the fullIeeeCtl, those + * types are anticipated to contain the same sequence number as the + * corresponding fullIeeeCtl. + * + * - Any root CA or elector certificate that is not on the CTL is + * not trusted. The electorRemove and rootCaRemove are intended to be used + * only if the SCMS manager wants to explicitly indicate that a previously + * trusted entity (elector or root CA) is now not trusted even though that + * entity's certificate is still within its validity period. In practice, it + * is anticipated that the remove fields (electorRemove and rootCaRemove) + * will almost always be sequences of length 0. + * + * @param type: contains the type of the CTL. It is identical to the type + * field that appears in the enclosing MultiSignedCtl. The field is included + * here as well to provide the simplest mechanism to help ensure that the + * type is included in the calculated CTL hash. + * + * @param CtlSeriesId: contains the group of electors that have signed the + * CTL. It plays a role similar to CrlSeries in a CRL. This field is intended + * to be globally unique in the universe of all systems that use the + * MultiSignedCtl. See the specification of CtlSeriesId for discussion of + * a convention that can be followed to enable uniqueness. + * + * @param sequenceNumber: contains the sequence number of the CTL. This is + * incremented by 1 every time a new FullIeeeTbsCtl is issued. + * + * @param effectiveDate: contains the time when the CTL is to take effect. + * This is to be greater than or equal to the effectiveDate field in the CTL + * with the same CtlSeriesId and the previous sequence number. + * + * @param electorApprove: contains the list of hashes of the elector + * certificates that are approved as of the effective date. The hash is + * calculated with the same hash algorithm that is used to hash the elector + * certificate for signing. + * + * @param electorRemove: contains the list of hashes of the elector + * certificates that are valid (that is, not expired) on the effective date and + * are not approved, as of the effective date, to sign a CTL. The hash is + * calculated with the same hash algorithm that is used to hash the elector + * certificate for signing. This field is to be considered informational as a + * certificate that is not included in electorApprove is not valid even if it + * does not appear in electorRemove. + * + * @param rootCaApprove: contains the list of root CA certificates that are + * approved as of the effective date. The hash is calculated with the same + * hash algorithm that is used to hash the root certificate for signing. If + * the root certificate is signed with a hash function with a 48 octet + * output, this is truncated to the low-order 32 bytes for inclusion in the + * CTL. + * + * @param rootCaRemove: contains the list of root CA certificates that are + * valid (that is, not expired) on the effective date and are not approved, as + * of the effective date, to issue certificates or carry out other + * activities. If the root certificate is signed with a hash function + * with a 48 octet output, this is truncated to the low-order 32 bytes for + * inclusion in the CTL. This field is to be considered informational as a + * certificate that is not included in rootCaApprove is not valid even if it + * does not appear in rootCaRemove. + * + * @param quorum: contains the quorum, that is, the number of the electors + * required to sign the next CTL with the same CtlSeriesId value for that + * CTL to be trusted. If this field is absent, the quorum for the next CTL + * shall be the quorum for the current CTL. + */ +FullIeeeTbsCtl ::= SEQUENCE { + type Ieee1609dot2dot1MsctlType(fullIeeeCtl), + ctlSeriesId CtlSeriesId, + sequenceNumber CtlSequenceNumber, + effectiveDate Time32, + electorApprove SEQUENCE OF CtlElectorEntry, + electorRemove SEQUENCE OF CtlElectorEntry, + rootCaApprove SEQUENCE OF CtlRootCaEntry, + rootCaRemove SEQUENCE OF CtlRootCaEntry, + ..., + quorum INTEGER +} + +/** + * @brief This structure identifies a group of electors that sign a series of + * CTLs for a specific purpose. Registration of CtlSeriesId values is + * managed by the IEEE RA; see http://standards.ieee.org/regauth. A list of + * assigned CtlSeriesId values is provided in K.1. + */ +CtlSeriesId ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(8)) + +/** + * @brief This structure is used to encode the CTL sequence number. This + * document does not specify semantics of this type once it reaches its + * maximum value. + */ +CtlSequenceNumber ::= INTEGER(0..65535) + +/** + * @brief This structure contains the hash of an elector certificate. + */ +CtlElectorEntry ::= HashedId48 + +/** + * @brief This structure contains the hash of a root CA certificate. + */ +CtlRootCaEntry ::= HashedId32 + +/** + * @brief This structure contains the CTL-instance-specific information used + * to generate a signature on the CTL. An overview of this structure is as + * follows: + * + * @param ctlSeriesId: contains the CtlSeriesId that appears in the CTL. + * + * @param ctlType: identifies the type of the CTL. + * + * @param sequenceNumber: contains the sequence number of the CTL being signed. + * + * @param tbsCtlHash: contains the hash of the C-OER encoded tbsCtl field + * in the MultiSignedCtl. The hash is calculated using the same hash + * algorithm that is used to generate the signature on this structure when it + * is contained in a CtlSignatureSpdu. This algorithm can be determined from + * the headers of the CtlSignatureSpdu. + */ +ToBeSignedCtlSignature ::= SEQUENCE { + ctlSeriesId CtlSeriesId, + ctlType Ieee1609dot2dot1MsctlType, + sequenceNumber CtlSequenceNumber, + tbsCtlHash HashedId48 +} + +/** + * @brief This structure contains the status of different certificate + * management information, including CRLs, CTLs, and individual certificates + * of CAs, MAs, and the RA. + * + * @param crl: contains the status information for CRLs. + * + * @param ctl: contains the status information for CTLs. + * + * @param caCcf: contains the time of the last update of any of the CA + * certificates in the CCF. + * + * @param ma: contains the status information for MA certificates. + * + * @param ra: shall be present and contain the time of last update of the RA's + * certificate, if this structure is sent by an RA. + */ +CertificateManagementInfoStatus ::= SEQUENCE { + crl SequenceOfCrlInfoStatus, + ctl SequenceOfCtlInfoStatus, + caCcf Time32, + ma SequenceOfMaInfoStatus, + ra Time32 OPTIONAL, + ... +} + +/** + * @brief This type is used for clarity of definitions. + */ +SequenceOfCtlInfoStatus ::= SEQUENCE OF CtlInfoStatus + +/** + * @brief This structure contains the status information for a CTL. + * + * @param ctlSeriesId: contains the elector group ID of the CTL. + * + * @param sequenceNumber: contains the sequence number of the CTL. + * + * @param lastUpdate: contains the time of the last update of the CTL. + */ +CtlInfoStatus ::= SEQUENCE { + ctlSeriesId CtlSeriesId, + sequenceNumber CtlSequenceNumber, + lastUpdate Time32, + ... +} + +/** + * @brief This type is used for clarity of definitions. + */ +SequenceOfCrlInfoStatus ::= SEQUENCE OF CrlInfoStatus + +/** + * @brief This structure contains the status information for a CRL. + * + * @param cracaId: contains the CRACA ID of the CRL. + * + * @param series: contains the CRL series of the CRL. + * + * @param issueDate: contains the time of the last update of the CRL. + */ +CrlInfoStatus ::= SEQUENCE { + cracaId HashedId8, + series CrlSeries, + issueDate Time32, + ... +} + +/** + * @brief This type is used for clarity of definitions. + */ +SequenceOfMaInfoStatus ::= SEQUENCE OF MaInfoStatus + +/** + * @brief This structure contains the status information for an MA's + * certificate. + * + * @param psids: contains the PSIDs associated with the misbehavior that is to + * be reported to that MA. + * + * @param updated: contains the time of the last update of the MA's certificate. + */ +MaInfoStatus ::= SEQUENCE { + psids SequenceOfPsid, + updated Time32, + ... +} + +END diff --git a/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1EcaEeInterface.asn b/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1EcaEeInterface.asn index a76fea5..c325a77 100755 --- a/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1EcaEeInterface.asn +++ b/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1EcaEeInterface.asn @@ -1,180 +1,172 @@ ---***************************************************************************-- --- IEEE Std 1609.2.1: ECA - EE Interface -- ---***************************************************************************-- - -/** - * @brief NOTE: Section references in this file are to clauses in IEEE Std - * 1609.2.1 unless indicated otherwise. Full forms of acronyms and - * abbreviations used in this file are specified in 3.2. - */ - -Ieee1609Dot2Dot1EcaEeInterface {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) - standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) - extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) eca-ee(9) major-version-2(2) - minor-version-2(2) -} - -DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS ::= BEGIN - -EXPORTS ALL; - -IMPORTS - EccP256CurvePoint, - HashedId8, - Time32, - Uint8 -FROM Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) - standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) - dot2(2) base(1) base-types(2) major-version-2(2) minor-version-3(3)} -WITH SUCCESSORS - - Certificate, - CertificateType, - SequenceOfCertificate -FROM Ieee1609Dot2 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) - standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) - dot2(2) base (1) schema (1) major-version-2(2) minor-version-4(4)} -WITH SUCCESSORS - - PublicVerificationKey, - ToBeSignedCertificate -FROM Ieee1609Dot2Dot1Protocol {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) - standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) - extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) protocol(17) - major-version-2(2) minor-version-2(2)} -WITH SUCCESSORS -; - -/** - * @class EcaEeInterfacePDU - * - * @brief This is the parent structure for all structures exchanged between - * the ECA and the EE. An overview of this structure is as follows: - * - * @param eeEcaCertRequest contains the enrollment certificate request sent - * by the EE to the ECA. - * - * @param ecaEeCertResponse contains the enrollment certificate response sent - * by the ECA to the EE. - */ - EcaEeInterfacePdu::= CHOICE { - eeEcaCertRequest EeEcaCertRequest, - ecaEeCertResponse EcaEeCertResponse, - ... - } - -/** - * @class EeEcaCertRequest - * - * @brief This structure contains parameters needed to request an enrollment - * certificate from the ECA. The ECA may, subject to policy, issue an - * enrollment certificate with different contents than the contents requested. - * An overview of this structure is as follows: - * - *

NOTE 1: The tbsCert.cracaId and tbsCert.crlSeries are set to the - * indicated values in the corresponding EeEcaCertRequest. In the issued - * enrollment certificate, they may have different values, set by the ECA. - * - *

NOTE 2: The EE uses the type field to indicate whether it is - * requesting an explicit or an implicit enrollment certificate. A policy is - * anticipated that determines what type of certificate is appropriate for a - * given set of circumstances (such as PSIDs, other end entity information, - * and locality) and that if the EE has requested a kind of certificate that - * is not allowed by policy, the ECA returns an error to the EE. - * - * @param version contains the current version of the structure. - * - * @param generationTime contains the generation time of EeEcaCertRequest. - * - * @param type indicates whether the request is for an explicit or implicit - * certificate (see 4.1.1, 4.1.4.3.1). - * - * @param tbsCert contains the parameters used by the ECA to generate the - * enrollment certificate. tbsCert.verifyKeyIndicator.verificationKey - * contains the public key information sent by the requester. The - * verifyKeyIndicator field indicates the choice verificationKey even if type - * is implicit, as this allows the requester to indicate which signature - * algorithm and curve they are requesting. The value in this field is used - * as the verification key in the certificate if the certificate issued in - * response to this request is explicit, and as the input public key value - * for implicit certificate generation if the certificate issued in response - * to this request is implicit. - * - * @param canonicalId is the canonical identifier for the device per 4.1.4.2. - * If it is present, it indicates that the enclosing EeEcaCertRequestSpdu has - * been signed by the canonical private key. The receiver is intended to use - * the canonicalId to look up the canonical public key to verify the - * certificate request. - */ - EeEcaCertRequest ::= SEQUENCE { - version Uint8 (2), - generationTime Time32, - type CertificateType, - tbsCert ToBeSignedCertificate (WITH COMPONENTS { - ..., - id (WITH COMPONENTS { - ..., - linkageData ABSENT - }), - cracaId ('000000'H), - crlSeries (0), - appPermissions ABSENT, - certIssuePermissions ABSENT, - certRequestPermissions PRESENT, - verifyKeyIndicator (WITH COMPONENTS { - verificationKey - }) - }), - canonicalId IA5String OPTIONAL, - ... - } - -/** - * @class EcaEeCertResponse - * - * @brief This structure is used by the ECA to respond to an EE's enrollment - * certificate request. Additional bootstrapping information including the - * RA's certificate are provided by the DCM. The specification of the DCM is - * outside the scope of this document. An overview of this structure is as - * follows: - * - *

NOTE: The ECA uses the tbsCert.verifyKeyIndicator field in the - * EeEcaCertRequest to determine whether the EE is requesting an explicit or - * an implicit enrollment certificate. A policy is anticipated that - * determines what type of certificate is appropriate for a given set of - * circumstances (such as PSIDs, other end entity information, and locality) - * and that if the EE has requested a kind of certificate that is not - * allowed by policy, the ECA returns an error to the EE. - * - * @param version contains the current version of the structure. - * - * @param requestHash contains the following hash: - *
    - *
  1. EeEcaCertRequestSPDU, if the corresponding request was - * EeEcaCertRequestSPDU.
    2. - * - *
  2. EeRaSuccessorEnrollmentCertRequestSpd, if the corresponding request - * was EeRaSuccessorEnrollmentCertRequestSpd.
    3. - *
- * - * @param ecaCertChain contains the ECA's currently valid certificate and the - * certificate chain, up to and including the root CA. - * - * @param certificate contains the enrollment certificate generated by the - * ECA, which shall be of the type indicated by the type field in the - * corresponding request. - * - * @param privateKeyInfo contains the private key reconstruction value, if - * certificate.type is implicit. This is used by the EE as specified in - * 9.3.5.1. - */ - EcaEeCertResponse ::= SEQUENCE { - version Uint8 (2), - requestHash HashedId8, - ecaCertChain SequenceOfCertificate, - certificate Certificate, - privateKeyInfo OCTET STRING (SIZE(32)) OPTIONAL, - ... - } - -END \ No newline at end of file +--***************************************************************************-- +-- IEEE Std 1609.2.1: ECA - EE Interface -- +--***************************************************************************-- + +/** + * @note Section references in this file are to clauses in IEEE Std + * 1609.2.1 unless indicated otherwise. Full forms of acronyms and + * abbreviations used in this file are specified in 3.2. + */ + +Ieee1609Dot2Dot1EcaEeInterface {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) + standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) + extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) eca-ee(9) major-version-3(3) + minor-version-1(1)} + +DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS ::= BEGIN + +EXPORTS ALL; + +IMPORTS + Certificate, + CertificateType, + SequenceOfCertificate +FROM Ieee1609Dot2 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) + standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) + dot2(2) base(1) schema(1) major-version-2(2) minor-version-5(5)} +WITH SUCCESSORS + + EccP256CurvePoint, + HashedId8, + Time32, + Uint8 +FROM Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) + standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) + base(1) base-types(2) major-version-2(2) minor-version-3(3)} +WITH SUCCESSORS + + PublicVerificationKey, + ToBeSignedCertificate +FROM Ieee1609Dot2Dot1Protocol {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) + standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) + extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) protocol(17) + major-version-3(3) minor-version-1(1)} +WITH SUCCESSORS +; + +/** + * @brief This is the parent structure for all structures exchanged between + * the ECA and the EE. An overview of this structure is as follows: + * + * @param eeEcaCertRequest: contains the enrollment certificate request sent + * by the EE to the ECA. + * + * @param ecaEeCertResponse: contains the enrollment certificate response sent + * by the ECA to the EE. + */ +EcaEeInterfacePdu::= CHOICE { + eeEcaCertRequest EeEcaCertRequest, + ecaEeCertResponse EcaEeCertResponse, + ... +} + +/** + * @brief This structure contains parameters needed to request an enrollment + * certificate from the ECA. The ECA may, subject to policy, issue an + * enrollment certificate with different contents than the contents requested. + * An overview of this structure is as follows: + * + * @note: + * - The tbsCert.cracaId and tbsCert.crlSeries are set to the + * indicated values in the corresponding EeEcaCertRequest. In the issued + * enrollment certificate, they may have different values, set by the ECA. + * - The EE uses the type field to indicate whether it is + * requesting an explicit or an implicit enrollment certificate. A policy is + * anticipated that determines what type of certificate is appropriate for a + * given set of circumstances (such as PSIDs, other end entity information, + * and locality) and that if the EE has requested a kind of certificate that + * is not allowed by policy, the ECA returns an error to the EE. + * + * @param version: contains the current version of the structure. + * + * @param generationTime: contains the generation time of EeEcaCertRequest. + * + * @param type: indicates whether the request is for an explicit or implicit + * certificate (see 4.1.1, 4.1.4.3.1). + * + * @param tbsCert: contains the parameters used by the ECA to generate the + * enrollment certificate. tbsCert.verifyKeyIndicator.verificationKey + * contains the public key information sent by the requester. The + * verifyKeyIndicator field indicates the choice verificationKey even if type + * is implicit, as this allows the requester to indicate which signature + * algorithm and curve they are requesting. The value in this field is used + * as the verification key in the certificate if the certificate issued in + * response to this request is explicit, and as the input public key value + * for implicit certificate generation if the certificate issued in response + * to this request is implicit. + * + * @param canonicalId: shall be present and contain the canonical identifier + * for the device per 4.1.4.2, if the enclosing EeEcaCertRequestSpdu was + * signed by the canonical private key. The receiver is intended to use the + * canonicalId to look up the canonical public key to verify the certificate + * request. + */ +EeEcaCertRequest ::= SEQUENCE { + version Uint8 (2), + generationTime Time32, + type CertificateType, + tbsCert ToBeSignedCertificate (WITH COMPONENTS { + ..., + id (WITH COMPONENTS { + ..., + linkageData ABSENT + }), + cracaId ('000000'H), + crlSeries (0), + appPermissions ABSENT, + certIssuePermissions ABSENT, + certRequestPermissions PRESENT, + verifyKeyIndicator (WITH COMPONENTS { + verificationKey + }) + }), + canonicalId IA5String OPTIONAL, + ... +} + +/** + * @brief This structure is used by the ECA to respond to an EE's enrollment + * certificate request. Additional bootstrapping information including the + * RA's certificate are provided by the DCM. The specification of the DCM is + * outside the scope of this document. An overview of this structure is as + * follows: + * + * The definition of validity for a certificate request, including + * constraints on the fields in this structure, is specified in 10.1. + * + * @param version: contains the current version of the structure. + * + * @param generationTime: contains the generation time of EcaEeCertResponse. + * + * @param requestHash: contains the following hash: + * - EeEcaCertRequestSPDU, if the corresponding request was + * EeEcaCertRequestSPDU. This is calculated without "canonicalizing" the + * signature, i.e., it is calculated over the signature as given in the + * EeEcaCertRequestSpdu without re-encoding the signature's r component in + * x-coordinate-only form. See IEEE Std 1609.2 for further details on + * canonicalization. + * - EeRaSuccessorEnrollmentCertRequestSpd, if the corresponding request + * was EeRaSuccessorEnrollmentCertRequestSpd. + * + * @param ecaCertChain: contains the ECA's currently valid certificate and the + * certificate chain, up to and including the root CA. + * + * @param certificate: contains the enrollment certificate generated by the + * ECA, which shall be of the type indicated by the type field in the + * corresponding request. + * + * @param privateKeyInfo: shall be present and contain the private key + * reconstruction value, if certificate.type is implicit. This is used by the + * EE as specified in 9.3.5.1. + */ +EcaEeCertResponse ::= SEQUENCE { + version Uint8 (2), + generationTime Time32, + requestHash HashedId8, + ecaCertChain SequenceOfCertificate, + certificate Certificate, + privateKeyInfo OCTET STRING (SIZE(32)) OPTIONAL, + ... +} + +END diff --git a/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1EeMaInterface.asn b/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1EeMaInterface.asn index 0182858..e0eebae 100755 --- a/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1EeMaInterface.asn +++ b/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1EeMaInterface.asn @@ -1,28 +1,26 @@ ---***************************************************************************-- --- IEEE Std 1609.2.1: EE - MA Interface -- ---***************************************************************************-- - -/** - * @brief NOTE: Section references in this file are to clauses in IEEE Std - * 1609.2.1 unless indicated otherwise. Full forms of acronyms and - * abbreviations used in this file are specified in 3.2. - */ - -Ieee1609Dot2Dot1EeMaInterface {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) - standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) - extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) ee-ma(10) major-version-2(2) - minor-version-1(1)} - -DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS ::= BEGIN - -EXPORTS ALL; - -/** - * @class EeMaInterfacePdu - * - * @brief This structure is currently being defined outside of this document, - * so it is defined as NULL for purposes of this document. - */ - EeMaInterfacePdu ::= NULL - -END \ No newline at end of file +--***************************************************************************-- +-- IEEE Std 1609.2.1: EE - MA Interface -- +--***************************************************************************-- + +/** + * @note Section references in this file are to clauses in IEEE Std + * 1609.2.1 unless indicated otherwise. Full forms of acronyms and + * abbreviations used in this file are specified in 3.2. + */ + +Ieee1609Dot2Dot1EeMaInterface {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) + standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) + extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) ee-ma(10) major-version-2(2) + minor-version-1(1)} + +DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS ::= BEGIN + +EXPORTS ALL; + +/** + * @brief This structure is currently being defined outside of this document, + * so it is defined as NULL for purposes of this document. + */ +EeMaInterfacePdu ::= NULL + +END diff --git a/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1EeRaInterface.asn b/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1EeRaInterface.asn index 6a9f922..6384ae6 100755 --- a/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1EeRaInterface.asn +++ b/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1EeRaInterface.asn @@ -1,328 +1,305 @@ ---***************************************************************************-- --- IEEE Std 1609.2.1: EE - RA Interface -- ---***************************************************************************-- - -/** - * @brief NOTE: Section references in this file are to clauses in IEEE Std - * 1609.2.1 unless indicated otherwise. Full forms of acronyms and - * abbreviations used in this file are specified in 3.2. - */ - -Ieee1609Dot2Dot1EeRaInterface {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) - standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) - extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) ee-ra(11) major-version-2(2) - minor-version-2(2)} - -DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS ::= BEGIN - -EXPORTS ALL; - -IMPORTS - HashedId8, - IValue, - PublicEncryptionKey, - Time32, - Uint8 -FROM Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) - standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) - base(1) base-types(2) major-version-2(2) minor-version-3(3)} -WITH SUCCESSORS - - CertificateType - FROM Ieee1609Dot2 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) - standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) - base(1) schema(1) major-version-2(2) minor-version-4(4)} -WITH SUCCESSORS - - EeEcaCertRequestSpdu, - PublicVerificationKey, - ToBeSignedCertificate -FROM Ieee1609Dot2Dot1Protocol {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) - standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) - extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) protocol(17) - major-version-2(2) minor-version-2(2)} -WITH SUCCESSORS - - AcpcTreeId -FROM Ieee1609Dot2Dot1Acpc {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) - standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) - extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) acpc(18) major-version-1(1) - minor-version-2(2)} -WITH SUCCESSORS -; - -/** - * @class EeRaInterfacePDU - * - * @brief This is the parent structure for all structures exchanged between - * the EE and the RA. An overview of this structure is as follows: - * - *

NOTE: This CHOICE does not include a PDU type for encrypted - * misbehavior report upload; see 4.1.5. - * - * @param eeRaCertRequest contains the certificate generation request sent by - * the EE to the RA. - * - * @param raEeCertAck contains the RA's acknowledgement of the receipt of - * EeRaCertRequestSpdu. - * - * @param raEeCertInfo contains the information about certificate download. - * - * @param eeRaDownloadRequest contains the download request sent by the EE to - * the RA. - * - * @param eeRaSuccessorEnrollmentCertRequest contains a self-signed request - * for an enrollment certificate, identical in format to the one submitted - * for an initial enrollment certificate. (This becomes a request for a - * successor enrollment certificate by virtue of being signed by the current - * enrollment certificate.) - */ - EeRaInterfacePdu ::= CHOICE { - eeRaCertRequest EeRaCertRequest, - raEeCertAck RaEeCertAck, - raEeCertInfo RaEeCertInfo, - eeRaDownloadRequest EeRaDownloadRequest, - eeRaSuccessorEnrollmentCertRequest EeEcaCertRequestSpdu, - ... - } - -/** - * @class EeRaCertRequest - * - * @brief This structure contains parameters needed to request different types - * of authorization certificates. An overview of this structure is as follows: - * - *

NOTE 1: In the case where the butterfly key mechanism is used to - * derive the certificate encryption key, the value j is not communicated to - * the ACA. However, the EE that receives the certificate response can only - * decrypt the response if it knows j. The RA is therefore anticipated to - * store j so that it can be associated with the appropriate certificate - * response. - * - *

NOTE 2: The EE uses the type field to indicate whether it is - * requesting an explicit or an implicit authorization certificate. A policy - * is anticipated that determines what type of certificate is appropriate for - * a given set of circumstances (such as PSIDs, other end entity information, - * locality, ...) and that if the EE has requested a kind of certificate that - * is not allowed by policy, the ACA returns an error to the EE. This implies - * that the certificate issued by the ACA is always of type indicated in the - * EeRaCertRequest. - * - *

NOTE 3 This document does not specify a method to include an - * encryptionKey in the requested certificates, if the butterfly key - * mechanism is used. The EE using such a certificate to sign a message can - * request an encrypted response using the tbsData.headerInfo.encryptionKey - * field of the SignedData; see 6.3.9, 6.3.33, 6.3.34, and 6.3.36 of - * IEEE Std 1609.2 for more details. - * - * @param version contains the current version of the structure. - * - * @param generationTime contains the generation time of EeRaCertRequest. - * - * @param type indicates whether the request is for an explicit or implicit - * certificate (see 4.1.1 and 4.1.4.3.1). - * - * @param tbsCert contains the parameters to be used by the ACA to generate - * authorization certificate(s). - *
    - *
  1. id contains the identity information sent by the requester. If the - * type is LinkageData, the RA replaces that in the certificates with the - * linkage values generated with the help of the LAs and the ACA; see Annex - * D.
    2. - * - *
  2. validityPeriod contains the requested validity period of the first - * batch of certificates.
    3. - * - *
  3. region, assuranceLevel, canRequestRollover, and encryptionKey, if - * present, contain the information sent by the requester for the requested - * certificates.
    4. - * - *
  4. verifyKeyIndicator.verificationKey contains the public key - * information sent by the requester. The verifyKeyIndicator field indicates - * the choice verificationKey even if type is implicit, as this allows the - * requester to indicate which signature algorithm and curve they are - * requesting.
    5. - * - *
      - *
    1. If the certificate issued in response to this request is explicit and - * butterfly expansion is not used, the value in this field is the - * verification key that appears in that certificate.
      2. - * - *
    2. If the certificate issued in response to this request is implicit and - * butterfly expansion is not used, the value in this field is the input - * public key value for implicit certificate generation.
      3. - * - *
    3. If butterfly expansion is used, that is, if one of (original, unified, - * compactUnified) options is present in the field additionalParams, the - * value in this field is combined with the values in the additionalParams - * field as specified in 9.3.
      4. - *
    - *
- * - * @param additionalParams contains relevant parameters for generating the - * requested certificates using the butterfly key mechanism as specified in - * 9.3, or for encrypting the certificates without using the butterfly key - * mechanism. If present, the field tbsCert.verifyKeyIndicator shall be used - * as the caterpillar public key for signing in the butterfly key mechanism. - */ - EeRaCertRequest ::= SEQUENCE { - version Uint8 (2), - generationTime Time32, - type CertificateType, - tbsCert ToBeSignedCertificate (WITH COMPONENTS { - ..., - cracaId ('000000'H), - crlSeries (0), - appPermissions PRESENT, - certIssuePermissions ABSENT, - certRequestPermissions ABSENT, - verifyKeyIndicator (WITH COMPONENTS { - verificationKey - }) - }), - additionalParams AdditionalParams OPTIONAL, - ... - } - -/** - * @class AdditionalParams - * - * @brief This structure contains parameters for the butterfly key mechanism. - * An overview of this structure is as follows: - * - * @param original contains the parameters for the original variant. - * - * @param unified contains the expansion function for signing to be used for - * the unified variant. The caterpillar public key and expansion function for - * encryption are the same as those for signing. - * - * @param compactUnified contains the expansion function for signing to be - * used for the compact unified variant. The caterpillar public key and - * expansion function for encryption are the same as those for signing. - * - * @param encryptionKey contains the public key for encrypting the - * certificate if the butterfly key mechanism is not used. - */ - AdditionalParams ::= CHOICE { - original ButterflyParamsOriginal, - unified ButterflyExpansion, - compactUnified ButterflyExpansion, - encryptionKey PublicEncryptionKey, - ... - } - -/** - * @class ButterflyParamsOriginal - * - * @brief This structure contains parameters for the original variation of the - * butterfly key mechanism. An overview of this structure is as follows: - * - * @param signingExpansion contains the expansion function for signing. - * - * @param encryptionKey contains the caterpillar public key for encryption. - * - * @param encryptionExpansion contains the expansion function for encryption. - */ - ButterflyParamsOriginal ::= SEQUENCE { - signingExpansion ButterflyExpansion, - encryptionKey PublicEncryptionKey, - encryptionExpansion ButterflyExpansion - } - -/** - * @class ButterflyExpansion - * - * @brief This structure contains material used in the butterfly key - * calculations as specified in 9.3.5.1 and 9.3.5.2. An overview of this - * structure is as follows: - * - * @param aes128 indicates that the symmetric algorithm used in the expansion - * function is AES-128 with the indicated 16 byte string used as the key. - */ - ButterflyExpansion ::= CHOICE { - aes128 OCTET STRING (SIZE(16)), - ... - } - -/** - * @class RaEeCertAck - * - * @brief This structure is used to create the acknowledgement for certificate - * requests. An overview of this structure is as follows: - * - * @param version contains the current version of the structure. - * - * @param generationTime contains the generation time of RaEeCertAck. - * - * @param requestHash contains the hash of the corresponding - * EeRaCertRequestSpdu. - * - * @param firstI contains the i-value that will be associated with the first - * certificate or certificate batch that will be made available to the EE. The - * EE uses this to form the download filename for the download request as - * specified in 8.2.2. - * - * @param nextDlTime contains the time after which the EE should connect to - * the RA to download the certificates. - */ - RaEeCertAck ::= SEQUENCE { - version Uint8 (2), - generationTime Time32, - requestHash HashedId8, - firstI IValue OPTIONAL, - nextDlTime Time32, - ... - } - -/** - * @class RaEeCertInfo - * - * @brief This structure is used to create the info file that accompanies a - * batch of certificates for download as specified in 8.2.3. It is used when - * certificates were generated using the butterfly key expansion mechanism - * specified in 9.3. An overview of this structure is as follows: - * - * @param version contains the current version of the structure. - * - * @param generationTime contains the generation time of RaEeCertInfo. - * - * @param currentI contains the i-value associated with the batch of - * certificates. - * - * @param requestHash contains the hash of the corresponding - * EeRaCertRequestSpdu. - * - * @param nextDlTime contains the time after which the EE should connect to - * the RA to download the certificates. - * - * @param acpcTreeId contains the ACPC Tree Id if the certificates were - * generated using ACPC as specified in 9.5. - */ - RaEeCertInfo ::= SEQUENCE { - version Uint8 (2), - generationTime Time32, - currentI IValue, - requestHash HashedId8, - nextDlTime Time32, - acpcTreeId AcpcTreeId OPTIONAL, - ... - } - -/** - * @class EeRaDownloadRequest - * - * @brief This structure contains parameters needed to request the download of - * certificates from the RA. An overview of this structure is as follows: - * - * @param generationTime contains the generation time of EeRaDownloadRequest. - * - * @param filename contains the name of the file requested for download, - * formed as specified in 8.2.2. - */ - EeRaDownloadRequest ::= SEQUENCE { - generationTime Time32, - filename UTF8String (SIZE (0..255)), - ... - } - -END \ No newline at end of file +--***************************************************************************-- +-- IEEE Std 1609.2.1: EE - RA Interface -- +--***************************************************************************-- + +/** + * @note Section references in this file are to clauses in IEEE Std + * 1609.2.1 unless indicated otherwise. Full forms of acronyms and + * abbreviations used in this file are specified in 3.2. + */ + +Ieee1609Dot2Dot1EeRaInterface {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) + standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) + extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) ee-ra(11) major-version-3(3) + minor-version-1(1)} + +DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS ::= BEGIN + +EXPORTS ALL; + +IMPORTS + CertificateType +FROM Ieee1609Dot2 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) + standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) + dot2(2) base(1) schema(1) major-version-2(2) minor-version-5(5)} +WITH SUCCESSORS + + HashedId8, + IValue, + PublicEncryptionKey, + Time32, + Uint8 +FROM Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) + standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) + base(1) base-types(2) major-version-2(2) minor-version-3(3)} +WITH SUCCESSORS + + AcpcTreeId +FROM Ieee1609Dot2Dot1Acpc {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) + standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) + extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) acpc(18) major-version-3(3) + minor-version-1(1)} +WITH SUCCESSORS + + EeEcaCertRequestSpdu, + PublicVerificationKey, + ToBeSignedCertificate +FROM Ieee1609Dot2Dot1Protocol {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) + standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) + extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) protocol(17) + major-version-3(3) minor-version-1(1)} +WITH SUCCESSORS +; + +/** + * @brief This is the parent structure for all structures exchanged between + * the EE and the RA. An overview of this structure is as follows: + * + * @note This CHOICE does not include a PDU type for encrypted + * misbehavior report upload; see 4.1.5. + * + * @param eeRaCertRequest: contains the certificate generation request sent by + * the EE to the RA. + * + * @param raEeCertAck: contains the RA's acknowledgement of the receipt of + * EeRaCertRequestSpdu. + * + * @param raEeCertInfo: contains the information about certificate download. + * + * @param eeRaDownloadRequest: contains the download request sent by the EE to + * the RA. + * + * @param eeRaSuccessorEnrollmentCertRequest: contains a self-signed request + * for an enrollment certificate, identical in format to the one submitted + * for an initial enrollment certificate. (This becomes a request for a + * successor enrollment certificate by virtue of being signed by the current + * enrollment certificate.) + */ +EeRaInterfacePdu ::= CHOICE { + eeRaCertRequest EeRaCertRequest, + raEeCertAck RaEeCertAck, + raEeCertInfo RaEeCertInfo, + eeRaDownloadRequest EeRaDownloadRequest, + eeRaSuccessorEnrollmentCertRequest EeEcaCertRequestSpdu, + ... +} + +/** + * @brief This structure contains parameters needed to request different types + * of authorization certificates. An overview of this structure is as follows: + * + * The definition of validity for a certificate request, including + * constraints on the fields in this structure, is specified in 10.1. + * + * @note: + * - In the case where the butterfly key mechanism is used to + * derive the certificate encryption key, the value j is not communicated to + * the ACA. However, the EE that receives the certificate response can only + * decrypt the response if it knows j. The RA is therefore anticipated to + * store j so that it can be associated with the appropriate certificate + * response. + * - If the type of id is LinkageData, the contents of the + * field in the request are replaced by random data by the RA when it sends + * the individual certificate requests to the ACA. The ACA then in turn + * replaces that data with the linkage values generated with the help of the + * LAs; see Annex D. + * - This document does not specify a method to include an + * encryptionKey in the requested certificates, if the butterfly key + * mechanism is used. The EE using such a certificate to sign a message + * cannot request that the response is encrypted to the certificate. Instead, + * it can request an encrypted response using the + * tbsData.headerInfo.encryptionKey field of the SignedData; see 6.3.9, + * 6.3.33, 6.3.34, and 6.3.36 of IEEE Std 1609.2 for more details. + * + * @param version: contains the current version of the structure. + * + * @param generationTime: contains the generation time of EeRaCertRequest. + * + * @param type: indicates whether the request is for an explicit or implicit + * certificate (see 4.1.1 and 4.1.4.3.1). + * + * @param tbsCert: contains the parameters to be used by the ACA to generate + * authorization certificate(s). + * - id contains the identity information sent by the requester. If the + * type is LinkageData, the contents of the field are chosen by the EE using + * any appropriate means. RA replaces that in the certificates with the + * linkage values generated with the help of the LAs and the ACA; see Annex D. + * - validityPeriod contains the requested validity period of the first + * batch of certificates. + * - region, assuranceLevel, canRequestRollover, and encryptionKey, if + * present, contain the information sent by the requester for the requested + * certificates. + * - verifyKeyIndicator.verificationKey contains the public key + * information sent by the requester. The verifyKeyIndicator field indicates + * the choice verificationKey even if type is implicit, as this allows the + * requester to indicate which signature algorithm and curve they are + * requesting. + * - If the certificate issued in response to this request is explicit and + * butterfly expansion is not used, the value in this field is the + * verification key that appears in that certificate. + * - If the certificate issued in response to this request is implicit and + * butterfly expansion is not used, the value in this field is the input + * public key value for implicit certificate generation. + * - If butterfly expansion is used, that is, if one of (original, unified, + * compactUnified) options is present in the field additionalParams, the + * value in this field is combined with the values in the additionalParams + * field as specified in 9.3. + * + * @param additionalParams: shall be present and contain relevant parameters if + * the requested certificates are to be generated using the butterfly key + * mechanism as specified in 9.3, or if the requested certificates are to be + * encrypted without using the butterfly key mechanism. If present, the field + * tbsCert.verifyKeyIndicator shall be used as the caterpillar public key for + * signing in the butterfly key mechanism. + */ +EeRaCertRequest ::= SEQUENCE { + version Uint8 (2), + generationTime Time32, + type CertificateType, + tbsCert ToBeSignedCertificate (WITH COMPONENTS { + ..., + cracaId ('000000'H), + crlSeries (0), + appPermissions PRESENT, + certIssuePermissions ABSENT, + certRequestPermissions ABSENT, + verifyKeyIndicator (WITH COMPONENTS { + verificationKey + }) + }), + additionalParams AdditionalParams OPTIONAL, + ... +} + +/** + * @brief This structure contains parameters for the butterfly key mechanism. + * An overview of this structure is as follows: + * + * @param original: contains the parameters for the original variant. + * + * @param unified: contains the expansion function for signing to be used for + * the unified variant. The caterpillar public key and expansion function for + * encryption are the same as those for signing. + * + * @param compactUnified: contains the expansion function for signing to be + * used for the compact unified variant. The caterpillar public key and + * expansion function for encryption are the same as those for signing. + * + * @param encryptionKey: contains the public key for encrypting the + * certificate if the butterfly key mechanism is not used. + */ +AdditionalParams ::= CHOICE { + original ButterflyParamsOriginal, + unified ButterflyExpansion, + compactUnified ButterflyExpansion, + encryptionKey PublicEncryptionKey, + ... +} + +/** + * @brief This structure contains parameters for the original variation of the + * butterfly key mechanism. An overview of this structure is as follows: + * + * @param signingExpansion: contains the expansion function for signing. + * + * @param encryptionKey: contains the caterpillar public key for encryption. + * + * @param encryptionExpansion: contains the expansion function for encryption. + */ +ButterflyParamsOriginal ::= SEQUENCE { + signingExpansion ButterflyExpansion, + encryptionKey PublicEncryptionKey, + encryptionExpansion ButterflyExpansion +} + +/** + * @brief This structure contains material used in the butterfly key + * calculations as specified in 9.3.5.1 and 9.3.5.2. An overview of this + * structure is as follows: + * + * @param aes128: indicates that the symmetric algorithm used in the expansion + * function is AES-128 with the indicated 16 byte string used as the key. + */ +ButterflyExpansion ::= CHOICE { + aes128 OCTET STRING (SIZE(16)), + ... +} + +/** + * @brief This structure is used to create the acknowledgement for certificate + * requests. An overview of this structure is as follows: + * + * @param version: contains the current version of the structure. + * + * @param generationTime: contains the generation time of RaEeCertAck. + * + * @param requestHash: contains the hash of the corresponding + * EeRaCertRequestSpdu. + * + * @param firstI: shall be present and contain the i-value that will be + * associated with the first certificate or the certificate batch that will be + * made available to the EE, if the corresponding EeRaCertRequest uses the + * butterfly key mechanism as indicated in the field additionalParams. The EE + * uses this to form the download filename for the download request as + * specified in 8.2.2. + * + * @param nextDlTime: contains the time after which the EE should connect to + * the RA to download the certificates. + */ +RaEeCertAck ::= SEQUENCE { + version Uint8 (2), + generationTime Time32, + requestHash HashedId8, + firstI IValue OPTIONAL, + nextDlTime Time32, + ... +} + +/** + * @brief This structure is used to create the info file that accompanies a + * batch of certificates for download as specified in 8.2.3. It is used when + * certificates were generated using the butterfly key expansion mechanism + * specified in 9.3. An overview of this structure is as follows: + * + * @param version: contains the current version of the structure. + * + * @param generationTime: contains the generation time of RaEeCertInfo. + * + * @param currentI: contains the i-value associated with the batch of + * certificates. + * + * @param requestHash: contains the hash of the corresponding + * EeRaCertRequestSpdu. + * + * @param nextDlTime: contains the time after which the EE should connect to + * the RA to download the certificates. + * + * @param acpcTreeId: shall be present and contain the ACPC Tree Id, if the + * certificates were generated using ACPC as specified in 9.5. + */ +RaEeCertInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + version Uint8 (2), + generationTime Time32, + currentI IValue, + requestHash HashedId8, + nextDlTime Time32, + acpcTreeId AcpcTreeId OPTIONAL, + ... +} + +/** + * @brief This structure contains parameters needed to request the download of + * certificates from the RA. An overview of this structure is as follows: + * + * @param generationTime: contains the generation time of EeRaDownloadRequest. + * + * @param filename: contains the name of the file requested for download, + * formed as specified in 8.2.2. + */ +EeRaDownloadRequest ::= SEQUENCE { + generationTime Time32, + filename UTF8String (SIZE (0..255)), + ... +} + +END diff --git a/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1LaMaInterface.asn b/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1LaMaInterface.asn index d223a1c..74959cb 100755 --- a/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1LaMaInterface.asn +++ b/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1LaMaInterface.asn @@ -1,28 +1,26 @@ ---***************************************************************************-- --- IEEE Std 1609.2.1: LA - MA Interface -- ---***************************************************************************-- - -/** - * @brief NOTE: Section references in this file are to clauses in IEEE Std - * 1609.2.1 unless indicated otherwise. Full forms of acronyms and - * abbreviations used in this file are specified in 3.2. - */ - -Ieee1609Dot2Dot1LaMaInterface {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) - standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) - extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) la-ma(12) major-version-2(2) - minor-version-1(1)} - -DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS ::= BEGIN - -EXPORTS ALL; - -/** - * @class LaMaInterfacePdu - * - * @brief This structure is not used by EEs, so it is defined as NULL for - * purposes of this document. - */ - LaMaInterfacePdu ::= NULL - -END \ No newline at end of file +--***************************************************************************-- +-- IEEE Std 1609.2.1: LA - MA Interface -- +--***************************************************************************-- + +/** + * @note Section references in this file are to clauses in IEEE Std + * 1609.2.1 unless indicated otherwise. Full forms of acronyms and + * abbreviations used in this file are specified in 3.2. + */ + +Ieee1609Dot2Dot1LaMaInterface {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) + standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) + extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) la-ma(12) major-version-2(2) + minor-version-1(1)} + +DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS ::= BEGIN + +EXPORTS ALL; + +/** + * @brief This structure is not used by EEs, so it is defined as NULL for + * purposes of this document. + */ +LaMaInterfacePdu ::= NULL + +END diff --git a/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1LaRaInterface.asn b/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1LaRaInterface.asn index a726f48..c5f819a 100755 --- a/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1LaRaInterface.asn +++ b/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1LaRaInterface.asn @@ -1,28 +1,26 @@ ---***************************************************************************-- --- IEEE Std 1609.2.1: LA - RA Interface -- ---***************************************************************************-- - -/** - * @brief NOTE: Section references in this file are to clauses in IEEE Std - * 1609.2.1 unless indicated otherwise. Full forms of acronyms and - * abbreviations used in this file are specified in 3.2. - */ - -Ieee1609Dot2Dot1LaRaInterface {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) - standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) - extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) la-ra(13) major-version-2(2) - minor-version-1(1)} - -DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS ::= BEGIN - -EXPORTS ALL; - -/** - * @class LaRaInterfacePdu - * - * @brief This structure is not used by EEs, so it is defined as NULL for - * purposes of this document. - */ - LaRaInterfacePdu ::= NULL - -END \ No newline at end of file +--***************************************************************************-- +-- IEEE Std 1609.2.1: LA - RA Interface -- +--***************************************************************************-- + +/** + * @note Section references in this file are to clauses in IEEE Std + * 1609.2.1 unless indicated otherwise. Full forms of acronyms and + * abbreviations used in this file are specified in 3.2. + */ + +Ieee1609Dot2Dot1LaRaInterface {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) + standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) + extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) la-ra(13) major-version-2(2) + minor-version-1(1)} + +DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS ::= BEGIN + +EXPORTS ALL; + +/** + * @brief This structure is not used by EEs, so it is defined as NULL for + * purposes of this document. + */ +LaRaInterfacePdu ::= NULL + +END diff --git a/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1MaRaInterface.asn b/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1MaRaInterface.asn index 958f41d..b74c248 100755 --- a/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1MaRaInterface.asn +++ b/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1MaRaInterface.asn @@ -1,28 +1,26 @@ ---***************************************************************************-- --- IEEE Std 1609.2.1: MA - RA Interface -- ---***************************************************************************-- - -/** - * @brief NOTE: Section references in this file are to clauses in IEEE Std - * 1609.2.1 unless indicated otherwise. Full forms of acronyms and - * abbreviations used in this file are specified in 3.2. - */ - -Ieee1609Dot2Dot1MaRaInterface {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) - standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) - extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) ma-ra(14) major-version-2(2) - minor-version-1(1)} - -DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS ::= BEGIN - -EXPORTS ALL; - -/** - * @class MaRaInterfacePdu - * - * @brief This structure is not used by EEs, so it is defined as NULL for - * purposes of this document. - */ - MaRaInterfacePdu ::= NULL - -END \ No newline at end of file +--***************************************************************************-- +-- IEEE Std 1609.2.1: MA - RA Interface -- +--***************************************************************************-- + +/** + * @note Section references in this file are to clauses in IEEE Std + * 1609.2.1 unless indicated otherwise. Full forms of acronyms and + * abbreviations used in this file are specified in 3.2. + */ + +Ieee1609Dot2Dot1MaRaInterface {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) + standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) + extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) ma-ra(14) major-version-2(2) + minor-version-1(1)} + +DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS ::= BEGIN + +EXPORTS ALL; + +/** + * @brief This structure is not used by EEs, so it is defined as NULL for + * purposes of this document. + */ +MaRaInterfacePdu ::= NULL + +END diff --git a/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1Protocol.asn b/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1Protocol.asn index 99d4408..78c0489 100755 --- a/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1Protocol.asn +++ b/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1Protocol.asn @@ -1,1432 +1,1273 @@ ---***************************************************************************-- --- IEEE Std 1609.2.1: Protocol -- ---***************************************************************************-- - -/** - * @brief NOTE: Section references in this file are to clauses in IEEE Std - * 1609.2.1 unless indicated otherwise. Full forms of acronyms and - * abbreviations used in this file are specified in 3.2. - */ - -Ieee1609Dot2Dot1Protocol {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) - standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) - extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) protocol(17) - major-version-2(2) minor-version-2(2)} - -DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS ::= BEGIN - -EXPORTS ALL; - -IMPORTS - CrlSeries, - EccP256CurvePoint, - EccP384CurvePoint, - EcdsaP256Signature, - EcdsaP384Signature, - GeographicRegion, - HashAlgorithm, - HashedId3, - Psid, - PublicEncryptionKey, - PublicVerificationKey, - SequenceOfPsid, - SequenceOfPsidSsp, - SubjectAssurance, - Uint8, - Uint16, - ValidityPeriod -FROM Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) - standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) - dot2(2) base(1) base-types(2) major-version-2(2) minor-version-3(3)} - - Certificate, - CertificateId, - Ieee1609Dot2Data, - SequenceOfCertificate, - SequenceOfPsidGroupPermissions, - SignerIdentifier, - VerificationKeyIndicator, - Signature, - ToBeSignedCertificate -FROM Ieee1609Dot2 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) - standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) - dot2(2) base(1) schema(1) major-version-2(2) minor-version-4(4)} -WITH SUCCESSORS - - AcaEeInterfacePdu -FROM Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaEeInterface {iso(1) identified-organization(3) - ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) - wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) - aca-ee(1) major-version-2(2) minor-version-2(2)} -WITH SUCCESSORS - - AcaLaInterfacePdu -FROM Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaLaInterface {iso(1) identified-organization(3) - ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) - wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) - aca-la(2) major-version-2(2) minor-version-1(1)} -WITH SUCCESSORS - - AcaMaInterfacePdu -FROM Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaMaInterface {iso(1) identified-organization(3) - ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) - wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) - aca-ma(3) major-version-2(2) minor-version-1(1)} -WITH SUCCESSORS - - AcaRaInterfacePdu -FROM Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaRaInterface {iso(1) identified-organization(3) - ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) - wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) - aca-ra(4) major-version-2(2) minor-version-2(2)} -WITH SUCCESSORS - - AcpcTreeId -FROM Ieee1609Dot2Dot1Acpc {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) - standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) - extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) acpc(18) major-version-1(1) - minor-version-2(2)} -WITH SUCCESSORS - - CertManagementPdu -FROM Ieee1609Dot2Dot1CertManagement{iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) - standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) - extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) cert-management(7) - major-version-2(2) minor-version-2(2)} -WITH SUCCESSORS - - EcaEeInterfacePdu -FROM Ieee1609Dot2Dot1EcaEeInterface {iso(1) identified-organization(3) - ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) - wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) - eca-ee(9) major-version-2(2) minor-version-2(2)} -WITH SUCCESSORS - - EeMaInterfacePdu -FROM Ieee1609Dot2Dot1EeMaInterface {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) - standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) - extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) ee-ma(10) major-version-2(2) - minor-version-1(1)} -WITH SUCCESSORS - - EeRaInterfacePdu -FROM Ieee1609Dot2Dot1EeRaInterface {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) - standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) - extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) ee-ra(11) major-version-2(2) - minor-version-2(2)} -WITH SUCCESSORS - - LaMaInterfacePdu -FROM Ieee1609Dot2Dot1LaMaInterface {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) - standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) - extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) la-ma(12) major-version-2(2) - minor-version-1(1)} -WITH SUCCESSORS - - LaRaInterfacePdu -FROM Ieee1609Dot2Dot1LaRaInterface {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) - standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) - extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) la-ra(13) major-version-2(2) - minor-version-1(1)} -WITH SUCCESSORS - - MaRaInterfacePdu -FROM Ieee1609Dot2Dot1MaRaInterface {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) - standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) - extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) ma-ra(14) major-version-2(2) - minor-version-1(1)} -WITH SUCCESSORS -; - -/** - * @class SecurityMgmtPsid - * - * @brief This PSID, 0x23, identifies security management activities as - * defined in this document. - */ - SecurityMgmtPsid ::= Psid (35) - -/** - * @class ScmsPdu - * - * @brief This is the parent structure that encompasses all parent structures - * of interfaces defined in the SCMS. An overview of this structure is as - * follows: - * - * @param version contains the current version of the structure. - * - * @param aca-ee contains the interface structures defined for interaction - * between the ACA and the EE. - * - * @param aca-la contains the interface structures defined for interaction - * between the ACA and the LA. - * - * @param aca-ma contains the interface structures defined for interaction - * between the ACA and the MA. - * - * @param aca-ra contains the interface structures defined for interaction - * between the ACA and the RA. - * - * @param cert contains the interface structures defined for certificate - * management. - * - * @param eca-ee contains the interface structures defined for interaction - * between the ECA and the EE. - * - * @param ee-ma contains the interface structures defined for interaction - * between the EE and the MA. - * - * @param ee-ra contains the interface structures defined for interaction - * between the EE and the RA. - * - * @param la-ma contains the interface structures defined for interaction - * between the LA and the MA. - * - * @param la-ra contains the interface structures defined for interaction - * between the LA and the RA. - * - * @param ma-ra contains the interface structures defined for interactions - * between the MA and the RA. - */ - ScmsPdu ::= SEQUENCE { - version Uint8 (2), - content CHOICE { - aca-ee AcaEeInterfacePdu, - aca-la AcaLaInterfacePdu, - aca-ma AcaMaInterfacePdu, - aca-ra AcaRaInterfacePdu, - cert CertManagementPdu, - eca-ee EcaEeInterfacePdu, - ee-ma EeMaInterfacePdu, - ee-ra EeRaInterfacePdu, - la-ma LaMaInterfacePdu, - la-ra LaRaInterfacePdu, - ma-ra MaRaInterfacePdu, - ... - } - } - ---***************************************************************************-- --- Parameterized Types -- ---***************************************************************************-- - -/** - * @class ScmsPdu-Scoped - * - * @brief This structure defines a parameterized type for creating a scoped - * data as a subtype of ScmsPdu. - */ - ScmsPdu-Scoped {Pdu} ::= ScmsPdu (WITH COMPONENTS { - ..., - content (CONSTRAINED BY { - Pdu - }) - }) - -/** - * @class Ieee1609Dot2Data-Unsecured - * - * @brief This structure defines a parameterized type for creating an - * unsecured data as a subtype of Ieee1609Dot2Data. - */ - Ieee1609Dot2Data-Unsecured {Tbu} ::= Ieee1609Dot2Data (WITH COMPONENTS { - content (WITH COMPONENTS { - ..., - unsecuredData (CONTAINING Tbu) - }) - }) - -/** - * @class Ieee1609Dot2Data-Signed - * - * @brief This structure defines a parameterized type for creating a signed - * data as a subtype of Ieee1609Dot2Data. - */ - Ieee1609Dot2Data-Signed {Tbs, Psid} ::= - Ieee1609Dot2Data (WITH COMPONENTS { - ..., - content (WITH COMPONENTS { - ..., - signedData (WITH COMPONENTS { - ..., - tbsData (WITH COMPONENTS { - ..., - payload (WITH COMPONENTS { - ..., - data (WITH COMPONENTS { - ..., - content (WITH COMPONENTS { - unsecuredData (CONTAINING Tbs) - }) - }) - }), - headerInfo (WITH COMPONENTS { - ..., - psid (Psid), - generationTime PRESENT, - expiryTime ABSENT, - generationLocation ABSENT, - p2pcdLearningRequest ABSENT, - missingCrlIdentifier ABSENT, - encryptionKey ABSENT - }) - }), - signer (SignerSingleCert) - }) - }) - }) - -/** - * @class Ieee1609Dot2Data-Encrypted - * - * @brief This structure defines a parameterized type for creating an - * encrypted data as a subtype of Ieee1609Dot2Data. An overview of this - * structure is as follows: - * - * @param Tbe is first encrypted and the resulting ciphertext is used as - * input to the encryptedData field. - */ - Ieee1609Dot2Data-Encrypted {Tbe} ::= - Ieee1609Dot2Data (WITH COMPONENTS { - ..., - content (WITH COMPONENTS { - encryptedData (CONSTRAINED BY { - --encryption of-- Tbe - }) - }) - }) - -/** - * @class Ieee1609Dot2Data-EncryptedOpen - * - * @brief This structure defines a parameterized type for creating an - * encrypted data as a subtype of Ieee1609Dot2Data. This structure differs - * from Ieee1609Dot2Data-Encrypted in that it does not specify the contents - * of the encrypted data. - */ - Ieee1609Dot2Data-EncryptedOpen ::= - Ieee1609Dot2Data (WITH COMPONENTS { - ..., - content (WITH COMPONENTS { - encryptedData - }) - }) - -/** - * @class Ieee1609Dot2Data-SignedCertRequest - * - * @brief This structure defines a parameterized type for creating a signed - * certificate request as a subtype of Ieee1609Dot2Data. - */ - Ieee1609Dot2Data-SignedCertRequest {Tbscr, Signer} ::= - Ieee1609Dot2Data (WITH COMPONENTS { - ..., - content (WITH COMPONENTS { - ..., - signedCertificateRequest (CONTAINING - SignedCertificateRequest (WITH COMPONENTS { - ..., - tbsRequest (Tbscr), - signer (Signer) - })) - }) - }) - -/** - * @class X509Certificate - * - * @brief This structure is a wrapper for an ITU-T X.509 certificate. - * - *

NOTE: ITU-T X.509 certificates are encoded with the ASN.1 DER - * rather than the OER used in this document and so cannot be "directly" - * imported into these structures. - */ - X509Certificate ::= OCTET STRING - -/** - * @class SequenceOfX509Certificate - * - * @brief This type is used for clarity of definitions. - */ - SequenceOfX509Certificate ::= SEQUENCE OF X509Certificate - -/** - * @class X509SignerIdentifier - * - * @brief This structure identifies an ITU-T X.509 certificate used to sign a - * signed data structure. The only data structure currently defined that can - * be signed by an ITU-T X.509 certificate is SignedX509CertificateRequest. - */ - X509SignerIdentifier ::= CHOICE { - certificate SequenceOfX509Certificate, - ... - } - -/** - * @class Ieee1609Dot2Data-SignedX509AuthenticatedCertRequest - * - * @brief This structure defines a parameterized type for creating a - * certificate request, signed with an ITU-T X.509 certificate, as a subtype of - * Ieee1609Dot2Data. It makes use of the extension of Ieee1609Dot2Content - * defined in 11.2.3. - */ - Ieee1609Dot2Data-SignedX509AuthenticatedCertRequest {Tbscr, Signer} - ::= Ieee1609Dot2Data (WITH COMPONENTS { - ..., - content (WITH COMPONENTS { - ..., - signedX509CertificateRequest (CONTAINING - SignedX509CertificateRequest (WITH COMPONENTS { - ..., - tbsRequest (Tbscr), - signer (Signer) - })) - }) - }) - -/** - * @class Ieee1609Dot2Data-SignedEncrypted - * - * @brief This structure defines a parameterized type for creating a signed - * then encrypted data as a subtype of Ieee1609Dot2Data. - */ - Ieee1609Dot2Data-SignedEncrypted {Tbse, Psid} ::= - Ieee1609Dot2Data-Encrypted { - Ieee1609Dot2Data-Signed { - Tbse, - Psid - } - } - -/** - * @class Ieee1609Dot2Data-EncryptedSigned - * - * @brief This structure defines a parameterized type for creating an - * encrypted then signed data as a subtype of Ieee1609Dot2Data. - */ - Ieee1609Dot2Data-EncryptedSigned {Tbes, Psid} ::= Ieee1609Dot2Data-Signed { - Ieee1609Dot2Data-Encrypted { - Tbes - }, - Psid - } - -/** - * @class Ieee1609Dot2Data-EncryptedOpenSigned - * - * @brief This structure defines a parameterized type for creating an - * encrypted then signed data as a subtype of Ieee1609Dot2Data. Unlike - * Ieee1609Dot2Data-EncryptedSigned, this structure does not specify the - * contents to be encrypted. This structure is intended for use in - * misbehavior report upload where the encrypted data is received by the RA - * that does not know the contents. - */ - Ieee1609Dot2Data-EncryptedOpenSigned{Psid} ::= - Ieee1609Dot2Data-Signed { - Ieee1609Dot2Data-EncryptedOpen, - Psid - } - -/** - * @class Ieee1609Dot2Data-SignedEncryptedCertRequest - * - * @brief This structure defines a parameterized type for creating a signed - * then encrypted certificate request as a subtype of Ieee1609Dot2Data. - */ - Ieee1609Dot2Data-SignedEncryptedCertRequest {Tbstecr, Signer} ::= - Ieee1609Dot2Data-Encrypted { - Ieee1609Dot2Data-SignedCertRequest { - Tbstecr, - Signer - } - } - -/** - * @class Ieee1609Dot2Data-SymmEncryptedSingleRecipient - * - * @brief This structure defines a parameterized type for creating an - * encrypted data as a subtype of Ieee1609Dot2Data. An overview of this - * structure is as follows: - * - * @param Tbe is first encrypted and the resulting ciphertext is used as - * input to the encryptedData field. - */ - Ieee1609Dot2Data-SymmEncryptedSingleRecipient {Tbe} ::= - Ieee1609Dot2Data (WITH COMPONENTS { - ..., - content (WITH COMPONENTS { - encryptedData (CONSTRAINED BY { - --contains only one RecipientInfo, of form symmRecipinfo - --symmetric encryption of-- Tbe - }) - }) - }) - ---***************************************************************************-- --- Signer Types -- ---***************************************************************************-- - -/** - * @class SignerSingleCert - * - * @brief This structure is used to indicate a SignerIdentifier with a - * certificate chain of size 1. - */ - SignerSingleCert ::= SignerIdentifier(WITH COMPONENTS { - certificate (SequenceOfCertificate (SIZE (1))) - }) - -/** - * @class SignerSingleX509Cert - * - * @brief This structure is used to indicate an X509SignerIdentifier with a - * certificate chain of size 1. - */ - SignerSingleX509Cert ::= X509SignerIdentifier(WITH COMPONENTS { - certificate (SequenceOfX509Certificate (SIZE (1))) - }) - -/** - * @class SignerSelf - * - * @brief This structure is used to indicate a SignerIdentifier of type self. - */ - SignerSelf ::= SignerIdentifier(WITH COMPONENTS { - self - }) - ---***************************************************************************-- --- Certificate Requests -- ---***************************************************************************-- - - ScmsPdu-RaAcaCertRequest ::= ScmsPdu-Scoped { - AcaRaInterfacePdu (WITH COMPONENTS { - raAcaCertRequest - }) - } - ScmsPdu-EeEcaCertRequest ::= ScmsPdu-Scoped { - EcaEeInterfacePdu (WITH COMPONENTS { - eeEcaCertRequest - }) - } - ScmsPdu-EeRaCertRequest ::= ScmsPdu-Scoped { - EeRaInterfacePdu (WITH COMPONENTS { - eeRaCertRequest - }) - } - ScmsPdu-EeRaSuccessorEnrollmentCertRequest ::= ScmsPdu-Scoped { - EeRaInterfacePdu (WITH COMPONENTS { - eeRaSuccessorEnrollmentCertRequest - }) - } - -/** - * @class ScopedCertificateRequest - * - * @brief This structure defines the all certificate request structures as a - * scoped version of the ScmsPdu. - */ - ScopedCertificateRequest ::= ScmsPdu ( - ScmsPdu-RaAcaCertRequest | ScmsPdu-EeEcaCertRequest | ScmsPdu-EeRaCertRequest | ScmsPdu-EeRaSuccessorEnrollmentCertRequest - ) - -/** - * @class SignedCertificateRequest - * - * @brief This structure defines the format of a signed certificate request. - * An overview of this structure is as follows: - * - *

The signature is generated on the hash of this structure, obtained - * per the rules specified for hashing data objects in 5.3.1 of IEEE Std - * 1609.2a-2017, with the parameter Data Input equal to the C-OER - * encoding of tbsRequest, and the parameter Signer Identifier Input - * equal to the signer's enrollment certificate. - * - * @param hashAlgorithmId contains the identifier of the hash algorithm used - * inside the binary tree. - * - * @param tbsRequest contains the certificate request information that is - * signed by the recipient. - * - * @param signer denotes the signing entity's identifier. - * - * @param signature contains the request sender's signature. - */ - SignedCertificateRequest ::= SEQUENCE { - hashAlgorithmId HashAlgorithm, - tbsRequest ScopedCertificateRequest, - signer SignerIdentifier, - signature Signature - } - -/** - * @class SignedX509CertificateRequest - * - * @brief This structure contains a certificate request signed with an ITU-T - * X.509 certificate. The only type of certificate request signed with an - * ITU-T X.509 certificate supported in this document is an authorization - * certificate request. An overview of this structure is as follows: - * - *

The signature is generated on the hash of this structure, obtained - * per the rules specified for hashing data objects in 5.3.1 of IEEE - * Std 1609.2a-2017, with the parameter Data Input equal to the C-OER - * encoding of tbsRequest, and the parameter Signer Identifier Input - * equal to the signer's certificate, that is, the ITU-T X.509 certificate - * contained in the OCTET STRING indicated by the first X509Certificate in - * signer. - * - * @param hashAlgorithmId contains the identifier of the hash algorithm used - * inside the binary tree. - * - * @param tbsRequest contains the certificate request information that is - * signed by the recipient. - * - * @param signer denotes the signing entity's identifier. - * - * @param signature contains the request sender's signature. - */ - SignedX509CertificateRequest ::= SEQUENCE { - hashAlgorithmId HashAlgorithm, - tbsRequest ScopedCertificateRequest, - signer X509SignerIdentifier, - signature Signature - } - ---***************************************************************************-- --- ACA - EE Interface -- ---***************************************************************************-- - -/** - * @class AcaEeCertResponsePlainSpdu - * - * @brief This structure contains a certificate response for consumption by - * the EE. In the architecture of this document, although it is created by the - * ACA, it is made available to the EE via the RA as described in 8.2. - * - *

The ACA creates this response when 1) the compact unified - * butterfly key mechanism is not being used (that is, some other flavor of - * butterfly key is being used, or butterfly keys are not being used) and 2) - * it is not necessary to protect the EE's privacy from the RA, for example, - * when the certificate being returned is not a pseudonym certificate. - */ - AcaEeCertResponsePlainSpdu ::= Ieee1609Dot2Data-Unsecured { - ScmsPdu-Scoped { - AcaEeInterfacePdu (WITH COMPONENTS { - acaEeCertResponse - }) - } - } - -/** - * @class AcaEeCertResponsePrivateSpdu - * - * @brief This structure contains a certificate response for consumption by - * the EE. In the architecture of this document, although it is created by the - * ACA, it is made available to the EE via the RA as described in 8.2. - * - *

The ACA creates this response when 1) the compact unified - * butterfly key mechanism is not being used (that is, some other flavor of - * butterfly key is being used, or butterfly keys are not being used) and 2) - * it is necessary to protect the EE's privacy from the RA, for example when - * the certificate being returned is a pseudonym certificate. - * - *

The structure consists of a signed SPDU containing an encrypted - * SPDU. - * - *

The encrypted SPDU is encrypted with the response - * encryption key that was provided to the ACA for that purpose. This key is - * determined as follows: - *
    - *
  • If the original EeRaCertRequest from the end entity indicated a single - * response encryption key, that is, if the additionalParams.encryptionKey - * field was present in the request, then the response is encrypted with that - * key. - *
    • - * - *
  • If the original EeRaCertRequest from the end entity indicated a - * response encryption key generated with the “original” butterfly key - * mechanism, that is, the additionalParams.original field was provided in the - * request, then the response is encrypted with the cocoon encryption key - * derived from additionalParams.original.encryptionKey and - * additionalParams.original.encryptionExpansion as specified in 9.3.4.2 - * and the corresponding decryption private key is derived as specified in - * 9.3.4.1.
    • - * - *
  • If the original EeRaCertRequest from the end entity indicated a - * response encryption key generated with the “unified” butterfly key - * mechanism, that is, the additionalParams.unified field was provided in the - * request, then the response is encrypted with the cocoon encryption key - * derived from tbsCert.verifyKeyIndicator and additionalParams.unified as - * specified in 9.3.4.2 and the corresponding decryption private key is - * derived as specified in 9.3.4.1.
    • - *
- * - * See 9.3 for more material about butterfly keys. - * - *

The resulting Ieee1609Dot2Data of content type encryptedData is - * signed by the same ACA certificate that was used to issue the certificate - * field in the AcaEeCertResponse. If this structure is signed by a different - * ACA certificate, it is invalid. The ACA certificate shall follow the ACA - * certificate profile given in 7.7.3.2. - * - *

NOTE 1: Other potential responses to an authorization certificate - * request. If the original request indicated the use of “compact unified” - * butterfly key mechanism by including the additionalParams.compactUnified - * field, the response shall be a AcaEeCertResponseCubkSpdu, not a - * AcaEeCertResponsePrivateSpdu. - * - *

NOTE 2: How the ACA obtains the response encryption key. This - * document provides the RaAcaCertRequest structure to allow the RA to - * indicate whether the original or unified butterfly key mechanism is to be - * used via the flags field. The encryption key for encrypting - * AcaEeCertResponse is calculated by the indicated method even if the RA - * does not use an RaAcaCertRequest as defined in this document to - * communicate the certificate request to the ACA. - * - *

NOTE 3: Consistency between inner and outer signers, and the IEEE - * Std 1609.2 model. This SPDU introduces a new type of validity condition - * by requiring that the ACA that signs the outer signed SPDU is also the ACA - * that issued the certificate inside the encrypted SPDU. This requires that - * to verify the inner “SPDU”, that is, the certificate, the verifier - * needs to store the information from the outer SPDU. This is not a violation - * of the IEEE 1609.2 model: Subclause 4.2.2.3 of IEEE Std 1609.2 considers all - * operations carried out on received data to be atomic and does not put any - * restrictions on the information that is stored between operations. However, - * it should be noted that because the IEEE 1609.2 approach enables SPDUs to - * be nested within one another as Ieee1609Dot2Data, in principle an - * implementation could be built that iterated through the layers of a nested - * SPDU within a single call from the invoking application instance. (And it - * should also be noted that IEEE Std 1609.2 was consciously designed to - * enable this approach: Although the primitives provided in IEEE Std 1609.2 - * only support the series-of-single-operations approach, an implementation - * could layer this “one-invocation processing” on top of the IEEE 1609.2 - * interface as an optimization.) A “one-invocation processing” implementation - * of that type would have to anticipate situations of coupling between inner - * and outer SPDUs like the one created by this AcaEeCertResponsePrivateSpdu, - * and allow the invoking certificate management service to check consistency - * at the application layer, perhaps by (for example) returning the signing - * certificates for all nested signed SPDUs. How this is to be implemented is - * implementation specific; this note is intended as a notification of this - * potential issue to implementers planning to implement one-invocation - * processing. - */ - AcaEeCertResponsePrivateSpdu ::= Ieee1609Dot2Data-EncryptedSigned { - ScmsPdu-Scoped { - AcaEeInterfacePdu (WITH COMPONENTS { - acaEeCertResponse - }) - }, - SecurityMgmtPsid - } - -/** - * @class AcaEeCertResponseCubkSpdu - * - * @brief This structure contains a certificate response for consumption by - * the EE. In the architecture of this document, although it is created by - * the ACA, it is made available to the EE via the RA as described in 8.2. - * - *

The ACA creates a certificate response in this form when the - * compact unified butterfly key mechanism is being used. If the - * RaAcaCertRequest structure was used to communicate between the RA and the - * ACA, the RA indicated use of compact unified butterfly keys by setting the - * cubk (1) bit in the bkType field in the corresponding RaAcaCertRequest. - * - *

The AcaEeCertResponse is encrypted by the ACA using the cocoon - * public key for encryption. See 9.3.4.2 for how the ACA derives the cocoon - * public key for encryption, using the tbsCert.verifyKeyIndicator field in the - * corresponding RaAcaCertRequest as the input cocoon public key for signing - * Bt. See 9.3.4.1 for how the EE derives the corresponding cocoon private - * key for encryption. - */ - AcaEeCertResponseCubkSpdu ::= Ieee1609Dot2Data-Encrypted { - ScmsPdu-Scoped { - AcaEeInterfacePdu (WITH COMPONENTS { - acaEeCertResponse - }) - } - } - ---***************************************************************************-- --- ACA - LA Interface -- ---***************************************************************************-- - ---***************************************************************************-- --- ACA - MA Interface -- ---***************************************************************************-- - ---***************************************************************************-- --- ACA - RA Interface -- ---***************************************************************************-- - -/** - * @class RaAcaCertRequestSpdu - * - * @brief This structure is the SPDU used to send a signed RaAcaCertRequest. - * For the signature to be valid the signing certificate shall conform to the - * RA certificate profile given in 7.7.3.9, contain a PSID equal to - * SecurityMgmtPsid (0x23) and a corresponding SSP containing the C-OER - * encoding of an ScmsSsp indicating RaSsp. The - * toBeSigned.certRequestPermissions field of the RA certificate shall permit - * the requested permissions in the raAcaCertRequest.tbsCert.appPermissions - * field. - */ - RaAcaCertRequestSpdu ::= Ieee1609Dot2Data-SignedCertRequest { - ScmsPdu-Scoped { - AcaRaInterfacePdu (WITH COMPONENTS { - raAcaCertRequest - }) - }, - SignerSingleCert - } - -/** - * @class AcaRaCertResponseSpdu - * - * @brief This structure is the SPDU used to send a signed AcaRaCertResponse. - * For the signature to be valid the signing certificate shall contain a PSID - * equal to SecurityMgmtPsid (0x23) and a corresponding SSP containing the - * C-OER encoding of an ScmsSsp indicating AcaSsp. - */ - AcaRaCertResponseSpdu ::= Ieee1609Dot2Data-Signed { - ScmsPdu-Scoped { - AcaRaInterfacePdu (WITH COMPONENTS { - acaRaCertResponse - }) - }, - SecurityMgmtPsid - } - ---***************************************************************************-- --- Certificate Management -- ---***************************************************************************-- - -/** - * @class CompositeCrlSpdu - * - * @brief This structure is the SPDU used to send an unsecured CompositeCrl. - * It is used to create composite CRL files as specified in 8.5. - */ - CompositeCrlSpdu ::= Ieee1609Dot2Data-Unsecured { - ScmsPdu-Scoped { - CertManagementPdu (WITH COMPONENTS { - compositeCrl - }) - } - } - -/** - * @class CertificateChainSpdu - * - * @brief This structure is the SPDU used to send an unsecured - * CertificateChain. It is used to create certificate chain files as - * specified in 8.4. - */ - CertificateChainSpdu ::= Ieee1609Dot2Data-Unsecured { - ScmsPdu-Scoped { - CertManagementPdu (WITH COMPONENTS { - certificateChain - }) - } - } - -/** - * @class MultiSignedCtlSpdu - * - * @brief This structure is the SPDU used to send an unsecured MultiSignedCtl. - */ - MultiSignedCtlSpdu ::= Ieee1609Dot2Data-Unsecured { - ScmsPdu-Scoped { - CertManagementPdu (WITH COMPONENTS { - multiSignedCtl - }) - } - } - -/** - * @class CtlSignatureSpdu - * - * @brief This structure is the SPDU used to send a signed - * ToBeSignedCtlSignature. For the signature to be valid, the signing - * certificate shall match the elector certificate profile in 7.7.3.7. This - * means that the signature is calculated as specified in IEEE Std 1609.2, - * with the data input to the hash process consisting of the C-OER encoding - * of the tbsData that includes the ToBeSignedCtlSignature. - */ - CtlSignatureSpdu ::= Ieee1609Dot2Data-Signed { - ScmsPdu-Scoped { - CertManagementPdu (WITH COMPONENTS { - tbsCtlSignature - }) - }, - SecurityMgmtPsid - } - -/** - * @class CertificateManagementInformationStatusSpdu - * - * @brief This structure is the SPDU used to send a signed - * CertManagementInfoStatus. For the signature to be valid the signing - * certificate shall conform to the RA certificate profile given in 7.7.3.9 or - * the DC certificate profile given in 7.7.3.10. - */ - CertificateManagementInformationStatusSpdu ::= - Ieee1609Dot2Data-Signed { - ScmsPdu-Scoped { - CertManagementPdu (WITH COMPONENTS { - infoStatus - }) - }, - SecurityMgmtPsid - } - - ---***************************************************************************-- --- ECA - EE Interface -- ---***************************************************************************-- - -/** - * @class EeEcaCertRequestSpdu - * - * @brief This structure is the SPDU used to send a signed EeEcaCertRequest, - * as follows: - *
    - *
  • If eeEcaCertRequest.canonicalId is not present, the EE signs this - * structure using the private key corresponding to the - * tbsCert.verifyKeyIndicator field of the EeEcaCertRequest.
    • - * - *
  • If eeEcaCertRequest.canonicalId is present, the EE signs this - * structure using the canonical private key as specified in 4.1.4.2.
    • - *
- */ - EeEcaCertRequestSpdu ::= Ieee1609Dot2Data-SignedCertRequest { - ScmsPdu-Scoped { - EcaEeInterfacePdu (WITH COMPONENTS { - eeEcaCertRequest - }) - }, - SignerSelf - } - -/** - * @class EcaEeCertResponseSpdu - * - * @brief This structure is the SPDU used to send a signed EcaEeCertResponse. - * For the signature to be valid, the signing certificate shall contain a PSID - * equal to SecurityMgmtPsid (0x23) and a corresponding SSP containing the - * C-OER encoding of an ScmsSsp indicating EcaSsp. - */ - EcaEeCertResponseSpdu ::= Ieee1609Dot2Data-Signed { - ScmsPdu-Scoped { - EcaEeInterfacePdu (WITH COMPONENTS { - ecaEeCertResponse - }) - }, - SecurityMgmtPsid - } - ---***************************************************************************-- --- EE - MA Interface -- ---***************************************************************************-- - ---***************************************************************************-- --- EE - RA Interface -- ---***************************************************************************-- - -/** - * @class EeRaCertRequestSpdu - * - * @brief This structure is the SPDU used to send a signed then encrypted - * EeRaCertRequest. It is a choice of the IEEE 1609.2 authenticated - * certificate request, which may be any kind of EE-RA certificate request, - * and the ITU-T X.509 certificate request, which is required to be an - * authorization certificate request. - */ - EeRaCertRequestSpdu ::= Ieee1609Dot2Data ( - EeRa1609Dot2AuthenticatedCertRequestSpdu | - EeRaX509AuthenticatedCertRequestSpdu - ) - -/** - * @class EeRa1609Dot2AuthenticatedCertRequestSpdu - * - * @brief This structure is the SPDU used to send a signed then encrypted IEEE - * 1609.2 authenticated certificate request. The EE signs this structure - * using its enrollment certificate. The enrollment certificate shall conform - * to the enrollment certificate profile given in 7.7.3.5. The EE encrypts - * the signed structure using the encryptionKey from the RA's certificate. - */ - EeRa1609Dot2AuthenticatedCertRequestSpdu ::= - Ieee1609Dot2Data-SignedEncryptedCertRequest { - ScmsPdu-Scoped { - EeRaInterfacePdu (WITH COMPONENTS { - eeRaCertRequest - }) - }, - SignerSingleCert - } - -/** - * @class EeRaX509AuthenticatedCertRequestSpdu - * - * @brief This structure is the SPDU used to send a signed then encrypted ITU-T - * X.509authenticated certificate request. The EE signs this structure - * using its enrollment certificate. The enrollment certificate shall conform - * to the enrollment certificate profile given in 7.7.3.6. The EE encrypts - * the signed structure using the encryptionKey from the RA's certificate. - */ - EeRaX509AuthenticatedCertRequestSpdu ::= Ieee1609Dot2Data-Encrypted { - Ieee1609Dot2Data-SignedX509AuthenticatedCertRequest { - ScmsPdu-Scoped { - EeRaInterfacePdu (WITH COMPONENTS { - eeRaCertRequest - }) - }, - SignerSingleX509Cert - } - } - -/** - * @class RaEeCertAckSpdu - * - * @brief This structure is the SPDU used to send a signed RaEeCertAck to - * acknowledge the receipt of an EeRaCertRequestSpdu. For the signature to be - * valid the signing certificate shall conform to the RA certificate profile - * given in 7.7.3.9. - */ - RaEeCertAckSpdu ::= Ieee1609Dot2Data-Signed { - ScmsPdu-Scoped { - EeRaInterfacePdu (WITH COMPONENTS { - raEeCertAck - }) - }, - SecurityMgmtPsid - } - -/** - * @class RaEeCertInfoSpdu - * - * @brief This structure is the SPDU used to create an unsigned .info file - * to be included in a certificate batch zip file as specified in 8.2. This - * SPDU is used if the RaEeCertInfo does not contain an acpcTreeId field. - */ - RaEeCertInfoSpdu ::= Ieee1609Dot2Data-Unsecured { - ScmsPdu-Scoped { - EeRaInterfacePdu (WITH COMPONENTS { - raEeCertInfo (WITH COMPONENTS { - acpcTreeId ABSENT - }) - }) - } - } - -/** - * @class RaEeCertAndAcpcInfoSpdu - * - * @brief This structure is the SPDU used to create a signed .info file to - * be included in a certificate batch zip file as specified in 8.2. This - * SPDU is used if the RaEeCertInfo contains an acpcTreeId field. For the - * signature to be valid the signing certificate shall conform to the RA - * certificate profile given in 7.7.3.9. - */ - RaEeCertAndAcpcInfoSpdu ::= Ieee1609Dot2Data-Signed { - ScmsPdu-Scoped { - EeRaInterfacePdu (WITH COMPONENTS { - raEeCertInfo (WITH COMPONENTS { - acpcTreeId PRESENT - }) - }) - }, - SecurityMgmtPsid - } - -/** - * @class EeRaDownloadRequestPlainSpdu - * - * @brief This structure is the SPDU used to send an unsecured - * EeRaDownloadRequest. - */ - EeRaDownloadRequestPlainSpdu ::= Ieee1609Dot2Data-Unsecured { - ScmsPdu-Scoped { - EeRaInterfacePdu (WITH COMPONENTS { - eeRaDownloadRequest - }) - } - } - -/** - * @class EeRaDownloadRequestSpdu - * - * @brief This structure is the SPDU used to send an signed then encrypted - * EeRaDownloadRequest. The EE signs this structure using its enrollment - * certificate. The enrollment certificate shall conform to the enrollment - * certificate profile given in 7.7.3.5. The EE encrypts the signed - * structure using the encryptionKey from the RA's certificate. - */ - EeRaDownloadRequestSpdu ::= Ieee1609Dot2Data-SignedEncrypted { - ScmsPdu-Scoped { - EeRaInterfacePdu (WITH COMPONENTS { - eeRaDownloadRequest - }) - }, - SecurityMgmtPsid - } - -/** - * @class EeRaSuccessorEnrollmentCertRequestSpdu - * - * @brief This structure is the SPDU used to send a signed then encrypted - * EeEcaCertRequestSpdu. The EE signs this structure using its enrollment - * certificate. The enrollment certificate shall conform to the enrollment - * certificate profile given in 7.7.3.5. The EE encrypts the signed - * structure using the encryptionKey from the RA's certificate. - */ - EeRaSuccessorEnrollmentCertRequestSpdu ::= - Ieee1609Dot2Data-SignedEncryptedCertRequest {ScmsPdu-Scoped { - EeRaInterfacePdu (WITH COMPONENTS { - eeRaSuccessorEnrollmentCertRequest - }) - }, - SignerSingleCert - } - -/** - * @class RaEeEnrollmentCertAckSpdu - * - * @brief This structure is the SPDU used to send a signed RaEeCertInfo. For - * the signature to be valid the signing certificate shall conform to the RA - * certificate profile given in 7.7.3.9. - */ - RaEeEnrollmentCertAckSpdu ::= Ieee1609Dot2Data-Signed { - ScmsPdu-Scoped { - EeRaInterfacePdu (WITH COMPONENTS { - raEeCertInfo (WITH COMPONENTS { - acpcTreeId ABSENT - }) - }) - }, - SecurityMgmtPsid - } - -/** - * @class EeRaEncryptedSignedMisbehaviorReportSpdu - * - * @brief This structure is used for misbehavior report upload when EE - * authentication is done at the SCMS REST API v2 level (see 6.3.5.6). The - * contents of the encrypted data are misbehavior report specific and - * outside the scope of this document. The contents are encrypted for the MA - * certificate. - */ - EeRaEncryptedSignedMisbehaviorReportSpdu ::= - Ieee1609Dot2Data-EncryptedOpenSigned {AnyMbrPsid} - -/** - * @class EeRaEncryptedMisbehaviorReportSpdu - * - * @brief This structure is used for misbehavior report upload when EE - * authentication is done at the Web API level (see 6.3.5.6). The contents of - * the encrypted data are misbehavior report specific and outside the scope - * of this document. The contents are encrypted for the MA certificate. - */ - EeRaEncryptedMisbehaviorReportSpdu ::= Ieee1609Dot2Data-EncryptedOpen - -/** - * @class AnyMbrPsid - * - * @brief This structure is a list of the PSIDs entitled to authorize - * misbehavior report upload. It currently only lists one PSID. It is - * intended to be extensible as additional misbehavior reporting PSIDs are - * defined and to take the form AnyMbrPsid = Psid (BaseMbrPsid | MbrPsid2 | - * MbrPsid3 | etc.). - */ - AnyMbrPsid ::= Psid(BaseMbrPsid) - -/** - * @class BaseMbrPsid - * - * @brief This PSID identifies misbehavior reporting for a baseline set of - * applications. It is owned by CAMP. - */ - BaseMbrPsid ::= Psid(38) - ---***************************************************************************-- --- LA - MA Interface -- ---***************************************************************************-- - ---***************************************************************************-- --- LA - RA Interface -- ---***************************************************************************-- - ---***************************************************************************-- --- MA - RA Interface -- ---***************************************************************************-- - ---***************************************************************************-- --- Service Specific Permissions -- ---***************************************************************************-- - -/** - * @class ScmsSsp - * - * @brief This parent structure defines the SSP for PSID 0x23 and encompasses - * all SSP structures defined in this document. An overview of this structure - * is as follows: - * - *

NOTE: The LOP is in the SSP for backward compatibility reasons, - * and in practice, in this design the LOP does not have a certificate. - * - * @param elector contains the SSP defined for an elector. - * - * @param root contains the SSP defined for a root CA. - * - * @param pg contains the SSP defined for a policy generator. - * - * @param ica contains the SSP defined for an intermediate CA. - * - * @param eca contains the SSP defined for an enrollment CA. - * - * @param aca contains the SSP defined for an authorization CA. - * - * @param crl contains the SSP defined for a CRL signer. - * - * @param dcm contains the SSP defined for a device configuration manager. - * - * @param la contains the SSP defined for a linkage authority. - * - * @param lop contains the SSP defined for a location obscurer proxy. - * - * @param ma contains the SSP defined for a misbehavior authority. - * - * @param ra contains the SSP defined for a registration authority. - * - * @param ee contains the SSP defined for an end entity. - * - * @param dc contains the SSP defined for a distribution center. - */ - ScmsSsp ::= CHOICE { - elector ElectorSsp, - root RootCaSsp, - pg PgSsp, - ica IcaSsp, - eca EcaSsp, - aca AcaSsp, - crl CrlSignerSsp, - dcm DcmSsp, - la LaSsp, - lop LopSsp, - ma MaSsp, - ra RaSsp, - ee EeSsp, - ..., - dc DcSsp - } - -/** - * @class ElectorSsp - * - * @brief This structure defines the SSP for an elector when it is - * authorizing Security Management messages (PSID 0x23). It has no - * parameters other than the version number. - */ - ElectorSsp ::= SEQUENCE { - version Uint8 (2), - ... - } - -/** - * @class RootCaSsp - * - * @brief This structure defines the SSP for a root CA when it is - * authorizing Security Management messages (PSID 0x23). It has no - * parameters other than the version number. - */ - RootCaSsp ::= SEQUENCE { - version Uint8 (2), - ... - } - -/** - * @class PgSsp - * - * @brief This structure defines the SSP for a policy generator when it is - * authorizing Security Management messages (PSID 0x23). It has no - * parameters other than the version number. - */ - PgSsp ::= SEQUENCE { - version Uint8 (2), - ... - } - -/** - * @class IcaSsp - * - * @brief This structure defines the SSP for an intermediate CA when it is - * authorizing Security Management messages (PSID 0x23). It has no - * parameters other than the version number. - */ - IcaSsp ::= SEQUENCE { - version Uint8 (2), - ... - } - -/** - * @class EcaSsp - * - * @brief This structure defines the SSP for an enrollment CA when it is - * authorizing Security Management messages (PSID 0x23). It has no - * parameters other than the version number. - */ - EcaSsp ::= SEQUENCE { - version Uint8 (2), - ... - } - -/** - * @class AcaSsp - * - * @brief This structure defines the SSP for an ACA when it is authorizing - * Security Management messages (PSID 0x23). It has no parameters other than - * the version number. - */ - AcaSsp ::= SEQUENCE { - version Uint8 (2), - ... - } - -/** - * @class CrlSignerSsp - * - * @brief This structure defines the SSP for a CRL signer when it is - * authorizing Security Management messages (PSID 0x23). It has no - * parameters other than the version number. - * - *

NOTE: The SSP for a CRL signer when signing CRLs is associated with - * PSID 0x0100 and is defined in IEEE Std 1609.2. - */ - CrlSignerSsp ::= SEQUENCE { - version Uint8 (2), - ... - } - -/** - * @class DcmSsp - * - * @brief This structure defines the SSP for a device configuration manager - * when it is authorizing Security Management messages (PSID 0x23). It has - * no parameters other than the version number. - */ - DcmSsp ::= SEQUENCE { - version Uint8 (2), - ... - } - -/** - * @class LaSsp - * - * @brief This structure defines the SSP for a linkage authority when it is - * authorizing Security Management messages (PSID 0x23). The SSP contains - * the 16 bit LA ID for that linkage authority. - */ - LaSsp ::= SEQUENCE { - version Uint8 (2), - laId Uint16, - ... - } - -/** - * @class LopSsp - * - * @brief This structure defines the SSP for a location obscurer proxy (LOP) - * when it is authorizing Security Management messages (PSID 0x23). It has - * no parameters other than the version number. - * - *

NOTE: The LOP is in the SSP for backward compatibility reasons, and - * in practice, in this design the LOP does not have a certificate. - */ - LopSsp ::= SEQUENCE { - version Uint8 (2), - ... - } - -/** - * @class MaSsp - * - * @brief This structure defines the SSP for a misbehavior authority when it - * is authorizing Security Management messages (PSID 0x23). Its parameters - * indicate the PSIDs associated with the misbehavior that is to be reported - * to that MA (see 4.1.5 for further details). The certificate containing - * this SSP is the MA Certificate to which an end entity should encrypt - * misbehavior reports related to the indicated PSIDs. - */ - MaSsp ::= SEQUENCE { - version Uint8 (2), - relevantPsids SequenceOfPsid, - ... - } - -/** - * @class RaSsp - * - * @brief This structure defines the SSP for an RA when it is authorizing - * Security Management messages (PSID 0x23). It has no parameters other than - * the version number. - */ - RaSsp ::= SEQUENCE { - version Uint8 (2), - ... - } - -/** - * @class EeSsp - * - * @brief This structure defines the SSP for an end entity when it is - * authorizing Security Management messages (PSID 0x23). It has no - * parameters other than the version number. - */ - EeSsp ::= SEQUENCE { - version Uint8(2), - ... - } - -/** - * @class AcpcSsp - * - * @brief This is a container for ACPC-related SSPs, specifying one SSP for - * each role. The only SSP defined in this document is the CamSsp, used in - * the CAM certificate that signs a SignedAprvBinaryTree or a - * SignedIndividualAprv. The SSP shall be C-OER encoded for inclusion in the - * CAM certificate. New versions of the CAM SSP should be handled by - * extending this structure rather than by use of a version number in the - * CamSsp structure. - * - *

The AcpcSsp is associated with the AcpcPsid in the CAM certificate's - * appPermissions field. - */ - AcpcSsp ::= CHOICE { - cam CamSsp, - ... - } - -/** - * @class CamSsp - * - * @brief This is a list of the ACPC Tree IDs for which the containing CAM - * certificate is entitled to sign a SignedAprvBinaryTree or a - * SignedIndividualAprv. The SSP entitles the certificate holder to sign - * either of these structures. - */ - CamSsp ::= SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF AcpcTreeId - -/** - * @class DcSsp - * - * @brief This structure defines the SSP for a distribution center when it is - * authorizing Security Management messages (PSID 0x23). It has no - * parameters other than the version number. - */ - DcSsp ::= SEQUENCE { - version Uint8(2), - ... - } - -END \ No newline at end of file +--***************************************************************************-- +-- IEEE Std 1609.2.1 -- +--***************************************************************************-- + +/** + * @note Section references in this file are to clauses in IEEE Std + * 1609.2.1 unless indicated otherwise. Full forms of acronyms and + * abbreviations used in this file are specified in 3.2. + */ + +Ieee1609Dot2Dot1Protocol {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) + standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) + extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) protocol(17) + major-version-3(3) minor-version-1(1)} + +DEFINITIONS AUTOMATIC TAGS ::= BEGIN + +EXPORTS ALL; + +IMPORTS + Certificate, + CertificateId, + Ieee1609Dot2Data, + SequenceOfCertificate, + SequenceOfPsidGroupPermissions, + SignerIdentifier, + ToBeSignedCertificate, + VerificationKeyIndicator +FROM Ieee1609Dot2 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) + standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) + dot2(2) base(1) schema(1) major-version-2(2) minor-version-5(5)} +WITH SUCCESSORS + + CrlSeries, + EccP256CurvePoint, + EccP384CurvePoint, + EcdsaP256Signature, + EcdsaP384Signature, + GeographicRegion, + HashAlgorithm, + HashedId3, + Psid, + PublicEncryptionKey, + PublicVerificationKey, + SequenceOfPsid, + SequenceOfPsidSsp, + Signature, + SubjectAssurance, + Uint8, + Uint16, + ValidityPeriod +FROM Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) + standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) + base(1) base-types(2) major-version-2(2) minor-version-3(3)} +WITH SUCCESSORS + + AcaEeInterfacePdu +FROM Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaEeInterface {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) + standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) + extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) aca-ee(1) major-version-2(2) + minor-version-3(3)} +WITH SUCCESSORS + + AcaLaInterfacePdu +FROM Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaLaInterface {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) + standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) + extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) aca-la(2) major-version-2(2) + minor-version-1(1)} +WITH SUCCESSORS + + AcaMaInterfacePdu +FROM Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaMaInterface {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) + standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) + extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) aca-ma(3) major-version-2(2) + minor-version-1(1)} +WITH SUCCESSORS + + AcaRaInterfacePdu +FROM Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaRaInterface {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) + standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) + extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) aca-ra(4) major-version-3(3) + minor-version-1(1)} +WITH SUCCESSORS + + AcpcTreeId +FROM Ieee1609Dot2Dot1Acpc {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) + standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) + extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) acpc(18) major-version-3(3) + minor-version-1(1)} +WITH SUCCESSORS + + CertManagementPdu +FROM Ieee1609Dot2Dot1CertManagement {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) + standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) + extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) cert-management(7) + major-version-3(3) minor-version-1(1)} +WITH SUCCESSORS + + EcaEeInterfacePdu +FROM Ieee1609Dot2Dot1EcaEeInterface {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) + standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) + extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) eca-ee(9) major-version-3(3) + minor-version-1(1)} +WITH SUCCESSORS + + EeMaInterfacePdu +FROM Ieee1609Dot2Dot1EeMaInterface {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) + standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) + extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) ee-ma(10) major-version-2(2) + minor-version-1(1)} +WITH SUCCESSORS + + EeRaInterfacePdu +FROM Ieee1609Dot2Dot1EeRaInterface {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) + standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) + extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) ee-ra(11) major-version-3(3) + minor-version-1(1)} +WITH SUCCESSORS + + LaMaInterfacePdu +FROM Ieee1609Dot2Dot1LaMaInterface {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) + standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) + extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) la-ma(12) major-version-2(2) + minor-version-1(1)} +WITH SUCCESSORS + + LaRaInterfacePdu +FROM Ieee1609Dot2Dot1LaRaInterface {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) + standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) + extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) la-ra(13) major-version-2(2) + minor-version-1(1)} +WITH SUCCESSORS + + MaRaInterfacePdu +FROM Ieee1609Dot2Dot1MaRaInterface {iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) + standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) + extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) ma-ra(14) major-version-2(2) + minor-version-1(1)} +WITH SUCCESSORS +; + +/** + * @brief This PSID, 0x23, identifies security management activities as + * defined in this document. + */ +SecurityMgmtPsid ::= Psid (35) + +/** + * @brief This is the parent structure that encompasses all parent structures + * of interfaces defined in the SCMS. An overview of this structure is as + * follows: + * - aca-ee contains the interface structures defined for interaction + * between the ACA and the EE. + * - aca-la contains the interface structures defined for interaction + * between the ACA and the LA. + * - aca-ma contains the interface structures defined for interaction + * between the ACA and the MA. + * - aca-ra contains the interface structures defined for interaction + * between the ACA and the RA. + * - cert contains the interface structures defined for certificate + * management. + * - eca-ee contains the interface structures defined for interaction + * between the ECA and the EE. + * - ee-ma contains the interface structures defined for interaction + * between the EE and the MA. + * - ee-ra contains the interface structures defined for interaction + * between the EE and the RA. + * - la-ma contains the interface structures defined for interaction + * between the LA and the MA. + * - la-ra contains the interface structures defined for interaction + * between the LA and the RA. + * - ma-ra contains the interface structures defined for interactions + * between the MA and the RA. + * + * @param version: contains the current version of the structure. + */ +ScmsPdu ::= SEQUENCE { + version Uint8 (2), + content CHOICE { + aca-ee AcaEeInterfacePdu, + aca-la AcaLaInterfacePdu, + aca-ma AcaMaInterfacePdu, + aca-ra AcaRaInterfacePdu, + cert CertManagementPdu, + eca-ee EcaEeInterfacePdu, + ee-ma EeMaInterfacePdu, + ee-ra EeRaInterfacePdu, + la-ma LaMaInterfacePdu, + la-ra LaRaInterfacePdu, + ma-ra MaRaInterfacePdu, + ... + } +} + + +--***************************************************************************-- +-- Parameterized Types -- +--***************************************************************************-- + +/** + * @brief This structure defines a parameterized type for creating a scoped + * data as a subtype of ScmsPdu. + */ +ScmsPdu-Scoped {Pdu} ::= ScmsPdu (WITH COMPONENTS { + ..., + content (CONSTRAINED BY { + Pdu + }) +}) + +/** + * @brief This structure defines a parameterized type for creating an + * unsecured data as a subtype of Ieee1609Dot2Data. + */ +Ieee1609Dot2Data-Unsecured {Tbu} ::= + Ieee1609Dot2Data (WITH COMPONENTS { + content (WITH COMPONENTS { + ..., + unsecuredData (CONTAINING Tbu) + }) +}) + +/** + * @brief This structure defines a parameterized type for creating a signed + * data as a subtype of Ieee1609Dot2Data. + */ +Ieee1609Dot2Data-Signed {Tbs, Psid} ::= + Ieee1609Dot2Data (WITH COMPONENTS { + ..., + content (WITH COMPONENTS { + ..., + signedData (WITH COMPONENTS { + ..., + tbsData (WITH COMPONENTS { + ..., + payload (WITH COMPONENTS { + ..., + data (WITH COMPONENTS { + ..., + content (WITH COMPONENTS { + unsecuredData (CONTAINING Tbs) + }) + }) + }), + headerInfo (WITH COMPONENTS { + ..., + psid (Psid), + generationTime ABSENT, + expiryTime ABSENT, + generationLocation ABSENT, + p2pcdLearningRequest ABSENT, + missingCrlIdentifier ABSENT, + encryptionKey ABSENT + }) + }), + signer (SignerSingleCert) + }) + }) +}) + +/** + * @brief This structure defines a parameterized type for creating an + * encrypted data as a subtype of Ieee1609Dot2Data. An overview of this + * structure is as follows: + * + * @param Tbe: is first encrypted per IEEE 1609.2. Per IEEE 1609.2, this + * includes encapsulating Tbe in an Ieee1609Dot2Data of type unsecured if + * Tbe is not already an Ieee1609Dot2Data. The ciphertext output from the + * encryption of Tbe is used to set the encryptedData.ciphertext field. The + * encryptedData.recipients field is set to reflect the recipients. This + * parameterized type does not provide parameters to set the recipients; that + * information is set directly by the entity that creates an instance of this + * type. + */ +Ieee1609Dot2Data-Encrypted {Tbe} ::= + Ieee1609Dot2Data (WITH COMPONENTS { + ..., + content (WITH COMPONENTS { + encryptedData (CONSTRAINED BY { + --encryption of-- Tbe + }) + }) +}) + +/** + * @brief This structure defines a parameterized type for creating a signed + * certificate request as a subtype of Ieee1609Dot2Data. + */ +Ieee1609Dot2Data-SignedCertRequest {Tbscr, Signer} ::= + Ieee1609Dot2Data (WITH COMPONENTS { + ..., + content (WITH COMPONENTS { + ..., + signedCertificateRequest (CONTAINING + SignedCertificateRequest (WITH COMPONENTS { + ..., + tbsRequest (Tbscr), + signer (Signer) + })) + }) +}) + +/** + * @brief This structure is a wrapper for an ITU-T X.509 certificate. + * + * @note ITU-T X.509 certificates are encoded with the ASN.1 DER + * rather than the OER used in this document and so cannot be "directly" + * imported into these structures. + */ +X509Certificate ::= OCTET STRING + +/** + * @brief This type is used for clarity of definitions. + */ +SequenceOfX509Certificate ::= + SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF X509Certificate + +/** + * @brief This structure identifies an ITU-T X.509 certificate used to sign a + * signed data structure. The only data structure currently defined that can + * be signed by an ITU-T X.509 certificate is SignedX509CertificateRequest. + */ +X509SignerIdentifier ::= CHOICE { + certificate SequenceOfX509Certificate, + ... +} + +/** + * @brief This structure defines a parameterized type for creating a + * certificate request, signed with an ITU-T X.509 certificate, as a subtype of + * Ieee1609Dot2Data. It makes use of the extension of Ieee1609Dot2Content + * defined in 11.2.3. + */ +Ieee1609Dot2Data-SignedX509AuthenticatedCertRequest {Tbscr, Signer} ::= + Ieee1609Dot2Data (WITH COMPONENTS { + ..., + content (WITH COMPONENTS { + ..., + signedX509CertificateRequest (CONTAINING + SignedX509CertificateRequest (WITH COMPONENTS { + ..., + tbsRequest (Tbscr), + signer (Signer) + })) + }) +}) + +/** + * @brief This structure defines a parameterized type for creating a signed + * then encrypted data as a subtype of Ieee1609Dot2Data. + */ +Ieee1609Dot2Data-SignedEncrypted {Tbse, Psid} ::= + Ieee1609Dot2Data-Encrypted { + Ieee1609Dot2Data-Signed { + Tbse, + Psid + } +} + +/** + * @brief This structure defines a parameterized type for creating an + * encrypted then signed data as a subtype of Ieee1609Dot2Data. + * + * @note This parameterized type inadvertently adds some overhead. + * The Ieee1609Dot2Data-EncryptedSigned {Tbes, Psid} structure, because it + * puts Ieee1609Dot2Data-Encrypted inside Ieee1609Dot2Data-Signed {Tbs, Psid}, + * and because Ieee1609Dot2Data-Signed {Tbs, Psid} puts Tbs inside + * unsecuredData, Tbes is "Signed (Unsecured (Encrypted))" instead of + * "Signed (Encrypted))", which was the intent and also in the original CAMP + * design. Other documents that use this document may be better off defining + * this structure on their own, if they want avoid this overhead. + */ +Ieee1609Dot2Data-EncryptedSigned {Tbes, Psid} ::= + Ieee1609Dot2Data-Signed { + Ieee1609Dot2Data-Encrypted { + Tbes + }, + Psid +} + +/** + * @brief This structure defines a parameterized type for creating a signed + * then encrypted certificate request as a subtype of Ieee1609Dot2Data. + */ +Ieee1609Dot2Data-SignedEncryptedCertRequest {Tbstecr, Signer} ::= + Ieee1609Dot2Data-Encrypted { + Ieee1609Dot2Data-SignedCertRequest { + Tbstecr, + Signer + } +} + +/** + * @brief This structure defines a parameterized type for creating an + * encrypted data as a subtype of Ieee1609Dot2Data. An overview of this + * structure is as follows: + * + * @param Tbe: is first encrypted and the resulting ciphertext is used as + * input to the encryptedData field. + */ +Ieee1609Dot2Data-SymmEncryptedSingleRecipient {Tbe} ::= + Ieee1609Dot2Data (WITH COMPONENTS { + ..., + content (WITH COMPONENTS { + encryptedData (CONSTRAINED BY { + --contains only one RecipientInfo, of form symmRecipinfo + --symmetric encryption of-- Tbe + }) + }) +}) + +--***************************************************************************-- +-- Signer Types -- +--***************************************************************************-- + +/** + * @brief This structure is used to indicate a SignerIdentifier with a + * certificate chain of size 1. + */ +SignerSingleCert ::= SignerIdentifier (WITH COMPONENTS { + certificate (SequenceOfCertificate (SIZE (1))) +}) + +/** + * @brief This structure is used to indicate an X509SignerIdentifier with a + * certificate chain of size 1. + */ +SignerSingleX509Cert ::= X509SignerIdentifier (WITH COMPONENTS { + certificate (SequenceOfX509Certificate (SIZE (1))) +}) + +/** + * @brief This structure is used to indicate a SignerIdentifier of type self. + */ +SignerSelf ::= SignerIdentifier (WITH COMPONENTS { + self +}) + +--***************************************************************************-- +-- Certificate Requests -- +--***************************************************************************-- + +/** + * @brief This structure defines the all certificate request structures as a + * scoped version of the ScmsPdu. + */ +ScopedCertificateRequest ::= ScmsPdu ( + ScmsPdu-Scoped { + AcaRaInterfacePdu (WITH COMPONENTS { + raAcaCertRequest + }) + } | + ScmsPdu-Scoped { + EcaEeInterfacePdu (WITH COMPONENTS { + eeEcaCertRequest + }) + } | + ScmsPdu-Scoped { + EeRaInterfacePdu (WITH COMPONENTS { + eeRaCertRequest + }) + } | + ScmsPdu-Scoped { + EeRaInterfacePdu (WITH COMPONENTS { + eeRaSuccessorEnrollmentCertRequest + }) + } +) + +/** + * @brief This structure defines the format of a signed certificate request. + * An overview of this structure is as follows: + * + * The signature is generated on the hash of this structure, obtained + * per the rules specified for hashing data objects in 5.3.1 of IEEE Std + * 1609.2a-2017, where the parameter Data Input shall be the C-OER + * encoding of tbsRequest, and the parameter Signer Identifier Input + * depending on whether the request is self-signed or signed using an + * enrollment certificate: + * - If the request is self-signed, the parameter Signer Identifier + * Input shall be the empty string, i.e., a string of length 0. + * - If the request is signed using an enrollment certificate, the + * parameter Signer Identifier Input shall be the signer's enrollment + * certificate. + * + * @param hashAlgorithmId: contains the identifier of the hash algorithm used + * to calculate the hash of tbsRequest. + * + * @param tbsRequest: contains the certificate request information that is + * signed by the recipient. + * + * @param signer: denotes the signing entity's identifier. + * + * @param signature: contains the request sender's signature. + */ +SignedCertificateRequest ::= SEQUENCE { + hashAlgorithmId HashAlgorithm, + tbsRequest ScopedCertificateRequest, + signer SignerIdentifier, + signature Signature +} + +/** + * @brief This structure contains a certificate request signed with an ITU-T + * X.509 certificate. The only type of certificate request signed with an + * ITU-T X.509 certificate supported in this document is an authorization + * certificate request. An overview of this structure is as follows: + * + * The signature is generated on the hash of this structure, obtained + * per the rules specified for hashing data objects in 5.3.1 of IEEE Std + * 1609.2a-2017, where the parameter Data Input shall be the C-OER + * encoding of tbsRequest, and the parameter Signer Identifier Input + * shall be the signer's certificate, that is, the ITU-T X.509 certificate + * contained in the OCTET STRING indicated by the first X509Certificate in + * signer. For example, if the signer is as below, the first 6 bytes are the + * ASN.1 encoding overhead, where 80 01 01 is the overhead for signer, and + * then 82 01 AC is the overhead introduced by the OCTET STRING encoding for + * the first (in this case, the only) X509Certificate; and the first + * X509Certificate is contained in the next 428 bytes (30 82 01 ... 00 00 00), + * so the parameter Signer Identifier Input shall be '30 82 01 ... 00 00 00'. + * + * An example X509SignerIdentifier with one X509Certificate: + * + * 80 01 01 82 01 AC 30 82 01 A8 30 82 01 4D A0 03 02 01 02 02 04 90 + * C5 9D 21 30 0A 06 08 2A 86 48 CE 3D 04 03 02 30 24 31 0A 30 08 06 03 55 04 + * 06 13 01 00 31 0A 30 08 06 03 55 04 0A 13 01 00 31 0A 30 08 06 03 55 04 03 + * 13 01 00 30 1E 17 0D 30 30 30 31 30 31 30 30 30 30 30 30 5A 17 0D 30 30 30 + * 31 30 31 30 30 30 30 30 30 5A 30 24 31 0A 30 08 06 03 55 04 06 13 01 00 31 + * 0A 30 08 06 03 55 04 0A 13 01 00 31 0A 30 08 06 03 55 04 03 13 01 00 30 59 + * 30 13 06 07 2A 86 48 CE 3D 02 01 06 08 2A 86 48 CE 3D 03 01 07 03 42 00 00 + * 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 + * 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 + * 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 A3 6D 30 6B 30 0A 06 03 55 1D 0E + * 04 03 04 01 00 30 0A 06 03 55 1D 23 04 03 04 01 00 30 0C 06 03 55 1D 13 01 + * 01 FF 04 02 30 00 30 0E 06 03 55 1D 0F 01 01 FF 04 04 03 02 03 C8 30 0A 06 + * 03 55 1D 25 04 03 04 01 00 30 0A 06 03 55 1D 1F 04 03 04 01 00 30 0F 06 08 + * 2B 06 01 05 05 07 01 01 04 03 04 01 00 30 0A 06 03 55 1D 20 04 03 04 01 00 + * 30 0A 06 08 2A 86 48 CE 3D 04 03 02 03 49 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 + * 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 + * 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 + * 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 + * + * @param hashAlgorithmId: contains the identifier of the hash algorithm used + * inside the binary tree. + * + * @param tbsRequest: contains the certificate request information that is + * signed by the recipient. + * + * @param signer: denotes the signing entity's identifier. + * + * @param signature: contains the request sender's signature. + */ +SignedX509CertificateRequest ::= SEQUENCE { + hashAlgorithmId HashAlgorithm, + tbsRequest ScopedCertificateRequest, + signer X509SignerIdentifier, + signature Signature +} + +--***************************************************************************-- +-- ACA - EE Interface -- +--***************************************************************************-- + +/** + * @brief This structure contains a certificate response for consumption by + * the EE. In the architecture of this document, although it is created by the + * ACA, it is made available to the EE via the RA as described in 8.2. + * + * The ACA creates this response when 1) the compact unified + * butterfly key mechanism is not being used (that is, some other flavor of + * butterfly key is being used, or butterfly keys are not being used) and 2) + * it is not necessary to protect the EE's privacy from the RA, for example, + * when the certificate being returned is not a pseudonym certificate. + */ +AcaEeCertResponsePlainSpdu ::= Ieee1609Dot2Data-Unsecured { + ScmsPdu-Scoped { + AcaEeInterfacePdu (WITH COMPONENTS { + acaEeCertResponse + }) + } +} + +/** + * @brief This structure contains a certificate response for consumption by + * the EE. In the architecture of this document, although it is created by the + * ACA, it is made available to the EE via the RA as described in 8.2. + * + * The ACA creates this response when 1) the compact unified + * butterfly key mechanism is not being used (that is, some other flavor of + * butterfly key is being used, or butterfly keys are not being used) and 2) + * it is necessary to protect the EE's privacy from the RA, for example when + * the certificate being returned is a pseudonym certificate. + * + * The structure consists of a signed SPDU containing an encrypted + * SPDU. + * + * The encrypted SPDU is encrypted with the response + * encryption key that was provided to the ACA for that purpose. This key is + * determined as follows: + * - If the original EeRaCertRequest from the end entity indicated a single + * response encryption key, that is, if the additionalParams.encryptionKey + * field was present in the request, then the response is encrypted with that + * key. + * - If the original EeRaCertRequest from the end entity indicated a + * response encryption key generated with the "original" butterfly key + * mechanism, that is, the additionalParams.original field was provided in the + * request, then the response is encrypted with the cocoon encryption key + * derived from additionalParams.original.encryptionKey and + * additionalParams.original.encryptionExpansion as specified in 9.3.4.2 + * and the corresponding decryption private key is derived as specified in + * 9.3.4.1. + * - If the original EeRaCertRequest from the end entity indicated a + * response encryption key generated with the "unified" butterfly key + * mechanism, that is, the additionalParams.unified field was provided in the + * request, then the response is encrypted with the cocoon encryption key + * derived from tbsCert.verifyKeyIndicator and additionalParams.unified as + * specified in 9.3.4.2 and the corresponding decryption private key is + * derived as specified in 9.3.4.1. + * + * See 9.3 for more material about butterfly keys. + * + * The resulting Ieee1609Dot2Data of content type encryptedData is + * signed by the same ACA certificate that was used to issue the certificate + * field in the AcaEeCertResponse. If this structure is signed by a different + * ACA certificate, it is invalid. The ACA certificate shall follow the ACA + * certificate profile given in 7.7.3.2. + * + * @note: + * - Other potential responses to an authorization certificate + * request: If the original request indicated the use of "compact unified" + * butterfly key mechanism by including the additionalParams.compactUnified + * field, the response shall be a AcaEeCertResponseCubkSpdu, not a + * AcaEeCertResponsePrivateSpdu. + * + * - How the ACA obtains the response encryption key: This + * document provides the RaAcaCertRequest structure to allow the RA to + * indicate whether the original or unified butterfly key mechanism is to be + * used via the flags field. The encryption key for encrypting + * AcaEeCertResponse is calculated by the indicated method even if the RA + * does not use an RaAcaCertRequest as defined in this document to + * communicate the certificate request to the ACA. + * + * - Consistency between inner and outer signers, and the IEEE + * Std 1609.2 model. This SPDU introduces a new type of validity condition + * by requiring that the ACA that signs the outer signed SPDU is also the ACA + * that issued the certificate inside the encrypted SPDU. This requires that + * to verify the inner "SPDU", that is, the certificate, the verifier + * needs to store the information from the outer SPDU. This is not a violation + * of the IEEE 1609.2 model: Subclause 4.2.2.3 of IEEE Std 1609.2 considers all + * operations carried out on received data to be atomic and does not put any + * restrictions on the information that is stored between operations. However, + * it should be noted that because the IEEE 1609.2 approach enables SPDUs to + * be nested within one another as Ieee1609Dot2Data, in principle an + * implementation could be built that iterated through the layers of a nested + * SPDU within a single call from the invoking application instance. (And it + * should also be noted that IEEE Std 1609.2 was consciously designed to + * enable this approach: Although the primitives provided in IEEE Std 1609.2 + * only support the series-of-single-operations approach, an implementation + * could layer this "one-invocation processing" on top of the IEEE 1609.2 + * interface as an optimization.) A "one-invocation processing" implementation + * of that type would have to anticipate situations of coupling between inner + * and outer SPDUs like the one created by this AcaEeCertResponsePrivateSpdu, + * and allow the invoking certificate management service to check consistency + * at the application layer, perhaps by (for example) returning the signing + * certificates for all nested signed SPDUs. How this is to be implemented is + * implementation specific; this note is intended as a notification of this + * potential issue to implementers planning to implement one-invocation + * processing. + */ +AcaEeCertResponsePrivateSpdu ::= Ieee1609Dot2Data-EncryptedSigned { + ScmsPdu-Scoped { + AcaEeInterfacePdu (WITH COMPONENTS { + acaEeCertResponse + }) + }, + SecurityMgmtPsid +} + +/** + * @brief This structure contains a certificate response for consumption by + * the EE. In the architecture of this document, although it is created by + * the ACA, it is made available to the EE via the RA as described in 8.2. + * + * The ACA creates a certificate response in this form when the + * compact unified butterfly key mechanism is being used. If the + * RaAcaCertRequest structure was used to communicate between the RA and the + * ACA, the RA indicated use of compact unified butterfly keys by setting the + * cubk (1) bit in the bkType field in the corresponding RaAcaCertRequest. + * + * The AcaEeCertResponse is encrypted by the ACA using the cocoon + * public key for encryption. See 9.3.4.2 for how the ACA derives the cocoon + * public key for encryption, using the tbsCert.verifyKeyIndicator field in the + * corresponding RaAcaCertRequest as the input cocoon public key for signing + * Bt. See 9.3.4.1 for how the EE derives the corresponding cocoon private + * key for encryption. + */ +AcaEeCertResponseCubkSpdu ::= Ieee1609Dot2Data-Encrypted { + ScmsPdu-Scoped { + AcaEeInterfacePdu (WITH COMPONENTS { + acaEeCertResponse + }) + } +} + +--***************************************************************************-- +-- ACA - LA Interface -- +--***************************************************************************-- + +--***************************************************************************-- +-- ACA - MA Interface -- +--***************************************************************************-- + +--***************************************************************************-- +-- ACA - RA Interface -- +--***************************************************************************-- + +/** + * @brief This structure is the SPDU used to send a signed RaAcaCertRequest. + * For the signature to be valid the signing certificate shall conform to the + * RA certificate profile given in 7.7.3.9, contain a PSID equal to + * SecurityMgmtPsid and a corresponding SSP containing the C-OER encoding of a + * SecurityMgmtSsp indicating RaSsp. The toBeSigned.certRequestPermissions + * field of the RA certificate shall permit the requested permissions in the + * raAcaCertRequest.tbsCert.appPermissions field. + */ +RaAcaCertRequestSpdu ::= Ieee1609Dot2Data-SignedCertRequest { + ScmsPdu-Scoped { + AcaRaInterfacePdu (WITH COMPONENTS { + raAcaCertRequest + }) + }, + SignerSingleCert +} + +/** + * @brief This structure is the SPDU used to send a signed AcaRaCertResponse. + * For the signature to be valid the signing certificate shall contain a PSID + * equal to SecurityMgmtPsid and a corresponding SSP containing the C-OER + * encoding of a SecurityMgmtSsp indicating AcaSsp. + */ +AcaRaCertResponseSpdu ::= Ieee1609Dot2Data-Signed { + ScmsPdu-Scoped { + AcaRaInterfacePdu (WITH COMPONENTS { + acaRaCertResponse + }) + }, + SecurityMgmtPsid +} + +--***************************************************************************-- +-- Certificate Management -- +--***************************************************************************-- + +/** + * @brief This structure is the SPDU used to send an unsecured CompositeCrl. + * It is used to create composite CRL files as specified in 8.5. + */ +CompositeCrlSpdu ::= Ieee1609Dot2Data-Unsecured { + ScmsPdu-Scoped { + CertManagementPdu (WITH COMPONENTS { + compositeCrl + }) + } +} + +/** + * @brief This structure is the SPDU used to send an unsecured + * CertificateChain. It is used to create certificate chain files as + * specified in 8.4. + */ +CertificateChainSpdu ::= Ieee1609Dot2Data-Unsecured { + ScmsPdu-Scoped { + CertManagementPdu (WITH COMPONENTS { + certificateChain + }) + } +} + +/** + * @brief This structure is the SPDU used to send an unsecured MultiSignedCtl. + */ +MultiSignedCtlSpdu ::= Ieee1609Dot2Data-Unsecured { + ScmsPdu-Scoped { + CertManagementPdu (WITH COMPONENTS { + multiSignedCtl + }) + } +} + +/** + * @brief This structure is the SPDU used to send a signed + * ToBeSignedCtlSignature. For the signature to be valid, the signing + * certificate shall match the elector certificate profile in 7.7.3.7. This + * means that the signature is calculated as specified in IEEE Std 1609.2, + * with the data input to the hash process consisting of the C-OER encoding + * of the tbsData that includes the ToBeSignedCtlSignature. + */ +CtlSignatureSpdu ::= Ieee1609Dot2Data-Signed { + ScmsPdu-Scoped { + CertManagementPdu (WITH COMPONENTS { + tbsCtlSignature + }) + }, + SecurityMgmtPsid +} + +/** + * @brief This structure is the SPDU used to send a signed + * CertManagementInfoStatus. For the signature to be valid the signing + * certificate shall conform to the RA certificate profile given in 7.7.3.9 or + * the DC certificate profile given in 7.7.3.10. + */ +CertificateManagementInformationStatusSpdu ::= + Ieee1609Dot2Data-Signed { + ScmsPdu-Scoped { + CertManagementPdu (WITH COMPONENTS { + infoStatus + }) + }, + SecurityMgmtPsid +} + + +--***************************************************************************-- +-- ECA - EE Interface -- +--***************************************************************************-- + +/** + * @brief This structure is the SPDU used to send a signed EeEcaCertRequest, + * as follows: + * - If eeEcaCertRequest.canonicalId is not present, the EE signs this + * structure using the private key corresponding to the + * tbsCert.verifyKeyIndicator field of the EeEcaCertRequest. + * - If eeEcaCertRequest.canonicalId is present, the EE signs this + * structure using the canonical private key as specified in 4.1.4.2. + */ +EeEcaCertRequestSpdu ::= Ieee1609Dot2Data-SignedCertRequest { + ScmsPdu-Scoped { + EcaEeInterfacePdu (WITH COMPONENTS { + eeEcaCertRequest + }) + }, + SignerSelf +} + +/** + * @brief This structure is the SPDU used to send a signed EcaEeCertResponse. + * For the signature to be valid, the signing certificate shall contain a PSID + * equal to SecurityMgmtPsid and a corresponding SSP containing the C-OER + * encoding of a SecurityMgmtSsp indicating EcaSsp. + */ +EcaEeCertResponseSpdu ::= Ieee1609Dot2Data-Signed { + ScmsPdu-Scoped { + EcaEeInterfacePdu (WITH COMPONENTS { + ecaEeCertResponse + }) + }, + SecurityMgmtPsid +} + +--***************************************************************************-- +-- EE - MA Interface -- +--***************************************************************************-- + +--***************************************************************************-- +-- EE - RA Interface -- +--***************************************************************************-- + +/** + * @brief This structure is the SPDU used to send a signed then encrypted + * EeRaCertRequest. It is a choice of the IEEE 1609.2 authenticated + * certificate request, which may be any kind of EE-RA certificate request, + * and the ITU-T X.509 certificate request, which is required to be an + * authorization certificate request. + */ +EeRaCertRequestSpdu ::= Ieee1609Dot2Data ( + EeRa1609Dot2AuthenticatedCertRequestSpdu | + EeRaX509AuthenticatedCertRequestSpdu +) + +/** + * @brief This structure is the SPDU used to send a signed then encrypted IEEE + * 1609.2 authenticated certificate request. The EE signs this structure + * using its enrollment certificate. The enrollment certificate shall conform + * to the enrollment certificate profile given in 7.7.3.5. The EE encrypts + * the signed structure using the encryptionKey from the RA's certificate. + */ +EeRa1609Dot2AuthenticatedCertRequestSpdu ::= + Ieee1609Dot2Data-SignedEncryptedCertRequest { + ScmsPdu-Scoped { + EeRaInterfacePdu (WITH COMPONENTS { + eeRaCertRequest + }) + }, + SignerSingleCert +} + +/** + * @brief This structure is the SPDU used to send a signed then encrypted ITU-T + * X.509authenticated certificate request. The EE signs this structure + * using its enrollment certificate. The enrollment certificate shall conform + * to the enrollment certificate profile given in 7.7.3.6. The EE encrypts + * the signed structure using the encryptionKey from the RA's certificate. + */ +EeRaX509AuthenticatedCertRequestSpdu ::= Ieee1609Dot2Data-Encrypted { + Ieee1609Dot2Data-SignedX509AuthenticatedCertRequest { + ScmsPdu-Scoped { + EeRaInterfacePdu (WITH COMPONENTS { + eeRaCertRequest + }) + }, + SignerSingleX509Cert + } +} + +/** + * @brief This structure is the SPDU used to send a signed RaEeCertAck to + * acknowledge the receipt of an EeRaCertRequestSpdu. For the signature to be + * valid the signing certificate shall conform to the RA certificate profile + * given in 7.7.3.9. + */ +RaEeCertAckSpdu ::= Ieee1609Dot2Data-Signed { + ScmsPdu-Scoped { + EeRaInterfacePdu (WITH COMPONENTS { + raEeCertAck + }) + }, + SecurityMgmtPsid +} + +/** + * @brief This structure is the SPDU used to create an unsigned .info file + * to be included in a certificate batch zip file as specified in 8.2. This + * SPDU is used if the RaEeCertInfo does not contain an acpcTreeId field. + */ +RaEeCertInfoSpdu ::= Ieee1609Dot2Data-Unsecured { + ScmsPdu-Scoped { + EeRaInterfacePdu (WITH COMPONENTS { + raEeCertInfo (WITH COMPONENTS { + acpcTreeId ABSENT + }) + }) + } +} + +/** + * @brief This structure is the SPDU used to create a signed .info file to + * be included in a certificate batch zip file as specified in 8.2. This + * SPDU is used if the RaEeCertInfo contains an acpcTreeId field. For the + * signature to be valid the signing certificate shall conform to the RA + * certificate profile given in 7.7.3.9. + */ +RaEeCertAndAcpcInfoSpdu ::= Ieee1609Dot2Data-Signed { + ScmsPdu-Scoped { + EeRaInterfacePdu (WITH COMPONENTS { + raEeCertInfo (WITH COMPONENTS { + acpcTreeId PRESENT + }) + }) + }, + SecurityMgmtPsid +} + +/** + * @brief This structure is the SPDU used to send an unsecured + * EeRaDownloadRequest. + */ +EeRaDownloadRequestPlainSpdu ::= Ieee1609Dot2Data-Unsecured { + ScmsPdu-Scoped { + EeRaInterfacePdu (WITH COMPONENTS { + eeRaDownloadRequest + }) + } +} + +/** + * @brief This structure is the SPDU used to send a signed then encrypted + * EeRaDownloadRequest. The EE signs this structure using its enrollment + * certificate. The enrollment certificate shall conform to the enrollment + * certificate profile given in 7.7.3.5. The EE encrypts the signed + * structure using the encryptionKey from the RA's certificate. + */ +EeRaDownloadRequestSpdu ::= Ieee1609Dot2Data-SignedEncrypted { + ScmsPdu-Scoped { + EeRaInterfacePdu (WITH COMPONENTS { + eeRaDownloadRequest + }) + }, + SecurityMgmtPsid +} + +/** + * @brief This structure is the SPDU used to send a signed then encrypted + * EeEcaCertRequestSpdu. The EE signs this structure using its enrollment + * certificate. The enrollment certificate shall conform to the enrollment + * certificate profile given in 7.7.3.5. The EE encrypts the signed + * structure using the encryptionKey from the RA's certificate. + */ +EeRaSuccessorEnrollmentCertRequestSpdu ::= + Ieee1609Dot2Data-SignedEncryptedCertRequest { + ScmsPdu-Scoped { + EeRaInterfacePdu (WITH COMPONENTS { + eeRaSuccessorEnrollmentCertRequest + }) + }, + SignerSingleCert +} + +/** + * @brief This structure is the SPDU used to send a signed RaEeCertInfo. For + * the signature to be valid the signing certificate shall conform to the RA + * certificate profile given in 7.7.3.9. + */ +RaEeEnrollmentCertAckSpdu ::= Ieee1609Dot2Data-Signed { + ScmsPdu-Scoped { + EeRaInterfacePdu (WITH COMPONENTS { + raEeCertInfo (WITH COMPONENTS { + acpcTreeId ABSENT + }) + }) + }, + SecurityMgmtPsid +} + +--***************************************************************************-- +-- LA - MA Interface -- +--***************************************************************************-- + +--***************************************************************************-- +-- LA - RA Interface -- +--***************************************************************************-- + +--***************************************************************************-- +-- MA - RA Interface -- +--***************************************************************************-- + +--***************************************************************************-- +-- Service Specific Permissions -- +--***************************************************************************-- + +/** + * @brief This parent structure defines the SSP for SecurityMgmtPsid and + * encompasses all SSP structures defined in this document. An overview of + * this structure is as follows: + * + * @note The LOP is in the SSP for backward compatibility reasons, + * and in practice, in this design the LOP does not have a certificate. + * + * @param elector: contains the SSP defined for an elector. + * + * @param root: contains the SSP defined for a root CA. + * + * @param pg: contains the SSP defined for a policy generator. + * + * @param ica: contains the SSP defined for an intermediate CA. + * + * @param eca: contains the SSP defined for an enrollment CA. + * + * @param aca: contains the SSP defined for an authorization CA. + * + * @param crl: contains the SSP defined for a CRL signer. + * + * @param dcm: contains the SSP defined for a device configuration manager. + * + * @param la: contains the SSP defined for a linkage authority. + * + * @param lop: contains the SSP defined for a location obscurer proxy. + * + * @param ma: contains the SSP defined for a misbehavior authority. + * + * @param ra: contains the SSP defined for a registration authority. + * + * @param ee: contains the SSP defined for an end entity. + * + * @param dc: contains the SSP defined for a distribution center. + */ +SecurityMgmtSsp ::= CHOICE { + elector ElectorSsp, + root RootCaSsp, + pg PgSsp, + ica IcaSsp, + eca EcaSsp, + aca AcaSsp, + crl CrlSignerSsp, + dcm DcmSsp, + la LaSsp, + lop LopSsp, + ma MaSsp, + ra RaSsp, + ee EeSsp, + ..., + dc DcSsp + } + +TestSecurityMgmtSsp ::= SecurityMgmtSsp + +/** + * @brief This structure defines the SSP for an elector when it is authorizing + * SecurityMgmtPsid messages. It has no parameters other than the version + * number. + */ +ElectorSsp ::= SEQUENCE { + version Uint8 (2), + ... +} + +/** + * @brief This structure defines the SSP for a root CA when it is authorizing + * SecurityMgmtPsid messages. It has no parameters other than the version + * number. + */ +RootCaSsp ::= SEQUENCE { + version Uint8 (2), + ... +} + +/** + * @brief This structure defines the SSP for a policy generator when it is + * authorizing SecurityMgmtPsid messages. It has no parameters other than the + * version number. + */ +PgSsp ::= SEQUENCE { + version Uint8 (2), + ... +} + +/** + * @brief This structure defines the SSP for an intermediate CA when it is + * authorizing SecurityMgmtPsid messages. It has no parameters other than the + * version number. + */ +IcaSsp ::= SEQUENCE { + version Uint8 (2), + ... +} + +/** + * @brief This structure defines the SSP for an enrollment CA when it is + * authorizing SecurityMgmtPsid messages. It has no parameters other than the + * version number. + */ +EcaSsp ::= SEQUENCE { + version Uint8 (2), + ... +} + +/** + * @brief This structure defines the SSP for an authorization CA when it is + * authorizing SecurityMgmtPsid messages. It has no parameters other than the + * version number. + */ +AcaSsp ::= SEQUENCE { + version Uint8 (2), + ... +} + +/** + * @brief This structure defines the SSP for a CRL signer when it is + * authorizing SecurityMgmtPsid messages. It has no parameters other than the + * version number. + * + * @note The SSP for a CRL signer when signing CRLs is associated with + * PSID 0x0100 and is defined in IEEE Std 1609.2. + */ +CrlSignerSsp ::= SEQUENCE { + version Uint8 (2), + ... +} + +/** + * @brief This structure defines the SSP for a device configuration manager + * when it is authorizing SecurityMgmtPsid messages. It has no parameters + * other than the version number. + */ +DcmSsp ::= SEQUENCE { + version Uint8 (2), + ... +} + +/** + * @brief This structure defines the SSP for a linkage authority when it is + * authorizing SecurityMgmtPsid messages. It has no parameters other than the + * version number. + */ +LaSsp ::= SEQUENCE { + version Uint8 (2), + laId Uint16, + ... +} + +/** + * @brief This structure defines the SSP for a location obscurer proxy (LOP) + * when it is authorizing SecurityMgmtPsid messages. It has no parameters + * other than the version number. + * + * @note The LOP is in the SSP for backward compatibility reasons, and + * in practice, in this design the LOP does not have a certificate. + */ +LopSsp ::= SEQUENCE { + version Uint8 (2), + ... +} + +/** + * @brief This structure defines the SSP for a misbehavior authority when it + * is authorizing SecurityMgmtPsid messages. Its parameters + * indicate the PSIDs associated with the misbehavior that is to be reported + * to that MA (see 4.1.5 for further details). The certificate containing + * this SSP is the MA Certificate to which an end entity should encrypt + * misbehavior reports related to the indicated PSIDs. + */ +MaSsp ::= SEQUENCE { + version Uint8 (2), + relevantPsids SequenceOfPsid, + ... +} + +/** + * @brief This structure defines the SSP for an RA when it is authorizing + * SecurityMgmtPsid messages. It has no parameters other than the version + * number. + */ +RaSsp ::= SEQUENCE { + version Uint8 (2), + ... +} + +/** + * @brief This structure defines the SSP for an end entity when it is + * authorizing SecurityMgmtPsid messages. It has no parameters other than the + * version number. + */ +EeSsp ::= SEQUENCE { + version Uint8(2), + ... +} + +/** + * @brief This is a container for ACPC-related SSPs, specifying one SSP for + * each role. The only SSP defined in this document is the CamSsp, used in + * the CAM certificate that signs a SignedAprvBinaryTree or a + * SignedIndividualAprv. The SSP shall be C-OER encoded for inclusion in the + * CAM certificate. New versions of the CAM SSP should be handled by + * extending this structure rather than by use of a version number in the + * CamSsp structure. + * + * The AcpcSsp is associated with the AcpcPsid in the CAM certificate's + * appPermissions field. + */ +AcpcSsp ::= CHOICE { + cam CamSsp, + ... +} + +/** + * @brief This is a list of the ACPC Tree IDs for which the containing CAM + * certificate is entitled to sign a SignedAprvBinaryTree or a + * SignedIndividualAprv. The SSP entitles the certificate holder to sign + * either of these structures. + */ +CamSsp ::= SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF AcpcTreeId + +/** + * @brief This structure defines the SSP for a distribution center when it is + * authorizing SecurityMgmtPsid messages. It has no parameters other than the + * version number. + */ +DcSsp ::= SEQUENCE { + version Uint8(2), + ... +} + +END diff --git a/asn2md.py b/asn2md.py new file mode 100755 index 0000000..b6dfc68 --- /dev/null +++ b/asn2md.py @@ -0,0 +1,363 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env python +# -*- coding: utf-8 -*- + +import argparse # parse arguments +import os.path # getting extension from file +import sys # output and stuff +import re # for regular expressions +import copy # for copy +if (sys.version_info > (3, 0)): + import urllib.parse # +else: + import urllib # + +## extract doxygen-tag namespace +RE_MODULE = re.compile( r'^\s*([A-Z][\w-]*)\s*({.*?})?\s*DEFINITIONS.*?::=\s*?BEGIN(.*)END', re.VERBOSE | re.MULTILINE | re.DOTALL) + +RE_SPACES = re.compile(r'\s+') + +RE_COMMENTS = re.compile(r'^\s*--.*?\n|--.*?(?:--|$)|/\*.*?\*/[\t ]*\n?', re.MULTILINE|re.DOTALL) + +RE_BASIC_TYPES = re.compile(r'^OCTET\s+STRING|BIT\s+STRING|BOOLEAN|INTEGER|FLOAT|SEQUENCE|SET|NULL') + +#RE_TYPE_BODY_1 = re.compile(r'.*?{(.*)}\s*WITH', re.MULTILINE|re.DOTALL) +#RE_TYPE_BODY_2 = re.compile(r'.*?{(.*)}\s*(?:WITH.*|\(.*?\)|\s*$)', re.MULTILINE|re.DOTALL) +RE_TYPE_BODY = re.compile(r'.*?{(.*)}\s*(?:WITH.*|\(.*?\)|\s*$)', re.MULTILINE|re.DOTALL) + +#RE_FIELDS = re.compile(r'^\s*(?:/\*\*.*?\*/)|^\s*([\w-]+?)\s+(OCTET\s+STRING|BIT\s+STRING|[A-Z][.\w-]+)?(.*?)(?:,((?:\s*--!?<.*?\n)*)|((?:--!?<.*?\n)*)$)', re.MULTILINE | re.DOTALL| re.VERBOSE) +RE_FIELDS = re.compile(r'^\s*/\*.*?\*/|^\s*--\!.*?\n|^[\s&]*([\w-]+)\s+(OCTET\s+STRING|BIT\s+STRING|[A-Z][\w-]+)?((?:{[^}]*}|\([^)]*\)|.)*?)(?:,|(--)|$)', re.MULTILINE | re.DOTALL) + +RE_EXPORTS = re.compile(r'^\s*EXPORTS.*?;', re.DOTALL | re.MULTILINE) + +RE_IMPORTS = re.compile(r'^\s*IMPORTS\s*(.*?);', re.DOTALL | re.MULTILINE) + +RE_IMPORT_ELEMENTS = re.compile(r'^([,\s\w-]*?)FROM\s*([\w-]+)\s*({[^}]*}(?:\s+WITH\s+SUCCESSORS)?)?', re.MULTILINE) + +RE_IMPORT_ELEMENT_TYPE = re.compile(r'[^,\s]+') + +RE_DOXY_ASN_COMMENTS = re.compile(r'^\s*--[-!#](:?$|\s(.*))', re.MULTILINE) + +RE_DOXY_C_COMMENTS = re.compile(r'^\s*/\*\*\s(.*?)\*/', re.MULTILINE | re.DOTALL) + +RE_DOXY_C_COMMENTS_I = re.compile(r'\s*\*+') +RE_STRIPSTAR = re.compile(r'^\s*\*', re.MULTILINE) +RE_POWER_SIGN = re.compile('\^(-?\w+|\(.*?\))') +RE_GREATEQ_SIGN = re.compile(r'(?<=\s)>=(?=\s)') +RE_LESSEQ_SIGN = re.compile(r'(?<=\s)<=(?=\s)') +RE_REFERENCE_NUMBER = re.compile(r'\[(?:i\.)?\d+\]') + + +RE_DOXY_REF = re.compile(r'@ref\s+([\w-]+)') +RE_DOXY_CLASS = re.compile(r'@(?:class|struct|details):?\s+([\w-]+)') +RE_DOXY_DETAILS = re.compile(r'@details:?\s+[\w-]+') +RE_DOXY_STRIP_SINGLE_TAG = re.compile(r'@(?:brief|url)\s+') +RE_DOXY_STRIP_TAG = re.compile(r'\s*@(?:class|struct|details):?\s+[\w-]+') +RE_DOXY_UNIT = re.compile(r'^\s*@unit:?\s+(.+)\n', re.MULTILINE) +RE_DOXY_REVISION = re.compile(r'^\s*@revision:?\s+(.+)\n', re.MULTILINE) +RE_DOXY_BRIEF = re.compile(r'^\s*@brief[\s:]+(.+)\n', re.MULTILINE) +RE_DOXY_CATEGORY = re.compile(r'^\s*@category[\s:]+(.+)\n', re.MULTILINE) +RE_DOXY_PARAM = re.compile(r'^\s*@(?:param|field):?\s+([\w-]+)\s*(.*?)\n\s*$', re.MULTILINE | re.DOTALL) + +RE_DOXY_SECTION = re.compile(r"^\s*@(brief|note|(class|struct|param|field|details)\s+([-\w]+)):?(.*?)(?=\n\s*@|\n\s*\n|\Z)", re.MULTILINE | re.DOTALL) +RE_NOTE_SECTION = re.compile(r"^\s*@(note):?(.*?)(?=\n\s*@|\n\s*\n|\Z)", re.MULTILINE | re.DOTALL) + +# RE_TYPE = re.compile(r'(([A-Z][\w-]*)\s*::=[\w \t]+(?:{+(.*?)}+)?.*?)\n\s*\n', re.MULTILINE | re.DOTALL) +RE_TYPE = re.compile(r'^\s*([A-Z][\w-]*)?\s*([{} \t:\w-]*?)?::=([\w \t]+.*?)\n\s*\n', re.MULTILINE | re.DOTALL) +RE_OPTIONS = re.compile(r'^\s*@options[\s:]+(.+)', re.MULTILINE) + +extTypes = {} +cpos = 0 +o_args = [] +m_options = [] + +def urlquote(s): + if (sys.version_info > (3, 0)): + return urllib.parse.quote_plus(s) + else: + return urllib.quote_plus(s) + +def indentLines(content:str, indent): + ret='' + lines = content.splitlines() + for l in lines: + ret += ''.ljust(indent or 0) + l +'\n' + return ret + +def parseText(content, indent=None): + + def repl_ref(m): + return '[**{0}**]({1}#{0})'.format(m.group(1), extTypes.get(m.group(1),'')) + content = RE_DOXY_REF.sub(repl_ref, content) + + content = RE_DOXY_STRIP_TAG.sub('', content) + + content = RE_DOXY_STRIP_SINGLE_TAG.sub('', content) + + content = RE_POWER_SIGN.sub('\\1', content) + + content = RE_LESSEQ_SIGN.sub('≤', content) + + content = RE_GREATEQ_SIGN.sub('≥', content) + + content = RE_REFERENCE_NUMBER.sub('[\\g<0>](#references)', content) + + return indentLines(content, indent) + +def parseInlineComments(content:str, indent=None): + # keep into account only '--<' comments + lines = content.splitlines() + content = '' + for l in lines: + l = l.lstrip() + if l.startswith('--< '): + content += l[4:] + '\n' + elif l.startswith('--!< '): + content += l[5:] + '\n' + else: + continue + return parseText(content, indent) + +def parseDoxyComments(content:str): + # keep only '--! ' and /** */ comments + # convert '--! ' comments to C-style + content = RE_DOXY_ASN_COMMENTS.sub('/** *\g<1>*/', content) + ret = '' + for m in RE_DOXY_C_COMMENTS.finditer(content): + ret += RE_STRIPSTAR.sub('', m.group(1)) + return ret + +def parseOptions(doc, opts): + def repl_options(m): + if m.group(1) is not None: + for o in m.group(1).split(','): + setattr(opts, o.strip(), True) + return '' + return RE_OPTIONS.sub(repl_options, doc) + +def parseModule(mname, content): + global cpos + cpos = 0 + ret = '' + m = RE_IMPORTS.search(content) + if m is not None: + pos = 0 + if m.group(1) is not None: + ret += '## Imports:\n' + s = m.group(1) + for fm in RE_IMPORT_ELEMENTS.finditer(s): + imName = fm.group(2) + for im in RE_IMPORT_ELEMENT_TYPE.finditer(fm.group(1)): + extTypes[im.group(0)] = imName+'.md' + ret += ' * **[{0}]({0}.md)** *{1}*
\n'.format(imName, RE_SPACES.sub(' ', fm.group(3) or '')) + ret += parseText(parseDoxyComments(s[pos:fm.start()])+'\n', 2) + pos = fm.end() + ret += parseText(parseDoxyComments(s[pos:])) + cpos = m.end() + + m = RE_EXPORTS.search(content) + if m is not None: + if cpos < m.end(): + cpos = m.end() + + # parse types + def repl_type (m, doc): + global m_options + title = t = m.group(1) # type name + f_params = {} + s_unit = '' + s_category = '' + s_note = '' + s_revision = '' + options = copy.copy(m_options) + if doc : # doc is the prepending comment. Check if not None and not Empty + doc = parseDoxyComments(doc) + + # parse options + doc = parseOptions(doc, options) + + def repl_section (m): + nonlocal title + nonlocal t + nonlocal f_params + nonlocal s_note + ret = '' + l = m.group(4).lstrip(":, \t").lstrip('\n') + if m.group(2) is not None: + # this can be class|struct|details|param|field + if m.group(3) == t: + ret = parseText(l) + else: + if len(l): + if len(f_params) == 0: + ret = '--((FIELDS))--' + f_params[m.group(3)] = parseText(l, 2) + + elif m.group(1) == 'brief': + if options.brief_as_title: + title = parseText(l) + else: + ret = parseText(l) + elif m.group(1) == 'note': + s_note = '\n>>>\n' + 'NOTE: ' + parseText(l).rstrip() + '\n>>>\n' + else: + ret = m.string[m.start():m.end()] + return ret + doc = RE_DOXY_SECTION.sub(repl_section, doc) + + def repl_category(m): + nonlocal s_category + s_category = '\n    **Categories:** ' + for l in m.group(1).split(','): +# s_category += '[{0}](#{1}) '.format(l.strip(), urlquote(l.strip())) + s_category += parseText(l).strip() + ' ' + s_category += '\n' + return '' + doc = RE_DOXY_CATEGORY.sub(repl_category, doc) + + def repl_unit(m): + nonlocal s_unit + s_unit = '\n    **Unit:** _' + parseText(m.group(1)).strip() + '_\n' + return '' + doc = RE_DOXY_UNIT.sub(repl_unit, doc) + + def repl_revision(m): + nonlocal s_revision + s_revision = '\n    **Revision:** _' + parseText(m.group(1)).strip() + '_\n' + return '' + doc = RE_DOXY_REVISION.sub(repl_revision, doc) + else: + doc = '' + + doc = [x.strip() for x in doc.split('--((FIELDS))--')] + + ret = '' + if t is not None: + fields = '' + ret = '\n### {1}\n'.format(t, title) + parseText(doc[0]) + + # parse fields and get out fields descriptions + if m.group(3) is not None: + # check if contain fields + fm = RE_TYPE_BODY.search(m.group(3)) + if fm is not None and fm.group(1) is not None: + typeBody = fm.group(1).strip() + if typeBody is not None: + fTitle = '' + field = '' + pos = 0 + for fm in RE_FIELDS.finditer(typeBody): + if fm.group(1) is not None: + # add description to the previous type + if len(field): + fields += parseInlineComments(fm.string[pos:fm.start()], 3) + field = '' + f = fm.group(1).strip() + ext = fm.group(3) or '' + if f in f_params: + field = f_params.pop(f) + '\n\n' + if fm.group(2) is not None: + fTitle = 'Fields:\n' + if len(field) or not options.no_auto_fields: + t = fm.group(2).strip() + if RE_BASIC_TYPES.match(t) is not None: + field = '* {0} of type **{1}** {2}
\n'.format(f, t, ext) + field + else: + field = '* {0} of type [**{1}**]({2}#{1}) {3}
\n'.format(f, t, extTypes.get(t,''), ext) + field + else: + fTitle = 'Values:\n' + if len(field) or not options.no_auto_values: + field = '* **{0}** {1}
\n'.format(f, ext) + field + if len(field): + field += parseText(fm.string[pos:fm.start()], 3) + pos = fm.end() + if fm.group(4) is not None: + # keep '--' for the next round + pos -= 2 + if len(field): + fields += field + if len(field): + fields += parseInlineComments(typeBody[pos:], 3) + # add all other fields defined as @params + if 'force-all-fields' in options: + for f in f_params: + fields += '* {}
\n{}\n\n'.format(f, f_params[f]) + if 'no-fields-header' in options: + fTitle = '' + if len(fields): + ret = ret.strip() + '\n\n' + fTitle + fields + else: + if title: + ret = '### {}\n\n'.format(title) + l = parseText(parseDoxyComments(doc[0])) + if len(l): + ret += l + '\n\n' + for p in f_params: + ret += '* `{0}` {1}\n'.format(p, f_params[p]) + + try: + if len(doc[1]): + ret += doc[1] + '\n' + except: + pass + + return ret + s_unit + s_category + s_revision + s_note + '```asn1\n' + RE_COMMENTS.sub('', m.group(0).strip()) +'\n```\n\n' + + pos = 0 + ret += '## Data Elements:\n' + for m in RE_TYPE.finditer(content[cpos:]): + ret += repl_type (m, m.string[pos:m.start()]) + pos = m.end() + + v = parseText(parseOptions(parseDoxyComments(content[pos:]), m_options)) + if len(v): + def repl_note (m): + return '\n>>>\n' + 'NOTE: ' + m.group(2).lstrip(":, \t").lstrip('\n').rstrip() + '\n>>>\n' + ret += '\n\n' + RE_NOTE_SECTION.sub(repl_note, v).strip() +'\n' + + return ret + + +def parseAsn(outDir, content) : + # iterate modules in the file + global m_options + pos= 0 + cnt = 0 + m_options = copy.copy(o_args) + for m in RE_MODULE.finditer(content): + ret = '# ASN.1 module {}\n OID: _{}_\n'.format(m.group(1), RE_SPACES.sub(' ', m.group(2))) + ret += parseText(parseOptions(parseDoxyComments(content[pos:m.start()]), m_options)) + '\n' + if m.group(3) is not None: + ret += parseModule(m.group(1), m.group(3)) + ret += '\n\n' + open(outDir + '/' + m.group(1) + '.md', "w",encoding='utf-8').write(ret) + pos = m.end() + cnt += 1 + return cnt + +def main(): + global o_args + ap = argparse.ArgumentParser(description='ASN.1 to markdown converter') + ap.add_argument('--out', '-o', type=str, default='.', help='output directory') + ap.add_argument('--brief-as-title', '-B', default=False, action='store_true', help='Do not treat @brief line as type header') + ap.add_argument('--force-all-fields', '-f', default=False,action='store_true', help='Add all fields in the list even if empty') + ap.add_argument('--no-auto-fields', '-F', default=False,action='store_true', help='Add fields only if @param or @field is defined') + ap.add_argument('--no-auto-values', '-V', default=False,action='store_true', help='Do not add named values or enums') + ap.add_argument('--no-fields-header', '-H', default=False,action='store_true', help='Do not add fields and values header') + ap.add_argument('modules', action='store', nargs='+', help='ASN.1 files') + o_args = ap.parse_args() + + if not o_args.modules: + ap.print_help() + exit(1) + + cnt = 0 + for a in o_args.modules: + try: + content = open(a, mode="r", encoding='latin-1').read() + cnt += parseAsn(o_args.out, content) + except IOError as e: + sys.stderr.write(e[1]+"\n") + print("{} modules porcessed\n".format(cnt)) + +if __name__ == '__main__': + main() diff --git a/ieee1609dot2 b/ieee1609dot2 index ddf554e..880216d 160000 --- a/ieee1609dot2 +++ b/ieee1609dot2 @@ -1 +1 @@ -Subproject commit ddf554e5e23398d578b9519f0e19682e3f058cfe +Subproject commit 880216d33d08b424764a319ae1d8ee825a793a47 -- GitLab From 1d683f6eb10e22a746d871e5b5438a60c00e19da Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Denis Filatov Date: Thu, 27 Oct 2022 14:55:50 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 6/8] deactivate validation --- .gitlab-ci.yml | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/.gitlab-ci.yml b/.gitlab-ci.yml index 0c94885..c81c1af 100755 --- a/.gitlab-ci.yml +++ b/.gitlab-ci.yml @@ -5,11 +5,11 @@ include: variables: ASN1_SRC: '*.asn ieee1609dot2/*.asn' -validate: - extends: .validate - only: - changes: - - '*.asn' +#validate: +# extends: .validate +# only: +# changes: +# - '*.asn' documentation: -- GitLab From 398627862aa7193545a2f24a645c3022a51a5312 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Denis Filatov Date: Fri, 28 Oct 2022 11:43:56 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 7/8] reference the right branch in ieee 1609.2 --- .gitmodules | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/.gitmodules b/.gitmodules index 728eea4..3e4be2d 100644 --- a/.gitmodules +++ b/.gitmodules @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ [submodule "ieee1609dot2"] path = ieee1609dot2 url = https://forge.etsi.org/rep/ITS/asn1/ieee1609.2.git - branch = 2022 + branch = ieee -- GitLab From 329ff68846fea0c01c3c1c3cdb924d2a3d02989b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "ASN.1 Checker" Date: Fri, 28 Oct 2022 09:44:23 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 8/8] Documentation update --- docs/Ieee1609Dot2.md | 1787 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ docs/Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md | 1726 +++++++++++++++++++++++ docs/Ieee1609Dot2Crl.md | 55 + docs/Ieee1609Dot2CrlBaseTypes.md | 635 +++++++++ docs/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaEeInterface.md | 95 ++ docs/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaLaInterface.md | 18 + docs/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaMaInterface.md | 18 + docs/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaRaInterface.md | 324 +++++ docs/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1Acpc.md | 264 ++++ docs/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1CamRaInterface.md | 110 ++ docs/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1CertManagement.md | 570 ++++++++ docs/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1EcaEeInterface.md | 204 +++ docs/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1EeMaInterface.md | 18 + docs/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1EeRaInterface.md | 409 ++++++ docs/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1LaMaInterface.md | 18 + docs/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1LaRaInterface.md | 18 + docs/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1MaRaInterface.md | 18 + docs/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1Protocol.md | 1242 ++++++++++++++++ 18 files changed, 7529 insertions(+) create mode 100644 docs/Ieee1609Dot2.md create mode 100644 docs/Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md create mode 100644 docs/Ieee1609Dot2Crl.md create mode 100644 docs/Ieee1609Dot2CrlBaseTypes.md create mode 100644 docs/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaEeInterface.md create mode 100644 docs/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaLaInterface.md create mode 100644 docs/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaMaInterface.md create mode 100644 docs/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaRaInterface.md create mode 100644 docs/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1Acpc.md create mode 100644 docs/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1CamRaInterface.md create mode 100644 docs/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1CertManagement.md create mode 100644 docs/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1EcaEeInterface.md create mode 100644 docs/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1EeMaInterface.md create mode 100644 docs/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1EeRaInterface.md create mode 100644 docs/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1LaMaInterface.md create mode 100644 docs/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1LaRaInterface.md create mode 100644 docs/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1MaRaInterface.md create mode 100644 docs/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1Protocol.md diff --git a/docs/Ieee1609Dot2.md b/docs/Ieee1609Dot2.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d1f4d2b --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/Ieee1609Dot2.md @@ -0,0 +1,1787 @@ +# ASN.1 module Ieee1609Dot2 + OID: _{iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) base(1) schema(1) major-version-2(2) minor-version-6(6)}_ + @note Section references in this file are to clauses in IEEE Std + 1609.2 unless indicated otherwise. Full forms of acronyms and + abbreviations used in this file are specified in 3.2. + + +## Imports: + * **[Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md)** *{iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) base(1) base-types(2) major-version-2(2) minor-version-4(4)} WITH SUCCESSORS*
+ + * **[EtsiTs103097ExtensionModule](EtsiTs103097ExtensionModule.md)** *{itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) itsDomain(5) wg5(5) secHeaders(103097) extension(2) major-version-1(1) minor-version-0(0)} WITH SUCCESSORS*
+ +## Data Elements: +### Ieee1609Dot2Data +This data type is used to contain the other data types in this + clause. The fields in the Ieee1609Dot2Data have the following meanings: + +Fields: +* protocolVersion of type [**Uint8**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Uint8) (3)
+ contains the current version of the protocol. The + version specified in this standard is version 3, represented by the + integer 3. There are no major or minor version numbers. + + +* content of type [**Ieee1609Dot2Content**](#Ieee1609Dot2Content)
+ contains the content in the form of an Ieee1609Dot2Content. + + + + +>>> +NOTE: Canonicalization: This data structure is subject to canonicalization + for the relevant operations specified in 6.1.2. The canonicalization + applies to the Ieee1609Dot2Content. +>>> +```asn1 +Ieee1609Dot2Data ::= SEQUENCE { + protocolVersion Uint8(3), + content Ieee1609Dot2Content +} +``` + +### Ieee1609Dot2Content +In this structure: + +Fields: +* unsecuredData of type [**Opaque**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Opaque)
+ indicates that the content is an OCTET STRING to be + consumed outside the SDS. + + +* signedData of type [**SignedData**](#SignedData)
+ indicates that the content has been signed according to + this standard. + + + +* encryptedData of type [**EncryptedData**](#EncryptedData)
+ indicates that the content has been encrypted + according to this standard. + + + +* signedCertificateRequest of type [**Opaque**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Opaque)
+ indicates that the content is a + certificate request signed by an IEEE 1609.2 certificate or self-signed. + + + +* signedX509CertificateRequest of type [**Opaque**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Opaque)
+ indicates that the content is a + certificate request signed by an ITU-T X.509 certificate. + + + + ..., + +>>> +NOTE: Canonicalization: This data structure is subject to canonicalization + for the relevant operations specified in 6.1.2 if it is of type signedData. + The canonicalization applies to the SignedData. +>>> +```asn1 +Ieee1609Dot2Content ::= CHOICE { + unsecuredData Opaque, + signedData SignedData, + encryptedData EncryptedData, + signedCertificateRequest Opaque, + ..., + signedX509CertificateRequest Opaque +} +``` + +### SignedData +In this structure: + +Fields: +* hashId of type [**HashAlgorithm**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#HashAlgorithm)
+ indicates the hash algorithm to be used to generate the hash + of the message for signing and verification. + + +* tbsData of type [**ToBeSignedData**](#ToBeSignedData)
+ contains the data that is hashed as input to the signature. + + + +* signer of type [**SignerIdentifier**](Ieee1609Dot2.md#SignerIdentifier)
+ determines the keying material and hash algorithm used to + sign the data. + + + +* signature of type [**Signature**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Signature)
+ contains the digital signature itself, calculated as + specified in 5.3.1. + - If signer indicates the choice self, then the signature calculation + is parameterized as follows: + - Data input is equal to the COER encoding of the tbsData field + canonicalized according to the encoding considerations given in 6.3.6. + - Verification type is equal to self. + - Signer identifier input is equal to the empty string. + - If signer indicates certificate or digest, then the signature + calculation is parameterized as follows: + - Data input is equal to the COER encoding of the tbsData field + canonicalized according to the encoding considerations given in 6.3.6. + - Verification type is equal to certificate. + - Signer identifier input equal to the COER-encoding of the + Certificate that is to be used to verify the SPDU, canonicalized according + to the encoding considerations given in 6.4.3. + + + + +>>> +NOTE: Canonicalization: This data structure is subject to canonicalization + for the relevant operations specified in 6.1.2. The canonicalization + applies to the ToBeSignedData and the Signature. +>>> +```asn1 +SignedData ::= SEQUENCE { + hashId HashAlgorithm, + tbsData ToBeSignedData, + signer SignerIdentifier, + signature Signature +} +``` + +### ToBeSignedData +This structure contains the data to be hashed when generating or + verifying a signature. See 6.3.4 for the specification of the input to the + hash. + +Fields: +* payload of type [**SignedDataPayload**](#SignedDataPayload)
+ contains data that is provided by the entity that invokes + the SDS. + + +* headerInfo of type [**HeaderInfo**](#HeaderInfo)
+ contains additional data that is inserted by the SDS. + This structure is used as follows to determine the "data input" to the + hash operation for signing or verification as specified in 5.3.1.2.2 or + 5.3.1.3. + - If payload does not contain the field omitted, the data input to the + hash operation is the COER encoding of the ToBeSignedData. + - If payload field in this ToBeSignedData instance contains the field + omitted, the data input to the hash operation is the COER encoding of the + ToBeSignedData, concatenated with the hash of the omitted payload. The hash + of the omitted payload is calculated with the same hash algorithm that is + used to calculate the hash of the data input for signing or verification. + The data input to the hash operation is simply the COER enocding of the + ToBeSignedData, concatenated with the hash of the omitted payload: there is + no additional wrapping or length indication. As noted in 5.2.4.3.4, the + means by which the signer and verifier establish the contents of the + omitted payload are out of scope for this standard. + + + + +>>> +NOTE: Canonicalization: This data structure is subject to canonicalization + for the relevant operations specified in 6.1.2. The canonicalization + applies to the SignedDataPayload if it is of type data, and to the + HeaderInfo. +>>> +```asn1 +ToBeSignedData ::= SEQUENCE { + payload SignedDataPayload, + headerInfo HeaderInfo +} +``` + +### SignedDataPayload +This structure contains the data payload of a ToBeSignedData. This + structure contains at least one of the optional elements, and may contain + more than one. See 5.2.4.3.4 for more details. + The security profile in Annex C allows an implementation of this standard + to state which forms of Signed¬Data¬Payload are supported by that + implementation, and also how the signer and verifier are intended to obtain + the external data for hashing. The specification of an SDEE that uses + external data is expected to be explicit and unambiguous about how this + data is obtained and how it is formatted prior to processing by the hash + function. + +Fields: +* data of type [**Ieee1609Dot2Data**](Ieee1609Dot2.md#Ieee1609Dot2Data) OPTIONAL
+ contains data that is explicitly transported within the + structure. + + +* extDataHash of type [**HashedData**](#HashedData) OPTIONAL
+ contains the hash of data that is not explicitly + transported within the structure, and which the creator of the structure + wishes to cryptographically bind to the signature. + + + +* omitted of type **NULL** OPTIONAL
+ indicates that there is external data to be included in the + hash calculation for the signature.The mechanism for including the external + data in the hash calculation is specified in 6.3.6. + + + + ..., + +>>> +NOTE: Canonicalization: This data structure is subject to canonicalization + for the relevant operations specified in 6.1.2. The canonicalization + applies to the Ieee1609Dot2Data. +>>> +```asn1 +SignedDataPayload ::= SEQUENCE { + data Ieee1609Dot2Data OPTIONAL, + extDataHash HashedData OPTIONAL, + ..., + omitted NULL OPTIONAL +} (WITH COMPONENTS {..., data PRESENT} | + WITH COMPONENTS {..., extDataHash PRESENT} | + WITH COMPONENTS {..., omitted PRESENT}) +``` + +### HashedData +This structure contains the hash of some data with a specified hash + algorithm. See 5.3.3 for specification of the permitted hash algorithms. + +Fields: +* sha256HashedData of type [**HashedId32**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#HashedId32)
+ indicates data hashed with SHA-256. + + +* sha384HashedData of type [**HashedId48**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#HashedId48)
+ indicates data hashed with SHA-384. + + + + ..., +* sm3HashedData of type [**HashedId32**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#HashedId32)
+ indicates data hashed with SM3. + + + + +>>> +NOTE: Critical information fields: If present, this is a critical + information field as defined in 5.2.6. An implementation that does not + recognize the indicated CHOICE for this type when verifying a signed SPDU + shall indicate that the signed SPDU is invalid in the sense of 4.2.2.3.2, + that is, it is invalid in the sense that its validity cannot be established. +>>> +```asn1 +HashedData::= CHOICE { + sha256HashedData HashedId32, + ..., + sha384HashedData HashedId48, + sm3HashedData HashedId32 +} +``` + +### HeaderInfo +This structure contains information that is used to establish + validity by the criteria of 5.2. + +Fields: +* psid of type [**Psid**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Psid)
+ indicates the application area with which the sender is + claiming the payload is to be associated. + + +* generationTime of type [**Time64**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Time64) OPTIONAL
+ indicates the time at which the structure was + generated. See 5.2.5.2.2 and 5.2.5.2.3 for discussion of the use of this + field. + + + +* expiryTime of type [**Time64**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Time64) OPTIONAL
+ if present, contains the time after which the data + is no longer considered relevant. If both generationTime and + expiryTime are present, the signed SPDU is invalid if generationTime is + not strictly earlier than expiryTime. + + + +* generationLocation of type [**ThreeDLocation**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#ThreeDLocation) OPTIONAL
+ if present, contains the location at which the + signature was generated. + + + +* p2pcdLearningRequest of type [**HashedId3**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#HashedId3) OPTIONAL
+ if present, is used by the SDS to request + certificates for which it has seen identifiers and does not know the + entire certificate. A specification of this peer-to-peer certificate + distribution (P2PCD) mechanism is given in Clause 8. This field is used + for the separate-certificate-pdu flavor of P2PCD and shall only be present + if inlineP2pcdRequest is not present. The HashedId3 is calculated with the + whole-certificate hash algorithm, determined as described in 6.4.3, + applied to the COER-encoded certificate, canonicalized as defined in the + definition of Certificate. + + + +* missingCrlIdentifier of type [**MissingCrlIdentifier**](#MissingCrlIdentifier) OPTIONAL
+ if present, is used by the SDS to request + CRLs which it knows to have been issued and have not received. This is + provided for future use and the associated mechanism is not defined in + this version of this standard. + + + +* encryptionKey of type [**EncryptionKey**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#EncryptionKey) OPTIONAL
+ if present, is used to provide a key that is to + be used to encrypt at least one response to this SPDU. The SDEE + specification is expected to specify which response SPDUs are to be + encrypted with this key. One possible use of this key to encrypt a + response is specified in 6.3.35, 6.3.37, and 6.3.34. An encryptionKey + field of type symmetric should only be used if the SignedData containing + this field is securely encrypted by some means. + + + +* inlineP2pcdRequest of type [**SequenceOfHashedId3**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#SequenceOfHashedId3) OPTIONAL
+ if present, is used by the SDS to request + unknown certificates per the inline peer-to-peer certificate distribution + mechanism is given in Clause 8. This field shall only be present if + p2pcdLearningRequest is not present. The HashedId3 is calculated with the + whole-certificate hash algorithm, determined as described in 6.4.3, applied + to the COER-encoded certificate, canonicalized as defined in the definition + of Certificate. + + + + ..., +* requestedCertificate of type [**Certificate**](Ieee1609Dot2.md#Certificate) OPTIONAL
+ if present, is used by the SDS to provide + certificates per the "inline" version of the peer-to-peer certificate + distribution mechanism given in Clause 8. + + + +* pduFunctionalType of type [**PduFunctionalType**](#PduFunctionalType) OPTIONAL
+ if present, is used to indicate that the SPDU is + to be consumed by a process other than an application process as defined + in ISO 21177 [B14a]. See 6.3.23b for more details. + + + +* contributedExtensions of type [**ContributedExtensionBlocks**](#ContributedExtensionBlocks) OPTIONAL
+ if present, is used to contain additional + extensions defined using the ContributedExtensionBlocks structure. + + + + +>>> +NOTE: Canonicalization: This data structure is subject to canonicalization + for the relevant operations specified in 6.1.2. The canonicalization + applies to the EncryptionKey. If encryptionKey is present, and indicates + the choice public, and contains a BasePublicEncryptionKey that is an + elliptic curve point (i.e., of type EccP256CurvePoint or + EccP384CurvePoint), then the elliptic curve point is encoded in compressed + form, i.e., such that the choice indicated within the Ecc*CurvePoint is + compressed-y-0 or compressed-y-1. + The canonicalization does not apply to any fields after the extension + marker, including any fields in contributedExtensions. +>>> +```asn1 +HeaderInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + psid Psid, + generationTime Time64 OPTIONAL, + expiryTime Time64 OPTIONAL, + generationLocation ThreeDLocation OPTIONAL, + p2pcdLearningRequest HashedId3 OPTIONAL, + missingCrlIdentifier MissingCrlIdentifier OPTIONAL, + encryptionKey EncryptionKey OPTIONAL, + ..., + inlineP2pcdRequest SequenceOfHashedId3 OPTIONAL, + requestedCertificate Certificate OPTIONAL, + pduFunctionalType PduFunctionalType OPTIONAL, + contributedExtensions ContributedExtensionBlocks OPTIONAL +} +``` + +### MissingCrlIdentifier +This structure may be used to request a CRL that the SSME knows to + have been issued and has not yet received. It is provided for future use + and its use is not defined in this version of this standard. + +Fields: +* cracaId of type [**HashedId3**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#HashedId3)
+ is the HashedId3 of the CRACA, as defined in 5.1.3. The + HashedId3 is calculated with the whole-certificate hash algorithm, + determined as described in 6.4.3, applied to the COER-encoded certificate, + canonicalized as defined in the definition of Certificate. + + +* crlSeries of type [**CrlSeries**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#CrlSeries)
+ is the requested CRL Series value. See 5.1.3 for more + information. + + + + +```asn1 +MissingCrlIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE { + cracaId HashedId3, + crlSeries CrlSeries, + ... +} +``` + + +### PduFunctionalType +This data structure identifies the functional entity that is + intended to consume an SPDU, for the case where that functional entity is + not an application process, and are instead security support services for an + application process. Further details and the intended use of this field are + defined in ISO 21177 [B20]. +```asn1 +PduFunctionalType ::= INTEGER (0..255) +``` + +```asn1 +tlsHandshake PduFunctionalType ::= 1 +iso21177ExtendedAuth PduFunctionalType ::= 2 +iso21177SessionExtension PduFunctionalType ::= 3 +``` + + +### ContributedExtensionBlocks +This type is used for clarity of definitions. +```asn1 +ContributedExtensionBlocks ::= SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF + ContributedExtensionBlock +``` + +### ContributedExtensionBlock +This data structure defines the format of an extension block + provided by an identified contributor by using the temnplate provided + in the class IEEE1609DOT2-HEADERINFO-CONTRIBUTED-EXTENSION constraint + to the objects in the set Ieee1609Dot2HeaderInfoContributedExtensions. + +Fields: +* contributorId of type [**IEEE1609DOT2-HEADERINFO-CONTRIBUTED-EXTENSION**](#IEEE1609DOT2-HEADERINFO-CONTRIBUTED-EXTENSION) .&id({ + Ieee1609Dot2HeaderInfoContributedExtensions + })
+ uniquely identifies the contributor. + + +* extns of type **SEQUENCE** (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF
+ contains a list of extensions from that contributor. + Extensions are expected and not required to follow the format specified + in 6.5. + + + + +```asn1 +ContributedExtensionBlock ::= SEQUENCE { + contributorId IEEE1609DOT2-HEADERINFO-CONTRIBUTED-EXTENSION.&id({ + Ieee1609Dot2HeaderInfoContributedExtensions + }), + extns SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF + IEEE1609DOT2-HEADERINFO-CONTRIBUTED-EXTENSION.&Extn({ + Ieee1609Dot2HeaderInfoContributedExtensions + }{@.contributorId}) +} +``` + +### IEEE1609DOT2-HEADERINFO-CONTRIBUTED-EXTENSION +This Information Object Class defines the class that provides a + template for defining extension blocks. + +Fields: +* id of type [**HeaderInfoContributorId**](#HeaderInfoContributorId) UNIQUE
+```asn1 +IEEE1609DOT2-HEADERINFO-CONTRIBUTED-EXTENSION ::= CLASS { + &id HeaderInfoContributorId UNIQUE, + &Extn +} WITH SYNTAX {&Extn IDENTIFIED BY &id} +``` + + +### Ieee1609Dot2HeaderInfoContributedExtensions +This structure is an ASN.1 Information Object Set listing the + defined contributed extension types and the associated + HeaderInfoContributorId values. In this version of this standard two + extension types are defined: Ieee1609ContributedHeaderInfoExtension and + EtsiOriginatingHeaderInfoExtension. +```asn1 +Ieee1609Dot2HeaderInfoContributedExtensions + IEEE1609DOT2-HEADERINFO-CONTRIBUTED-EXTENSION ::= { + {Ieee1609ContributedHeaderInfoExtension IDENTIFIED BY + ieee1609HeaderInfoContributorId} | + {EtsiOriginatingHeaderInfoExtension IDENTIFIED BY + etsiHeaderInfoContributorId}, + ... +} +``` + + +### HeaderInfoContributorId +This is an integer used to identify a HeaderInfo extension + contributing organization. In this version of this standard two values are + defined: + - ieee1609OriginatingExtensionId indicating extensions originating with + IEEE 1609. + - etsiOriginatingExtensionId indicating extensions originating with + ETSI TC ITS. +```asn1 +HeaderInfoContributorId ::= INTEGER (0..255) +``` + +```asn1 +ieee1609HeaderInfoContributorId HeaderInfoContributorId ::= 1 +etsiHeaderInfoContributorId HeaderInfoContributorId ::= 2 +``` + +### SignerIdentifier +This structure allows the recipient of data to determine which + keying material to use to authenticate the data. It also indicates the + verification type to be used to generate the hash for verification, as + specified in 5.3.1. + +Fields: +* digest of type [**HashedId8**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#HashedId8)
+ If the choice indicated is digest: + - The structure contains the HashedId8 of the relevant certificate. The + HashedId8 is calculated with the whole-certificate hash algorithm, + determined as described in 6.4.3. + - The verification type is certificate and the certificate data + passed to the hash function as specified in 5.3.1 is the authorization + certificate. + + +* certificate of type [**SequenceOfCertificate**](Ieee1609Dot2.md#SequenceOfCertificate)
+ If the choice indicated is certificate: + - The structure contains one or more Certificate structures, in order + such that the first certificate is the authorization certificate and each + subsequent certificate is the issuer of the one before it. + - The verification type is certificate and the certificate data + passed to the hash function as specified in 5.3.1 is the authorization + certificate. + + + +* self of type **NULL**
+ If the choice indicated is self: + - The structure does not contain any data beyond the indication that + the choice value is self. + - The verification type is self-signed. + + + + +>>> +NOTE: Canonicalization: This data structure is subject to canonicalization + for the relevant operations specified in 6.1.2. The canonicalization + applies to every Certificate in the certificate field. +>>> +```asn1 +SignerIdentifier ::= CHOICE { + digest HashedId8, + certificate SequenceOfCertificate, + self NULL, + ... +} +``` + + +### Countersignature +This data structure is used to perform a countersignature over an + already-signed SPDU. This is the profile of an Ieee1609Dot2Data containing + a signedData. The tbsData within content is composed of a payload + containing the hash (extDataHash) of the externally generated, pre-signed + SPDU over which the countersignature is performed. +```asn1 +Countersignature ::= Ieee1609Dot2Data (WITH COMPONENTS {..., + content (WITH COMPONENTS {..., + signedData (WITH COMPONENTS {..., + tbsData (WITH COMPONENTS {..., + payload (WITH COMPONENTS {..., + data ABSENT, + extDataHash PRESENT + }), + headerInfo(WITH COMPONENTS {..., + generationTime PRESENT, + expiryTime ABSENT, + generationLocation ABSENT, + p2pcdLearningRequest ABSENT, + missingCrlIdentifier ABSENT, + encryptionKey ABSENT + }) + }) + }) + }) +}) +``` + +### EncryptedData +This data structure encodes data that has been encrypted to one or + more recipients using the recipientsÂ’ public or symmetric keys as + specified in 5.3.4. + +Fields: +* recipients of type [**SequenceOfRecipientInfo**](#SequenceOfRecipientInfo)
+ contains one or more RecipientInfos. These entries may + be more than one RecipientInfo, and more than one type of RecipientInfo, + as long as all entries are indicating or containing the same data encryption + key. + + +* ciphertext of type [**SymmetricCiphertext**](#SymmetricCiphertext)
+ contains the encrypted data. This is the encryption of + an encoded Ieee1609Dot2Data structure as specified in 5.3.4.2. + + + + +>>> +NOTE: If the plaintext is raw data, i.e., it has not been output from a + previous operation of the SDS, then it is trivial to encapsulate it in an + Ieee1609Dot2Data of type unsecuredData as noted in 4.2.2.2.2. For example, + '03 80 08 01 23 45 67 89 AB CD EF' is the C-OER encoding of '01 23 45 67 + 89 AB CD EF' encapsulated in an Ieee1609Dot2Data of type unsecuredData. + The first byte of the encoding 03 is the protocolVersion, the second byte + 80 indicates the choice unsecuredData, and the third byte 08 is the length + of the raw data '01 23 45 67 89 AB CD EF'. +>>> +```asn1 +EncryptedData ::= SEQUENCE { + recipients SequenceOfRecipientInfo, + ciphertext SymmetricCiphertext +} +``` + +### RecipientInfo +This data structure is used to transfer the data encryption key to + an individual recipient of an EncryptedData. The option pskRecipInfo is + selected if the EncryptedData was encrypted using the static encryption + key approach specified in 5.3.4. The other options are selected if the + EncryptedData was encrypted using the ephemeral encryption key approach + specified in 5.3.4. The meanings of the choices are: + + + See Annex C.7 for guidance on when it may be appropriate to use + each of these approaches. + +Fields: +* pskRecipInfo of type [**PreSharedKeyRecipientInfo**](#PreSharedKeyRecipientInfo)
+ The data was encrypted directly using a pre-shared + symmetric key. + + +* symmRecipInfo of type [**SymmRecipientInfo**](#SymmRecipientInfo)
+ The data was encrypted with a data encryption key, + and the data encryption key was encrypted using a symmetric key. + + + +* certRecipInfo of type [**PKRecipientInfo**](#PKRecipientInfo)
+ The data was encrypted with a data encryption key, + the data encryption key was encrypted using a public key encryption scheme, + where the public encryption key was obtained from a certificate. In this + case, the parameter P1 to ECIES as defined in 5.3.5 is the hash of the + certificate, calculated with the whole-certificate hash algorithm, + determined as described in 6.4.3, applied to the COER-encoded certificate, + canonicalized as defined in the definition of Certificate. + + + +* signedDataRecipInfo of type [**PKRecipientInfo**](#PKRecipientInfo)
+ The data was encrypted with a data encryption + key, the data encryption key was encrypted using a public key encryption + scheme, where the public encryption key was obtained as the public response + encryption key from a SignedData. In this case, if ECIES is the encryption + algorithm, then the parameter P1 to ECIES as defined in 5.3.5 is the + SHA-256 hash of the Ieee1609Dot2Data of type signedData containing the + response encryption key, canonicalized as defined in the definition of + Ieee1609Dot2Data. + + + +* rekRecipInfo of type [**PKRecipientInfo**](#PKRecipientInfo)
+ The data was encrypted with a data encryption key, + the data encryption key was encrypted using a public key encryption scheme, + where the public encryption key was not obtained from a Signed-Data or a + certificate. In this case, the SDEE specification is expected to specify + how the public key is obtained, and if ECIES is the encryption algorithm, + then the parameter P1 to ECIES as defined in 5.3.5 is the hash of the + empty string. + + + + +>>> +NOTE: The material input to encryption is the bytes of the encryption key + with no headers, encapsulation, or length indication. Contrast this to + encryption of data, where the data is encapsulated in an Ieee1609Dot2Data. +>>> +```asn1 +RecipientInfo ::= CHOICE { + pskRecipInfo PreSharedKeyRecipientInfo, + symmRecipInfo SymmRecipientInfo, + certRecipInfo PKRecipientInfo, + signedDataRecipInfo PKRecipientInfo, + rekRecipInfo PKRecipientInfo +} +``` + + +### SequenceOfRecipientInfo +This type is used for clarity of definitions. +```asn1 +SequenceOfRecipientInfo ::= SEQUENCE OF RecipientInfo +``` + + +### PreSharedKeyRecipientInfo +This data structure is used to indicate a symmetric key that may + be used directly to decrypt a SymmetricCiphertext. It consists of the + low-order 8 bytes of the hash of the COER encoding of a + SymmetricEncryptionKey structure containing the symmetric key in question. + The HashedId8 is calculated with the hash algorithm determined as + specified in 5.3.9.3. The symmetric key may be established by any + appropriate means agreed by the two parties to the exchange. +```asn1 +PreSharedKeyRecipientInfo ::= HashedId8 +``` + +### SymmRecipientInfo +This data structure contains the following fields: + +Fields: +* recipientId of type [**HashedId8**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#HashedId8)
+ contains the hash of the symmetric key encryption key + that may be used to decrypt the data encryption key. It consists of the + low-order 8 bytes of the hash of the COER encoding of a + SymmetricEncryptionKey structure containing the symmetric key in question. + The HashedId8 is calculated with the hash algorithm determined as + specified in 5.3.9.4. The symmetric key may be established by any + appropriate means agreed by the two parties to the exchange. + + +* encKey of type [**SymmetricCiphertext**](#SymmetricCiphertext)
+ contains the encrypted data encryption key within a + SymmetricCiphertext, where the data encryption key is input to the data + encryption key encryption process with no headers, encapsulation, or + length indication. + + + + +```asn1 +SymmRecipientInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + recipientId HashedId8, + encKey SymmetricCiphertext +} +``` + +### PKRecipientInfo +This data structure contains the following fields: + +Fields: +* recipientId of type [**HashedId8**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#HashedId8)
+ contains the hash of the container for the encryption + public key as specified in the definition of RecipientInfo. Specifically, + depending on the choice indicated by the containing RecipientInfo structure: + - If the containing RecipientInfo structure indicates certRecipInfo, + this field contains the HashedId8 of the certificate. The HashedId8 is + calculated with the whole-certificate hash algorithm, determined as + described in 6.4.3, applied to the COER-encoded certificate, canonicalized + as defined in the definition of Certificate. + - If the containing RecipientInfo structure indicates + signedDataRecipInfo, this field contains the HashedId8 of the + Ieee1609Dot2Data of type signedData that contained the encryption key, + with that Ieee¬¬1609¬Dot2¬¬Data canonicalized per 6.3.4. The HashedId8 is + calculated with the hash algorithm determined as specified in 5.3.9.5. + - If the containing RecipientInfo structure indicates rekRecipInfo, this + field contains the HashedId8 of the COER encoding of a PublicEncryptionKey + structure containing the response encryption key. The HashedId8 is + calculated with the hash algorithm determined as specified in 5.3.9.5. + + +* encKey of type [**EncryptedDataEncryptionKey**](#EncryptedDataEncryptionKey)
+ contains the encrypted data encryption key, where the data + encryption key is input to the data encryption key encryption process with + no headers, encapsulation, or length indication. + + + + +```asn1 +PKRecipientInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + recipientId HashedId8, + encKey EncryptedDataEncryptionKey +} +``` + +### EncryptedDataEncryptionKey +This data structure contains an encrypted data encryption key, + where the data encryption key is input to the data encryption key + encryption process with no headers, encapsulation, or length indication. + + + Critical information fields: If present and applicable to + the receiving SDEE, this is a critical information field as defined in + 5.2.6. If an implementation receives an encrypted SPDU and determines that + one or more RecipientInfo fields are relevant to it, and if all of those + RecipientInfos contain an EncryptedDataEncryptionKey such that the + implementation does not recognize the indicated CHOICE, the implementation + shall indicate that the encrypted SPDU is not decryptable. + +Fields: +* eciesNistP256 of type [**EciesP256EncryptedKey**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#EciesP256EncryptedKey)
+* eciesBrainpoolP256r1 of type [**EciesP256EncryptedKey**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#EciesP256EncryptedKey)
+ +* ecencSm2256 of type [**EcencP256EncryptedKey**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#EcencP256EncryptedKey)
+ + ..., +```asn1 +EncryptedDataEncryptionKey ::= CHOICE { + eciesNistP256 EciesP256EncryptedKey, + eciesBrainpoolP256r1 EciesP256EncryptedKey, + ..., + ecencSm2256 EcencP256EncryptedKey +} +``` + +### SymmetricCiphertext +This data structure encapsulates a ciphertext generated with an + approved symmetric algorithm. + +Fields: +* aes128ccm of type [**One28BitCcmCiphertext**](#One28BitCcmCiphertext)
+* sm4Ccm of type [**One28BitCcmCiphertext**](#One28BitCcmCiphertext)
+ + ..., + +>>> +NOTE: Critical information fields: If present, this is a critical + information field as defined in 5.2.6. An implementation that does not + recognize the indicated CHOICE value for this type in an encrypted SPDU + shall indicate that the signed SPDU is invalid in the sense of 4.2.2.3.2, + that is, it is invalid in the sense that its validity cannot be established. +>>> +```asn1 +SymmetricCiphertext ::= CHOICE { + aes128ccm One28BitCcmCiphertext, + ..., + sm4Ccm One28BitCcmCiphertext +} +``` + +### One28BitCcmCiphertext +This data structure encapsulates an encrypted ciphertext for any + symmetric algorithm with 128-bit blocks in CCM mode. The ciphertext is + 16 bytes longer than the corresponding plaintext due to the inclusion of + the message authentication code (MAC). The plaintext resulting from a + correct decryption of the ciphertext is either a COER-encoded + Ieee1609Dot2Data structure (see 6.3.41), or a 16-byte symmetric key + (see 6.3.44). + + + The ciphertext is 16 bytes longer than the corresponding plaintext. + + The plaintext resulting from a correct decryption of the + ciphertext is a COER-encoded Ieee1609Dot2Data structure. + +Fields: +* nonce of type **OCTET STRING** (SIZE (12))
+ contains the nonce N as specified in 5.3.8. + + +* ccmCiphertext of type [**Opaque**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Opaque)
+ contains the ciphertext C as specified in 5.3.8. + + + + +>>> +NOTE: In the name of this structure, "One28" indicates that the + symmetric cipher block size is 128 bits. It happens to also be the case + that the keys used for both AES-128-CCM and SM4-CCM are also 128 bits long. + This is, however, not what “One28” refers to. Since the cipher is used in + counter mode, i.e., as a stream cipher, the fact that that block size is 128 + bits affects only the size of the MAC and does not affect the size of the + raw ciphertext. +>>> +```asn1 +One28BitCcmCiphertext ::= SEQUENCE { + nonce OCTET STRING (SIZE (12)), + ccmCiphertext Opaque +} +``` + + +### Aes128CcmCiphertext +This type is defined only for backwards compatibility. +```asn1 +Aes128CcmCiphertext ::= One28BitCcmCiphertext +``` + + +### TestCertificate +This structure is a profile of the structure CertificateBase which + specifies the valid combinations of fields to transmit implicit and + explicit certificates. + +>>> +NOTE: Canonicalization: This data structure is subject to canonicalization + for the relevant operations specified in 6.1.2. The canonicalization + applies to the CertificateBase. +>>> +```asn1 +TestCertificate ::= Certificate +``` + + +### SequenceOfCertificate +This type is used for clarity of definitions. +```asn1 +SequenceOfCertificate ::= SEQUENCE OF Certificate +``` + +### CertificateBase +The fields in this structure have the following meaning: + +Fields: +* version of type [**Uint8**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Uint8) (3)
+ contains the version of the certificate format. In this + version of the data structures, this field is set to 3. + + +* type of type [**CertificateType**](Ieee1609Dot2.md#CertificateType)
+ states whether the certificate is implicit or explicit. This + field is set to explicit for explicit certificates and to implicit for + implicit certificates. See ExplicitCertificate and ImplicitCertificate for + more details. + + + +* issuer of type [**IssuerIdentifier**](#IssuerIdentifier)
+ identifies the issuer of the certificate. + + + +* toBeSigned of type [**ToBeSignedCertificate**](Ieee1609Dot2.md#ToBeSignedCertificate)
+ is the certificate contents. This field is an input to + the hash when generating or verifying signatures for an explicit + certificate, or generating or verifying the public key from the + reconstruction value for an implicit certificate. The details of how this + field are encoded are given in the description of the + ToBeSignedCertificate type. + + + +* signature of type [**Signature**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Signature) OPTIONAL
+ is included in an ExplicitCertificate. It is the + signature, calculated by the signer identified in the issuer field, over + the hash of toBeSigned. The hash is calculated as specified in 5.3.1, where: + - Data input is the encoding of toBeSigned following the COER. + - Signer identifier input depends on the verification type, which in + turn depends on the choice indicated by issuer. If the choice indicated by + issuer is self, the verification type is self-signed and the signer + identifier input is the empty string. If the choice indicated by issuer is + not self, the verification type is certificate and the signer identifier + input is the canonicalized COER encoding of the certificate indicated by + issuer. The canonicalization is carried out as specified in the + Canonicalization section of this subclause. + + + + +>>> +NOTE: Whole-certificate hash: If the entirety of a certificate is hashed + to calculate a HashedId3, HashedId8, or HashedId10, the algorithm used for + this purpose is known as the whole-certificate hash. The method used to + determine the whole-certificate hash algorithm is specified in 5.3.9.2. +>>> +```asn1 +CertificateBase ::= SEQUENCE { + version Uint8(3), + type CertificateType, + issuer IssuerIdentifier, + toBeSigned ToBeSignedCertificate, + signature Signature OPTIONAL +} +``` + + +### CertificateType +This enumerated type indicates whether a certificate is explicit or + implicit. + +>>> +NOTE: Critical information fields: If present, this is a critical + information field as defined in 5.2.5. An implementation that does not + recognize the indicated CHOICE for this type when verifying a signed SPDU + shall indicate that the signed SPDU is invalid in the sense of 4.2.2.3.2, + that is, it is invalid in the sense that its validity cannot be + established. +>>> +```asn1 +CertificateType ::= ENUMERATED { + explicit, + implicit, + ... +} +``` + + +### ImplicitCertificate +This is a profile of the CertificateBase structure providing all + the fields necessary for an implicit certificate, and no others. +```asn1 +ImplicitCertificate ::= CertificateBase (WITH COMPONENTS {..., + type(implicit), + toBeSigned(WITH COMPONENTS {..., + verifyKeyIndicator(WITH COMPONENTS {reconstructionValue}) + }), + signature ABSENT +}) +``` + + +### ExplicitCertificate +This is a profile of the CertificateBase structure providing all + the fields necessary for an explicit certificate, and no others. +```asn1 +ExplicitCertificate ::= CertificateBase (WITH COMPONENTS {..., + type(explicit), + toBeSigned (WITH COMPONENTS {..., + verifyKeyIndicator(WITH COMPONENTS {verificationKey}) + }), + signature PRESENT +}) +``` + +### IssuerIdentifier +This structure allows the recipient of a certificate to determine + which keying material to use to authenticate the certificate. + + + If the choice indicated is sha256AndDigest, sha384AndDigest, or + sm3AndDigest: + - The structure contains the HashedId8 of the issuing certificate. The + HashedId8 is calculated with the whole-certificate hash algorithm, + determined as described in 6.4.3, applied to the COER-encoded certificate, + canonicalized as defined in the definition of Certificate. + - The hash algorithm to be used to generate the hash of the certificate + for verification is SHA-256 (in the case of sha256AndDigest), SM3 (in the + case of sm3AndDigest) or SHA-384 (in the case of sha384AndDigest). + - The certificate is to be verified with the public key of the + indicated issuing certificate. + + If the choice indicated is self: + - The structure indicates what hash algorithm is to be used to generate + the hash of the certificate for verification. + - The certificate is to be verified with the public key indicated by + the verifyKeyIndicator field in theToBeSignedCertificate. + +Fields: +* sha256AndDigest of type [**HashedId8**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#HashedId8)
+* self of type [**HashAlgorithm**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#HashAlgorithm)
+ +* sha384AndDigest of type [**HashedId8**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#HashedId8)
+ + ..., +* sm3AndDigest of type [**HashedId8**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#HashedId8)
+ + +>>> +NOTE: Critical information fields: If present, this is a critical + information field as defined in 5.2.5. An implementation that does not + recognize the indicated CHOICE for this type when verifying a signed SPDU + shall indicate that the signed SPDU is invalid in the sense of 4.2.2.3.2, + that is, it is invalid in the sense that its validity cannot be + established. +>>> +```asn1 +IssuerIdentifier ::= CHOICE { + sha256AndDigest HashedId8, + self HashAlgorithm, + ..., + sha384AndDigest HashedId8, + sm3AndDigest HashedId8 +} +``` + +### ToBeSignedCertificate +The fields in the ToBeSignedCertificate structure have the + following meaning: + + + For both implicit and explicit certificates, when the certificate + is hashed to create or recover the public key (in the case of an implicit + certificate) or to generate or verify the signature (in the case of an + explicit certificate), the hash is Hash (Data input) || Hash ( + Signer identifier input), where: + - Data input is the COER encoding of toBeSigned, canonicalized + as described above. + - Signer identifier input depends on the verification type, + which in turn depends on the choice indicated by issuer. If the choice + indicated by issuer is self, the verification type is self-signed and the + signer identifier input is the empty string. If the choice indicated by + issuer is not self, the verification type is certificate and the signer + identifier input is the COER encoding of the canonicalization per 6.4.3 of + the certificate indicated by issuer. + + In other words, for implicit certificates, the value H (CertU) in SEC 4, + section 3, is for purposes of this standard taken to be H [H + (canonicalized ToBeSignedCertificate from the subordinate certificate) || + H (entirety of issuer Certificate)]. See 5.3.2 for further discussion, + including material differences between this standard and SEC 4 regarding + how the hash function output is converted from a bit string to an integer. + +Fields: +* id of type [**CertificateId**](Ieee1609Dot2.md#CertificateId)
+ contains information that is used to identify the certificate + holder if necessary. + + +* cracaId of type [**HashedId3**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#HashedId3)
+ identifies the Certificate Revocation Authorization CA + (CRACA) responsible for certificate revocation lists (CRLs) on which this + certificate might appear. Use of the cracaId is specified in 5.1.3. The + HashedId3 is calculated with the whole-certificate hash algorithm, + determined as described in 6.4.3, applied to the COER-encoded certificate, + canonicalized as defined in the definition of Certificate. + + + +* crlSeries of type [**CrlSeries**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#CrlSeries)
+ represents the CRL series relevant to a particular + Certificate Revocation Authorization CA (CRACA) on which the certificate + might appear. Use of this field is specified in 5.1.3. + + + +* validityPeriod of type [**ValidityPeriod**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#ValidityPeriod)
+ contains the validity period of the certificate. + + + +* region of type [**GeographicRegion**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#GeographicRegion) OPTIONAL
+ if present, indicates the validity region of the + certificate. If it is omitted the validity region is indicated as follows: + - If enclosing certificate is self-signed, i.e., the choice indicated + by the issuer field in the enclosing certificate structure is self, the + certificate is valid worldwide. + - Otherwise, the certificate has the same validity region as the + certificate that issued it. + + + +* assuranceLevel of type [**SubjectAssurance**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#SubjectAssurance) OPTIONAL
+ indicates the assurance level of the certificate + holder. + + + +* appPermissions of type [**SequenceOfPsidSsp**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#SequenceOfPsidSsp) OPTIONAL
+ indicates the permissions that the certificate + holder has to sign application data with this certificate. A valid + instance of appPermissions contains any particular Psid value in at most + one entry. + + + +* certIssuePermissions of type [**SequenceOfPsidGroupPermissions**](Ieee1609Dot2.md#SequenceOfPsidGroupPermissions) OPTIONAL
+ indicates the permissions that the certificate + holder has to sign certificates with this certificate. A valid instance of + this array contains no more than one entry whose psidSspRange field + indicates all. If the array has multiple entries and one entry has its + psidSspRange field indicate all, then the entry indicating all specifies + the permissions for all PSIDs other than the ones explicitly specified in + the other entries. See the description of PsidGroupPermissions for further + discussion. + + + +* certRequestPermissions of type [**SequenceOfPsidGroupPermissions**](Ieee1609Dot2.md#SequenceOfPsidGroupPermissions) OPTIONAL
+ indicates the permissions that the + certificate holder can request in its certificate. A valid instance of this + array contains no more than one entry whose psidSspRange field indicates + all. If the array has multiple entries and one entry has its psidSspRange + field indicate all, then the entry indicating all specifies the permissions + for all PSIDs other than the ones explicitly specified in the other entries. + See the description of PsidGroupPermissions for further discussion. + + + +* canRequestRollover of type **NULL** OPTIONAL
+ indicates that the certificate may be used to + sign a request for another certificate with the same permissions. This + field is provided for future use and its use is not defined in this + version of this standard. + + + +* encryptionKey of type [**PublicEncryptionKey**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#PublicEncryptionKey) OPTIONAL
+ contains a public key for encryption for which the + certificate holder holds the corresponding private key. + + + +* verifyKeyIndicator of type [**VerificationKeyIndicator**](Ieee1609Dot2.md#VerificationKeyIndicator)
+ contains material that may be used to recover + the public key that may be used to verify data signed by this certificate. + + + +* flags of type **BIT STRING** {usesCubk (0)} (SIZE (8)) OPTIONAL
+ indicates additional yes/no properties of the certificate + holder. The only bit with defined semantics in this string in this version + of this standard is usesCubk. If set, the usesCubk bit indicates that the + certificate holder supports the compact unified butterfly key response. + Further material about the compact unified butterfly key response can be + found in IEEE Std 1609.2.1. + + + + ..., +* appExtensions of type [**SequenceOfAppExtensions**](#SequenceOfAppExtensions)
+ indicates additional permissions that may be applied + to application activities that the certificate holder is carrying out. + + + +* certIssueExtensions of type [**SequenceOfCertIssueExtensions**](#SequenceOfCertIssueExtensions)
+ indicates additional permissions to issue + certificates containing endEntityExtensions. + + + +* certRequestExtension of type [**SequenceOfCertRequestExtensions**](#SequenceOfCertRequestExtensions)
+ +If the PublicEncryptionKey contains a BasePublicEncryptionKey that is an + elliptic curve point (i.e., of type EccP256CurvePoint or EccP384CurvePoint), + then the elliptic curve point is encoded in compressed form, i.e., such + that the choice indicated within the Ecc*CurvePoint is compressed-y-0 or + compressed-y-1. + +>>> +NOTE: Critical information fields: + - If present, appPermissions is a critical information field as defined + in 5.2.6. If an implementation of verification does not support the number + of PsidSsp in the appPermissions field of a certificate that signed a + signed SPDU, that implementation shall indicate that the signed SPDU is + invalid in the sense of 4.2.2.3.2, that is, it is invalid in the sense + that its validity cannot be established.. A conformant implementation + shall support appPermissions fields containing at least eight entries. + It may be the case that an implementation of verification does not support + the number of entries in the appPermissions field and the appPermissions + field is not relevant to the verification: this will occur, for example, + if the certificate in question is a CA certificate and so the + certIssuePermissions field is relevant to the verification and the + appPermissions field is not. In this case, whether the implementation + indicates that the signed SPDU is valid (because it could validate all + relevant fields) or invalid (because it could not parse the entire + certificate) is implementation-specific. + - If present, certIssuePermissions is a critical information field as + defined in 5.2.6. If an implementation of verification does not support + the number of PsidGroupPermissions in the certIssuePermissions field of a + CA certificate in the chain of a signed SPDU, the implementation shall + indicate that the signed SPDU is invalid in the sense of 4.2.2.3.2, that + is, it is invalid in the sense that its validity cannot be established. + A conformant implementation shall support certIssuePermissions fields + containing at least eight entries. + It may be the case that an implementation of verification does not support + the number of entries in the certIssuePermissions field and the + certIssuePermissions field is not relevant to the verification: this will + occur, for example, if the certificate in question is the signing + certificate for the SPDU and so the appPermissions field is relevant to + the verification and the certIssuePermissions field is not. In this case, + whether the implementation indicates that the signed SPDU is valid + (because it could validate all relevant fields) or invalid (because it + could not parse the entire certificate) is implementation-specific. + - If present, certRequestPermissions is a critical information field as + defined in 5.2.6. If an implementaiton of verification of a certificate + request does not support the number of PsidGroupPermissions in + certRequestPermissions, the implementation shall indicate that the signed + SPDU is invalid in the sense of 4.2.2.3.2, that is, it is invalid in the + sense that its validity cannot be established. A conformant implementation + shall support certRequestPermissions fields containing at least eight + entries. + It may be the case that an implementation of verification does not support + the number of entries in the certRequestPermissions field and the + certRequestPermissions field is not relevant to the verification: this will + occur, for example, if the certificate in question is the signing + certificate for the SPDU and so the appPermissions field is relevant to + the verification and the certRequestPermissions field is not. In this + case, whether the implementation indicates that the signed SPDU is valid + (because it could validate all relevant fields) or invalid (because it + could not parse the entire certificate) is implementation-specific. +>>> +```asn1 +ToBeSignedCertificate ::= SEQUENCE { + id CertificateId, + cracaId HashedId3, + crlSeries CrlSeries, + validityPeriod ValidityPeriod, + region GeographicRegion OPTIONAL, + assuranceLevel SubjectAssurance OPTIONAL, + appPermissions SequenceOfPsidSsp OPTIONAL, + certIssuePermissions SequenceOfPsidGroupPermissions OPTIONAL, + certRequestPermissions SequenceOfPsidGroupPermissions OPTIONAL, + canRequestRollover NULL OPTIONAL, + encryptionKey PublicEncryptionKey OPTIONAL, + verifyKeyIndicator VerificationKeyIndicator, + ..., + flags BIT STRING {usesCubk (0)} (SIZE (8)) OPTIONAL, + appExtensions SequenceOfAppExtensions, + certIssueExtensions SequenceOfCertIssueExtensions, + certRequestExtension SequenceOfCertRequestExtensions +} +(WITH COMPONENTS { ..., appPermissions PRESENT} | + WITH COMPONENTS { ..., certIssuePermissions PRESENT} | + WITH COMPONENTS { ..., certRequestPermissions PRESENT}) +``` + +### CertificateId +This structure contains information that is used to identify the + certificate holder if necessary. + +Fields: +* linkageData of type [**LinkageData**](#LinkageData)
+ is used to identify the certificate for revocation + purposes in the case of certificates that appear on linked certificate + CRLs. See 5.1.3 and 7.3 for further discussion. + + +* name of type [**Hostname**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Hostname)
+ is used to identify the certificate holder in the case of + non-anonymous certificates. The contents of this field are a matter of + policy and are expected to be human-readable. + + + +* binaryId of type **OCTET STRING** (SIZE(1..64))
+ supports identifiers that are not human-readable. + + + +* none of type **NULL**
+ indicates that the certificate does not include an identifier. + + + + +>>> +NOTE: Critical information fields: + - If present, this is a critical information field as defined in 5.2.6. + An implementation that does not recognize the choice indicated in this + field shall reject a signed SPDU as invalid. +>>> +```asn1 +CertificateId ::= CHOICE { + linkageData LinkageData, + name Hostname, + binaryId OCTET STRING(SIZE(1..64)), + none NULL, + ... +} +``` + +### LinkageData +This structure contains information that is matched against + information obtained from a linkage ID-based CRL to determine whether the + containing certificate has been revoked. See 5.1.3.4 and 7.3 for details + of use. + +Fields: +* iCert of type [**IValue**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#IValue)
+* linkage-value of type [**LinkageValue**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#LinkageValue)
+ +* group-linkage-value of type [**GroupLinkageValue**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#GroupLinkageValue) OPTIONAL
+ +```asn1 +LinkageData ::= SEQUENCE { + iCert IValue, + linkage-value LinkageValue, + group-linkage-value GroupLinkageValue OPTIONAL +} +``` + +### PsidGroupPermissions +This type indicates which type of permissions may appear in + end-entity certificates the chain of whose permissions passes through the + PsidGroupPermissions field containing this value. If app is indicated, the + end-entity certificate may contain an appPermissions field. If enroll is + indicated, the end-entity certificate may contain a certRequestPermissions + field. + +This structure states the permissions that a certificate holder has + with respect to issuing and requesting certificates for a particular set + of PSIDs. For examples, see D.5.3 and D.5.4. + +Fields: +* subjectPermissions of type [**SubjectPermissions**](#SubjectPermissions)
+ indicates PSIDs and SSP Ranges covered by this + field. + + +* minChainLength of type **INTEGER** DEFAULT 1
+ and chainLengthRange indicate how long the + certificate chain from this certificate to the end-entity certificate is + permitted to be. As specified in 5.1.2.1, the length of the certificate + chain is the number of certificates "below" this certificate in the chain, + down to and including the end-entity certificate. The length is permitted + to be (a) greater than or equal to minChainLength certificates and (b) + less than or equal to minChainLength + chainLengthRange certificates. A + value of 0 for minChainLength is not permitted when this type appears in + the certIssuePermissions field of a ToBeSignedCertificate; a certificate + that has a value of 0 for this field is invalid. The value -1 for + chainLengthRange is a special case: if the value of chainLengthRange is -1 + it indicates that the certificate chain may be any length equal to or + greater than minChainLength. See the examples below for further discussion. + + + +* chainLengthRange of type **INTEGER** DEFAULT 0
+ +* eeType of type [**EndEntityType**](#EndEntityType) DEFAULT {app}
+ takes one or more of the values app and enroll and indicates + the type of certificates or requests that this instance of + PsidGroupPermissions in the certificate is entitled to authorize. + Different instances of PsidGroupPermissions within a ToBeSignedCertificate + may have different values for eeType. + - If this field indicates app, the chain is allowed to end in an + authorization certificate, i.e., a certficate in which these permissions + appear in an appPermissions field (in other words, if the field does not + indicate app and the chain ends in an authorization certificate, the + chain shall be considered invalid). + - If this field indicates enroll, the chain is allowed to end in an + enrollment certificate, i.e., a certificate in which these permissions + appear in a certReqPermissions permissions field (in other words, if the + field does not indicate enroll and the chain ends in an enrollment + certificate, the chain shall be considered invalid). + + + + +```asn1 +PsidGroupPermissions ::= SEQUENCE { + subjectPermissions SubjectPermissions, + minChainLength INTEGER DEFAULT 1, + chainLengthRange INTEGER DEFAULT 0, + eeType EndEntityType DEFAULT {app} +} +``` + + +### SequenceOfPsidGroupPermissions +This type is used for clarity of definitions. +```asn1 +SequenceOfPsidGroupPermissions ::= SEQUENCE OF PsidGroupPermissions +``` + +### SubjectPermissions +This indicates the PSIDs and associated SSPs for which certificate + issuance or request permissions are granted by a PsidGroupPermissions + structure. If this takes the value explicit, the enclosing + PsidGroupPermissions structure grants certificate issuance or request + permissions for the indicated PSIDs and SSP Ranges. If this takes the + value all, the enclosing PsidGroupPermissions structure grants certificate + issuance or request permissions for all PSIDs not indicated by other + PsidGroupPermissions in the same certIssuePermissions or + certRequestPermissions field. + +Fields: +* explicit of type [**SequenceOfPsidSspRange**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#SequenceOfPsidSspRange)
+* all of type **NULL**
+ + +>>> +NOTE: Critical information fields: + - If present, this is a critical information field as defined in 5.2.6. + An implementation that does not recognize the indicated CHOICE when + verifying a signed SPDU shall indicate that the signed SPDU is + invalidin the sense of 4.2.2.3.2, that is, it is invalid in the sense that + its validity cannot be established. + - If present, explicit is a critical information field as defined in + 5.2.6. An implementation that does not support the number of PsidSspRange + in explicit when verifying a signed SPDU shall indicate that the signed + SPDU is invalid in the sense of 4.2.2.3.2, that is, it is invalid in the + sense that its validity cannot be established. A conformant implementation + shall support explicit fields containing at least eight entries. +>>> +```asn1 +SubjectPermissions ::= CHOICE { + explicit SequenceOfPsidSspRange, + all NULL, + ... +} +``` + +### VerificationKeyIndicator +The contents of this field depend on whether the certificate is an + implicit or an explicit certificate. + +Fields: +* verificationKey of type [**PublicVerificationKey**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#PublicVerificationKey)
+ is included in explicit certificates. It contains + the public key to be used to verify signatures generated by the holder of + the Certificate. + + +* reconstructionValue of type [**EccP256CurvePoint**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#EccP256CurvePoint)
+ is included in implicit certificates. It + contains the reconstruction value, which is used to recover the public key + as specified in SEC 4 and 5.3.2. + + + + +>>> +NOTE: Canonicalization: This data structure is subject to canonicalization + for the relevant operations specified in 6.1.2. The canonicalization + applies to the PublicVerificationKey and to the EccP256CurvePoint. The + EccP256CurvePoint is encoded in compressed form, i.e., such that the + choice indicated within the EccP256CurvePoint is compressed-y-0 or + compressed-y-1. +>>> +```asn1 +VerificationKeyIndicator ::= CHOICE { + verificationKey PublicVerificationKey, + reconstructionValue EccP256CurvePoint, + ... +} +``` + + +### Ieee1609HeaderInfoExtensionId +This structure uses the parameterized type Extension to define an + Ieee1609ContributedHeaderInfoExtension as an open Extension Content field + identified by an extension identifier. The extension identifier value is + unique to extensions defined by ETSI and need not be unique among all + extension identifier values defined by all contributing organizations. + +This is an integer used to identify an + Ieee1609ContributedHeaderInfoExtension. +```asn1 +Ieee1609HeaderInfoExtensionId ::= ExtId +``` + +```asn1 +p2pcd8ByteLearningRequestId Ieee1609HeaderInfoExtensionId ::= 1 +``` + + +### Ieee1609HeaderInfoExtensions +This is the ASN.1 Information Object Class that associates IEEE + 1609 HeaderInfo contributed extensions with the appropriate + Ieee1609HeaderInfoExtensionId value. +```asn1 +Ieee1609HeaderInfoExtensions EXT-TYPE ::= { + {HashedId8 IDENTIFIED BY p2pcd8ByteLearningRequestId}, + ... +} +``` + + +### SequenceOfAppExtensions +This structure contains any AppExtensions that apply to the + certificate holder. As specified in 5.2.4.2.3, each individual + AppExtension type is associated with consistency conditions, specific to + that extension, that govern its consistency with SPDUs signed by the + certificate holder and with the CertIssueExtensions in the CA certificates + in that certificate holderÂ’s chain. Those consistency conditions are + specified for each individual AppExtension below. +```asn1 +SequenceOfAppExtensions ::= SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF AppExtension +``` + +### AppExtension +This structure contains an individual AppExtension. AppExtensions + specified in this standard are drawn from the ASN.1 Information Object Set + SetCertExtensions. This set, and its use in the AppExtension type, is + structured so that each AppExtension is associated with a + CertIssueExtension and a CertRequestExtension and all are identified by + the same id value. In this structure: + +Fields: +* id of type [**CERT-EXT-TYPE**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#CERT-EXT-TYPE) .&id({SetCertExtensions})
+ identifies the extension type. + + +* content of type [**CERT-EXT-TYPE**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#CERT-EXT-TYPE) .&App({SetCertExtensions}{@.id})
+ provides the content of the extension. + + + + +```asn1 +AppExtension ::= SEQUENCE { + id CERT-EXT-TYPE.&id({SetCertExtensions}), + content CERT-EXT-TYPE.&App({SetCertExtensions}{@.id}) +} +``` + + +### SequenceOfCertIssueExtensions +This field contains any CertIssueExtensions that apply to the + certificate holder. As specified in 5.2.4.2.3, each individual + CertIssueExtension type is associated with consistency conditions, + specific to that extension, that govern its consistency with + AppExtensions in certificates issued by the certificate holder and with + the CertIssueExtensions in the CA certificates in that certificate + holderÂ’s chain. Those consistency conditions are specified for each + individual CertIssueExtension below. +```asn1 +SequenceOfCertIssueExtensions ::= + SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF CertIssueExtension +``` + +### CertIssueExtension +This field contains an individual CertIssueExtension. + CertIssueExtensions specified in this standard are drawn from the ASN.1 + Information Object Set SetCertExtensions. This set, and its use in the + CertIssueExtension type, is structured so that each CertIssueExtension + is associated with a AppExtension and a CertRequestExtension and all are + identified by the same id value. In this structure: + +Fields: +* id of type [**CERT-EXT-TYPE**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#CERT-EXT-TYPE) .&id({SetCertExtensions})
+ identifies the extension type. + + +* permissions of type [**CHOICE**](#CHOICE) { + specific CERT-EXT-TYPE.&Issue({SetCertExtensions}{@.id})
+ indicates the permissions. Within this field. + - all indicates that the certificate is entitled to issue all values of + the extension. + - specific is used to specify which values of the extension may be + issued in the case where all does not apply. + + + + +* all of type **NULL**
+ +```asn1 +CertIssueExtension ::= SEQUENCE { + id CERT-EXT-TYPE.&id({SetCertExtensions}), + permissions CHOICE { + specific CERT-EXT-TYPE.&Issue({SetCertExtensions}{@.id}), + all NULL + } +} +``` + + +### SequenceOfCertRequestExtensions +This field contains any CertRequestExtensions that apply to the + certificate holder. As specified in 5.2.4.2.3, each individual + CertRequestExtension type is associated with consistency conditions, + specific to that extension, that govern its consistency with + AppExtensions in certificates issued by the certificate holder and with + the CertRequestExtensions in the CA certificates in that certificate + holderÂ’s chain. Those consistency conditions are specified for each + individual CertRequestExtension below. +```asn1 +SequenceOfCertRequestExtensions ::= SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF CertRequestExtension +``` + +### CertRequestExtension +This field contains an individual CertRequestExtension. + CertRequestExtensions specified in this standard are drawn from the + ASN.1 Information Object Set SetCertExtensions. This set, and its use in + the CertRequestExtension type, is structured so that each + CertRequestExtension is associated with a AppExtension and a + CertRequestExtension and all are identified by the same id value. In this + structure: + +Fields: +* id of type [**CERT-EXT-TYPE**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#CERT-EXT-TYPE) .&id({SetCertExtensions})
+ identifies the extension type. + + +* permissions of type [**CHOICE**](#CHOICE) { + content CERT-EXT-TYPE.&Req({SetCertExtensions}{@.id})
+ indicates the permissions. Within this field. + - all indicates that the certificate is entitled to issue all values of + the extension. + - specific is used to specify which values of the extension may be + issued in the case where all does not apply. + + + + +* all of type **NULL**
+ +```asn1 +CertRequestExtension ::= SEQUENCE { + id CERT-EXT-TYPE.&id({SetCertExtensions}), + permissions CHOICE { + content CERT-EXT-TYPE.&Req({SetCertExtensions}{@.id}), + all NULL + } +} +``` + + +### OperatingOrganizationId +This type is the AppExtension used to identify an operating + organization. The associated CertIssueExtension and CertRequestExtension + are both of type OperatingOrganizationId. + To determine consistency between this type and an SPDU, the SDEE + specification for that SPDU is required to specify how the SPDU can be + used to determine an OBJECT IDENTIFIER (for example, by including the + full OBJECT IDENTIFIER in the SPDU, or by including a RELATIVE-OID with + clear instructions about how a full OBJECT IDENTIFIER can be obtained from + the RELATIVE-OID). The SPDU is then consistent with this type if the + OBJECT IDENTIFIER determined from the SPDU is identical to the OBJECT + IDENTIFIER contained in this field. + This AppExtension does not have consistency conditions with a + corresponding CertIssueExtension. It can appear in a certificate issued + by any CA. +```asn1 +OperatingOrganizationId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER +``` + +```asn1 +certExtId-OperatingOrganization ExtId ::= 1 +``` + +```asn1 +instanceOperatingOrganizationCertExtensions CERT-EXT-TYPE ::= { + ID certExtId-OperatingOrganization + APP OperatingOrganizationId + ISSUE NULL + REQUEST NULL +} +``` + + +### SetCertExtensions +This Information Object Set is a collection of Information Objects + used to contain the AppExtension, CertIssueExtension, and + CertRequestExtension types associated with a specific use of certificate + extensions. In this version of this standard it only has a single entry + instanceOperatingOrganizationCertExtensions. +```asn1 +SetCertExtensions CERT-EXT-TYPE ::= { + instanceOperatingOrganizationCertExtensions, + ... +} +``` + + + +This Information Object is an instance of the Information Object + Class CERT-EXT-TYPE. It is defined to bind together the AppExtension, + CertIssueExtension, and CertRequestExtension types associated with the + use of an operating organization identifier, and to assocaute them all + with the extension identifier value certExtId-OperatingOrganization. + This Information Object Set is a collection of Information Objects + used to contain the AppExtension, CertIssueExtension, and + CertRequestExtension types associated with a specific use of certificate + extensions. In this version of this standard it only has a single entry + instanceOperatingOrganizationCertExtensions. + + diff --git a/docs/Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md b/docs/Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..92ddc6c --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md @@ -0,0 +1,1726 @@ +# ASN.1 module Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes + OID: _{iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) base(1) base-types(2) major-version-2(2) minor-version-4(4)}_ + @note Section references in this file are to clauses in IEEE Std + 1609.2 unless indicated otherwise. Full forms of acronyms and + abbreviations used in this file are specified in 3.2. + + +## Data Elements: + +### Uint3 +This atomic type is used in the definition of other data structures. + It is for non-negative integers up to 7, i.e., (hex)07. +```asn1 +Uint3 ::= INTEGER (0..7) +``` + + +### Uint8 +This atomic type is used in the definition of other data structures. + It is for non-negative integers up to 255, i.e., (hex)ff. +```asn1 +Uint8 ::= INTEGER (0..255) +``` + + +### Uint16 +This atomic type is used in the definition of other data structures. + It is for non-negative integers up to 65,535, i.e., (hex)ff ff. +```asn1 +Uint16 ::= INTEGER (0..65535) +``` + + +### Uint32 +This atomic type is used in the definition of other data structures. + It is for non-negative integers up to 4,294,967,295, i.e., + (hex)ff ff ff ff. +```asn1 +Uint32 ::= INTEGER (0..4294967295) +``` + + +### Uint64 +This atomic type is used in the definition of other data structures. + It is for non-negative integers up to 18,446,744,073,709,551,615, i.e., + (hex)ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff. +```asn1 +Uint64 ::= INTEGER (0..18446744073709551615) +``` + + +### SequenceOfUint8 +This type is used for clarity of definitions. +```asn1 +SequenceOfUint8 ::= SEQUENCE OF Uint8 +``` + + +### SequenceOfUint16 +This type is used for clarity of definitions. +```asn1 +SequenceOfUint16 ::= SEQUENCE OF Uint16 +``` + + +### Opaque +This is a synonym for ASN.1 OCTET STRING, and is used in the + definition of other data structures. +```asn1 +Opaque ::= OCTET STRING +``` + + +### HashedId3 +This type contains the truncated hash of another data structure. + The HashedId3 for a given data structure is calculated by calculating the + hash of the encoded data structure and taking the low-order three bytes of + the hash output. The low-order three bytes are the last three bytes of the + 32-byte hash when represented in network byte order. If the data structure + is subject to canonicalization it is canonicalized before hashing. See + Example below. + + + The hash algorithm to be used to calculate a HashedId3 within a + structure depends on the context. In this standard, for each structure + that includes a HashedId3 field, the corresponding text indicates how the + hash algorithm is determined. See also the discussion in 5.3.9. + + Example: Consider the SHA-256 hash of the empty string: + + SHA-256("") = + e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855 + + The HashedId3 derived from this hash corresponds to the following: + + HashedId3 = 52b855. +```asn1 +HashedId3 ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(3)) +``` + + +### SequenceOfHashedId3 +This type is used for clarity of definitions. +```asn1 +SequenceOfHashedId3 ::= SEQUENCE OF HashedId3 +``` + + +### HashedId8 +This type contains the truncated hash of another data structure. + The HashedId8 for a given data structure is calculated by calculating the + hash of the encoded data structure and taking the low-order eight bytes of + the hash output. The low-order eight bytes are the last eight bytes of the + hash when represented in network byte order. If the data structure + is subject to canonicalization it is canonicalized before hashing. See + Example below. + + + The hash algorithm to be used to calculate a HashedId8 within a + structure depends on the context. In this standard, for each structure + that includes a HashedId8 field, the corresponding text indicates how the + hash algorithm is determined. See also the discussion in 5.3.9. + + Example: Consider the SHA-256 hash of the empty string: + + SHA-256("") = + e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855 + + The HashedId8 derived from this hash corresponds to the following: + + HashedId8 = a495991b7852b855. +```asn1 +HashedId8 ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(8)) +``` + + +### HashedId10 +This type contains the truncated hash of another data structure. + The HashedId10 for a given data structure is calculated by calculating the + hash of the encoded data structure and taking the low-order ten bytes of + the hash output. The low-order ten bytes are the last ten bytes of the + hash when represented in network byte order. If the data structure + is subject to canonicalization it is canonicalized before hashing. See + Example below. + + + The hash algorithm to be used to calculate a HashedId10 within a + structure depends on the context. In this standard, for each structure + that includes a HashedId10 field, the corresponding text indicates how the + hash algorithm is determined. See also the discussion in 5.3.9. + + Example: Consider the SHA-256 hash of the empty string: + + SHA-256("") = + e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855 + + The HashedId10 derived from this hash corresponds to the following: + + HashedId10 = 934ca495991b7852b855. +```asn1 +HashedId10 ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(10)) +``` + + +### HashedId32 +This data structure contains the truncated hash of another data + structure. The HashedId32 for a given data structure is calculated by + calculating the hash of the encoded data structure and taking the + low-order 32 bytes of the hash output. The low-order 32 bytes are the last + 32 bytes of the hash when represented in network byte order. If the data + structure is subject to canonicalization it is canonicalized before + hashing. See Example below. + + + The hash algorithm to be used to calculate a HashedId32 within a + structure depends on the context. In this standard, for each structure + that includes a HashedId32 field, the corresponding text indicates how the + hash algorithm is determined. See also the discussion in 5.3.9. + + Example: Consider the SHA-256 hash of the empty string: + + SHA-256("") = + e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855 + + The HashedId32 derived from this hash corresponds to the following: + + HashedId32 = e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b8 + 55. +```asn1 +HashedId32 ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(32)) +``` + + +### HashedId48 +This data structure contains the truncated hash of another data + structure. The HashedId48 for a given data structure is calculated by + calculating the hash of the encoded data structure and taking the + low-order 48 bytes of the hash output. The low-order 48 bytes are the last + 48 bytes of the hash when represented in network byte order. If the data + structure is subject to canonicalization it is canonicalized before + hashing. See Example below. + + + The hash algorithm to be used to calculate a HashedId48 within a + structure depends on the context. In this standard, for each structure + that includes a HashedId48 field, the corresponding text indicates how the + hash algorithm is determined. See also the discussion in 5.3.9. + + Example: Consider the SHA-384 hash of the empty string: + + SHA-384("") = 38b060a751ac96384cd9327eb1b1e36a21fdb71114be07434c0cc7bf63f6 + e1da274edebfe76f65fbd51ad2f14898b95b + + The HashedId48 derived from this hash corresponds to the following: + + HashedId48 = 38b060a751ac96384cd9327eb1b1e36a21fdb71114be07434c0cc7bf63f6e + 1da274edebfe76f65fbd51ad2f14898b95b. +```asn1 +HashedId48 ::= OCTET STRING(SIZE(48)) +``` + + +### Time32 +This type gives the number of (TAI) seconds since 00:00:00 UTC, 1 + January, 2004. +```asn1 +Time32 ::= Uint32 +``` + + +### Time64 +This data structure is a 64-bit integer giving an estimate of the + number of (TAI) microseconds since 00:00:00 UTC, 1 January, 2004. +```asn1 +Time64 ::= Uint64 +``` + +### ValidityPeriod +This type gives the validity period of a certificate. The start of + the validity period is given by start and the end is given by + start + duration. + +Fields: +* start of type [**Time32**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Time32)
+* duration of type [**Duration**](#Duration)
+ +```asn1 +ValidityPeriod ::= SEQUENCE { + start Time32, + duration Duration +} +``` + +### Duration +This structure represents the duration of validity of a + certificate. The Uint16 value is the duration, given in the units denoted + by the indicated choice. A year is considered to be 31556952 seconds, + which is the average number of seconds in a year. + +Fields: +* microseconds of type [**Uint16**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Uint16)
+* milliseconds of type [**Uint16**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Uint16)
+ +* seconds of type [**Uint16**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Uint16)
+ +* minutes of type [**Uint16**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Uint16)
+ +* hours of type [**Uint16**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Uint16)
+ +* sixtyHours of type [**Uint16**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Uint16)
+ +* years of type [**Uint16**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Uint16)
+ + +>>> +NOTE: Years can be mapped more closely to wall-clock days using the hours + choice for up to 7 years and the sixtyHours choice for up to 448 years. +>>> +```asn1 +Duration ::= CHOICE { + microseconds Uint16, + milliseconds Uint16, + seconds Uint16, + minutes Uint16, + hours Uint16, + sixtyHours Uint16, + years Uint16 +} +``` + +### GeographicRegion +This structure represents a geographic region of a specified form. + A certificate is not valid if any part of the region indicated in its + scope field lies outside the region indicated in the scope of its issuer. + +Fields: +* circularRegion of type [**CircularRegion**](#CircularRegion)
+ contains a single instance of the CircularRegion + structure. + + +* rectangularRegion of type [**SequenceOfRectangularRegion**](#SequenceOfRectangularRegion)
+ is an array of RectangularRegion structures + containing at least one entry. This field is interpreted as a series of + rectangles, which may overlap or be disjoint. The permitted region is any + point within any of the rectangles. + + + +* polygonalRegion of type [**PolygonalRegion**](#PolygonalRegion)
+ contains a single instance of the PolygonalRegion + structure. + + + +* identifiedRegion of type [**SequenceOfIdentifiedRegion**](#SequenceOfIdentifiedRegion)
+ is an array of IdentifiedRegion structures + containing at least one entry. The permitted region is any point within + any of the identified regions. + + + + +>>> +NOTE: Critical information fields: + - If present, this is a critical information field as defined in 5.2.6. + An implementation that does not recognize the indicated CHOICE when + verifying a signed SPDU shall indicate that the signed SPDU is invalid in + the sense of 4.2.2.3.2, that is, it is invalid in the sense that its + validity cannot be established. + - If selected, rectangularRegion is a critical information field as + defined in 5.2.6. An implementation that does not support the number of + RectangularRegion in rectangularRegions when verifying a signed SPDU shall + indicate that the signed SPDU is invalid in the sense of 4.2.2.3.2, that + is, it is invalid in the sense that its validity cannot be established. + A conformant implementation shall support rectangularRegions fields + containing at least eight entries. + - If selected, identifiedRegion is a critical information field as + defined in 5.2.6. An implementation that does not support the number of + IdentifiedRegion in identifiedRegion shall reject the signed SPDU as + invalid in the sense of 4.2.2.3.2, that is, it is invalid in the sense + that its validity cannot be established. A conformant implementation shall + support identifiedRegion fields containing at least eight entries. +>>> +```asn1 +GeographicRegion ::= CHOICE { + circularRegion CircularRegion, + rectangularRegion SequenceOfRectangularRegion, + polygonalRegion PolygonalRegion, + identifiedRegion SequenceOfIdentifiedRegion, + ... +} +``` + +### CircularRegion +This structure specifies a circle with its center at center, its + radius given in meters, and located tangential to the reference ellipsoid. + The indicated region is all the points on the surface of the reference + ellipsoid whose distance to the center point over the reference ellipsoid + is less than or equal to the radius. A point which contains an elevation + component is considered to be within the circular region if its horizontal + projection onto the reference ellipsoid lies within the region. + +Fields: +* center of type [**TwoDLocation**](#TwoDLocation)
+* radius of type [**Uint16**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Uint16)
+ +```asn1 +CircularRegion ::= SEQUENCE { + center TwoDLocation, + radius Uint16 +} +``` + +### RectangularRegion +This structure specifies a “rectangle” on the surface of the WGS84 ellipsoid where the + sides are given by lines of constant latitude or longitude. + A point which contains an elevation component is considered to be within the rectangular region + if its horizontal projection onto the reference ellipsoid lies within the region. + A RectangularRegion is invalid if the northWest value is south of the southEast value, or if the + latitude values in the two points are equal, or if the longitude values in the two points are + equal; otherwise it is valid. A certificate that contains an invalid RectangularRegion is invalid. + +Fields: +* northWest of type [**TwoDLocation**](#TwoDLocation)
+ is the north-west corner of the rectangle. + + +* southEast of type [**TwoDLocation**](#TwoDLocation)
+ is the south-east corner of the rectangle. + + + + +```asn1 +RectangularRegion ::= SEQUENCE { + northWest TwoDLocation, + southEast TwoDLocation +} +``` + + +### SequenceOfRectangularRegion +This type is used for clarity of definitions. +```asn1 +SequenceOfRectangularRegion ::= SEQUENCE OF RectangularRegion +``` + + +### PolygonalRegion +This structure defines a region using a series of distinct + geographic points, defined on the surface of the reference ellipsoid. The + region is specified by connecting the points in the order they appear, + with each pair of points connected by the geodesic on the reference + ellipsoid. The polygon is completed by connecting the final point to the + first point. The allowed region is the interior of the polygon and its + boundary. + + + A point which contains an elevation component is considered to be + within the polygonal region if its horizontal projection onto the + reference ellipsoid lies within the region. + + A valid PolygonalRegion contains at least three points. In a valid + PolygonalRegion, the implied lines that make up the sides of the polygon + do not intersect. + +>>> +NOTE: Critical information fields: If present, this is a critical + information field as defined in 5.2.6. An implementation that does not + support the number of TwoDLocation in the PolygonalRegion when verifying a + signed SPDU shall indicate that the signed SPDU is invalid. A compliant + implementation shall support PolygonalRegions containing at least eight + TwoDLocation entries. +>>> +```asn1 +PolygonalRegion ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (3..MAX) OF TwoDLocation +``` + +### TwoDLocation +This structure is used to define validity regions for use in + certificates. The latitude and longitude fields contain the latitude and + longitude as defined above. + +Fields: +* latitude of type [**Latitude**](#Latitude)
+* longitude of type [**Longitude**](#Longitude)
+ + +>>> +NOTE: This data structure is consistent with the location encoding + used in SAE J2735, except that values 900 000 001 for latitude (used to + indicate that the latitude was not available) and 1 800 000 001 for + longitude (used to indicate that the longitude was not available) are not + valid. +>>> +```asn1 +TwoDLocation ::= SEQUENCE { + latitude Latitude, + longitude Longitude +} +``` + +### IdentifiedRegion +This structure indicates the region of validity of a certificate + using region identifiers. + A conformant implementation that supports this type shall support at least + one of the possible CHOICE values. The Protocol Implementation Conformance + Statement (PICS) provided in Annex A allows an implementation to state + which CountryOnly values it recognizes. + +Fields: +* countryOnly of type [**UnCountryId**](#UnCountryId)
+ indicates that only a country (or a geographic entity + included in a country list) is given. + + +* countryAndRegions of type [**CountryAndRegions**](#CountryAndRegions)
+ indicates that one or more top-level regions + within a country (as defined by the region listing associated with that + country) is given. + + + +* countryAndSubregions of type [**CountryAndSubregions**](#CountryAndSubregions)
+ indicates that one or more regions smaller + than the top-level regions within a country (as defined by the region + listing associated with that country) is given. + + + +Critical information fields: If present, this is a critical + information field as defined in 5.2.6. An implementation that does not + recognize the indicated CHOICE when verifying a signed SPDU shall indicate + that the signed SPDU is invalid in the sense of 4.2.2.3.2, that is, it is + invalid in the sense that its validity cannot be established. +```asn1 +IdentifiedRegion ::= CHOICE { + countryOnly UnCountryId, + countryAndRegions CountryAndRegions, + countryAndSubregions CountryAndSubregions, + ... +} +``` + + +### SequenceOfIdentifiedRegion +This type is used for clarity of definitions. +```asn1 +SequenceOfIdentifiedRegion ::= SEQUENCE OF IdentifiedRegion +``` + + +### UnCountryId +This type contains the integer representation of the country or + area identifier as defined by the United Nations Statistics Division in + October 2013 (see normative references in Clause 0). + A conformant implementation that implements IdentifiedRegion shall + recognize (in the sense of “be able to determine whether a two dimensional + location lies inside or outside the borders identified by”) at least one + value of UnCountryId. The Protocol Implementation Conformance Statement + (PICS) provided in Annex A allows an implementation to state which + UnCountryId values it recognizes. + Since 2013 and before the publication of this version of this standard, + three changes have been made to the country code list, to define the + region "sub-Saharan Africa" and remove the "developed regions", and + "developing regions". A conformant implementation may recognize these + region identifiers in the sense defined in the previous paragraph. + If a verifying implementation is required to check that relevant + geographic information in a signed SPDU is consistent with a certificate + containing one or more instances of this type, then the SDS is permitted + to indicate that the signed SPDU is valid even if some instances of this + type are unrecognized in the sense defined above, so long as the + recognized instances of this type completely contain the relevant + geographic information. Informally, if the recognized values in the + certificate allow the SDS to determine that the SPDU is valid, then it + can make that determination even if there are also unrecognized values in + the certificate. This field is therefore not a "critical information + field" as defined in 5.2.6, because unrecognized values are permitted so + long as the validity of the SPDU can be established with the recognized + values. However, as discussed in 5.2.6, the presence of an unrecognized + value in a certificate can make it impossible to determine whether the + certificate and the SPDU are valid. +```asn1 +UnCountryId ::= Uint16 +``` + + +### CountryOnly +This type is defined only for backwards compatibility. +```asn1 +CountryOnly ::= UnCountryId +``` + +### CountryAndRegions +A conformant implementation that supports CountryAndRegions shall + support a regions field containing at least eight entries. + A conformant implementation that implements this type shall recognize + (in the sense of "be able to determine whether a two dimensional location + lies inside or outside the borders identified by") at least one value of + UnCountryId and at least one value for a region within the country + indicated by that recognized UnCountryId value. In this version of this + standard, the only means to satisfy this is for a conformant + implementation to recognize the value of UnCountryId indicating USA and + at least one of the FIPS state codes for US states. The Protocol + Implementation Conformance Statement (PICS) provided in Annex A allows + an implementation to state which UnCountryId values it recognizes and + which region values are recognized within that country. + If a verifying implementation is required to check that an relevant + geographic information in a signed SPDU is consistent with a certificate + containing one or more instances of this type, then the SDS is permitted + to indicate that the signed SPDU is valid even if some values of country + or within regions are unrecognized in the sense defined above, so long + as the recognized instances of this type completely contain the relevant + geographic information. Informally, if the recognized values in the + certificate allow the SDS to determine that the SPDU is valid, then it + can make that determination even if there are also unrecognized values + in the certificate. This field is therefore not a "critical information + field" as defined in 5.2.6, because unrecognized values are permitted so + long as the validity of the SPDU can be established with the recognized + values. However, as discussed in 5.2.6, the presence of an unrecognized + value in a certificate can make it impossible to determine whether the + certificate is valid and so whether the SPDU is valid. + In this type: + +Fields: +* countryOnly of type [**UnCountryId**](#UnCountryId)
+ is a UnCountryId as defined above. + + +* regions of type [**SequenceOfUint8**](#SequenceOfUint8)
+ identifies one or more regions within the country. If + country indicates the United States of America, the values in this field + identify the state or statistically equivalent entity using the integer + version of the 2010 FIPS codes as provided by the U.S. Census Bureau + (see normative references in Clause 0). For other values of country, the + meaning of region is not defined in this version of this standard. + + + + +```asn1 +CountryAndRegions ::= SEQUENCE { + countryOnly UnCountryId, + regions SequenceOfUint8 +} +``` + +### CountryAndSubregions +A conformant implementation that supports CountryAndSubregions + shall support a regionAndSubregions field containing at least eight + entries. + A conformant implementation that implements this type shall recognize + (in the sense of “be able to determine whether a two dimensional location + lies inside or outside the borders identified by”) at least one value of + country and at least one value for a region within the country indicated + by that recognized country value. In this version of this standard, the + only means to satisfy this is for a conformant implementation to recognize + the value of UnCountryId indicating USA and at least one of the FIPS state + codes for US states. The Protocol Implementation Conformance Statement + (PICS) provided in Annex A allows an implementation to state which + UnCountryId values it recognizes and which region values are recognized + within that country. + If a verifying implementation is required to check that an relevant + geographic information in a signed SPDU is consistent with a certificate + containing one or more instances of this type, then the SDS is permitted + to indicate that the signed SPDU is valid even if some values of country + or within regionAndSubregions are unrecognized in the sense defined above, + so long as the recognized instances of this type completely contain the + relevant geographic information. Informally, if the recognized values in + the certificate allow the SDS to determine that the SPDU is valid, then + it can make that determination even if there are also unrecognized values + in the certificate. This field is therefore not a "critical information + field" as defined in 5.2.6, because unrecognized values are permitted so + long as the validity of the SPDU can be established with the recognized + values. However, as discussed in 5.2.6, the presence of an unrecognized + value in a certificate can make it impossible to determine whether the + certificate is valid and so whether the SPDU is valid. + In this structure: + +Fields: +* countryOnly of type [**UnCountryId**](#UnCountryId)
+ is a UnCountryId as defined above. + + +* regionAndSubregions of type [**SequenceOfRegionAndSubregions**](#SequenceOfRegionAndSubregions)
+ identifies one or more subregions within + country. + + + + +```asn1 +CountryAndSubregions ::= SEQUENCE { + countryOnly UnCountryId, + regionAndSubregions SequenceOfRegionAndSubregions +} +``` + +### RegionAndSubregions +The meanings of the fields in this structure are to be interpreted + in the context of a country within which the region is located, referred + to as the "enclosing country". If this structure is used in a + CountryAndSubregions structure, the enclosing country is the one indicated + by the country field in the CountryAndSubregions structure. If other uses + are defined for this structure in future, it is expected that that + definition will include a specification of how the enclosing country can + be determined. + If the enclosing country is the United States of America: + - The region field identifies the state or statistically equivalent + entity using the integer version of the 2010 FIPS codes as provided by the + U.S. Census Bureau (see normative references in Clause 0). + - The values in the subregions field identify the county or county + equivalent entity using the integer version of the 2010 FIPS codes as + provided by the U.S. Census Bureau. + If the enclosing country is a different country from the USA, the meaning + of regionAndSubregions is not defined in this version of this standard. + A conformant implementation that implements this type shall recognize (in + the sense of "be able to determine whether a two-dimensional location lies + inside or outside the borders identified by"), for at least one enclosing + country, at least one value for a region within that country and at least + one subregion for the indicated region. In this version of this standard, + the only means to satisfy this is for a conformant implementation to + recognize, for the USA, at least one of the FIPS state codes for US + states, and at least one of the county codes in at least one of the + recognized states. The Protocol Implementation Conformance Statement + (PICS) provided in Annex A allows an implementation to state which + UnCountryId values it recognizes and which region values are recognized + within that country. + If a verifying implementation is required to check that an relevant + geographic information in a signed SPDU is consistent with a certificate + containing one or more instances of this type, then the SDS is permitted + to indicate that the signed SPDU is valid even if some values within + subregions are unrecognized in the sense defined above, so long as the + recognized instances of this type completely contain the relevant + geographic information. Informally, if the recognized values in the + certificate allow the SDS to determine that the SPDU is valid, then it + can make that determination even if there are also unrecognized values + in the certificate. This field is therefore not not a "critical + information field" as defined in 5.2.6, because unrecognized values are + permitted so long as the validity of the SPDU can be established with the + recognized values. However, as discussed in 5.2.6, the presence of an + unrecognized value in a certificate can make it impossible to determine + whether the certificate is valid and so whether the SPDU is valid. + In this structure: + +Fields: +* region of type [**Uint8**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Uint8)
+ identifies a region within a country. + + +* subregions of type [**SequenceOfUint16**](#SequenceOfUint16)
+ identifies one or more subregions within region. A + conformant implementation that supports RegionAndSubregions shall support + a subregions field containing at least eight entries. + + + + +```asn1 +RegionAndSubregions ::= SEQUENCE { + region Uint8, + subregions SequenceOfUint16 +} +``` + + +### SequenceOfRegionAndSubregions +This type is used for clarity of definitions. +```asn1 +SequenceOfRegionAndSubregions ::= SEQUENCE OF RegionAndSubregions +``` + +### ThreeDLocation +This structure contains an estimate of 3D location. The details of + the structure are given in the definitions of the individual fields below. + +Fields: +* latitude of type [**Latitude**](#Latitude)
+* longitude of type [**Longitude**](#Longitude)
+ +* elevation of type [**Elevation**](#Elevation)
+ + +>>> +NOTE: The units used in this data structure are consistent with the + location data structures used in SAE J2735 [B26], though the encoding is + incompatible. +>>> +```asn1 +ThreeDLocation ::= SEQUENCE { + latitude Latitude, + longitude Longitude, + elevation Elevation +} +``` + + +### Latitude +This type contains an INTEGER encoding an estimate of the latitude + with precision 1/10th microdegree relative to the World Geodetic System + (WGS)-84 datum as defined in NIMA Technical Report TR8350.2. + The integer in the latitude field is no more than 900 000 000 and no less + than ?900 000 000, except that the value 900 000 001 is used to indicate + the latitude was not available to the sender. +```asn1 +Latitude ::= NinetyDegreeInt +``` + + +### Longitude +This type contains an INTEGER encoding an estimate of the longitude + with precision 1/10th microdegree relative to the World Geodetic System + (WGS)-84 datum as defined in NIMA Technical Report TR8350.2. + The integer in the longitude field is no more than 1 800 000 000 and no + less than ?1 799 999 999, except that the value 1 800 000 001 is used to + indicate that the longitude was not available to the sender. +```asn1 +Longitude ::= OneEightyDegreeInt +``` + + +### Elevation +This structure contains an estimate of the geodetic altitude above + or below the WGS84 ellipsoid. The 16-bit value is interpreted as an + integer number of decimeters representing the height above a minimum + height of -409.5 m, with the maximum height being 6143.9 m. +```asn1 +Elevation ::= Uint16 +``` + + +### NinetyDegreeInt +The integer in the latitude field is no more than 900,000,000 and + no less than -900,000,000, except that the value 900,000,001 is used to + indicate the latitude was not available to the sender. +```asn1 +NinetyDegreeInt ::= INTEGER { + min (-900000000), + max (900000000), + unknown (900000001) +} (-900000000..900000001) +``` + + +### KnownLatitude +The known latitudes are from -900,000,000 to +900,000,000 in 0.1 + microdegree intervals. +```asn1 +KnownLatitude ::= NinetyDegreeInt (min..max) +``` + + +### UnknownLatitude +The value 900,000,001 indicates that the latitude was not + available to the sender. +```asn1 +UnknownLatitude ::= NinetyDegreeInt (unknown) +``` + + +### OneEightyDegreeInt +The integer in the longitude field is no more than 1,800,000,000 + and no less than -1,799,999,999, except that the value 1,800,000,001 is + used to indicate that the longitude was not available to the sender. +```asn1 +OneEightyDegreeInt ::= INTEGER { + min (-1799999999), + max (1800000000), + unknown (1800000001) +} (-1799999999..1800000001) +``` + + +### KnownLongitude +The known longitudes are from -1,799,999,999 to +1,800,000,000 in + 0.1 microdegree intervals. +```asn1 +KnownLongitude ::= OneEightyDegreeInt (min..max) +``` + + +### UnknownLongitude +The value 1,800,000,001 indicates that the longitude was not + available to the sender. +```asn1 +UnknownLongitude ::= OneEightyDegreeInt (unknown) +``` + +### Signature +This structure represents a signature for a supported public key + algorithm. It may be contained within SignedData or Certificate. + +Fields: +* ecdsaNistP256Signature of type [**EcdsaP256Signature**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#EcdsaP256Signature)
+* ecdsaBrainpoolP256r1Signature of type [**EcdsaP256Signature**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#EcdsaP256Signature)
+ +* ecdsaBrainpoolP384r1Signature of type [**EcdsaP384Signature**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#EcdsaP384Signature)
+ + ..., +* ecdsaNistP384Signature of type [**EcdsaP384Signature**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#EcdsaP384Signature)
+ +* sm2Signature of type [**EcsigP256Signature**](#EcsigP256Signature)
+ + +>>> +NOTE: Canonicalization: This data structure is subject to canonicalization + for the relevant operations specified in 6.1.2. The canonicalization + applies to instances of this data structure of form EcdsaP256Signature + and EcdsaP384Signature. +>>> +```asn1 +Signature ::= CHOICE { + ecdsaNistP256Signature EcdsaP256Signature, + ecdsaBrainpoolP256r1Signature EcdsaP256Signature, + ..., + ecdsaBrainpoolP384r1Signature EcdsaP384Signature, + ecdsaNistP384Signature EcdsaP384Signature, + sm2Signature EcsigP256Signature +} +``` + +### EcdsaP256Signature +This structure represents an ECDSA signature. The signature is + generated as specified in 5.3.1. + + + If the signature process followed the specification of FIPS 186-4 + and output the integer r, r is represented as an EccP256CurvePoint + indicating the selection x-only. + + If the signature process followed the specification of SEC 1 and + output the elliptic curve point R to allow for fast verification, R is + represented as an EccP256CurvePoint indicating the choice compressed-y-0, + compressed-y-1, or uncompressed at the sender's discretion. + + + + NISTp256: + - p = FFFFFFFF00000001000000000000000000000000FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF + - n = FFFFFFFF00000000FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFBCE6FAADA7179E84F3B9CAC2FC632551 + + Brainpoolp256: + - p = A9FB57DBA1EEA9BC3E660A909D838D726E3BF623D52620282013481D1F6E5377 + - n = A9FB57DBA1EEA9BC3E660A909D838D718C397AA3B561A6F7901E0E82974856A7 + +Fields: +* rSig of type [**EccP256CurvePoint**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#EccP256CurvePoint)
+* sSig of type **OCTET STRING** (SIZE (32))
+ + +>>> +NOTE: When the signature is of form x-only, the x-value in rSig is + an integer mod n, the order of the group; when the signature is of form + compressed-y-\*, the x-value in rSig is an integer mod p, the underlying + prime defining the finite field. In principle this means that to convert a + signature from form compressed-y-\* to form x-only, the converter checks + the x-value to see if it lies between n and p and reduces it mod n if so. + In practice this check is unnecessary: Haase's Theorem states that + difference between n and p is always less than 2*square-root(p), and so the + chance that an integer lies between n and p, for a 256-bit curve, is + bounded above by approximately square-root(p)/p or 2(-128). For the + 256-bit curves in this standard, the exact values of n and p in hexadecimal + are: +>>> +```asn1 +EcdsaP256Signature ::= SEQUENCE { + rSig EccP256CurvePoint, + sSig OCTET STRING (SIZE (32)) +} +``` + +### EcdsaP384Signature +This structure represents an ECDSA signature. The signature is + generated as specified in 5.3.1. + + + If the signature process followed the specification of FIPS 186-4 + and output the integer r, r is represented as an EccP384CurvePoint + indicating the selection x-only. + + If the signature process followed the specification of SEC 1 and + output the elliptic curve point R to allow for fast verification, R is + represented as an EccP384CurvePoint indicating the choice compressed-y-0, + compressed-y-1, or uncompressed at the sender's discretion. + +Fields: +* rSig of type [**EccP384CurvePoint**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#EccP384CurvePoint)
+* sSig of type **OCTET STRING** (SIZE (48))
+ + +>>> +NOTE: When the signature is of form x-only, the x-value in rSig is + an integer mod n, the order of the group; when the signature is of form + compressed-y-\*, the x-value in rSig is an integer mod p, the underlying + prime defining the finite field. In principle this means that to convert a + signature from form compressed-y-* to form x-only, the converter checks the + x-value to see if it lies between n and p and reduces it mod n if so. In + practice this check is unnecessary: Haase's Theorem states that difference + between n and p is always less than 2*square-root(p), and so the chance + that an integer lies between n and p, for a 384-bit curve, is bounded + above by approximately square-root(p)/p or 2(-192). For the 384-bit curve + in this standard, the exact values of n and p in hexadecimal are: + - p = 8CB91E82A3386D280F5D6F7E50E641DF152F7109ED5456B412B1DA197FB71123 + ACD3A729901D1A71874700133107EC53 + - n = 8CB91E82A3386D280F5D6F7E50E641DF152F7109ED5456B31F166E6CAC0425A7 + CF3AB6AF6B7FC3103B883202E9046565 +>>> +```asn1 +EcdsaP384Signature ::= SEQUENCE { + rSig EccP384CurvePoint, + sSig OCTET STRING (SIZE (48)) +} +``` + +### EcsigP256Signature +This structure represents a elliptic curve signature where the + component r is constrained to be an integer. This structure supports SM2 + signatures as specified in 5.3.1.3. + +Fields: +* rSig of type **OCTET STRING** (SIZE (32))
+* sSig of type **OCTET STRING** (SIZE (32))
+ +```asn1 +EcsigP256Signature ::= SEQUENCE { + rSig OCTET STRING (SIZE (32)), + sSig OCTET STRING (SIZE (32)) +} +``` + +### EccP256CurvePoint +This structure specifies a point on an elliptic curve in Weierstrass + form defined over a 256-bit prime number. The curves supported in this + standard are NIST p256 as defined in FIPS 186-4, Brainpool p256r1 as + defined in RFC 5639, and the SM2 curve as defined in GB/T 32918.5-2017. + The fields in this structure are OCTET STRINGS produced with the elliptic + curve point encoding and decoding methods defined in subclause 5.5.6 of + IEEE Std 1363-2000. The x-coordinate is encoded as an unsigned integer of + length 32 octets in network byte order for all values of the CHOICE; the + encoding of the y-coordinate y depends on whether the point is x-only, + compressed, or uncompressed. If the point is x-only, y is omitted. If the + point is compressed, the value of type depends on the least significant + bit of y: if the least significant bit of y is 0, type takes the value + compressed-y-0, and if the least significant bit of y is 1, type takes the + value compressed-y-1. If the point is uncompressed, y is encoded explicitly + as an unsigned integer of length 32 octets in network byte order. + +Fields: +* x-only of type **OCTET STRING** (SIZE (32))
+* fill of type **NULL**
+ +* compressed-y-0 of type **OCTET STRING** (SIZE (32))
+ +* compressed-y-1 of type **OCTET STRING** (SIZE (32))
+ +* uncompressedP256 of type **SEQUENCE** { + x OCTET STRING (SIZE (32)), + y OCTET STRING (SIZE (32)) + }
+ + +>>> +NOTE: Canonicalization: This data structure is subject to canonicalization + for the relevant operations specified in 6.1.2 if it appears in a + HeaderInfo or in a ToBeSignedCertificate. See the definitions of HeaderInfo + and ToBeSignedCertificate for a specification of the canonicalization + operations. +>>> +```asn1 +EccP256CurvePoint::= CHOICE { + x-only OCTET STRING (SIZE (32)), + fill NULL, + compressed-y-0 OCTET STRING (SIZE (32)), + compressed-y-1 OCTET STRING (SIZE (32)), + uncompressedP256 SEQUENCE { + x OCTET STRING (SIZE (32)), + y OCTET STRING (SIZE (32)) + } +} +``` + +### EccP384CurvePoint +This structure specifies a point on an elliptic curve in + Weierstrass form defined over a 384-bit prime number. The only supported + such curve in this standard is Brainpool p384r1 as defined in RFC 5639. + The fields in this structure are octet strings produced with the elliptic + curve point encoding and decoding methods defined in subclause 5.5.6 of + IEEE Std 1363-2000. The x-coordinate is encoded as an unsigned integer of + length 48 octets in network byte order for all values of the CHOICE; the + encoding of the y-coordinate y depends on whether the point is x-only, + compressed, or uncompressed. If the point is x-only, y is omitted. If the + point is compressed, the value of type depends on the least significant + bit of y: if the least significant bit of y is 0, type takes the value + compressed-y-0, and if the least significant bit of y is 1, type takes the + value compressed-y-1. If the point is uncompressed, y is encoded + explicitly as an unsigned integer of length 48 octets in network byte order. + +Fields: +* x-only of type **OCTET STRING** (SIZE (48))
+* fill of type **NULL**
+ +* compressed-y-0 of type **OCTET STRING** (SIZE (48))
+ +* compressed-y-1 of type **OCTET STRING** (SIZE (48))
+ +* uncompressedP384 of type **SEQUENCE** { + x OCTET STRING (SIZE (48)), + y OCTET STRING (SIZE (48)) + }
+ + +>>> +NOTE: Canonicalization: This data structure is subject to canonicalization + for the relevant operations specified in 6.1.2 if it appears in a + HeaderInfo or in a ToBeSignedCertificate. See the definitions of HeaderInfo + and ToBeSignedCertificate for a specification of the canonicalization + operations. +>>> +```asn1 +EccP384CurvePoint::= CHOICE { + x-only OCTET STRING (SIZE (48)), + fill NULL, + compressed-y-0 OCTET STRING (SIZE (48)), + compressed-y-1 OCTET STRING (SIZE (48)), + uncompressedP384 SEQUENCE { + x OCTET STRING (SIZE (48)), + y OCTET STRING (SIZE (48)) + } +} +``` + + +### SymmAlgorithm +This enumerated value indicates supported symmetric algorithms. The + algorithm identifier identifies both the algorithm itself and a specific + mode of operation. The symmetric algorithms supported in this version of + this standard are AES-128 and SM4. The only mode of operation supported is + Counter Mode Encryption With Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication + Code (CCM). Full details are given in 5.3.8. +```asn1 +SymmAlgorithm ::= ENUMERATED { + aes128Ccm, + ..., + sm4Ccm +} +``` + + +### HashAlgorithm +This structure identifies a hash algorithm. The value sha256, + indicates SHA-256. The value sha384 indicates SHA-384. The value sm3 + indicates SM3. See 5.3.3 for more details. + +>>> +NOTE: Critical information fields: This is a critical information field as + defined in 5.2.6. An implementation that does not recognize the enumerated + value of this type in a signed SPDU when verifying a signed SPDU shall + indicate that the signed SPDU is invalid in the sense of 4.2.2.3.2, that + is, it is invalid in the sense that its validity cannot be established. +>>> +```asn1 +HashAlgorithm ::= ENUMERATED { + sha256, + ..., + sha384, + sm3 +} +``` + +### EciesP256EncryptedKey +This data structure is used to transfer a 16-byte symmetric key + encrypted using ECIES as specified in IEEE Std 1363a-2004. The symmetric + key is input to the key encryption process with no headers, encapsulation, + or length indication. Encryption and decryption are carried out as + specified in 5.3.5.1. + +Fields: +* v of type [**EccP256CurvePoint**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#EccP256CurvePoint)
+ is the sender's ephemeral public key, which is the output V from + encryption as specified in 5.3.5.1. + + +* c of type **OCTET STRING** (SIZE (16))
+ is the encrypted symmetric key, which is the output C from + encryption as specified in 5.3.5.1. The algorithm for the symmetric key + is identified by the CHOICE indicated in the following SymmetricCiphertext. + For ECIES this shall be AES-128. + + + +* t of type **OCTET STRING** (SIZE (16))
+ is the authentication tag, which is the output tag from + encryption as specified in 5.3.5.1. + + + + +```asn1 +EciesP256EncryptedKey ::= SEQUENCE { + v EccP256CurvePoint, + c OCTET STRING (SIZE (16)), + t OCTET STRING (SIZE (16)) +} +``` + +### EcencP256EncryptedKey +This data structure is used to transfer a 16-byte symmetric key + encrypted using SM2 encryption as specified in 5.3.3. The symmetric key is + input to the key encryption process with no headers, encapsulation, or + length indication. Encryption and decryption are carried out as specified + in 5.3.5.2. + +Fields: +* v of type [**EccP256CurvePoint**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#EccP256CurvePoint)
+ is the sender's ephemeral public key, which is the output V from + encryption as specified in 5.3.5.2. + + +* c of type **OCTET STRING** (SIZE (16))
+ is the encrypted symmetric key, which is the output C from + encryption as specified in 5.3.5.2. The algorithm for the symmetric key + is identified by the CHOICE indicated in the following SymmetricCiphertext. + For SM2 this algorithm shall be SM4. + + + +* t of type **OCTET STRING** (SIZE (32))
+ is the authentication tag, which is the output tag from + encryption as specified in 5.3.5.2. + + + + +```asn1 +EcencP256EncryptedKey ::= SEQUENCE { + v EccP256CurvePoint, + c OCTET STRING (SIZE (16)), + t OCTET STRING (SIZE (32)) +} +``` + +### EncryptionKey +This structure contains an encryption key, which may be a public or + a symmetric key. + +Fields: +* public of type [**PublicEncryptionKey**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#PublicEncryptionKey)
+* symmetric of type [**SymmetricEncryptionKey**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#SymmetricEncryptionKey)
+ + +>>> +NOTE: Canonicalization: This data structure is subject to canonicalization + for the relevant operations specified in 6.1.2 if it appears in a + HeaderInfo or in a ToBeSignedCertificate. The canonicalization applies to + the PublicEncryptionKey. See the definitions of HeaderInfo and + ToBeSignedCertificate for a specification of the canonicalization + operations. +>>> +```asn1 +EncryptionKey ::= CHOICE { + public PublicEncryptionKey, + symmetric SymmetricEncryptionKey +} +``` + +### PublicEncryptionKey +This structure specifies a public encryption key and the associated + symmetric algorithm which is used for bulk data encryption when encrypting + for that public key. + +Fields: +* supportedSymmAlg of type [**SymmAlgorithm**](#SymmAlgorithm)
+* publicKey of type [**BasePublicEncryptionKey**](#BasePublicEncryptionKey)
+ + +>>> +NOTE: Canonicalization: This data structure is subject to canonicalization + for the relevant operations specified in 6.1.2 if it appears in a + HeaderInfo or in a ToBeSignedCertificate. The canonicalization applies to + the BasePublicEncryptionKey. See the definitions of HeaderInfo and + ToBeSignedCertificate for a specification of the canonicalization + operations. +>>> +```asn1 +PublicEncryptionKey ::= SEQUENCE { + supportedSymmAlg SymmAlgorithm, + publicKey BasePublicEncryptionKey +} +``` + +### BasePublicEncryptionKey +This structure specifies the bytes of a public encryption key for + a particular algorithm. Supported public key encryption algorithms are + defined in 5.3.5. + +Fields: +* eciesNistP256 of type [**EccP256CurvePoint**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#EccP256CurvePoint)
+* eciesBrainpoolP256r1 of type [**EccP256CurvePoint**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#EccP256CurvePoint)
+ +* ecencSm2 of type [**EccP256CurvePoint**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#EccP256CurvePoint)
+ + ..., + +>>> +NOTE: Canonicalization: This data structure is subject to canonicalization + for the relevant operations specified in 6.1.2 if it appears in a + HeaderInfo or in a ToBeSignedCertificate. See the definitions of HeaderInfo + and ToBeSignedCertificate for a specification of the canonicalization + operations. +>>> +```asn1 +BasePublicEncryptionKey ::= CHOICE { + eciesNistP256 EccP256CurvePoint, + eciesBrainpoolP256r1 EccP256CurvePoint, + ..., + ecencSm2 EccP256CurvePoint +} +``` + +### PublicVerificationKey +This structure represents a public key and states with what + algorithm the public key is to be used. Cryptographic mechanisms are + defined in 5.3. + An EccP256CurvePoint or EccP384CurvePoint within a PublicVerificationKey + structure is invalid if it indicates the choice x-only. + +Fields: +* ecdsaNistP256 of type [**EccP256CurvePoint**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#EccP256CurvePoint)
+* ecdsaBrainpoolP256r1 of type [**EccP256CurvePoint**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#EccP256CurvePoint)
+ +* ecdsaBrainpoolP384r1 of type [**EccP384CurvePoint**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#EccP384CurvePoint)
+ + ... , +* ecdsaNistP384 of type [**EccP384CurvePoint**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#EccP384CurvePoint)
+ +* ecsigSm2 of type [**EccP256CurvePoint**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#EccP256CurvePoint)
+ + +>>> +NOTE: Canonicalization: This data structure is subject to canonicalization + for the relevant operations specified in 6.1.2. The canonicalization + applies to the EccP256CurvePoint and the Ecc384CurvePoint. Both forms of + point are encoded in compressed form, i.e., such that the choice indicated + within the Ecc*CurvePoint is compressed-y-0 or compressed-y-1. +>>> +```asn1 +PublicVerificationKey ::= CHOICE { + ecdsaNistP256 EccP256CurvePoint, + ecdsaBrainpoolP256r1 EccP256CurvePoint, + ... , + ecdsaBrainpoolP384r1 EccP384CurvePoint, + ecdsaNistP384 EccP384CurvePoint, + ecsigSm2 EccP256CurvePoint +} +``` + +### SymmetricEncryptionKey +This structure provides the key bytes for use with an identified + symmetric algorithm. The supported symmetric algorithms are AES-128 and + SM4 in CCM mode as specified in 5.3.8. + +Fields: +* aes128Ccm of type **OCTET STRING** (SIZE(16))
+* sm4Ccm of type **OCTET STRING** (SIZE(16))
+ + ..., +```asn1 +SymmetricEncryptionKey ::= CHOICE { + aes128Ccm OCTET STRING(SIZE(16)), + ..., + sm4Ccm OCTET STRING(SIZE(16)) +} +``` + +### PsidSsp +This structure represents the permissions that the certificate + holder has with respect to activities for a single application area, + identified by a Psid. + + + + + + + For consistency rules for other forms of the ssp field, see the + following subclauses. + +Fields: +* psid of type [**Psid**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Psid)
+* ssp of type [**ServiceSpecificPermissions**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#ServiceSpecificPermissions) OPTIONAL
+ + +>>> +NOTE: Consistency with issuing certificate: If a certificate has an + appPermissions entry A for which the ssp field is omitted, A is consistent + with the issuing certificate if the issuing certificate contains a + PsidSspRange P for which the following holds: + - The psid field in P is equal to the psid field in A and one of the + following is true: + - The sspRange field in P indicates all. + - The sspRange field in P indicates opaque and one of the entries in + opaque is an OCTET STRING of length 0. +>>> +```asn1 +PsidSsp ::= SEQUENCE { + psid Psid, + ssp ServiceSpecificPermissions OPTIONAL +} +``` + + +### SequenceOfPsidSsp +This type is used for clarity of definitions. +```asn1 +SequenceOfPsidSsp ::= SEQUENCE OF PsidSsp +``` + + +### Psid +This type represents the PSID defined in IEEE Std 1609.12. +```asn1 +Psid ::= INTEGER (0..MAX) +``` + + +### SequenceOfPsid +This type is used for clarity of definitions. +```asn1 +SequenceOfPsid ::= SEQUENCE OF Psid +``` + +### ServiceSpecificPermissions +This structure represents the Service Specific Permissions (SSP) + relevant to a given entry in a PsidSsp. The meaning of the SSP is specific + to the associated Psid. SSPs may be PSID-specific octet strings or + bitmap-based. See Annex C for further discussion of how application + specifiers may choose which SSP form to use. + + + + For consistency rules for other types of ServiceSpecificPermissions, + see the following subclauses. + +Fields: +* opaque of type **OCTET STRING** (SIZE(0..MAX))
+* bitmapSsp of type [**BitmapSsp**](#BitmapSsp)
+ + ..., + +>>> +NOTE: Consistency with issuing certificate: If a certificate has an + appPermissions entry A for which the ssp field is opaque, A is consistent + with the issuing certificate if the issuing certificate contains one of + the following: + - (OPTION 1) A SubjectPermissions field indicating the choice all and + no PsidSspRange field containing the psid field in A; + - (OPTION 2) A PsidSspRange P for which the following holds: + - The psid field in P is equal to the psid field in A and one of the + following is true: + - The sspRange field in P indicates all. + - The sspRange field in P indicates opaque and one of the entries in + the opaque field in P is an OCTET STRING identical to the opaque field in + A. +>>> +```asn1 +ServiceSpecificPermissions ::= CHOICE { + opaque OCTET STRING (SIZE(0..MAX)), + ..., + bitmapSsp BitmapSsp +} +``` + + +### BitmapSsp +This structure represents a bitmap representation of a SSP. The + mapping of the bits of the bitmap to constraints on the signed SPDU is + PSID-specific. + +>>> +NOTE: A BitmapSsp B is consistent with a BitmapSspRange R if for every + bit set to 1 in the sspBitmask in R, the bit in the identical position in + B is set equal to the bit in that position in the sspValue in R. For each + bit set to 0 in the sspBitmask in R, the corresponding bit in the + identical position in B may be freely set to 0 or 1, i.e., if a bit is + set to 0 in the sspBitmask in R, the value of corresponding bit in the + identical position in B has no bearing on whether B and R are consistent. +>>> +```asn1 +BitmapSsp ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(0..31)) +``` + +### PsidSspRange +This structure represents the certificate issuing or requesting + permissions of the certificate holder with respect to one particular set + of application permissions. + +Fields: +* psid of type [**Psid**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Psid)
+ identifies the application area. + + +* sspRange of type [**SspRange**](#SspRange) OPTIONAL
+ identifies the SSPs associated with that PSID for which + the holder may issue or request certificates. If sspRange is omitted, the + holder may issue or request certificates for any SSP for that PSID. + + + + +```asn1 +PsidSspRange ::= SEQUENCE { + psid Psid, + sspRange SspRange OPTIONAL +} +``` + + +### SequenceOfPsidSspRange +This type is used for clarity of definitions. +```asn1 +SequenceOfPsidSspRange ::= SEQUENCE OF PsidSspRange +``` + +### SspRange +This structure identifies the SSPs associated with a PSID for + which the holder may issue or request certificates. + + + + If a certificate has a PsidSspRange A for which the ssp field is all, + A is consistent with the issuing certificate if the issuing certificate + contains a PsidSspRange P for which the following holds: + - (OPTION 1) A SubjectPermissions field indicating the choice all and + no PsidSspRange field containing the psid field in A; + - (OPTION 2) A PsidSspRange P for which the psid field in P is equal to + the psid field in A and the sspRange field in P indicates all. + + For consistency rules for other types of SspRange, see the following + subclauses. + +Fields: +* opaque of type [**SequenceOfOctetString**](#SequenceOfOctetString)
+* all of type **NULL**
+ +* bitmapSspRange of type [**BitmapSspRange**](#BitmapSspRange)
+ + ..., + +>>> +NOTE: The choice "all" may also be indicated by omitting the + SspRange in the enclosing PsidSspRange structure. Omitting the SspRange is + preferred to explicitly indicating "all". +>>> +```asn1 +SspRange ::= CHOICE { + opaque SequenceOfOctetString, + all NULL, + ..., + bitmapSspRange BitmapSspRange +} +``` + +### BitmapSspRange +This structure represents a bitmap representation of a SSP. The + sspValue indicates permissions. The sspBitmask contains an octet string + used to permit or constrain sspValue fields in issued certificates. The + sspValue and sspBitmask fields shall be of the same length. + + + + Reference ETSI TS 103 097 for more information on bitmask SSPs. + +Fields: +* sspValue of type **OCTET STRING** (SIZE(1..32))
+* sspBitmask of type **OCTET STRING** (SIZE(1..32))
+ + +>>> +NOTE: Consistency with issuing certificate: If a certificate has an + PsidSspRange value P for which the sspRange field is bitmapSspRange, + P is consistent with the issuing certificate if the issuing certificate + contains one of the following: + - (OPTION 1) A SubjectPermissions field indicating the choice all and + no PsidSspRange field containing the psid field in P; + - (OPTION 2) A PsidSspRange R for which the following holds: + - The psid field in R is equal to the psid field in P and one of the + following is true: + - EITHER The sspRange field in R indicates all + - OR The sspRange field in R indicates bitmapSspRange and for every + bit set to 1 in the sspBitmask in R: + - The bit in the identical position in the sspBitmask in P is set + equal to 1, AND + - The bit in the identical position in the sspValue in P is set equal + to the bit in that position in the sspValue in R. +>>> +```asn1 +BitmapSspRange ::= SEQUENCE { + sspValue OCTET STRING (SIZE(1..32)), + sspBitmask OCTET STRING (SIZE(1..32)) +} +``` + + +### SubjectAssurance +This type is used for clarity of definitions. + +This field contains the certificate holder's assurance level, which + indicates the security of both the platform and storage of secret keys as + well as the confidence in this assessment. + + + This field is encoded as defined in Table 1, where "A" denotes bit + fields specifying an assurance level, "R" reserved bit fields, and "C" bit + fields specifying the confidence. + + Table 1: Bitwise encoding of subject assurance + + | Bit number | 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 0 | + | -------------- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | + | Interpretation | A | A | A | R | R | R | C | C | + + In Table 1, bit number 0 denotes the least significant bit. Bit 7 + to bit 5 denote the device's assurance levels, bit 4 to bit 2 are reserved + for future use, and bit 1 and bit 0 denote the confidence. + + The specification of these assurance levels as well as the + encoding of the confidence levels is outside the scope of the present + standard. It can be assumed that a higher assurance value indicates that + the holder is more trusted than the holder of a certificate with lower + assurance value and the same confidence value. + +>>> +NOTE: This field was originally specified in ETSI TS 103 097 and + future uses of this field are anticipated to be consistent with future + versions of that standard. +>>> +```asn1 +SubjectAssurance ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(1)) +``` + + +### CrlSeries +This integer identifies a series of CRLs issued under the authority + of a particular CRACA. +```asn1 +CrlSeries ::= Uint16 +``` + + +### IValue +This atomic type is used in the definition of other data structures. +```asn1 +IValue ::= Uint16 +``` + + +### Hostname +This is a UTF-8 string as defined in IETF RFC 3629. The contents + are determined by policy. +```asn1 +Hostname ::= UTF8String (SIZE(0..255)) +``` + + +### LinkageValue +This is the individual linkage value. See 5.1.3 and 7.3 for details + of use. +```asn1 +LinkageValue ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(9)) +``` + +### GroupLinkageValue +This is the group linkage value. See 5.1.3 and 7.3 for details of + use. + +Fields: +* jValue of type **OCTET STRING** (SIZE(4))
+* value of type **OCTET STRING** (SIZE(9))
+ +```asn1 +GroupLinkageValue ::= SEQUENCE { + jValue OCTET STRING (SIZE(4)), + value OCTET STRING (SIZE(9)) +} +``` + + +### LaId +This structure contains a LA Identifier for use in the algorithms + specified in 5.1.3.4. +```asn1 +LaId ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(2)) +``` + + +### SequenceOfLinkageSeed +This type is used for clarity of definitions. +```asn1 +SequenceOfLinkageSeed ::= SEQUENCE OF LinkageSeed +``` + + +### LinkageSeed +This structure contains a linkage seed value for use in the + algorithms specified in 5.1.3.4. +```asn1 +LinkageSeed ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(16)) +``` + +### CERT-EXT-TYPE +This structure is the Information Object Class used to contain + information about a set of certificate extensions that are associated with + each other: an AppExtension, a CertIssueExtension, and a + CertRequestExtension. + +Fields: +* id of type [**ExtId**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#ExtId)
+```asn1 +CERT-EXT-TYPE ::= CLASS { + &id ExtId, + &App, + &Issue, + &Req +} WITH SYNTAX {ID &id APP &App ISSUE &Issue REQUEST &Req} +``` + +### Extension +This parameterized type represents a (id, content) pair drawn from + the set ExtensionTypes, which is constrained to contain objects defined by + the class EXT-TYPE. + +Fields: +* id of type [**EXT-TYPE**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#EXT-TYPE) .&extId({ExtensionTypes})
+* content of type [**EXT-TYPE**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#EXT-TYPE) .&ExtContent({ExtensionTypes}{@.id})
+ +```asn1 +Extension {EXT-TYPE : ExtensionTypes} ::= SEQUENCE { + id EXT-TYPE.&extId({ExtensionTypes}), + content EXT-TYPE.&ExtContent({ExtensionTypes}{@.id}) +} +``` + +### EXT-TYPE +This class defines objects in a form suitable for import into the + definition of HeaderInfo. + +Fields: +* extId of type [**ExtId**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#ExtId)
+```asn1 +EXT-TYPE ::= CLASS { + &extId ExtId, + &ExtContent +} WITH SYNTAX {&ExtContent IDENTIFIED BY &extId} +``` + + +### ExtId +This type is used as an identifier for instances of ExtContent + within an EXT-TYPE. +```asn1 +ExtId ::= INTEGER(0..255) +``` + + + diff --git a/docs/Ieee1609Dot2Crl.md b/docs/Ieee1609Dot2Crl.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..49fecde --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/Ieee1609Dot2Crl.md @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +# ASN.1 module Ieee1609Dot2Crl + OID: _{iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) crl(3) major-version-3(3) minor-version-2(2)}_ + @note Section references in this file are to clauses in IEEE Std + 1609.2 unless indicated otherwise. Full forms of acronyms and + abbreviations used in this file are specified in 3.2. + + +## Imports: + * **[Ieee1609Dot2](Ieee1609Dot2.md)** *{iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) base(1) schema(1) major-version-2(2) minor-version-6(6)} WITH SUCCESSORS*
+ + * **[Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md)** *{iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) base(1) base-types(2) major-version-2(2) minor-version-4(4)} WITH SUCCESSORS*
+ + * **[Ieee1609Dot2CrlBaseTypes](Ieee1609Dot2CrlBaseTypes.md)** *{iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) crl(3) base-types(2) major-version-3(3) minor-version-2(2)} WITH SUCCESSORS*
+ +## Data Elements: + +### CrlPsid +This is the PSID for the CRL application. +```asn1 +CrlPsid ::= Psid(256) +``` + + +### SecuredCrl +This structure is the SPDU used to contain a signed CRL. A valid + signed CRL meets the validity criteria of 7.4. +```asn1 +SecuredCrl ::= Ieee1609Dot2Data (WITH COMPONENTS {..., + content (WITH COMPONENTS { + signedData (WITH COMPONENTS {..., + tbsData (WITH COMPONENTS { + payload (WITH COMPONENTS {..., + data (WITH COMPONENTS {..., + content (WITH COMPONENTS { + unsecuredData (CONTAINING CrlContents) + }) + }) + }), + headerInfo (WITH COMPONENTS {..., + psid (CrlPsid), + generationTime ABSENT, + expiryTime ABSENT, + generationLocation ABSENT, + p2pcdLearningRequest ABSENT, + missingCrlIdentifier ABSENT, + encryptionKey ABSENT + }) + }) + }) + }) +}) +``` + + + diff --git a/docs/Ieee1609Dot2CrlBaseTypes.md b/docs/Ieee1609Dot2CrlBaseTypes.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..017c37b --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/Ieee1609Dot2CrlBaseTypes.md @@ -0,0 +1,635 @@ +# ASN.1 module Ieee1609Dot2CrlBaseTypes + OID: _{iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) crl(3) base-types(2) major-version-3(3) minor-version-2(2)}_ + @note Section references in this file are to clauses in IEEE Std + 1609.2 unless indicated otherwise. Full forms of acronyms and + abbreviations used in this file are specified in 3.2. + + +## Imports: + * **[Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md)** *{iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) base(1) base-types(2) major-version-2(2) minor-version-4(4)} WITH SUCCESSORS*
+ +## Data Elements: +### CrlContents +The fields in this structure have the following meaning: + +Fields: +* version of type [**Uint8**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Uint8) (1)
+ is the version number of the CRL. For this version of this + standard it is 1. + + +* crlSeries of type [**CrlSeries**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#CrlSeries)
+ represents the CRL series to which this CRL belongs. This + is used to determine whether the revocation information in a CRL is relevant + to a particular certificate as specified in 5.1.3.2. + + + +* crlCraca of type [**HashedId8**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#HashedId8)
+ contains the low-order eight octets of the hash of the + certificate of the Certificate Revocation Authorization CA (CRACA) that + ultimately authorized the issuance of this CRL. This is used to determine + whether the revocation information in a CRL is relevant to a particular + certificate as specified in 5.1.3.2. In a valid signed CRL as specified in + 7.4 the crlCraca is consistent with the associatedCraca field in the + Service Specific Permissions as defined in 7.4.3.3. The HashedId8 is + calculated with the whole-certificate hash algorithm, determined as + described in 6.4.3, applied to the COER-encoded certificate, canonicalized + as defined in the definition of Certificate. + + + +* issueDate of type [**Time32**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Time32)
+ specifies the time when the CRL was issued. + + + +* nextCrl of type [**Time32**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Time32)
+ contains the time when the next CRL with the same crlSeries + and cracaId is expected to be issued. The CRL is invalid unless nextCrl is + strictly after issueDate. This field is used to set the expected update time + for revocation information associated with the (crlCraca, crlSeries) pair as + specified in 5.1.3.6. + + + +* priorityInfo of type [**CrlPriorityInfo**](#CrlPriorityInfo)
+ contains information that assists devices with limited + storage space in determining which revocation information to retain and + which to discard. + + + +* typeSpecific of type [**TypeSpecificCrlContents**](#TypeSpecificCrlContents)
+ contains the CRL body. + + + + +```asn1 +CrlContents ::= SEQUENCE { + version Uint8 (1), + crlSeries CrlSeries, + crlCraca HashedId8, + issueDate Time32, + nextCrl Time32, + priorityInfo CrlPriorityInfo, + typeSpecific TypeSpecificCrlContents +} +``` + +### CrlPriorityInfo +This data structure contains information that assists devices with + limited storage space in determining which revocation information to retain + and which to discard. + +Fields: +* priority of type [**Uint8**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Uint8) OPTIONAL
+ indicates the priority of the revocation information + relative to other CRLs issued for certificates with the same cracaId and + crlSeries values. A higher value for this field indicates higher importance + of this revocation information. + + + +>>> +NOTE: This mechanism is for future use; details are not specified in this + version of the standard. +>>> +```asn1 +CrlPriorityInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + priority Uint8 OPTIONAL, + ... +} +``` + +### TypeSpecificCrlContents +This structure contains type-specific CRL contents. + +Fields: +* fullHashCrl of type [**ToBeSignedHashIdCrl**](#ToBeSignedHashIdCrl)
+ contains a full hash-based CRL, i.e., a listing of the + hashes of all certificates that: + - contain the indicated cracaId and crlSeries values, and + - are revoked by hash, and + - have been revoked, and + - have not expired. + + +* deltaHashCrl of type [**ToBeSignedHashIdCrl**](#ToBeSignedHashIdCrl)
+ contains a delta hash-based CRL, i.e., a listing of + the hashes of all certificates that: + - contain the indicated cracaId and crlSeries values, and + - are revoked by hash, and + - have been revoked since the previous CRL that contained the indicated + cracaId and crlSeries values. + + + +* fullLinkedCrl of type [**ToBeSignedLinkageValueCrl**](#ToBeSignedLinkageValueCrl)
+ and fullLinkedCrlWithAlg: contain a full linkage + ID-based CRL, i.e., a listing of the individual and/or group linkage data + for all certificates that: + - contain the indicated cracaId and crlSeries values, and + - are revoked by linkage value, and + - have been revoked, and + - have not expired. + The difference between fullLinkedCrl and fullLinkedCrlWithAlg is in how + the cryptographic algorithms to be used in the seed evolution function and + linkage value generation function of 5.1.3.4 are communicated to the + receiver of the CRL. See below in this subclause for details. + + + +* deltaLinkedCrl of type [**ToBeSignedLinkageValueCrl**](#ToBeSignedLinkageValueCrl)
+ and deltaLinkedCrlWithAlg: contain a delta linkage + ID-based CRL, i.e., a listing of the individual and/or group linkage data + for all certificates that: + - contain the specified cracaId and crlSeries values, and + - are revoked by linkage data, and + - have been revoked since the previous CRL that contained the indicated + cracaId and crlSeries values. + The difference between deltaLinkedCrl and deltaLinkedCrlWithAlg is in how + the cryptographic algorithms to be used in the seed evolution function + and linkage value generation function of 5.1.3.4 are communicated to the + receiver of the CRL. See below in this subclause for details. + + + +* fullLinkedCrlWithAlg of type [**ToBeSignedLinkageValueCrlWithAlgIdentifier**](#ToBeSignedLinkageValueCrlWithAlgIdentifier)
+ + ..., +* deltaLinkedCrlWithAlg of type [**ToBeSignedLinkageValueCrlWithAlgIdentifier**](#ToBeSignedLinkageValueCrlWithAlgIdentifier)
+ +If the contents of this structure is a + ToBeSignedLinkageValueCrlWithAlgIdentifier, then the seed evolution function + and linkage value generation function are given explicitly as specified in + the specification of ToBeSignedLinkageValueCrlWithAlgIdentifier. + + If the contents of this structure is a ToBeSignedLinkageValueCrl, then the + seed evolution function and linkage value generation function are obtained + based on the crlCraca field in the CrlContents: + - If crlCraca was obtained with SHA-256 or SHA-384, then + seedEvolutionFunctionIdentifier is seedEvoFn1-sha256 and + linkageValueGenerationFunctionIdentifier is lvGenFn1-aes128. + - If crlCraca was obtained with SM3, then seedEvolutionFunctionIdentifier + is seedEvoFn1-sm3 and linkageValueGenerationFunctionIdentifier is + lvGenFn1-sm4. + +>>> +NOTE: Seed evolution function and linkage value generation function + identification. In order to derive linkage values per the mechanisms given + in 5.1.3.4, a receiver needs to know the seed evolution function and the + linkage value generation function. +>>> +```asn1 +TypeSpecificCrlContents ::= CHOICE { + fullHashCrl ToBeSignedHashIdCrl, + deltaHashCrl ToBeSignedHashIdCrl, + fullLinkedCrl ToBeSignedLinkageValueCrl, + deltaLinkedCrl ToBeSignedLinkageValueCrl, + ..., + fullLinkedCrlWithAlg ToBeSignedLinkageValueCrlWithAlgIdentifier, + deltaLinkedCrlWithAlg ToBeSignedLinkageValueCrlWithAlgIdentifier +} +``` + +### ToBeSignedHashIdCrl +This data structure represents information about a revoked + certificate. + +Fields: +* crlSerial of type [**Uint32**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Uint32)
+ is a counter that increments by 1 every time a new full + or delta CRL is issued for the indicated crlCraca and crlSeries values. + + +* entries of type [**SequenceOfHashBasedRevocationInfo**](#SequenceOfHashBasedRevocationInfo)
+ contains the individual revocation information items. + + + + +>>> +NOTE: To indicate that a hash-based CRL contains no individual revocation + information items, the recommended approach is for the SEQUENCE OF in the + SequenceOfHashBasedRevocationInfo in this field to indicate zero entries. +>>> +```asn1 +ToBeSignedHashIdCrl ::= SEQUENCE { + crlSerial Uint32, + entries SequenceOfHashBasedRevocationInfo, + ... +} +``` + + +### SequenceOfHashBasedRevocationInfo +This type is used for clarity of definitions. +```asn1 +SequenceOfHashBasedRevocationInfo ::= + SEQUENCE OF HashBasedRevocationInfo +``` + +### HashBasedRevocationInfo +In this structure: + +Fields: +* id of type [**HashedId10**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#HashedId10)
+ is the HashedId10 identifying the revoked certificate. The + HashedId10 is calculated with the whole-certificate hash algorithm, + determined as described in 6.4.3, applied to the COER-encoded certificate, + canonicalized as defined in the definition of Certificate. + + +* expiry of type [**Time32**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Time32)
+ is the value computed from the validity period's start and + duration values in that certificate. + + + + +```asn1 +HashBasedRevocationInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + id HashedId10, + expiry Time32, + ... +} +``` + +### ToBeSignedLinkageValueCrl +In this structure: + +Fields: +* iRev of type [**IValue**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#IValue)
+ is the value iRev used in the algorithm given in 5.1.3.4. This + value applies to all linkage-based revocation information included within + either indvidual or groups. + + +* indexWithinI of type [**Uint8**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Uint8)
+ is a counter that is set to 0 for the first CRL issued + for the indicated combination of crlCraca, crlSeries, and iRev, and + increments by 1 every time a new full or delta CRL is issued for the + indicated crlCraca and crlSeries values without changing iRev. + + + +* individual of type [**SequenceOfJMaxGroup**](#SequenceOfJMaxGroup) OPTIONAL
+ contains individual linkage data. + + + +* groups of type [**SequenceOfGroupCrlEntry**](#SequenceOfGroupCrlEntry) OPTIONAL
+ contains group linkage data. + + + +* groupsSingleSeed of type [**SequenceOfGroupSingleSeedCrlEntry**](#SequenceOfGroupSingleSeedCrlEntry) OPTIONAL
+ contains group linkage data generated with a single + seed. + + + + + ..., + +>>> +NOTE: To indicate that a linkage ID-based CRL contains no group linkage + data, the recommended approach is for the SEQUENCE OF in the + SequenceOfGroupCrlEntry in this field to indicate zero entries. +>>> +```asn1 +ToBeSignedLinkageValueCrl ::= SEQUENCE { + iRev IValue, + indexWithinI Uint8, + individual SequenceOfJMaxGroup OPTIONAL, + groups SequenceOfGroupCrlEntry OPTIONAL, + ..., + groupsSingleSeed SequenceOfGroupSingleSeedCrlEntry OPTIONAL +} (WITH COMPONENTS {..., individual PRESENT} | + WITH COMPONENTS {..., groups PRESENT} | + WITH COMPONENTS {..., groupsSingleSeed PRESENT}) +``` + + +### SequenceOfJMaxGroup +This type is used for clarity of definitions. +```asn1 +SequenceOfJMaxGroup ::= SEQUENCE OF JMaxGroup +``` + +### JMaxGroup +In this structure: + +Fields: +* jmax of type [**Uint8**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Uint8)
+* contents of type [**SequenceOfLAGroup**](#SequenceOfLAGroup)
+ contains individual linkage data. + + + + +```asn1 +JMaxGroup ::= SEQUENCE { + jmax Uint8, + contents SequenceOfLAGroup, + ... +} +``` + + +### SequenceOfLAGroup +This type is used for clarity of definitions. +```asn1 +SequenceOfLAGroup ::= SEQUENCE OF LAGroup +``` + +### LAGroup +In this structure: + +Fields: +* la1Id of type [**LaId**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#LaId)
+ is the value LinkageAuthorityIdentifier1 used in the + algorithm given in 5.1.3.4. This value applies to all linkage-based + revocation information included within contents. + + +* la2Id of type [**LaId**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#LaId)
+ is the value LinkageAuthorityIdentifier2 used in the + algorithm given in 5.1.3.4. This value applies to all linkage-based + revocation information included within contents. + + + +* contents of type [**SequenceOfIMaxGroup**](#SequenceOfIMaxGroup)
+ contains individual linkage data. + + + + +```asn1 +LAGroup ::= SEQUENCE { + la1Id LaId, + la2Id LaId, + contents SequenceOfIMaxGroup, + ... +} +``` + + +### SequenceOfIMaxGroup +This type is used for clarity of definitions. +```asn1 +SequenceOfIMaxGroup ::= SEQUENCE OF IMaxGroup +``` + +### IMaxGroup +In this structure: + +Fields: +* iMax of type [**Uint16**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Uint16)
+ indicates that for the entries in contents, revocation + information need no longer be calculated once iCert > iMax as the holder + is known to have no more valid certs at that point. iMax is not directly + used in the calculation of the linkage values, it is used to determine + when revocation information can safely be deleted. + + +* contents of type [**SequenceOfIndividualRevocation**](#SequenceOfIndividualRevocation)
+ contains individual linkage data for certificates that are + revoked using two seeds, per the algorithm given in per the mechanisms + given in 5.1.3.4 and with seedEvolutionFunctionIdentifier and + linkageValueGenerationFunctionIdentifier obtained as specified in 7.3.3. + + + +* singleSeed of type [**SequenceOfLinkageSeed**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#SequenceOfLinkageSeed) OPTIONAL
+ contains individual linkage data for certificates that + are revoked using a single seed, per the algorithm given in per the + mechanisms given in 5.1.3.4 and with seedEvolutionFunctionIdentifier and + linkageValueGenerationFunctionIdentifier obtained as specified in 7.3.3. + + + + + ..., +```asn1 +IMaxGroup ::= SEQUENCE { + iMax Uint16, + contents SequenceOfIndividualRevocation, + ..., + singleSeed SequenceOfLinkageSeed OPTIONAL +} +``` + + +### SequenceOfIndividualRevocation +This type is used for clarity of definitions. +```asn1 +SequenceOfIndividualRevocation ::= + SEQUENCE (SIZE(0..MAX)) OF IndividualRevocation +``` + +### IndividualRevocation +In this structure: + +Fields: +* linkageSeed1 of type [**LinkageSeed**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#LinkageSeed)
+ is the value LinkageSeed1 used in the algorithm given + in 5.1.3.4. + + +* linkageSeed2 of type [**LinkageSeed**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#LinkageSeed)
+ is the value LinkageSeed2 used in the algorithm given + in 5.1.3.4. + + + + +```asn1 +IndividualRevocation ::= SEQUENCE { + linkageSeed1 LinkageSeed, + linkageSeed2 LinkageSeed, + ... +} +``` + + +### SequenceOfGroupCrlEntry +This type is used for clarity of definitions. +```asn1 +SequenceOfGroupCrlEntry ::= SEQUENCE OF GroupCrlEntry +``` + +### GroupCrlEntry +In this structure: + +Fields: +* iMax of type [**Uint16**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Uint16)
+ indicates that for these certificates, revocation information + need no longer be calculated once iCert > iMax as the holders are known + to have no more valid certs for that (crlCraca, crlSeries) at that point. + + +* la1Id of type [**LaId**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#LaId)
+ is the value LinkageAuthorityIdentifier1 used in the + algorithm given in 5.1.3.4. This value applies to all linkage-based + revocation information included within contents. + + + +* linkageSeed1 of type [**LinkageSeed**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#LinkageSeed)
+ is the value LinkageSeed1 used in the algorithm given + in 5.1.3.4. + + + +* la2Id of type [**LaId**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#LaId)
+ is the value LinkageAuthorityIdentifier2 used in the + algorithm given in 5.1.3.4. This value applies to all linkage-based + revocation information included within contents. + + + +* linkageSeed2 of type [**LinkageSeed**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#LinkageSeed)
+ is the value LinkageSeed2 used in the algorithm given + in 5.1.3.4. + + + + +```asn1 +GroupCrlEntry ::= SEQUENCE { + iMax Uint16, + la1Id LaId, + linkageSeed1 LinkageSeed, + la2Id LaId, + linkageSeed2 LinkageSeed, + ... +} +``` + +### ToBeSignedLinkageValueCrlWithAlgIdentifier +In this structure: + +Fields: +* iRev of type [**IValue**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#IValue)
+ is the value iRev used in the algorithm given in 5.1.3.4. This + value applies to all linkage-based revocation information included within + either indvidual or groups. + + +* indexWithinI of type [**Uint8**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Uint8)
+ is a counter that is set to 0 for the first CRL issued + for the indicated combination of crlCraca, crlSeries, and iRev, and increments by 1 every time a new full or delta CRL is issued for the indicated crlCraca and crlSeries values without changing iRev. + + + +* seedEvolution of type [**SeedEvolutionFunctionIdentifier**](#SeedEvolutionFunctionIdentifier)
+ contains an identifier for the seed evolution + function, used as specified in 5.1.3.4. + + + +* lvGeneration of type [**LvGenerationFunctionIdentifier**](#LvGenerationFunctionIdentifier)
+ contains an identifier for the linkage value + generation function, used as specified in 5.1.3.4. + + + +* individual of type [**SequenceOfJMaxGroup**](#SequenceOfJMaxGroup) OPTIONAL
+ contains individual linkage data. + + + +* groups of type [**SequenceOfGroupCrlEntry**](#SequenceOfGroupCrlEntry) OPTIONAL
+ contains group linkage data for linkage value generation + with two seeds. + + + +* groupsSingleSeed of type [**SequenceOfGroupSingleSeedCrlEntry**](#SequenceOfGroupSingleSeedCrlEntry) OPTIONAL
+ contains group linkage data for linkage value + generation with one seed. + + + + +```asn1 +ToBeSignedLinkageValueCrlWithAlgIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE { + iRev IValue, + indexWithinI Uint8, + seedEvolution SeedEvolutionFunctionIdentifier, + lvGeneration LvGenerationFunctionIdentifier, + individual SequenceOfJMaxGroup OPTIONAL, + groups SequenceOfGroupCrlEntry OPTIONAL, + groupsSingleSeed SequenceOfGroupSingleSeedCrlEntry OPTIONAL, + ... +} (WITH COMPONENTS {..., individual PRESENT} | + WITH COMPONENTS {..., groups PRESENT} | + WITH COMPONENTS {..., groupsSingleSeed PRESENT}) +``` + + +### SequenceOfGroupSingleSeedCrlEntry +This type is used for clarity of definitions. +```asn1 +SequenceOfGroupSingleSeedCrlEntry ::= + SEQUENCE OF GroupSingleSeedCrlEntry +``` + +### GroupSingleSeedCrlEntry +This structure contains the linkage seed for group revocation with + a single seed. The seed is used as specified in the algorithms in 5.1.3.4. + +Fields: +* iMax of type [**Uint16**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Uint16)
+* laId of type [**LaId**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#LaId)
+ +* linkageSeed of type [**LinkageSeed**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#LinkageSeed)
+ +```asn1 +GroupSingleSeedCrlEntry ::= SEQUENCE { + iMax Uint16, + laId LaId, + linkageSeed LinkageSeed +} +``` + + +### ExpansionAlgorithmIdentifier +This structure contains an identifier for the algorithms specified + in 5.1.3.4. +```asn1 +ExpansionAlgorithmIdentifier ::= ENUMERATED { + sha256ForI-aesForJ, + sm3ForI-sm4ForJ, + ... +} +``` + + +### SeedEvolutionFunctionIdentifier +This is the identifier for the seed evolution function. See 5.1.3 + for details of use. +```asn1 +SeedEvolutionFunctionIdentifier ::= NULL +``` + + +### LvGenerationFunctionIdentifier +This is the identifier for the linkage value generation function. + See 5.1.3 for details of use. +```asn1 +LvGenerationFunctionIdentifier ::= NULL +``` + + + +This is the identifier for the seed evolution function. See 5.1.3 + for details of use. + This is the identifier for the linkage value generation function. + See 5.1.3 for details of use. + + diff --git a/docs/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaEeInterface.md b/docs/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaEeInterface.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4135d5c --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaEeInterface.md @@ -0,0 +1,95 @@ +# ASN.1 module Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaEeInterface + OID: _{iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) aca-ee(1) major-version-2(2) minor-version-3(3)}_ + @note Section references in this file are to clauses in IEEE Std + 1609.2.1 unless indicated otherwise. Full forms of acronyms and + abbreviations used in this file are specified in 3.2. + + +## Imports: + * **[Ieee1609Dot2](Ieee1609Dot2.md)** *{iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) base(1) schema(1) major-version-2(2) minor-version-5(5)} WITH SUCCESSORS*
+ + * **[Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md)** *{iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) base(1) base-types(2) major-version-2(2) minor-version-3(3)} WITH SUCCESSORS*
+ +## Data Elements: +### AcaEeInterfacePdu +This is the parent structure for all structures exchanged between + the ACA and the EE. The ACA - EE interface is a logical interface rather + than a direct communications interface in that there is no direct message + flow between the ACA and the EE: Messages from the ACA are stored + by the RA and subsequently forwarded to the EE. The PDUs are identified as + ACA-EE PDUs even though the RA acts as a forwarder for them because those + PDUs are created by the ACA and encrypted for the EE, and not modified and + frequently not read by the RA. An overview of this structure is as follows: + +Fields: +* acaEeCertResponse of type [**AcaEeCertResponse**](#AcaEeCertResponse)
+ contains the ACA's response to + RaAcaCertRequestSPDU, which is meant for the EE and sent via the RA. + + + +```asn1 +AcaEeInterfacePdu ::= CHOICE { + acaEeCertResponse AcaEeCertResponse, + ... +} +``` + +### AcaEeCertResponse +This structure contains a certificate and associated data as + generated by the ACA for the EE that will be the holder of that + certificate. An overview of this structure is as follows: + +Fields: +* version of type [**Uint8**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Uint8) (2)
+ contains the current version of the structure. + + +* generationTime of type [**Time32**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Time32)
+ contains the generation time of AcaEeCertResponse. + + + +* certificate of type [**Certificate**](Ieee1609Dot2.md#Certificate)
+ contains an authorization certificate generated by the + ACA. It is of the type indicated by the type field in the corresponding + request (if the requester requested an incorrect type, the response would + be an error not an instance of this structure). + + + +* privateKeyInfo of type **OCTET STRING** (SIZE (32)) OPTIONAL
+ shall be: + - Present and contain the private key randomization value, if the field + certificate.type is explicit and the butterfly key mechanism was used to + generate the certificate. This is used by the EE in deriving the butterfly + private key for explicit certificates as specified in 9.3. + - Present and contain the private key reconstruction value, if the field + certificate.type is implicit. This is used by the EE as specified in 5.3.2 + of IEEE Std 1609.2a-2017 (also 9.3 if the butterfly key mechanism is used). + - Absent otherwise. + + + + + +>>> +NOTE: In the case where the butterfly expansion function is used + to set certEncKey in RaAcaCertRequest, the value j is not communicated to + the ACA. However, the EE that receives the certificate response can only + decrypt the response if it knows j. The RA is therefore anticipated to + store j so that it can be associated with the appropriate certificate + response. The RA encodes j in the filename. +>>> +```asn1 +AcaEeCertResponse ::= SEQUENCE { + version Uint8 (2), + generationTime Time32, + certificate Certificate, + privateKeyInfo OCTET STRING (SIZE (32)) OPTIONAL, + ... +} +``` + + + diff --git a/docs/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaLaInterface.md b/docs/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaLaInterface.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4534146 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaLaInterface.md @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +# ASN.1 module Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaLaInterface + OID: _{iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) aca-la(2) major-version-2(2) minor-version-1(1)}_ + @note Section references in this file are to clauses in IEEE Std + 1609.2.1 unless indicated otherwise. Full forms of acronyms and + abbreviations used in this file are specified in 3.2. + + +## Data Elements: + +### AcaLaInterfacePdu +This structure is not used by EEs, so it is defined as NULL for + purposes of this document. +```asn1 +AcaLaInterfacePdu ::= NULL +``` + + + diff --git a/docs/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaMaInterface.md b/docs/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaMaInterface.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..455185a --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaMaInterface.md @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +# ASN.1 module Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaMaInterface + OID: _{iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) aca-ma(3) major-version-2(2) minor-version-1(1)}_ + @note Section references in this file are to clauses in IEEE Std + 1609.2.1 unless indicated otherwise. Full forms of acronyms and + abbreviations used in this file are specified in 3.2. + + +## Data Elements: + +### AcaMaInterfacePdu +This structure is not used by EEs, so it is defined as NULL for + purposes of this document. +```asn1 +AcaMaInterfacePdu ::= NULL +``` + + + diff --git a/docs/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaRaInterface.md b/docs/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaRaInterface.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..06e2c6c --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaRaInterface.md @@ -0,0 +1,324 @@ +# ASN.1 module Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaRaInterface + OID: _{iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) aca-ra(4) major-version-3(3) minor-version-1(1)}_ + @note Section references in this file are to clauses in IEEE Std + 1609.2.1 unless indicated otherwise. Full forms of acronyms and + abbreviations used in this file are specified in 3.2. + + +## Imports: + * **[Ieee1609Dot2](Ieee1609Dot2.md)** *{iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) base(1) schema(1) major-version-2(2) minor-version-5(5)} WITH SUCCESSORS*
+ + * **[Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md)** *{iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) base(1) base-types(2) major-version-2(2) minor-version-3(3)} WITH SUCCESSORS*
+ + * **[Ieee1609Dot2Dot1Protocol](Ieee1609Dot2Dot1Protocol.md)** *{iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) protocol(17) major-version-3(3) minor-version-1(1)} WITH SUCCESSORS*
+ +## Data Elements: +### AcaRaInterfacePdu +This is the parent structure for all structures exchanged between + the ACA and the RA. An overview of this structure is as follows: + +Fields: +* raAcaCertRequest of type [**RaAcaCertRequest**](#RaAcaCertRequest)
+ contains the request for an authorization + certificate from the RA to the ACA on behalf of the EE. + + +* acaRaCertResponse of type [**AcaRaCertResponse**](#AcaRaCertResponse)
+ contains the ACA's response to RaAcaCertRequest. + + + + +```asn1 +AcaRaInterfacePdu ::= CHOICE { + raAcaCertRequest RaAcaCertRequest, + acaRaCertResponse AcaRaCertResponse, + ... +} +``` + +### RaAcaCertRequest +This structure contains parameters needed to request an individual + authorization certificate. An overview of this structure is as follows: + + + + - The cracaId and crlSeries are set to the indicated values + in the request. The ACA replaces these values with the appropriate values + in the response. + + - The ACA is not bound by the contents of the request and can + issue certificates that are different from those requested, if so directed + by policy. + +Fields: +* version of type [**Uint8**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Uint8) (2)
+ contains the current version of the structure. + + +* generationTime of type [**Time32**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Time32)
+ contains the generation time of RaAcaCertRequest. + + + +* type of type [**CertificateType**](Ieee1609Dot2.md#CertificateType)
+ indicates whether the request is for an explicit or implicit + certificate (see 4.1.1, 4.1.3.3.1). + + + +* flags of type [**RaAcaCertRequestFlags**](#RaAcaCertRequestFlags)
+ contains the flags related to the use of the butterfly key + mechanism, and provides the following instructions to the ACA as to how + to generate the response: + - If the flag butterflyExplicit is set, the request is valid only if + the type field is set to explicit. In this case, the ACA uses the + butterfly key derivation for explicit certificates as specified in 9.3. + The field tbsCert.verifyKeyIndicator.verificationKey is used by the ACA as + the cocoon public key for signing. The field privateKeyInfo in the + corresponding AcaEeCertResponse is used by the EE as the random integer to + recover the butterfly private key for signing. + - If the flag cubk is set, the request is valid only if the certEncKey + field is absent. In this case, the ACA uses the compact unified variation + of the butterfly key mechanism as specified in 9.3. This means that the + ACA generates an AcaEeCertResponseCubkSpdu instead of an + AcaEeCertResponsePrivateSpdu, and the response is valid only if the ACA + certificate has the flag cubk set. + + + +* linkageInfo of type [**LinkageInfo**](#LinkageInfo) OPTIONAL
+ contains the encrypted prelinkage values needed to + generate the linkage value for the certificate. If linkageInfo is present, + the field tbsCert.id is of type LinkageData, where the iCert field is set + to the actual i-period value and the linkage-value field is set to a dummy + value to be replaced by the ACA with the actual linkage value. The + encrypted prelinkage values are encrypted for the ACA by the LAs. + + + +* certEncKey of type [**PublicEncryptionKey**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#PublicEncryptionKey) OPTIONAL
+ is used in combination with flags.cubk to indicate + the type of response that is expected from the ACA. It is as follows: + - Absent and flags.cubk is not set if the ACA's response doesn't need + to be encrypted. In this case, the ACA responds with + AcaEeCertResponsePlainSpdu. + - Absent and flags.cubk is set if the ACA's response is to be encrypted + with the verification key from the request and not signed. In this case, + the ACA responds with AcaEeCertResponseCubkSpdu. + - Present and flags.cubk is not set if the ACA's response is to be + encrypted with certEncKey and then signed by the ACA. In this case, the + ACA responds with AcaEeCertResponsePrivateSpdu. + + + +* tbsCert of type [**ToBeSignedCertificate**](Ieee1609Dot2.md#ToBeSignedCertificate) (WITH COMPONENTS { + ..., + cracaId ('000000'H)
+ contains parameters of the requested certificate. The + certificate type depends on the field type, as follows: + - If type is explicit, the request is valid only if + tbsCert.verifyKeyIndicator is a verificationKey. + - If type is implicit, the request is valid only if + tbsCert.verifyKeyIndicator is a reconstructionValue. + + + + +* appPermissions of type [**PRESENT**](#PRESENT)
+ +* certIssuePermissions of type [**ABSENT**](#ABSENT)
+ +* certRequestPermissions of type [**ABSENT**](#ABSENT)
+ + +>>> +NOTE:  - In the case where the butterfly key mechanism is used to set + certEncKey, the value of j is not communicated to the ACA. However, the EE + that receives the certificate response can only decrypt the response if it + knows j. The RA is therefore anticipated to store j so that it can be + associated with the appropriate certificate response. +>>> +```asn1 +RaAcaCertRequest ::= SEQUENCE { + version Uint8 (2), + generationTime Time32, + type CertificateType, + flags RaAcaCertRequestFlags, + linkageInfo LinkageInfo OPTIONAL, + certEncKey PublicEncryptionKey OPTIONAL, + tbsCert ToBeSignedCertificate (WITH COMPONENTS { + ..., + cracaId ('000000'H), + crlSeries (0), + appPermissions PRESENT, + certIssuePermissions ABSENT, + certRequestPermissions ABSENT + }), + ... +} +``` + +### LinkageInfo +This structure is used to convey information from the RA to the ACA + about operations to be carried out when generating the certificate. For + more details see the specification of RaAcaCertRequest. An overview of + this structure is as follows: + +This structure contains parameters needed to generate a linkage + value for a given (EE, i, j). An overview of this structure is as follows: + +Fields: +* encPlv1 of type [**EncryptedIndividualPLV**](#EncryptedIndividualPLV)
+ contains the EncryptedIndividualPLV from one of the LAs. + + +* encPlv2 of type [**EncryptedIndividualPLV**](#EncryptedIndividualPLV)
+ contains the EncryptedIndividualPLV from the other LA. + + + + + +>>> +NOTE: See Annex D for further discussion of LAs. +>>> +```asn1 +LinkageInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + encPlv1 EncryptedIndividualPLV, + encPlv2 EncryptedIndividualPLV, + ... +} +``` + +### EncryptedIndividualPLV +This structure contains an individual prelinkage value encrypted by + the LA for the ACA using the shared secret key. An overview of this + structure is as follows: + +Fields: +* version of type [**Uint8**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Uint8) (2)
+ contains the current version of the structure. + + +* laId of type [**LaId**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#LaId)
+ contains the ID of the LA that created the prelinkage value. + See Annex D for further discussion of LA IDs. + + + +* encPlv of type [**Ieee1609Dot2Data-SymmEncryptedSingleRecipient**](Ieee1609Dot2Dot1Protocol.md#Ieee1609Dot2Data-SymmEncryptedSingleRecipient) { + PreLinkageValue + }
+ contains the encrypted individual prelinkage value, that is, + the ciphertext field decrypts to a PreLinkageValue. It contains a pointer + (hash of the shared symmetric key) to the used shared secret encryption key. + + + + + +>>> +NOTE: How the ACA obtains the shared symmetric key and how the RA + associates the encPlv1 and encPlv2 with the correct certificate request are + outside the scope of this document. +>>> +```asn1 +EncryptedIndividualPLV ::= SEQUENCE { + version Uint8 (2), + laId LaId, + encPlv Ieee1609Dot2Data-SymmEncryptedSingleRecipient { + PreLinkageValue + } +} +``` + + +### PreLinkageValue +This structure contains an individual prelinkage value. It is an + octet string of length 9 octets. +```asn1 +PreLinkageValue ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(9)) +``` + +### AcaRaCertResponse +This structure contains a certificate response by the ACA, + encapsulated for consumption by the EE, as well as associated data for + consumption by the RA. The response is of form AcaEeCertResponsePlainSpdu, + AcaEeCertResponsePrivateSpdu, or AcaEeCertResponseCubkSpdu, and is + generated in response to a successful RaAcaCertRequestSpdu. In this + structure: + +Fields: +* version of type [**Uint8**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Uint8) (2)
+ contains the current version of the structure. + + +* generationTime of type [**Time32**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Time32)
+ contains the generation time of AcaRaCertResponse. + + + +* requestHash of type [**HashedId8**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#HashedId8)
+ contains the hash of the corresponding + RaAcaCertRequestSPDU. + + + +* acaResponse of type [**AcaResponse**](#AcaResponse)
+ contains the certificate for the EE in a suitable form + as determined from the corresponding RaAcaCertRequestSPDU. + + + + +```asn1 +AcaRaCertResponse ::= SEQUENCE { + version Uint8 (2), + generationTime Time32, + requestHash HashedId8, + acaResponse AcaResponse, + ... +} +``` + +### AcaResponse +This structure contains the certificate for the EE in a suitable + form as determined from the corresponding RaAcaCertRequestSPDU. In this + structure: + +Fields: +* plain of type [**AcaEeCertResponsePlainSpdu**](Ieee1609Dot2Dot1Protocol.md#AcaEeCertResponsePlainSpdu)
+ contains the certificate for the EE in plain, that is, without + encryption or signature. This choice is used only when the field + certEncKey is absent and flags.cubk is not set in the corresponding + RaAcaCertRequest. + + +* private of type [**AcaEeCertResponsePrivateSpdu**](Ieee1609Dot2Dot1Protocol.md#AcaEeCertResponsePrivateSpdu)
+ contains the certificate for the EE in an encrypted then + signed form to protect the EE's privacy from the RA. This choice is used + only when the field certEncKey is present and flags.cubk is not set in the + corresponding RaAcaCertRequest. + + + +* cubk of type [**AcaEeCertResponseCubkSpdu**](Ieee1609Dot2Dot1Protocol.md#AcaEeCertResponseCubkSpdu)
+ contains the certificate for the EE in an encrypted form. This + choice is used only when the field certEncKey is absent and flags.cubk is + set in the corresponding RaAcaCertRequest. + + + + +```asn1 +AcaResponse ::= CHOICE { + plain AcaEeCertResponsePlainSpdu, + private AcaEeCertResponsePrivateSpdu, + cubk AcaEeCertResponseCubkSpdu, + ... +} +``` + + + diff --git a/docs/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1Acpc.md b/docs/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1Acpc.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1f2b9a7 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1Acpc.md @@ -0,0 +1,264 @@ +# ASN.1 module Ieee1609Dot2Dot1Acpc + OID: _{iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) acpc(18) major-version-3(3) minor-version-1(1)}_ + @note Section references in this file are to clauses in IEEE Std + 1609.2.1 unless indicated otherwise. Full forms of acronyms and + abbreviations used in this file are specified in 3.2. + + +## Imports: + * **[Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md)** *{iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) base(1) base-types(2) major-version-2(2) minor-version-3(3)} WITH SUCCESSORS*
+ + * **[Ieee1609Dot2Dot1Protocol](Ieee1609Dot2Dot1Protocol.md)** *{iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) protocol(17) major-version-3(3) minor-version-1(1)} WITH SUCCESSORS*
+ +## Data Elements: +### AcpcPdu +This structure contains an APrV structure produced by the CAM. An + overview of this structure is as follows: + +Fields: +* tree of type [**AprvBinaryTree**](#AprvBinaryTree)
+ contains an AprvBinaryTree. + + +* aprv of type [**IndividualAprv**](#IndividualAprv)
+ contains a single IndividualAprv. + + + + +```asn1 +AcpcPdu ::= CHOICE { + tree AprvBinaryTree, + aprv IndividualAprv, + ... +} +``` + +### AprvBinaryTree +This structure encodes a binary tree. An overview of this structure + is as follows: + +Fields: +* version of type [**Uint8**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Uint8) (2)
+ contains the current version of the structure. + + +* generationTime of type [**Time32**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Time32)
+ contains the generation time of AprvBinaryTree. + + + +* currentI of type [**IValue**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#IValue)
+ contains the i-value associated with the batch of + certificates. + + + +* acpcTreeId of type [**AcpcTreeId**](#AcpcTreeId)
+ contains an identifier for the CAM creating this binary + tree. + + + +* hashAlgorithmId of type [**HashAlgorithm**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#HashAlgorithm)
+ contains the identifier of the hash algorithm used + inside the binary tree. + + + +* tree of type **BIT STRING**
+ contains a bit string indicating which nodes of the tree are + present. It is calculated as specified in 9.5.4.2, and can be used by the + EE to determine which entry in nodeValueList to use to derive that EE's + APrV as specified in 9.5.2. + + + +* nodeValueList of type **SEQUENCE** (SIZE (1..MAX)) OF AcpcNodeValue
+ contains the values of the nodes that are present in + the order indicated by tree. + + + + +```asn1 +AprvBinaryTree ::= SEQUENCE { + version Uint8 (2), + generationTime Time32, + currentI IValue, + acpcTreeId AcpcTreeId, + hashAlgorithmId HashAlgorithm, + tree BIT STRING, + nodeValueList SEQUENCE (SIZE (1..MAX)) OF AcpcNodeValue, + ... +} +``` + + +### AcpcPsid +This is the PSID used to indicate activities in ACPC as specified in + this document. +```asn1 +AcpcPsid ::= Psid(2113696) +``` + + +### UnsecuredAprvBinaryTree +This is used to wrap an AprvBinaryTree in an Ieee1609Dot2Data for + transmission if the policy is that the AprvBinaryTree need not be signed. + See 9.5.6 for discussion. +```asn1 +UnsecuredAprvBinaryTree ::= Ieee1609Dot2Data-Unsecured { + AcpcPdu (WITH COMPONENTS { + tree + }) +} +``` + + +### SignedAprvBinaryTree +This is used to wrap an AprvBinaryTree in an Ieee1609Dot2Data for + transmission if the policy is that the AprvBinaryTree be signed. See 9.5.6 + for discussion. +```asn1 +SignedAprvBinaryTree ::= Ieee1609Dot2Data-Signed { + AcpcPdu (WITH COMPONENTS { + tree + }), + AcpcPsid +} +``` + +### IndividualAprv +This structure contains an individual APrV. An overview of this + structure is as follows: + +Fields: +* version of type [**Uint8**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Uint8) (2)
+ contains the current version of the structure. + + +* generationTime of type [**Time32**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Time32)
+ contains the generation time of IndividualAprv. + + + +* currentI of type [**IValue**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#IValue)
+ contains the i-value associated with the batch of + certificates. + + + +* acpcTreeId of type [**AcpcTreeId**](#AcpcTreeId)
+ contains an identifier for the CAM creating this binary + tree. + + + +* nodeId of type **BIT STRING**
+ contains the identifier of the node. + + + +* nodeValue of type [**AcpcNodeValue**](#AcpcNodeValue)
+ contains the value of the node. + + + + +```asn1 +IndividualAprv ::= SEQUENCE { + version Uint8 (2), + generationTime Time32, + currentI IValue, + acpcTreeId AcpcTreeId, + nodeId BIT STRING, + nodeValue AcpcNodeValue, + ... +} +``` + + +### SignedIndividualAprv +This is used to wrap an IndividualAprv in an Ieee1609Dot2Data for + transmission if the policy is that the IndividualAprv be signed. See 9.5.6 + for discussion. +```asn1 +SignedIndividualAprv ::= Ieee1609Dot2Data-Signed { + AcpcPdu (WITH COMPONENTS { + aprv + }), + AcpcPsid +} +``` + + +### AcpcTreeId +This is an 8 byte string that identifies an ACPC tree series. It is + required to be globally unique within the system and is the same for all + ACPC tree instances within the ACPC tree series. Registration of AcpcTreeId + values is managed by the IEEE RA; see http://standards.ieee.org/regauth. A + list of assigned AcpcTreeId values is provided in L.2. +```asn1 +AcpcTreeId ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(8)) +``` + + +### AcpcNodeValue +This is a 16 byte string that represents the value of a node in the + ACPC tree. +```asn1 +AcpcNodeValue ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(16)) +``` + +### AprvHashCalculationInput +This structure, C-OER encoded, is the input to the hash function to + calculate child node values from a parent node. By including the ID fields + it "firewalls" the hash function so that an attacker who inverts the hash + has only found the hash preimage for a specific node, in a specific tree, + for a specific time period. An overview of this structure is as follows: + +Fields: +* version of type [**Uint8**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Uint8) (2)
+ contains the current version of the structure. + + +* acpcTreeId of type [**AcpcTreeId**](#AcpcTreeId)
+ contains an identifier for this ACPC tree series. + + + +* acpcPeriod of type [**IValue**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#IValue)
+ contains an identifier for the time period for this tree. + If the certificates for which this set of APrVs are intended have an IValue + field, acpcPeriod in this structure shall be the IValue field in the + certificates. How the RA and the CAM synchronize on this value is outside + the scope of this document. + + + +* childNodeId of type **BIT STRING**
+ contains a bit string of length l encoding the node + location within the l'th level. + + + +* parentNodeValue of type **OCTET STRING** (SIZE(16))
+ contains the value of the parent node. + + + + +```asn1 +AprvHashCalculationInput ::= SEQUENCE { + version Uint8 (2), + acpcTreeId AcpcTreeId, + acpcPeriod IValue, + childNodeId BIT STRING, + parentNodeValue OCTET STRING (SIZE(16)), + ... +} +``` + + + diff --git a/docs/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1CamRaInterface.md b/docs/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1CamRaInterface.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c60c5f0 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1CamRaInterface.md @@ -0,0 +1,110 @@ +# ASN.1 module Ieee1609Dot2Dot1CamRaInterface + OID: _{iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) cam-ra(19) major-version-2(2) minor-version-2(2)}_ + @note Section references in this file are to clauses in IEEE Std + 1609.2.1 unless indicated otherwise. Full forms of acronyms and + abbreviations used in this file are specified in 3.2. + + +## Imports: + * **[Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md)** *{iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) base(1) base-types(2) major-version-2(2) minor-version-3(3)} WITH SUCCESSORS*
+ +## Data Elements: +### CamRaInterfacePdu +This is the parent structure for all structures exchanged between + the CAM and the RA during ACPC enrollment. An overview of this structure + is as follows: + +Fields: +* raCamBatchRequest of type [**RaCamBatchRequest**](#RaCamBatchRequest)
+ contains the ACPC blinded key batch request sent + by the RA to the CAM. + + +* camRaBatchResponse of type [**CamRaBatchResponse**](#CamRaBatchResponse)
+ contains the CAM's response to RaCamBatchRequest. + + + + +```asn1 +CamRaInterfacePdu ::= CHOICE { + raCamBatchRequest RaCamBatchRequest, + camRaBatchResponse CamRaBatchResponse, + ... +} +``` + +### RaCamBatchRequest +This structure contains parameters needed to request a blinded batch + of keys for the EE during ACPC enrollment. An overview of this structure + is as follows: + +Fields: +* version of type [**Uint8**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Uint8) (2)
+ contains the current version of the structure. + + +* eeId of type **OCTET STRING** (SIZE(5))
+ contains the EE's ID generated by the RA for the production of + ACPC batch keys by the CAM. + + + +* periodList of type **SEQUENCE** OF IValue
+ contains the list of i-periods covered by the batch. + + + + +```asn1 +RaCamBatchRequest ::= SEQUENCE { + version Uint8 (2), + eeId OCTET STRING (SIZE(5)), + periodList SEQUENCE OF IValue, + ... +} +``` + +### CamRaBatchResponse +This structure contains a blinded batch of keys for the EE during + ACPC enrollment. An overview of this structure is as follows: + +Fields: +* version of type [**Uint8**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Uint8) (2)
+ contains the current version of the structure. + + +* requestHash of type [**HashedId8**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#HashedId8)
+ contains the hash of the corresponding request + RaCamBatchRequest. + + + +* batch of type **SEQUENCE** OF BlindedKey
+ contains a sequence of blinded keys, each mapped to one + IValue from the periodList field of the request. + + + + +```asn1 +CamRaBatchResponse ::= SEQUENCE { + version Uint8 (2), + requestHash HashedId8, + batch SEQUENCE OF BlindedKey, + ... +} +``` + + +### BlindedKey +This is a blinded ACPC encryption key produced by the CAM. +```asn1 +BlindedKey ::= EccP256CurvePoint +``` + + + +This is a blinded ACPC encryption key produced by the CAM. + + diff --git a/docs/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1CertManagement.md b/docs/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1CertManagement.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..979c134 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1CertManagement.md @@ -0,0 +1,570 @@ +# ASN.1 module Ieee1609Dot2Dot1CertManagement + OID: _{iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) cert-management(7) major-version-3(3) minor-version-1(1)}_ + @note Section references in this file are to clauses in IEEE Std + 1609.2.1 unless indicated otherwise. Full forms of acronyms and + abbreviations used in this file are specified in 3.2. + + +## Imports: + * **[Ieee1609Dot2](Ieee1609Dot2.md)** *{iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) base(1) schema(1) major-version-2(2) minor-version-5(5)} WITH SUCCESSORS*
+ + * **[Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md)** *{iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) base(1) base-types(2) major-version-2(2) minor-version-3(3)} WITH SUCCESSORS*
+ + * **[Ieee1609Dot2CrlBaseTypes](Ieee1609Dot2CrlBaseTypes.md)** *{iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) crl(3) base-types(2) major-version-3(3) minor-version-1(1)} WITH SUCCESSORS*
+ + * **[Ieee1609Dot2Crl](Ieee1609Dot2Crl.md)** *{iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) crl(3) major-version-3(3) minor-version-1(1)} WITH SUCCESSORS*
+ + * **[Ieee1609Dot2Dot1Protocol](Ieee1609Dot2Dot1Protocol.md)** *{iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) protocol(17) major-version-3(3) minor-version-1(1)} WITH SUCCESSORS*
+ +## Data Elements: +### CertManagementPdu +This is the parent structure for all SCMS component certificate + management structures. An overview of this structure is as follows: + +Fields: +* compositeCrl of type [**CompositeCrl**](#CompositeCrl)
+ contains zero or more SecuredCrl as defined in IEEE + Std 1609.2, and the CTL. + + +* certificateChain of type [**CertificateChain**](#CertificateChain)
+ contains a collection of certificates and the CTL. + + + +* multiSignedCtl of type [**MultiSignedCtl**](#MultiSignedCtl)
+ contains the CTL signed by multiple + signers, the electors. + + + +* tbsCtlSignature of type [**ToBeSignedCtlSignature**](#ToBeSignedCtlSignature)
+ contains the CTL-instance-specific information used + to generate a signature on the CTL. + + + + +* infoStatus of type [**CertificateManagementInfoStatus**](#CertificateManagementInfoStatus)
+ +```asn1 +CertManagementPdu ::= CHOICE { + compositeCrl CompositeCrl, + certificateChain CertificateChain, + multiSignedCtl MultiSignedCtl, + tbsCtlSignature ToBeSignedCtlSignature, + infoStatus CertificateManagementInfoStatus, + ... +} +``` + +### CompositeCrl +This structure is used to encapsulate CRLs and a CTL. An overview + of this structure is as follows: + +Fields: +* crl of type **SEQUENCE** SIZE(0..MAX) OF SecuredCrl
+ contains a list of signed CRLs for different (CRACA ID, CRL + series) pairs. The CRLs are signed individually, and this document does not + specify the order in which they should appear. + + +* homeCtl of type [**MultiSignedCtlSpdu**](Ieee1609Dot2Dot1Protocol.md#MultiSignedCtlSpdu)
+ contains a CTL. If the composite CRL was requested via the + mechanisms given in 6.3.5.8, the CtlSeriesId in this CTL is the same as + the CtlSeriesId provided in the request. The intent is that this is the + "home" CTL of the requester, but this field can in practice be used to + provide any CTL with any CtlSeriesId value. + + + + +```asn1 +CompositeCrl ::= SEQUENCE { + crl SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF SecuredCrl, + homeCtl MultiSignedCtlSpdu, + ... +} +``` + +### CertificateChain +This structure is used to encapsulate certificates and a CTL. An + overview of this structure is as follows: + +Fields: +* homeCtl of type [**MultiSignedCtlSpdu**](Ieee1609Dot2Dot1Protocol.md#MultiSignedCtlSpdu)
+ contains a CTL. If the certificate chain was requested via + the mechanisms given in 6.3.5.7, the CtlSeriesId in this CTL is the + same as the CtlSeriesId provided in the request. The intent is that + this is the "home" CTL of the requester, but this field can in practice be + used to provide any CTL. + + +* others of type **SEQUENCE** SIZE(0..MAX) OF Certificate
+ contains additional valid certificates of the CAs and the + MAs chosen by means outside the scope of this document. + + + + +```asn1 +CertificateChain ::= SEQUENCE { + homeCtl MultiSignedCtlSpdu, + others SEQUENCE SIZE(0..MAX) OF Certificate, + ... +} +``` + +### MultiSignedCtl +This structure a certificate trust list (CTL) signed by multiple + signers, the electors. An overview of this structure is as follows: + +Fields: +* type of type [**IEEE-1609-2-1-MSCTL**](#IEEE-1609-2-1-MSCTL) .&type({ + Ieee1609dot2dot1Ctls + })
+ contains the type of the multi-signed CTL. Only one type of + multi-signed CTL is supported in this version of this document. + + +* tbsCtl of type [**IEEE-1609-2-1-MSCTL**](#IEEE-1609-2-1-MSCTL) .&TbsCtl({ + Ieee1609dot2dot1Ctls + }{@.type})
+ contains the CTL contents. + + + +* unsigned of type [**IEEE-1609-2-1-MSCTL**](#IEEE-1609-2-1-MSCTL) .&UnsignedCtlMaterial({ + Ieee1609dot2dot1Ctls + }{@.type})
+ contains data that are associated with the CTL and that + are not included directly in tbsCtl. For example, if the type is + fullIeeeCtlType, the FullIeeeTbsCtl contains the hashes of the + certificates, and the certificates themselves are contained in unsigned. + + + +* signatures of type **SEQUENCE** (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF CtlSignatureSpdu
+ contains the signatures. How the signatures are + calculated is specified in the definition of ToBeSignedCtlSignature. The + number of signatures shall be no more than the number of electors. Each + signature shall have been generated by a distinct elector. + + + + +```asn1 +MultiSignedCtl ::= SEQUENCE { + type IEEE-1609-2-1-MSCTL.&type({ + Ieee1609dot2dot1Ctls + }), + tbsCtl IEEE-1609-2-1-MSCTL.&TbsCtl({ + Ieee1609dot2dot1Ctls + }{@.type}), + unsigned IEEE-1609-2-1-MSCTL.&UnsignedCtlMaterial({ + Ieee1609dot2dot1Ctls + }{@.type}), + signatures SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF CtlSignatureSpdu +} +``` + +### IEEE-1609-2-1-MSCTL +This is the ASN.1 Information Object Class used to associate + multisigned CTL type identifiers, CTL contents, and unsigned material. In + this structure: + +Fields: +* type of type [**Ieee1609dot2dot1MsctlType**](#Ieee1609dot2dot1MsctlType)
+ contains the type, an Ieee1609dot2dot1MsctlType. + + + contains unsigned material associated with the + CTL, as specified in 7.3.11. + + + + + &TbsCtl, +```asn1 +IEEE-1609-2-1-MSCTL ::= CLASS { + &type Ieee1609dot2dot1MsctlType, + &TbsCtl, + &UnsignedCtlMaterial +} WITH SYNTAX {&TbsCtl IDENTIFIED BY &type USING &UnsignedCtlMaterial} +``` + +### Ieee1609dot2dot1Ctls +This is the Information Object Set containing the instances of the + IEEE-1609-2-1-MSCTL class that are specified for use. Only one instance is + specified for use in this version of this document. + +Fields: +* fullIeeeCtl of type [**USING**](#USING) SequenceOfCertificate}
+ {FullIeeeTbsCtl IDENTIFIED BY +```asn1 +Ieee1609dot2dot1Ctls IEEE-1609-2-1-MSCTL ::= { + {FullIeeeTbsCtl IDENTIFIED BY + fullIeeeCtl USING SequenceOfCertificate}, + ... +} +``` + + +### Ieee1609dot2dot1MsctlType +This is the integer used to identify the type of the CTL. +```asn1 +Ieee1609dot2dot1MsctlType ::= INTEGER (0..255) +``` + +```asn1 +fullIeeeCtl Ieee1609dot2dot1MsctlType ::= 1 +``` + +### FullIeeeTbsCtl +This structure specifies a CTL that contains information about the + complete set of certificates trusted by the electors that sign the CTL. An + overview of this structure is as follows: + + + + - Any root CA or elector certificate that is not on the CTL is + not trusted. The electorRemove and rootCaRemove are intended to be used + only if the SCMS manager wants to explicitly indicate that a previously + trusted entity (elector or root CA) is now not trusted even though that + entity's certificate is still within its validity period. In practice, it + is anticipated that the remove fields (electorRemove and rootCaRemove) + will almost always be sequences of length 0. + +Fields: +* type of type [**Ieee1609dot2dot1MsctlType**](#Ieee1609dot2dot1MsctlType) (fullIeeeCtl)
+ contains the type of the CTL. It is identical to the type + field that appears in the enclosing MultiSignedCtl. The field is included + here as well to provide the simplest mechanism to help ensure that the + type is included in the calculated CTL hash. + + +* ctlSeriesId of type [**CtlSeriesId**](#CtlSeriesId)
+ +* sequenceNumber of type [**CtlSequenceNumber**](#CtlSequenceNumber)
+ contains the sequence number of the CTL. This is + incremented by 1 every time a new FullIeeeTbsCtl is issued. + + + +* effectiveDate of type [**Time32**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Time32)
+ contains the time when the CTL is to take effect. + This is to be greater than or equal to the effectiveDate field in the CTL + with the same CtlSeriesId and the previous sequence number. + + + +* electorApprove of type **SEQUENCE** OF CtlElectorEntry
+ contains the list of hashes of the elector + certificates that are approved as of the effective date. The hash is + calculated with the same hash algorithm that is used to hash the elector + certificate for signing. + + + +* electorRemove of type **SEQUENCE** OF CtlElectorEntry
+ contains the list of hashes of the elector + certificates that are valid (that is, not expired) on the effective date and + are not approved, as of the effective date, to sign a CTL. The hash is + calculated with the same hash algorithm that is used to hash the elector + certificate for signing. This field is to be considered informational as a + certificate that is not included in electorApprove is not valid even if it + does not appear in electorRemove. + + + +* rootCaApprove of type **SEQUENCE** OF CtlRootCaEntry
+ contains the list of root CA certificates that are + approved as of the effective date. The hash is calculated with the same + hash algorithm that is used to hash the root certificate for signing. If + the root certificate is signed with a hash function with a 48 octet + output, this is truncated to the low-order 32 bytes for inclusion in the + CTL. + + + +* rootCaRemove of type **SEQUENCE** OF CtlRootCaEntry
+ contains the list of root CA certificates that are + valid (that is, not expired) on the effective date and are not approved, as + of the effective date, to issue certificates or carry out other + activities. If the root certificate is signed with a hash function + with a 48 octet output, this is truncated to the low-order 32 bytes for + inclusion in the CTL. This field is to be considered informational as a + certificate that is not included in rootCaApprove is not valid even if it + does not appear in rootCaRemove. + + + +* quorum of type **INTEGER**
+ contains the quorum, that is, the number of the electors + required to sign the next CTL with the same CtlSeriesId value for that + CTL to be trusted. If this field is absent, the quorum for the next CTL + shall be the quorum for the current CTL. + + + + + ..., + +>>> +NOTE:  - If in future CTL types are defined that contain the same + information as, or a subset of the information in, the fullIeeeCtl, those + types are anticipated to contain the same sequence number as the + corresponding fullIeeeCtl. +>>> +```asn1 +FullIeeeTbsCtl ::= SEQUENCE { + type Ieee1609dot2dot1MsctlType(fullIeeeCtl), + ctlSeriesId CtlSeriesId, + sequenceNumber CtlSequenceNumber, + effectiveDate Time32, + electorApprove SEQUENCE OF CtlElectorEntry, + electorRemove SEQUENCE OF CtlElectorEntry, + rootCaApprove SEQUENCE OF CtlRootCaEntry, + rootCaRemove SEQUENCE OF CtlRootCaEntry, + ..., + quorum INTEGER +} +``` + + +### CtlSeriesId +This structure identifies a group of electors that sign a series of + CTLs for a specific purpose. Registration of CtlSeriesId values is + managed by the IEEE RA; see http://standards.ieee.org/regauth. A list of + assigned CtlSeriesId values is provided in K.1. +```asn1 +CtlSeriesId ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(8)) +``` + + +### CtlSequenceNumber +This structure is used to encode the CTL sequence number. This + document does not specify semantics of this type once it reaches its + maximum value. +```asn1 +CtlSequenceNumber ::= INTEGER(0..65535) +``` + + +### CtlElectorEntry +This structure contains the hash of an elector certificate. +```asn1 +CtlElectorEntry ::= HashedId48 +``` + + +### CtlRootCaEntry +This structure contains the hash of a root CA certificate. +```asn1 +CtlRootCaEntry ::= HashedId32 +``` + +### ToBeSignedCtlSignature +This structure contains the CTL-instance-specific information used + to generate a signature on the CTL. An overview of this structure is as + follows: + +Fields: +* ctlSeriesId of type [**CtlSeriesId**](#CtlSeriesId)
+ contains the CtlSeriesId that appears in the CTL. + + +* ctlType of type [**Ieee1609dot2dot1MsctlType**](#Ieee1609dot2dot1MsctlType)
+ identifies the type of the CTL. + + + +* sequenceNumber of type [**CtlSequenceNumber**](#CtlSequenceNumber)
+ contains the sequence number of the CTL being signed. + + + +* tbsCtlHash of type [**HashedId48**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#HashedId48)
+ contains the hash of the C-OER encoded tbsCtl field + in the MultiSignedCtl. The hash is calculated using the same hash + algorithm that is used to generate the signature on this structure when it + is contained in a CtlSignatureSpdu. This algorithm can be determined from + the headers of the CtlSignatureSpdu. + + + + +```asn1 +ToBeSignedCtlSignature ::= SEQUENCE { + ctlSeriesId CtlSeriesId, + ctlType Ieee1609dot2dot1MsctlType, + sequenceNumber CtlSequenceNumber, + tbsCtlHash HashedId48 +} +``` + +### CertificateManagementInfoStatus +This structure contains the status of different certificate + management information, including CRLs, CTLs, and individual certificates + of CAs, MAs, and the RA. + +Fields: +* crl of type [**SequenceOfCrlInfoStatus**](#SequenceOfCrlInfoStatus)
+ contains the status information for CRLs. + + +* ctl of type [**SequenceOfCtlInfoStatus**](#SequenceOfCtlInfoStatus)
+ contains the status information for CTLs. + + + +* caCcf of type [**Time32**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Time32)
+ contains the time of the last update of any of the CA + certificates in the CCF. + + + +* ma of type [**SequenceOfMaInfoStatus**](#SequenceOfMaInfoStatus)
+ contains the status information for MA certificates. + + + +* ra of type [**Time32**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Time32) OPTIONAL
+ shall be present and contain the time of last update of the RA's + certificate, if this structure is sent by an RA. + + + + +```asn1 +CertificateManagementInfoStatus ::= SEQUENCE { + crl SequenceOfCrlInfoStatus, + ctl SequenceOfCtlInfoStatus, + caCcf Time32, + ma SequenceOfMaInfoStatus, + ra Time32 OPTIONAL, + ... +} +``` + + +### SequenceOfCtlInfoStatus +This type is used for clarity of definitions. +```asn1 +SequenceOfCtlInfoStatus ::= SEQUENCE OF CtlInfoStatus +``` + +### CtlInfoStatus +This structure contains the status information for a CTL. + +Fields: +* ctlSeriesId of type [**CtlSeriesId**](#CtlSeriesId)
+ contains the elector group ID of the CTL. + + +* sequenceNumber of type [**CtlSequenceNumber**](#CtlSequenceNumber)
+ contains the sequence number of the CTL. + + + +* lastUpdate of type [**Time32**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Time32)
+ contains the time of the last update of the CTL. + + + + +```asn1 +CtlInfoStatus ::= SEQUENCE { + ctlSeriesId CtlSeriesId, + sequenceNumber CtlSequenceNumber, + lastUpdate Time32, + ... +} +``` + + +### SequenceOfCrlInfoStatus +This type is used for clarity of definitions. +```asn1 +SequenceOfCrlInfoStatus ::= SEQUENCE OF CrlInfoStatus +``` + +### CrlInfoStatus +This structure contains the status information for a CRL. + +Fields: +* cracaId of type [**HashedId8**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#HashedId8)
+ contains the CRACA ID of the CRL. + + +* series of type [**CrlSeries**](Ieee1609Dot2CrlBaseTypes.md#CrlSeries)
+ contains the CRL series of the CRL. + + + +* issueDate of type [**Time32**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Time32)
+ contains the time of the last update of the CRL. + + + + +```asn1 +CrlInfoStatus ::= SEQUENCE { + cracaId HashedId8, + series CrlSeries, + issueDate Time32, + ... +} +``` + + +### SequenceOfMaInfoStatus +This type is used for clarity of definitions. +```asn1 +SequenceOfMaInfoStatus ::= SEQUENCE OF MaInfoStatus +``` + +### MaInfoStatus +This structure contains the status information for an MA's + certificate. + +Fields: +* psids of type [**SequenceOfPsid**](Ieee1609Dot2Dot1Protocol.md#SequenceOfPsid)
+ contains the PSIDs associated with the misbehavior that is to + be reported to that MA. + + +* updated of type [**Time32**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Time32)
+ contains the time of the last update of the MA's certificate. + + + + +```asn1 +MaInfoStatus ::= SEQUENCE { + psids SequenceOfPsid, + updated Time32, + ... +} +``` + + + +This type is used for clarity of definitions. + This structure contains the status information for a CRL. + + @param cracaId: contains the CRACA ID of the CRL. + + @param series: contains the CRL series of the CRL. + + @param issueDate: contains the time of the last update of the CRL. + This type is used for clarity of definitions. + This structure contains the status information for an MA's + certificate. + + @param psids: contains the PSIDs associated with the misbehavior that is to + be reported to that MA. + + @param updated: contains the time of the last update of the MA's certificate. + + diff --git a/docs/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1EcaEeInterface.md b/docs/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1EcaEeInterface.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..276703e --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1EcaEeInterface.md @@ -0,0 +1,204 @@ +# ASN.1 module Ieee1609Dot2Dot1EcaEeInterface + OID: _{iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) eca-ee(9) major-version-3(3) minor-version-1(1)}_ + @note Section references in this file are to clauses in IEEE Std + 1609.2.1 unless indicated otherwise. Full forms of acronyms and + abbreviations used in this file are specified in 3.2. + + +## Imports: + * **[Ieee1609Dot2](Ieee1609Dot2.md)** *{iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) base(1) schema(1) major-version-2(2) minor-version-5(5)} WITH SUCCESSORS*
+ + * **[Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md)** *{iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) base(1) base-types(2) major-version-2(2) minor-version-3(3)} WITH SUCCESSORS*
+ + * **[Ieee1609Dot2Dot1Protocol](Ieee1609Dot2Dot1Protocol.md)** *{iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) protocol(17) major-version-3(3) minor-version-1(1)} WITH SUCCESSORS*
+ +## Data Elements: +### EcaEeInterfacePdu +This is the parent structure for all structures exchanged between + the ECA and the EE. An overview of this structure is as follows: + +Fields: +* eeEcaCertRequest of type [**EeEcaCertRequest**](#EeEcaCertRequest)
+ contains the enrollment certificate request sent + by the EE to the ECA. + + +* ecaEeCertResponse of type [**EcaEeCertResponse**](#EcaEeCertResponse)
+ contains the enrollment certificate response sent + by the ECA to the EE. + + + + +```asn1 +EcaEeInterfacePdu::= CHOICE { + eeEcaCertRequest EeEcaCertRequest, + ecaEeCertResponse EcaEeCertResponse, + ... +} +``` + +### EeEcaCertRequest +This structure contains parameters needed to request an enrollment + certificate from the ECA. The ECA may, subject to policy, issue an + enrollment certificate with different contents than the contents requested. + An overview of this structure is as follows: + +Fields: +* version of type [**Uint8**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Uint8) (2)
+ contains the current version of the structure. + + +* generationTime of type [**Time32**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Time32)
+ contains the generation time of EeEcaCertRequest. + + + +* type of type [**CertificateType**](Ieee1609Dot2.md#CertificateType)
+ indicates whether the request is for an explicit or implicit + certificate (see 4.1.1, 4.1.4.3.1). + + + +* tbsCert of type [**ToBeSignedCertificate**](Ieee1609Dot2Dot1Protocol.md#ToBeSignedCertificate) (WITH COMPONENTS { + ..., + id (WITH COMPONENTS { + ..., + linkageData ABSENT + })
+ contains the parameters used by the ECA to generate the + enrollment certificate. tbsCert.verifyKeyIndicator.verificationKey + contains the public key information sent by the requester. The + verifyKeyIndicator field indicates the choice verificationKey even if type + is implicit, as this allows the requester to indicate which signature + algorithm and curve they are requesting. The value in this field is used + as the verification key in the certificate if the certificate issued in + response to this request is explicit, and as the input public key value + for implicit certificate generation if the certificate issued in response + to this request is implicit. + + + +* appPermissions of type [**ABSENT**](#ABSENT)
+ +* certIssuePermissions of type [**ABSENT**](#ABSENT)
+ +* certRequestPermissions of type [**PRESENT**](#PRESENT)
+ +* canonicalId of type [**IA5String**](#IA5String) OPTIONAL
+ shall be present and contain the canonical identifier + for the device per 4.1.4.2, if the enclosing EeEcaCertRequestSpdu was + signed by the canonical private key. The receiver is intended to use the + canonicalId to look up the canonical public key to verify the certificate + request. + + + + + }), + +>>> +NOTE:  - The tbsCert.cracaId and tbsCert.crlSeries are set to the + indicated values in the corresponding EeEcaCertRequest. In the issued + enrollment certificate, they may have different values, set by the ECA. + - The EE uses the type field to indicate whether it is + requesting an explicit or an implicit enrollment certificate. A policy is + anticipated that determines what type of certificate is appropriate for a + given set of circumstances (such as PSIDs, other end entity information, + and locality) and that if the EE has requested a kind of certificate that + is not allowed by policy, the ECA returns an error to the EE. +>>> +```asn1 +EeEcaCertRequest ::= SEQUENCE { + version Uint8 (2), + generationTime Time32, + type CertificateType, + tbsCert ToBeSignedCertificate (WITH COMPONENTS { + ..., + id (WITH COMPONENTS { + ..., + linkageData ABSENT + }), + cracaId ('000000'H), + crlSeries (0), + appPermissions ABSENT, + certIssuePermissions ABSENT, + certRequestPermissions PRESENT, + verifyKeyIndicator (WITH COMPONENTS { + verificationKey + }) + }), + canonicalId IA5String OPTIONAL, + ... +} +``` + +### EcaEeCertResponse +This structure is used by the ECA to respond to an EE's enrollment + certificate request. Additional bootstrapping information including the + RA's certificate are provided by the DCM. The specification of the DCM is + outside the scope of this document. An overview of this structure is as + follows: + + + The definition of validity for a certificate request, including + constraints on the fields in this structure, is specified in 10.1. + +Fields: +* version of type [**Uint8**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Uint8) (2)
+ contains the current version of the structure. + + +* generationTime of type [**Time32**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Time32)
+ contains the generation time of EcaEeCertResponse. + + + +* requestHash of type [**HashedId8**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#HashedId8)
+ contains the following hash: + - EeEcaCertRequestSPDU, if the corresponding request was + EeEcaCertRequestSPDU. This is calculated without "canonicalizing" the + signature, i.e., it is calculated over the signature as given in the + EeEcaCertRequestSpdu without re-encoding the signature's r component in + x-coordinate-only form. See IEEE Std 1609.2 for further details on + canonicalization. + - EeRaSuccessorEnrollmentCertRequestSpd, if the corresponding request + was EeRaSuccessorEnrollmentCertRequestSpd. + + + +* ecaCertChain of type [**SequenceOfCertificate**](Ieee1609Dot2.md#SequenceOfCertificate)
+ contains the ECA's currently valid certificate and the + certificate chain, up to and including the root CA. + + + +* certificate of type [**Certificate**](Ieee1609Dot2.md#Certificate)
+ contains the enrollment certificate generated by the + ECA, which shall be of the type indicated by the type field in the + corresponding request. + + + +* privateKeyInfo of type **OCTET STRING** (SIZE(32)) OPTIONAL
+ shall be present and contain the private key + reconstruction value, if certificate.type is implicit. This is used by the + EE as specified in 9.3.5.1. + + + + +```asn1 +EcaEeCertResponse ::= SEQUENCE { + version Uint8 (2), + generationTime Time32, + requestHash HashedId8, + ecaCertChain SequenceOfCertificate, + certificate Certificate, + privateKeyInfo OCTET STRING (SIZE(32)) OPTIONAL, + ... +} +``` + + + diff --git a/docs/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1EeMaInterface.md b/docs/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1EeMaInterface.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..45a02d4 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1EeMaInterface.md @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +# ASN.1 module Ieee1609Dot2Dot1EeMaInterface + OID: _{iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) ee-ma(10) major-version-2(2) minor-version-1(1)}_ + @note Section references in this file are to clauses in IEEE Std + 1609.2.1 unless indicated otherwise. Full forms of acronyms and + abbreviations used in this file are specified in 3.2. + + +## Data Elements: + +### EeMaInterfacePdu +This structure is currently being defined outside of this document, + so it is defined as NULL for purposes of this document. +```asn1 +EeMaInterfacePdu ::= NULL +``` + + + diff --git a/docs/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1EeRaInterface.md b/docs/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1EeRaInterface.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e5ed670 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1EeRaInterface.md @@ -0,0 +1,409 @@ +# ASN.1 module Ieee1609Dot2Dot1EeRaInterface + OID: _{iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) ee-ra(11) major-version-3(3) minor-version-1(1)}_ + @note Section references in this file are to clauses in IEEE Std + 1609.2.1 unless indicated otherwise. Full forms of acronyms and + abbreviations used in this file are specified in 3.2. + + +## Imports: + * **[Ieee1609Dot2](Ieee1609Dot2.md)** *{iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) base(1) schema(1) major-version-2(2) minor-version-5(5)} WITH SUCCESSORS*
+ + * **[Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md)** *{iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) base(1) base-types(2) major-version-2(2) minor-version-3(3)} WITH SUCCESSORS*
+ + * **[Ieee1609Dot2Dot1Acpc](Ieee1609Dot2Dot1Acpc.md)** *{iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) acpc(18) major-version-3(3) minor-version-1(1)} WITH SUCCESSORS*
+ + * **[Ieee1609Dot2Dot1Protocol](Ieee1609Dot2Dot1Protocol.md)** *{iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) protocol(17) major-version-3(3) minor-version-1(1)} WITH SUCCESSORS*
+ +## Data Elements: +### EeRaInterfacePdu +This is the parent structure for all structures exchanged between + the EE and the RA. An overview of this structure is as follows: + +Fields: +* eeRaCertRequest of type [**EeRaCertRequest**](#EeRaCertRequest)
+ contains the certificate generation request sent by + the EE to the RA. + + +* raEeCertAck of type [**RaEeCertAck**](#RaEeCertAck)
+ contains the RA's acknowledgement of the receipt of + EeRaCertRequestSpdu. + + + +* raEeCertInfo of type [**RaEeCertInfo**](#RaEeCertInfo)
+ contains the information about certificate download. + + + +* eeRaDownloadRequest of type [**EeRaDownloadRequest**](#EeRaDownloadRequest)
+ contains the download request sent by the EE to + the RA. + + + +* eeRaSuccessorEnrollmentCertRequest of type [**EeEcaCertRequestSpdu**](Ieee1609Dot2Dot1Protocol.md#EeEcaCertRequestSpdu)
+ contains a self-signed request + for an enrollment certificate, identical in format to the one submitted + for an initial enrollment certificate. (This becomes a request for a + successor enrollment certificate by virtue of being signed by the current + enrollment certificate.) + + + + + +>>> +NOTE: This CHOICE does not include a PDU type for encrypted + misbehavior report upload; see 4.1.5. +>>> +```asn1 +EeRaInterfacePdu ::= CHOICE { + eeRaCertRequest EeRaCertRequest, + raEeCertAck RaEeCertAck, + raEeCertInfo RaEeCertInfo, + eeRaDownloadRequest EeRaDownloadRequest, + eeRaSuccessorEnrollmentCertRequest EeEcaCertRequestSpdu, + ... +} +``` + +### EeRaCertRequest +This structure contains parameters needed to request different types + of authorization certificates. An overview of this structure is as follows: + + + The definition of validity for a certificate request, including + constraints on the fields in this structure, is specified in 10.1. + +Fields: +* version of type [**Uint8**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Uint8) (2)
+ contains the current version of the structure. + + +* generationTime of type [**Time32**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Time32)
+ contains the generation time of EeRaCertRequest. + + + +* type of type [**CertificateType**](Ieee1609Dot2.md#CertificateType)
+ indicates whether the request is for an explicit or implicit + certificate (see 4.1.1 and 4.1.4.3.1). + + + +* tbsCert of type [**ToBeSignedCertificate**](Ieee1609Dot2Dot1Protocol.md#ToBeSignedCertificate) (WITH COMPONENTS { + ..., + cracaId ('000000'H)
+ contains the parameters to be used by the ACA to generate + authorization certificate(s). + - id contains the identity information sent by the requester. If the + type is LinkageData, the contents of the field are chosen by the EE using + any appropriate means. RA replaces that in the certificates with the + linkage values generated with the help of the LAs and the ACA; see Annex D. + - validityPeriod contains the requested validity period of the first + batch of certificates. + - region, assuranceLevel, canRequestRollover, and encryptionKey, if + present, contain the information sent by the requester for the requested + certificates. + - verifyKeyIndicator.verificationKey contains the public key + information sent by the requester. The verifyKeyIndicator field indicates + the choice verificationKey even if type is implicit, as this allows the + requester to indicate which signature algorithm and curve they are + requesting. + - If the certificate issued in response to this request is explicit and + butterfly expansion is not used, the value in this field is the + verification key that appears in that certificate. + - If the certificate issued in response to this request is implicit and + butterfly expansion is not used, the value in this field is the input + public key value for implicit certificate generation. + - If butterfly expansion is used, that is, if one of (original, unified, + compactUnified) options is present in the field additionalParams, the + value in this field is combined with the values in the additionalParams + field as specified in 9.3. + + + +* appPermissions of type [**PRESENT**](#PRESENT)
+ +* certIssuePermissions of type [**ABSENT**](#ABSENT)
+ +* certRequestPermissions of type [**ABSENT**](#ABSENT)
+ +* additionalParams of type [**AdditionalParams**](#AdditionalParams) OPTIONAL
+ shall be present and contain relevant parameters if + the requested certificates are to be generated using the butterfly key + mechanism as specified in 9.3, or if the requested certificates are to be + encrypted without using the butterfly key mechanism. If present, the field + tbsCert.verifyKeyIndicator shall be used as the caterpillar public key for + signing in the butterfly key mechanism. + + + + + }), + +>>> +NOTE:  - In the case where the butterfly key mechanism is used to + derive the certificate encryption key, the value j is not communicated to + the ACA. However, the EE that receives the certificate response can only + decrypt the response if it knows j. The RA is therefore anticipated to + store j so that it can be associated with the appropriate certificate + response. + - If the type of id is LinkageData, the contents of the + field in the request are replaced by random data by the RA when it sends + the individual certificate requests to the ACA. The ACA then in turn + replaces that data with the linkage values generated with the help of the + LAs; see Annex D. + - This document does not specify a method to include an + encryptionKey in the requested certificates, if the butterfly key + mechanism is used. The EE using such a certificate to sign a message + cannot request that the response is encrypted to the certificate. Instead, + it can request an encrypted response using the + tbsData.headerInfo.encryptionKey field of the SignedData; see 6.3.9, + 6.3.33, 6.3.34, and 6.3.36 of IEEE Std 1609.2 for more details. +>>> +```asn1 +EeRaCertRequest ::= SEQUENCE { + version Uint8 (2), + generationTime Time32, + type CertificateType, + tbsCert ToBeSignedCertificate (WITH COMPONENTS { + ..., + cracaId ('000000'H), + crlSeries (0), + appPermissions PRESENT, + certIssuePermissions ABSENT, + certRequestPermissions ABSENT, + verifyKeyIndicator (WITH COMPONENTS { + verificationKey + }) + }), + additionalParams AdditionalParams OPTIONAL, + ... +} +``` + +### AdditionalParams +This structure contains parameters for the butterfly key mechanism. + An overview of this structure is as follows: + +Fields: +* original of type [**ButterflyParamsOriginal**](#ButterflyParamsOriginal)
+ contains the parameters for the original variant. + + +* unified of type [**ButterflyExpansion**](#ButterflyExpansion)
+ contains the expansion function for signing to be used for + the unified variant. The caterpillar public key and expansion function for + encryption are the same as those for signing. + + + +* compactUnified of type [**ButterflyExpansion**](#ButterflyExpansion)
+ contains the expansion function for signing to be + used for the compact unified variant. The caterpillar public key and + expansion function for encryption are the same as those for signing. + + + +* encryptionKey of type [**PublicEncryptionKey**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#PublicEncryptionKey)
+ contains the public key for encrypting the + certificate if the butterfly key mechanism is not used. + + + + +```asn1 +AdditionalParams ::= CHOICE { + original ButterflyParamsOriginal, + unified ButterflyExpansion, + compactUnified ButterflyExpansion, + encryptionKey PublicEncryptionKey, + ... +} +``` + +### ButterflyParamsOriginal +This structure contains parameters for the original variation of the + butterfly key mechanism. An overview of this structure is as follows: + +Fields: +* signingExpansion of type [**ButterflyExpansion**](#ButterflyExpansion)
+ contains the expansion function for signing. + + +* encryptionKey of type [**PublicEncryptionKey**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#PublicEncryptionKey)
+ contains the caterpillar public key for encryption. + + + +* encryptionExpansion of type [**ButterflyExpansion**](#ButterflyExpansion)
+ contains the expansion function for encryption. + + + + +```asn1 +ButterflyParamsOriginal ::= SEQUENCE { + signingExpansion ButterflyExpansion, + encryptionKey PublicEncryptionKey, + encryptionExpansion ButterflyExpansion +} +``` + +### ButterflyExpansion +This structure contains material used in the butterfly key + calculations as specified in 9.3.5.1 and 9.3.5.2. An overview of this + structure is as follows: + +Fields: +* aes128 of type **OCTET STRING** (SIZE(16))
+ indicates that the symmetric algorithm used in the expansion + function is AES-128 with the indicated 16 byte string used as the key. + + + +```asn1 +ButterflyExpansion ::= CHOICE { + aes128 OCTET STRING (SIZE(16)), + ... +} +``` + +### RaEeCertAck +This structure is used to create the acknowledgement for certificate + requests. An overview of this structure is as follows: + +Fields: +* version of type [**Uint8**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Uint8) (2)
+ contains the current version of the structure. + + +* generationTime of type [**Time32**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Time32)
+ contains the generation time of RaEeCertAck. + + + +* requestHash of type [**HashedId8**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#HashedId8)
+ contains the hash of the corresponding + EeRaCertRequestSpdu. + + + +* firstI of type [**IValue**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#IValue) OPTIONAL
+ shall be present and contain the i-value that will be + associated with the first certificate or the certificate batch that will be + made available to the EE, if the corresponding EeRaCertRequest uses the + butterfly key mechanism as indicated in the field additionalParams. The EE + uses this to form the download filename for the download request as + specified in 8.2.2. + + + +* nextDlTime of type [**Time32**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Time32)
+ contains the time after which the EE should connect to + the RA to download the certificates. + + + + +```asn1 +RaEeCertAck ::= SEQUENCE { + version Uint8 (2), + generationTime Time32, + requestHash HashedId8, + firstI IValue OPTIONAL, + nextDlTime Time32, + ... +} +``` + +### RaEeCertInfo +This structure is used to create the info file that accompanies a + batch of certificates for download as specified in 8.2.3. It is used when + certificates were generated using the butterfly key expansion mechanism + specified in 9.3. An overview of this structure is as follows: + +Fields: +* version of type [**Uint8**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Uint8) (2)
+ contains the current version of the structure. + + +* generationTime of type [**Time32**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Time32)
+ contains the generation time of RaEeCertInfo. + + + +* currentI of type [**IValue**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#IValue)
+ contains the i-value associated with the batch of + certificates. + + + +* requestHash of type [**HashedId8**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#HashedId8)
+ contains the hash of the corresponding + EeRaCertRequestSpdu. + + + +* nextDlTime of type [**Time32**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Time32)
+ contains the time after which the EE should connect to + the RA to download the certificates. + + + +* acpcTreeId of type [**AcpcTreeId**](Ieee1609Dot2Dot1Acpc.md#AcpcTreeId) OPTIONAL
+ shall be present and contain the ACPC Tree Id, if the + certificates were generated using ACPC as specified in 9.5. + + + + +```asn1 +RaEeCertInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + version Uint8 (2), + generationTime Time32, + currentI IValue, + requestHash HashedId8, + nextDlTime Time32, + acpcTreeId AcpcTreeId OPTIONAL, + ... +} +``` + +### EeRaDownloadRequest +This structure contains parameters needed to request the download of + certificates from the RA. An overview of this structure is as follows: + +Fields: +* generationTime of type [**Time32**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Time32)
+ contains the generation time of EeRaDownloadRequest. + + +* filename of type [**UTF8String**](#UTF8String) (SIZE (0..255))
+ contains the name of the file requested for download, + formed as specified in 8.2.2. + + + + +```asn1 +EeRaDownloadRequest ::= SEQUENCE { + generationTime Time32, + filename UTF8String (SIZE (0..255)), + ... +} +``` + + + +This structure contains parameters needed to request the download of + certificates from the RA. An overview of this structure is as follows: + + @param generationTime: contains the generation time of EeRaDownloadRequest. + + @param filename: contains the name of the file requested for download, + formed as specified in 8.2.2. + + diff --git a/docs/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1LaMaInterface.md b/docs/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1LaMaInterface.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cdae5bc --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1LaMaInterface.md @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +# ASN.1 module Ieee1609Dot2Dot1LaMaInterface + OID: _{iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) la-ma(12) major-version-2(2) minor-version-1(1)}_ + @note Section references in this file are to clauses in IEEE Std + 1609.2.1 unless indicated otherwise. Full forms of acronyms and + abbreviations used in this file are specified in 3.2. + + +## Data Elements: + +### LaMaInterfacePdu +This structure is not used by EEs, so it is defined as NULL for + purposes of this document. +```asn1 +LaMaInterfacePdu ::= NULL +``` + + + diff --git a/docs/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1LaRaInterface.md b/docs/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1LaRaInterface.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b854989 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1LaRaInterface.md @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +# ASN.1 module Ieee1609Dot2Dot1LaRaInterface + OID: _{iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) la-ra(13) major-version-2(2) minor-version-1(1)}_ + @note Section references in this file are to clauses in IEEE Std + 1609.2.1 unless indicated otherwise. Full forms of acronyms and + abbreviations used in this file are specified in 3.2. + + +## Data Elements: + +### LaRaInterfacePdu +This structure is not used by EEs, so it is defined as NULL for + purposes of this document. +```asn1 +LaRaInterfacePdu ::= NULL +``` + + + diff --git a/docs/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1MaRaInterface.md b/docs/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1MaRaInterface.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..30812a9 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1MaRaInterface.md @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +# ASN.1 module Ieee1609Dot2Dot1MaRaInterface + OID: _{iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) ma-ra(14) major-version-2(2) minor-version-1(1)}_ + @note Section references in this file are to clauses in IEEE Std + 1609.2.1 unless indicated otherwise. Full forms of acronyms and + abbreviations used in this file are specified in 3.2. + + +## Data Elements: + +### MaRaInterfacePdu +This structure is not used by EEs, so it is defined as NULL for + purposes of this document. +```asn1 +MaRaInterfacePdu ::= NULL +``` + + + diff --git a/docs/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1Protocol.md b/docs/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1Protocol.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..188e5de --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/Ieee1609Dot2Dot1Protocol.md @@ -0,0 +1,1242 @@ +# ASN.1 module Ieee1609Dot2Dot1Protocol + OID: _{iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) protocol(17) major-version-3(3) minor-version-1(1)}_ + @note Section references in this file are to clauses in IEEE Std + 1609.2.1 unless indicated otherwise. Full forms of acronyms and + abbreviations used in this file are specified in 3.2. + + +## Imports: + * **[Ieee1609Dot2](Ieee1609Dot2.md)** *{iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) base(1) schema(1) major-version-2(2) minor-version-5(5)} WITH SUCCESSORS*
+ + * **[Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md)** *{iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) base(1) base-types(2) major-version-2(2) minor-version-3(3)} WITH SUCCESSORS*
+ + * **[Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaEeInterface](Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaEeInterface.md)** *{iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) aca-ee(1) major-version-2(2) minor-version-3(3)} WITH SUCCESSORS*
+ + * **[Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaLaInterface](Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaLaInterface.md)** *{iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) aca-la(2) major-version-2(2) minor-version-1(1)} WITH SUCCESSORS*
+ + * **[Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaMaInterface](Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaMaInterface.md)** *{iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) aca-ma(3) major-version-2(2) minor-version-1(1)} WITH SUCCESSORS*
+ + * **[Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaRaInterface](Ieee1609Dot2Dot1AcaRaInterface.md)** *{iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) aca-ra(4) major-version-3(3) minor-version-1(1)} WITH SUCCESSORS*
+ + * **[Ieee1609Dot2Dot1Acpc](Ieee1609Dot2Dot1Acpc.md)** *{iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) acpc(18) major-version-3(3) minor-version-1(1)} WITH SUCCESSORS*
+ + * **[Ieee1609Dot2Dot1CertManagement](Ieee1609Dot2Dot1CertManagement.md)** *{iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) cert-management(7) major-version-3(3) minor-version-1(1)} WITH SUCCESSORS*
+ + * **[Ieee1609Dot2Dot1EcaEeInterface](Ieee1609Dot2Dot1EcaEeInterface.md)** *{iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) eca-ee(9) major-version-3(3) minor-version-1(1)} WITH SUCCESSORS*
+ + * **[Ieee1609Dot2Dot1EeMaInterface](Ieee1609Dot2Dot1EeMaInterface.md)** *{iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) ee-ma(10) major-version-2(2) minor-version-1(1)} WITH SUCCESSORS*
+ + * **[Ieee1609Dot2Dot1EeRaInterface](Ieee1609Dot2Dot1EeRaInterface.md)** *{iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) ee-ra(11) major-version-3(3) minor-version-1(1)} WITH SUCCESSORS*
+ + * **[Ieee1609Dot2Dot1LaMaInterface](Ieee1609Dot2Dot1LaMaInterface.md)** *{iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) la-ma(12) major-version-2(2) minor-version-1(1)} WITH SUCCESSORS*
+ + * **[Ieee1609Dot2Dot1LaRaInterface](Ieee1609Dot2Dot1LaRaInterface.md)** *{iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) la-ra(13) major-version-2(2) minor-version-1(1)} WITH SUCCESSORS*
+ + * **[Ieee1609Dot2Dot1MaRaInterface](Ieee1609Dot2Dot1MaRaInterface.md)** *{iso(1) identified-organization(3) ieee(111) standards-association-numbered-series-standards(2) wave-stds(1609) dot2(2) extension-standards(255) dot1(1) interfaces(1) ma-ra(14) major-version-2(2) minor-version-1(1)} WITH SUCCESSORS*
+ +## Data Elements: + +### SecurityMgmtPsid +This PSID, 0x23, identifies security management activities as + defined in this document. +```asn1 +SecurityMgmtPsid ::= Psid (35) +``` + +### ScmsPdu +This is the parent structure that encompasses all parent structures + of interfaces defined in the SCMS. An overview of this structure is as + follows: + - aca-ee contains the interface structures defined for interaction + between the ACA and the EE. + - aca-la contains the interface structures defined for interaction + between the ACA and the LA. + - aca-ma contains the interface structures defined for interaction + between the ACA and the MA. + - aca-ra contains the interface structures defined for interaction + between the ACA and the RA. + - cert contains the interface structures defined for certificate + management. + - eca-ee contains the interface structures defined for interaction + between the ECA and the EE. + - ee-ma contains the interface structures defined for interaction + between the EE and the MA. + - ee-ra contains the interface structures defined for interaction + between the EE and the RA. + - la-ma contains the interface structures defined for interaction + between the LA and the MA. + - la-ra contains the interface structures defined for interaction + between the LA and the RA. + - ma-ra contains the interface structures defined for interactions + between the MA and the RA. + +Fields: +* version of type [**Uint8**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Uint8) (2)
+ contains the current version of the structure. + + + +* content of type [**CHOICE**](#CHOICE) { + aca-ee AcaEeInterfacePdu, + aca-la AcaLaInterfacePdu, + aca-ma AcaMaInterfacePdu, + aca-ra AcaRaInterfacePdu, + cert CertManagementPdu, + eca-ee EcaEeInterfacePdu, + ee-ma EeMaInterfacePdu, + ee-ra EeRaInterfacePdu, + la-ma LaMaInterfacePdu, + la-ra LaRaInterfacePdu, + ma-ra MaRaInterfacePdu, + ... + }
+ +```asn1 +ScmsPdu ::= SEQUENCE { + version Uint8 (2), + content CHOICE { + aca-ee AcaEeInterfacePdu, + aca-la AcaLaInterfacePdu, + aca-ma AcaMaInterfacePdu, + aca-ra AcaRaInterfacePdu, + cert CertManagementPdu, + eca-ee EcaEeInterfacePdu, + ee-ma EeMaInterfacePdu, + ee-ra EeRaInterfacePdu, + la-ma LaMaInterfacePdu, + la-ra LaRaInterfacePdu, + ma-ra MaRaInterfacePdu, + ... + } +} +``` + + +### ScmsPdu-Scoped +This structure defines a parameterized type for creating a scoped + data as a subtype of ScmsPdu. +```asn1 +ScmsPdu-Scoped {Pdu} ::= ScmsPdu (WITH COMPONENTS { + ..., + content (CONSTRAINED BY { + Pdu + }) +}) +``` + + +### X509Certificate +This structure defines a parameterized type for creating an + unsecured data as a subtype of Ieee1609Dot2Data. + +This structure defines a parameterized type for creating a signed + data as a subtype of Ieee1609Dot2Data. + +This structure defines a parameterized type for creating an + encrypted data as a subtype of Ieee1609Dot2Data. An overview of this + structure is as follows: +This structure defines a parameterized type for creating a signed + certificate request as a subtype of Ieee1609Dot2Data. + +This structure is a wrapper for an ITU-T X.509 certificate. + +>>> +NOTE: ITU-T X.509 certificates are encoded with the ASN.1 DER + rather than the OER used in this document and so cannot be "directly" + imported into these structures. +>>> +```asn1 +X509Certificate ::= OCTET STRING +``` + +### X509SignerIdentifier +This type is used for clarity of definitions. + +This structure identifies an ITU-T X.509 certificate used to sign a + signed data structure. The only data structure currently defined that can + be signed by an ITU-T X.509 certificate is SignedX509CertificateRequest. + +Fields: +* certificate of type [**SequenceOfX509Certificate**](#SequenceOfX509Certificate)
+```asn1 +X509SignerIdentifier ::= CHOICE { + certificate SequenceOfX509Certificate, + ... +} +``` + + +### SignerSingleCert +This structure defines a parameterized type for creating a + certificate request, signed with an ITU-T X.509 certificate, as a subtype of + Ieee1609Dot2Data. It makes use of the extension of Ieee1609Dot2Content + defined in 11.2.3. + +This structure defines a parameterized type for creating a signed + then encrypted data as a subtype of Ieee1609Dot2Data. + +This structure defines a parameterized type for creating an + encrypted then signed data as a subtype of Ieee1609Dot2Data. + + +This structure defines a parameterized type for creating a signed + then encrypted certificate request as a subtype of Ieee1609Dot2Data. + +This structure defines a parameterized type for creating an + encrypted data as a subtype of Ieee1609Dot2Data. An overview of this + structure is as follows: +This structure is used to indicate a SignerIdentifier with a + certificate chain of size 1. + +>>> +NOTE: This parameterized type inadvertently adds some overhead. + The Ieee1609Dot2Data-EncryptedSigned {Tbes, Psid} structure, because it + puts Ieee1609Dot2Data-Encrypted inside Ieee1609Dot2Data-Signed {Tbs, Psid}, + and because Ieee1609Dot2Data-Signed {Tbs, Psid} puts Tbs inside + unsecuredData, Tbes is "Signed (Unsecured (Encrypted))" instead of + "Signed (Encrypted))", which was the intent and also in the original CAMP + design. Other documents that use this document may be better off defining + this structure on their own, if they want avoid this overhead. +>>> +```asn1 +SignerSingleCert ::= SignerIdentifier (WITH COMPONENTS { + certificate (SequenceOfCertificate (SIZE (1))) +}) +``` + + +### SignerSingleX509Cert +This structure is used to indicate an X509SignerIdentifier with a + certificate chain of size 1. +```asn1 +SignerSingleX509Cert ::= X509SignerIdentifier (WITH COMPONENTS { + certificate (SequenceOfX509Certificate (SIZE (1))) +}) +``` + + +### SignerSelf +This structure is used to indicate a SignerIdentifier of type self. +```asn1 +SignerSelf ::= SignerIdentifier (WITH COMPONENTS { + self +}) +``` + + +### ScopedCertificateRequest +This structure defines the all certificate request structures as a + scoped version of the ScmsPdu. +```asn1 +ScopedCertificateRequest ::= ScmsPdu ( + ScmsPdu-Scoped { + AcaRaInterfacePdu (WITH COMPONENTS { + raAcaCertRequest + }) + } | + ScmsPdu-Scoped { + EcaEeInterfacePdu (WITH COMPONENTS { + eeEcaCertRequest + }) + } | + ScmsPdu-Scoped { + EeRaInterfacePdu (WITH COMPONENTS { + eeRaCertRequest + }) + } | + ScmsPdu-Scoped { + EeRaInterfacePdu (WITH COMPONENTS { + eeRaSuccessorEnrollmentCertRequest + }) + } +) +``` + +### SignedCertificateRequest +This structure defines the format of a signed certificate request. + An overview of this structure is as follows: + + + The signature is generated on the hash of this structure, obtained + per the rules specified for hashing data objects in 5.3.1 of IEEE Std + 1609.2a-2017, where the parameter Data Input shall be the C-OER + encoding of tbsRequest, and the parameter Signer Identifier Input + depending on whether the request is self-signed or signed using an + enrollment certificate: + - If the request is self-signed, the parameter Signer Identifier + Input shall be the empty string, i.e., a string of length 0. + - If the request is signed using an enrollment certificate, the + parameter Signer Identifier Input shall be the signer's enrollment + certificate. + +Fields: +* hashAlgorithmId of type [**HashAlgorithm**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#HashAlgorithm)
+ contains the identifier of the hash algorithm used + to calculate the hash of tbsRequest. + + +* tbsRequest of type [**ScopedCertificateRequest**](#ScopedCertificateRequest)
+ contains the certificate request information that is + signed by the recipient. + + + +* signer of type [**SignerIdentifier**](Ieee1609Dot2.md#SignerIdentifier)
+ denotes the signing entity's identifier. + + + +* signature of type [**Signature**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Signature)
+ contains the request sender's signature. + + + + +```asn1 +SignedCertificateRequest ::= SEQUENCE { + hashAlgorithmId HashAlgorithm, + tbsRequest ScopedCertificateRequest, + signer SignerIdentifier, + signature Signature +} +``` + +### SignedX509CertificateRequest +This structure contains a certificate request signed with an ITU-T + X.509 certificate. The only type of certificate request signed with an + ITU-T X.509 certificate supported in this document is an authorization + certificate request. An overview of this structure is as follows: + + + The signature is generated on the hash of this structure, obtained + per the rules specified for hashing data objects in 5.3.1 of IEEE Std + 1609.2a-2017, where the parameter Data Input shall be the C-OER + encoding of tbsRequest, and the parameter Signer Identifier Input + shall be the signer's certificate, that is, the ITU-T X.509 certificate + contained in the OCTET STRING indicated by the first X509Certificate in + signer. For example, if the signer is as below, the first 6 bytes are the + ASN.1 encoding overhead, where 80 01 01 is the overhead for signer, and + then 82 01 AC is the overhead introduced by the OCTET STRING encoding for + the first (in this case, the only) X509Certificate; and the first + X509Certificate is contained in the next 428 bytes (30 82 01 ... 00 00 00), + so the parameter Signer Identifier Input shall be '30 82 01 ... 00 00 00'. + + An example X509SignerIdentifier with one X509Certificate: + + 80 01 01 82 01 AC 30 82 01 A8 30 82 01 4D A0 03 02 01 02 02 04 90 + C5 9D 21 30 0A 06 08 2A 86 48 CE 3D 04 03 02 30 24 31 0A 30 08 06 03 55 04 + 06 13 01 00 31 0A 30 08 06 03 55 04 0A 13 01 00 31 0A 30 08 06 03 55 04 03 + 13 01 00 30 1E 17 0D 30 30 30 31 30 31 30 30 30 30 30 30 5A 17 0D 30 30 30 + 31 30 31 30 30 30 30 30 30 5A 30 24 31 0A 30 08 06 03 55 04 06 13 01 00 31 + 0A 30 08 06 03 55 04 0A 13 01 00 31 0A 30 08 06 03 55 04 03 13 01 00 30 59 + 30 13 06 07 2A 86 48 CE 3D 02 01 06 08 2A 86 48 CE 3D 03 01 07 03 42 00 00 + 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 + 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 + 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 A3 6D 30 6B 30 0A 06 03 55 1D 0E + 04 03 04 01 00 30 0A 06 03 55 1D 23 04 03 04 01 00 30 0C 06 03 55 1D 13 01 + 01 FF 04 02 30 00 30 0E 06 03 55 1D 0F 01 01 FF 04 04 03 02 03 C8 30 0A 06 + 03 55 1D 25 04 03 04 01 00 30 0A 06 03 55 1D 1F 04 03 04 01 00 30 0F 06 08 + 2B 06 01 05 05 07 01 01 04 03 04 01 00 30 0A 06 03 55 1D 20 04 03 04 01 00 + 30 0A 06 08 2A 86 48 CE 3D 04 03 02 03 49 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 + 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 + 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 + 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 + +Fields: +* hashAlgorithmId of type [**HashAlgorithm**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#HashAlgorithm)
+ contains the identifier of the hash algorithm used + inside the binary tree. + + +* tbsRequest of type [**ScopedCertificateRequest**](#ScopedCertificateRequest)
+ contains the certificate request information that is + signed by the recipient. + + + +* signer of type [**X509SignerIdentifier**](#X509SignerIdentifier)
+ denotes the signing entity's identifier. + + + +* signature of type [**Signature**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Signature)
+ contains the request sender's signature. + + + + +```asn1 +SignedX509CertificateRequest ::= SEQUENCE { + hashAlgorithmId HashAlgorithm, + tbsRequest ScopedCertificateRequest, + signer X509SignerIdentifier, + signature Signature +} +``` + + +### AcaEeCertResponsePlainSpdu +This structure contains a certificate response for consumption by + the EE. In the architecture of this document, although it is created by the + ACA, it is made available to the EE via the RA as described in 8.2. + + + The ACA creates this response when 1) the compact unified + butterfly key mechanism is not being used (that is, some other flavor of + butterfly key is being used, or butterfly keys are not being used) and 2) + it is not necessary to protect the EE's privacy from the RA, for example, + when the certificate being returned is not a pseudonym certificate. +```asn1 +AcaEeCertResponsePlainSpdu ::= Ieee1609Dot2Data-Unsecured { + ScmsPdu-Scoped { + AcaEeInterfacePdu (WITH COMPONENTS { + acaEeCertResponse + }) + } +} +``` + + +### AcaEeCertResponsePrivateSpdu +This structure contains a certificate response for consumption by + the EE. In the architecture of this document, although it is created by the + ACA, it is made available to the EE via the RA as described in 8.2. + + + The ACA creates this response when 1) the compact unified + butterfly key mechanism is not being used (that is, some other flavor of + butterfly key is being used, or butterfly keys are not being used) and 2) + it is necessary to protect the EE's privacy from the RA, for example when + the certificate being returned is a pseudonym certificate. + + The structure consists of a signed SPDU containing an encrypted + SPDU. + + The encrypted SPDU is encrypted with the response + encryption key that was provided to the ACA for that purpose. This key is + determined as follows: + - If the original EeRaCertRequest from the end entity indicated a single + response encryption key, that is, if the additionalParams.encryptionKey + field was present in the request, then the response is encrypted with that + key. + - If the original EeRaCertRequest from the end entity indicated a + response encryption key generated with the "original" butterfly key + mechanism, that is, the additionalParams.original field was provided in the + request, then the response is encrypted with the cocoon encryption key + derived from additionalParams.original.encryptionKey and + additionalParams.original.encryptionExpansion as specified in 9.3.4.2 + and the corresponding decryption private key is derived as specified in + 9.3.4.1. + - If the original EeRaCertRequest from the end entity indicated a + response encryption key generated with the "unified" butterfly key + mechanism, that is, the additionalParams.unified field was provided in the + request, then the response is encrypted with the cocoon encryption key + derived from tbsCert.verifyKeyIndicator and additionalParams.unified as + specified in 9.3.4.2 and the corresponding decryption private key is + derived as specified in 9.3.4.1. + + See 9.3 for more material about butterfly keys. + + The resulting Ieee1609Dot2Data of content type encryptedData is + signed by the same ACA certificate that was used to issue the certificate + field in the AcaEeCertResponse. If this structure is signed by a different + ACA certificate, it is invalid. The ACA certificate shall follow the ACA + certificate profile given in 7.7.3.2. + + + - How the ACA obtains the response encryption key: This + document provides the RaAcaCertRequest structure to allow the RA to + indicate whether the original or unified butterfly key mechanism is to be + used via the flags field. The encryption key for encrypting + AcaEeCertResponse is calculated by the indicated method even if the RA + does not use an RaAcaCertRequest as defined in this document to + communicate the certificate request to the ACA. + + - Consistency between inner and outer signers, and the IEEE + Std 1609.2 model. This SPDU introduces a new type of validity condition + by requiring that the ACA that signs the outer signed SPDU is also the ACA + that issued the certificate inside the encrypted SPDU. This requires that + to verify the inner "SPDU", that is, the certificate, the verifier + needs to store the information from the outer SPDU. This is not a violation + of the IEEE 1609.2 model: Subclause 4.2.2.3 of IEEE Std 1609.2 considers all + operations carried out on received data to be atomic and does not put any + restrictions on the information that is stored between operations. However, + it should be noted that because the IEEE 1609.2 approach enables SPDUs to + be nested within one another as Ieee1609Dot2Data, in principle an + implementation could be built that iterated through the layers of a nested + SPDU within a single call from the invoking application instance. (And it + should also be noted that IEEE Std 1609.2 was consciously designed to + enable this approach: Although the primitives provided in IEEE Std 1609.2 + only support the series-of-single-operations approach, an implementation + could layer this "one-invocation processing" on top of the IEEE 1609.2 + interface as an optimization.) A "one-invocation processing" implementation + of that type would have to anticipate situations of coupling between inner + and outer SPDUs like the one created by this AcaEeCertResponsePrivateSpdu, + and allow the invoking certificate management service to check consistency + at the application layer, perhaps by (for example) returning the signing + certificates for all nested signed SPDUs. How this is to be implemented is + implementation specific; this note is intended as a notification of this + potential issue to implementers planning to implement one-invocation + processing. + +>>> +NOTE:  - Other potential responses to an authorization certificate + request: If the original request indicated the use of "compact unified" + butterfly key mechanism by including the additionalParams.compactUnified + field, the response shall be a AcaEeCertResponseCubkSpdu, not a + AcaEeCertResponsePrivateSpdu. +>>> +```asn1 +AcaEeCertResponsePrivateSpdu ::= Ieee1609Dot2Data-EncryptedSigned { + ScmsPdu-Scoped { + AcaEeInterfacePdu (WITH COMPONENTS { + acaEeCertResponse + }) + }, + SecurityMgmtPsid +} +``` + + +### AcaEeCertResponseCubkSpdu +This structure contains a certificate response for consumption by + the EE. In the architecture of this document, although it is created by + the ACA, it is made available to the EE via the RA as described in 8.2. + + + The ACA creates a certificate response in this form when the + compact unified butterfly key mechanism is being used. If the + RaAcaCertRequest structure was used to communicate between the RA and the + ACA, the RA indicated use of compact unified butterfly keys by setting the + cubk (1) bit in the bkType field in the corresponding RaAcaCertRequest. + + The AcaEeCertResponse is encrypted by the ACA using the cocoon + public key for encryption. See 9.3.4.2 for how the ACA derives the cocoon + public key for encryption, using the tbsCert.verifyKeyIndicator field in the + corresponding RaAcaCertRequest as the input cocoon public key for signing + Bt. See 9.3.4.1 for how the EE derives the corresponding cocoon private + key for encryption. +```asn1 +AcaEeCertResponseCubkSpdu ::= Ieee1609Dot2Data-Encrypted { + ScmsPdu-Scoped { + AcaEeInterfacePdu (WITH COMPONENTS { + acaEeCertResponse + }) + } +} +``` + + +### RaAcaCertRequestSpdu +This structure is the SPDU used to send a signed RaAcaCertRequest. + For the signature to be valid the signing certificate shall conform to the + RA certificate profile given in 7.7.3.9, contain a PSID equal to + SecurityMgmtPsid and a corresponding SSP containing the C-OER encoding of a + SecurityMgmtSsp indicating RaSsp. The toBeSigned.certRequestPermissions + field of the RA certificate shall permit the requested permissions in the + raAcaCertRequest.tbsCert.appPermissions field. +```asn1 +RaAcaCertRequestSpdu ::= Ieee1609Dot2Data-SignedCertRequest { + ScmsPdu-Scoped { + AcaRaInterfacePdu (WITH COMPONENTS { + raAcaCertRequest + }) + }, + SignerSingleCert +} +``` + + +### AcaRaCertResponseSpdu +This structure is the SPDU used to send a signed AcaRaCertResponse. + For the signature to be valid the signing certificate shall contain a PSID + equal to SecurityMgmtPsid and a corresponding SSP containing the C-OER + encoding of a SecurityMgmtSsp indicating AcaSsp. +```asn1 +AcaRaCertResponseSpdu ::= Ieee1609Dot2Data-Signed { + ScmsPdu-Scoped { + AcaRaInterfacePdu (WITH COMPONENTS { + acaRaCertResponse + }) + }, + SecurityMgmtPsid +} +``` + + +### CompositeCrlSpdu +This structure is the SPDU used to send an unsecured CompositeCrl. + It is used to create composite CRL files as specified in 8.5. +```asn1 +CompositeCrlSpdu ::= Ieee1609Dot2Data-Unsecured { + ScmsPdu-Scoped { + CertManagementPdu (WITH COMPONENTS { + compositeCrl + }) + } +} +``` + + +### CertificateChainSpdu +This structure is the SPDU used to send an unsecured + CertificateChain. It is used to create certificate chain files as + specified in 8.4. +```asn1 +CertificateChainSpdu ::= Ieee1609Dot2Data-Unsecured { + ScmsPdu-Scoped { + CertManagementPdu (WITH COMPONENTS { + certificateChain + }) + } +} +``` + + +### MultiSignedCtlSpdu +This structure is the SPDU used to send an unsecured MultiSignedCtl. +```asn1 +MultiSignedCtlSpdu ::= Ieee1609Dot2Data-Unsecured { + ScmsPdu-Scoped { + CertManagementPdu (WITH COMPONENTS { + multiSignedCtl + }) + } +} +``` + + +### CtlSignatureSpdu +This structure is the SPDU used to send a signed + ToBeSignedCtlSignature. For the signature to be valid, the signing + certificate shall match the elector certificate profile in 7.7.3.7. This + means that the signature is calculated as specified in IEEE Std 1609.2, + with the data input to the hash process consisting of the C-OER encoding + of the tbsData that includes the ToBeSignedCtlSignature. +```asn1 +CtlSignatureSpdu ::= Ieee1609Dot2Data-Signed { + ScmsPdu-Scoped { + CertManagementPdu (WITH COMPONENTS { + tbsCtlSignature + }) + }, + SecurityMgmtPsid +} +``` + + +### EeEcaCertRequestSpdu +This structure is the SPDU used to send a signed + CertManagementInfoStatus. For the signature to be valid the signing + certificate shall conform to the RA certificate profile given in 7.7.3.9 or + the DC certificate profile given in 7.7.3.10. + +This structure is the SPDU used to send a signed EeEcaCertRequest, + as follows: + - If eeEcaCertRequest.canonicalId is not present, the EE signs this + structure using the private key corresponding to the + tbsCert.verifyKeyIndicator field of the EeEcaCertRequest. + - If eeEcaCertRequest.canonicalId is present, the EE signs this + structure using the canonical private key as specified in 4.1.4.2. +```asn1 +EeEcaCertRequestSpdu ::= Ieee1609Dot2Data-SignedCertRequest { + ScmsPdu-Scoped { + EcaEeInterfacePdu (WITH COMPONENTS { + eeEcaCertRequest + }) + }, + SignerSelf +} +``` + + +### EcaEeCertResponseSpdu +This structure is the SPDU used to send a signed EcaEeCertResponse. + For the signature to be valid, the signing certificate shall contain a PSID + equal to SecurityMgmtPsid and a corresponding SSP containing the C-OER + encoding of a SecurityMgmtSsp indicating EcaSsp. +```asn1 +EcaEeCertResponseSpdu ::= Ieee1609Dot2Data-Signed { + ScmsPdu-Scoped { + EcaEeInterfacePdu (WITH COMPONENTS { + ecaEeCertResponse + }) + }, + SecurityMgmtPsid +} +``` + + +### EeRaCertRequestSpdu +This structure is the SPDU used to send a signed then encrypted + EeRaCertRequest. It is a choice of the IEEE 1609.2 authenticated + certificate request, which may be any kind of EE-RA certificate request, + and the ITU-T X.509 certificate request, which is required to be an + authorization certificate request. +```asn1 +EeRaCertRequestSpdu ::= Ieee1609Dot2Data ( + EeRa1609Dot2AuthenticatedCertRequestSpdu | + EeRaX509AuthenticatedCertRequestSpdu +) +``` + + +### EeRaX509AuthenticatedCertRequestSpdu +This structure is the SPDU used to send a signed then encrypted IEEE + 1609.2 authenticated certificate request. The EE signs this structure + using its enrollment certificate. The enrollment certificate shall conform + to the enrollment certificate profile given in 7.7.3.5. The EE encrypts + the signed structure using the encryptionKey from the RA's certificate. + +This structure is the SPDU used to send a signed then encrypted ITU-T + X.509authenticated certificate request. The EE signs this structure + using its enrollment certificate. The enrollment certificate shall conform + to the enrollment certificate profile given in 7.7.3.6. The EE encrypts + the signed structure using the encryptionKey from the RA's certificate. +```asn1 +EeRaX509AuthenticatedCertRequestSpdu ::= Ieee1609Dot2Data-Encrypted { + Ieee1609Dot2Data-SignedX509AuthenticatedCertRequest { + ScmsPdu-Scoped { + EeRaInterfacePdu (WITH COMPONENTS { + eeRaCertRequest + }) + }, + SignerSingleX509Cert + } +} +``` + + +### RaEeCertAckSpdu +This structure is the SPDU used to send a signed RaEeCertAck to + acknowledge the receipt of an EeRaCertRequestSpdu. For the signature to be + valid the signing certificate shall conform to the RA certificate profile + given in 7.7.3.9. +```asn1 +RaEeCertAckSpdu ::= Ieee1609Dot2Data-Signed { + ScmsPdu-Scoped { + EeRaInterfacePdu (WITH COMPONENTS { + raEeCertAck + }) + }, + SecurityMgmtPsid +} +``` + + +### RaEeCertInfoSpdu +This structure is the SPDU used to create an unsigned .info file + to be included in a certificate batch zip file as specified in 8.2. This + SPDU is used if the RaEeCertInfo does not contain an acpcTreeId field. +```asn1 +RaEeCertInfoSpdu ::= Ieee1609Dot2Data-Unsecured { + ScmsPdu-Scoped { + EeRaInterfacePdu (WITH COMPONENTS { + raEeCertInfo (WITH COMPONENTS { + acpcTreeId ABSENT + }) + }) + } +} +``` + + +### RaEeCertAndAcpcInfoSpdu +This structure is the SPDU used to create a signed .info file to + be included in a certificate batch zip file as specified in 8.2. This + SPDU is used if the RaEeCertInfo contains an acpcTreeId field. For the + signature to be valid the signing certificate shall conform to the RA + certificate profile given in 7.7.3.9. +```asn1 +RaEeCertAndAcpcInfoSpdu ::= Ieee1609Dot2Data-Signed { + ScmsPdu-Scoped { + EeRaInterfacePdu (WITH COMPONENTS { + raEeCertInfo (WITH COMPONENTS { + acpcTreeId PRESENT + }) + }) + }, + SecurityMgmtPsid +} +``` + + +### EeRaDownloadRequestPlainSpdu +This structure is the SPDU used to send an unsecured + EeRaDownloadRequest. +```asn1 +EeRaDownloadRequestPlainSpdu ::= Ieee1609Dot2Data-Unsecured { + ScmsPdu-Scoped { + EeRaInterfacePdu (WITH COMPONENTS { + eeRaDownloadRequest + }) + } +} +``` + + +### EeRaDownloadRequestSpdu +This structure is the SPDU used to send a signed then encrypted + EeRaDownloadRequest. The EE signs this structure using its enrollment + certificate. The enrollment certificate shall conform to the enrollment + certificate profile given in 7.7.3.5. The EE encrypts the signed + structure using the encryptionKey from the RA's certificate. +```asn1 +EeRaDownloadRequestSpdu ::= Ieee1609Dot2Data-SignedEncrypted { + ScmsPdu-Scoped { + EeRaInterfacePdu (WITH COMPONENTS { + eeRaDownloadRequest + }) + }, + SecurityMgmtPsid +} +``` + + +### RaEeEnrollmentCertAckSpdu +This structure is the SPDU used to send a signed then encrypted + EeEcaCertRequestSpdu. The EE signs this structure using its enrollment + certificate. The enrollment certificate shall conform to the enrollment + certificate profile given in 7.7.3.5. The EE encrypts the signed + structure using the encryptionKey from the RA's certificate. + +This structure is the SPDU used to send a signed RaEeCertInfo. For + the signature to be valid the signing certificate shall conform to the RA + certificate profile given in 7.7.3.9. +```asn1 +RaEeEnrollmentCertAckSpdu ::= Ieee1609Dot2Data-Signed { + ScmsPdu-Scoped { + EeRaInterfacePdu (WITH COMPONENTS { + raEeCertInfo (WITH COMPONENTS { + acpcTreeId ABSENT + }) + }) + }, + SecurityMgmtPsid +} +``` + +### SecurityMgmtSsp +This parent structure defines the SSP for SecurityMgmtPsid and + encompasses all SSP structures defined in this document. An overview of + this structure is as follows: + +Fields: +* elector of type [**ElectorSsp**](#ElectorSsp)
+ contains the SSP defined for an elector. + + +* root of type [**RootCaSsp**](#RootCaSsp)
+ contains the SSP defined for a root CA. + + + +* pg of type [**PgSsp**](#PgSsp)
+ contains the SSP defined for a policy generator. + + + +* ica of type [**IcaSsp**](#IcaSsp)
+ contains the SSP defined for an intermediate CA. + + + +* eca of type [**EcaSsp**](#EcaSsp)
+ contains the SSP defined for an enrollment CA. + + + +* aca of type [**AcaSsp**](#AcaSsp)
+ contains the SSP defined for an authorization CA. + + + +* crl of type [**CrlSignerSsp**](#CrlSignerSsp)
+ contains the SSP defined for a CRL signer. + + + +* dcm of type [**DcmSsp**](#DcmSsp)
+ contains the SSP defined for a device configuration manager. + + + +* la of type [**LaSsp**](#LaSsp)
+ contains the SSP defined for a linkage authority. + + + +* lop of type [**LopSsp**](#LopSsp)
+ contains the SSP defined for a location obscurer proxy. + + + +* ma of type [**MaSsp**](#MaSsp)
+ contains the SSP defined for a misbehavior authority. + + + +* ra of type [**RaSsp**](#RaSsp)
+ contains the SSP defined for a registration authority. + + + +* ee of type [**EeSsp**](#EeSsp)
+ contains the SSP defined for an end entity. + + + +* dc of type [**DcSsp**](#DcSsp)
+ contains the SSP defined for a distribution center. + + + + + ..., + +>>> +NOTE: The LOP is in the SSP for backward compatibility reasons, + and in practice, in this design the LOP does not have a certificate. +>>> +```asn1 +SecurityMgmtSsp ::= CHOICE { + elector ElectorSsp, + root RootCaSsp, + pg PgSsp, + ica IcaSsp, + eca EcaSsp, + aca AcaSsp, + crl CrlSignerSsp, + dcm DcmSsp, + la LaSsp, + lop LopSsp, + ma MaSsp, + ra RaSsp, + ee EeSsp, + ..., + dc DcSsp + } +``` + + +### TestSecurityMgmtSsp +```asn1 +TestSecurityMgmtSsp ::= SecurityMgmtSsp +``` + +### ElectorSsp +This structure defines the SSP for an elector when it is authorizing + SecurityMgmtPsid messages. It has no parameters other than the version + number. + +Fields: +* version of type [**Uint8**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Uint8) (2)
+```asn1 +ElectorSsp ::= SEQUENCE { + version Uint8 (2), + ... +} +``` + +### RootCaSsp +This structure defines the SSP for a root CA when it is authorizing + SecurityMgmtPsid messages. It has no parameters other than the version + number. + +Fields: +* version of type [**Uint8**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Uint8) (2)
+```asn1 +RootCaSsp ::= SEQUENCE { + version Uint8 (2), + ... +} +``` + +### PgSsp +This structure defines the SSP for a policy generator when it is + authorizing SecurityMgmtPsid messages. It has no parameters other than the + version number. + +Fields: +* version of type [**Uint8**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Uint8) (2)
+```asn1 +PgSsp ::= SEQUENCE { + version Uint8 (2), + ... +} +``` + +### IcaSsp +This structure defines the SSP for an intermediate CA when it is + authorizing SecurityMgmtPsid messages. It has no parameters other than the + version number. + +Fields: +* version of type [**Uint8**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Uint8) (2)
+```asn1 +IcaSsp ::= SEQUENCE { + version Uint8 (2), + ... +} +``` + +### EcaSsp +This structure defines the SSP for an enrollment CA when it is + authorizing SecurityMgmtPsid messages. It has no parameters other than the + version number. + +Fields: +* version of type [**Uint8**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Uint8) (2)
+```asn1 +EcaSsp ::= SEQUENCE { + version Uint8 (2), + ... +} +``` + +### AcaSsp +This structure defines the SSP for an authorization CA when it is + authorizing SecurityMgmtPsid messages. It has no parameters other than the + version number. + +Fields: +* version of type [**Uint8**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Uint8) (2)
+```asn1 +AcaSsp ::= SEQUENCE { + version Uint8 (2), + ... +} +``` + +### CrlSignerSsp +This structure defines the SSP for a CRL signer when it is + authorizing SecurityMgmtPsid messages. It has no parameters other than the + version number. + +Fields: +* version of type [**Uint8**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Uint8) (2)
+ +>>> +NOTE: The SSP for a CRL signer when signing CRLs is associated with + PSID 0x0100 and is defined in IEEE Std 1609.2. +>>> +```asn1 +CrlSignerSsp ::= SEQUENCE { + version Uint8 (2), + ... +} +``` + +### DcmSsp +This structure defines the SSP for a device configuration manager + when it is authorizing SecurityMgmtPsid messages. It has no parameters + other than the version number. + +Fields: +* version of type [**Uint8**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Uint8) (2)
+```asn1 +DcmSsp ::= SEQUENCE { + version Uint8 (2), + ... +} +``` + +### LaSsp +This structure defines the SSP for a linkage authority when it is + authorizing SecurityMgmtPsid messages. It has no parameters other than the + version number. + +Fields: +* version of type [**Uint8**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Uint8) (2)
+* laId of type [**Uint16**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Uint16)
+ +```asn1 +LaSsp ::= SEQUENCE { + version Uint8 (2), + laId Uint16, + ... +} +``` + +### LopSsp +This structure defines the SSP for a location obscurer proxy (LOP) + when it is authorizing SecurityMgmtPsid messages. It has no parameters + other than the version number. + +Fields: +* version of type [**Uint8**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Uint8) (2)
+ +>>> +NOTE: The LOP is in the SSP for backward compatibility reasons, and + in practice, in this design the LOP does not have a certificate. +>>> +```asn1 +LopSsp ::= SEQUENCE { + version Uint8 (2), + ... +} +``` + +### MaSsp +This structure defines the SSP for a misbehavior authority when it + is authorizing SecurityMgmtPsid messages. Its parameters + indicate the PSIDs associated with the misbehavior that is to be reported + to that MA (see 4.1.5 for further details). The certificate containing + this SSP is the MA Certificate to which an end entity should encrypt + misbehavior reports related to the indicated PSIDs. + +Fields: +* version of type [**Uint8**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Uint8) (2)
+* relevantPsids of type [**SequenceOfPsid**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#SequenceOfPsid)
+ +```asn1 +MaSsp ::= SEQUENCE { + version Uint8 (2), + relevantPsids SequenceOfPsid, + ... +} +``` + +### RaSsp +This structure defines the SSP for an RA when it is authorizing + SecurityMgmtPsid messages. It has no parameters other than the version + number. + +Fields: +* version of type [**Uint8**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Uint8) (2)
+```asn1 +RaSsp ::= SEQUENCE { + version Uint8 (2), + ... +} +``` + +### EeSsp +This structure defines the SSP for an end entity when it is + authorizing SecurityMgmtPsid messages. It has no parameters other than the + version number. + +Fields: +* version of type [**Uint8**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Uint8) (2)
+```asn1 +EeSsp ::= SEQUENCE { + version Uint8(2), + ... +} +``` + +### AcpcSsp +This is a container for ACPC-related SSPs, specifying one SSP for + each role. The only SSP defined in this document is the CamSsp, used in + the CAM certificate that signs a SignedAprvBinaryTree or a + SignedIndividualAprv. The SSP shall be C-OER encoded for inclusion in the + CAM certificate. New versions of the CAM SSP should be handled by + extending this structure rather than by use of a version number in the + CamSsp structure. + + + The AcpcSsp is associated with the AcpcPsid in the CAM certificate's + appPermissions field. + +Fields: +* cam of type [**CamSsp**](#CamSsp)
+```asn1 +AcpcSsp ::= CHOICE { + cam CamSsp, + ... +} +``` + + +### CamSsp +This is a list of the ACPC Tree IDs for which the containing CAM + certificate is entitled to sign a SignedAprvBinaryTree or a + SignedIndividualAprv. The SSP entitles the certificate holder to sign + either of these structures. +```asn1 +CamSsp ::= SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF AcpcTreeId +``` + +### DcSsp +This structure defines the SSP for a distribution center when it is + authorizing SecurityMgmtPsid messages. It has no parameters other than the + version number. + +Fields: +* version of type [**Uint8**](Ieee1609Dot2BaseTypes.md#Uint8) (2)
+```asn1 +DcSsp ::= SEQUENCE { + version Uint8(2), + ... +} +``` + + + +This structure defines the SSP for a policy generator when it is + authorizing SecurityMgmtPsid messages. It has no parameters other than the + version number. + This structure defines the SSP for an intermediate CA when it is + authorizing SecurityMgmtPsid messages. It has no parameters other than the + version number. + This structure defines the SSP for an enrollment CA when it is + authorizing SecurityMgmtPsid messages. It has no parameters other than the + version number. + This structure defines the SSP for an authorization CA when it is + authorizing SecurityMgmtPsid messages. It has no parameters other than the + version number. + This structure defines the SSP for a CRL signer when it is + authorizing SecurityMgmtPsid messages. It has no parameters other than the + version number. + +>>> +NOTE: The SSP for a CRL signer when signing CRLs is associated with + PSID 0x0100 and is defined in IEEE Std 1609.2. + This structure defines the SSP for a device configuration manager + when it is authorizing SecurityMgmtPsid messages. It has no parameters + other than the version number. + This structure defines the SSP for a linkage authority when it is + authorizing SecurityMgmtPsid messages. It has no parameters other than the + version number. + This structure defines the SSP for a location obscurer proxy (LOP) + when it is authorizing SecurityMgmtPsid messages. It has no parameters + other than the version number. +>>> + + +>>> +NOTE: The LOP is in the SSP for backward compatibility reasons, and + in practice, in this design the LOP does not have a certificate. + This structure defines the SSP for a misbehavior authority when it + is authorizing SecurityMgmtPsid messages. Its parameters + indicate the PSIDs associated with the misbehavior that is to be reported + to that MA (see 4.1.5 for further details). The certificate containing + this SSP is the MA Certificate to which an end entity should encrypt + misbehavior reports related to the indicated PSIDs. + This structure defines the SSP for an RA when it is authorizing + SecurityMgmtPsid messages. It has no parameters other than the version + number. + This structure defines the SSP for an end entity when it is + authorizing SecurityMgmtPsid messages. It has no parameters other than the + version number. + This is a container for ACPC-related SSPs, specifying one SSP for + each role. The only SSP defined in this document is the CamSsp, used in + the CAM certificate that signs a SignedAprvBinaryTree or a + SignedIndividualAprv. The SSP shall be C-OER encoded for inclusion in the + CAM certificate. New versions of the CAM SSP should be handled by + extending this structure rather than by use of a version number in the + CamSsp structure. +>>> + + + The AcpcSsp is associated with the AcpcPsid in the CAM certificate's + appPermissions field. + This is a list of the ACPC Tree IDs for which the containing CAM + certificate is entitled to sign a SignedAprvBinaryTree or a + SignedIndividualAprv. The SSP entitles the certificate holder to sign + either of these structures. + This structure defines the SSP for a distribution center when it is + authorizing SecurityMgmtPsid messages. It has no parameters other than the + version number. + + -- GitLab