diff --git a/.jenkins.sh b/.jenkins.sh index c5026977e0510f50bcffea0bbab651fd4cfc4f72..ee78b865929dc0ff5124b5a389163821b9ba0291 100755 --- a/.jenkins.sh +++ b/.jenkins.sh @@ -12,6 +12,14 @@ run_dir=`pwd` # Docker version 2 cd ./virtualization/docker ./build.sh #--force-stfubuntu +ret_code=`echo $?` + +if [ $ret_code != 0 ] +then + cd $run_dir + exit -1 +fi + #./run.sh if [ "$1" == "--remove" ] @@ -19,4 +27,6 @@ then docker rmi --force etsiforge/etsi-its-ts:latest fi -cd - +cd $run_dir + +exit 0 diff --git a/TTF011_win.tpd b/TS.ITS.tpd similarity index 99% rename from TTF011_win.tpd rename to TS.ITS.tpd index d33af871dd44012805d3346a89179ee182d6eb75..3685372ee988ce437aa8959ded22927a357c406d 100644 --- a/TTF011_win.tpd +++ b/TS.ITS.tpd @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ - +\0;136;0c - TTF011_Its + TS.ITS @@ -201,8 +201,8 @@ - - + + @@ -6354,4 +6354,4 @@ - \ No newline at end of file + diff --git a/ccsrc/Externals/LibItsCommon_externals.cc b/ccsrc/Externals/LibItsCommon_externals.cc index 9f2297b85d207a89a48efa46a1442d7e067aa5db..2a2c16fc4a416eb90784833d0612d1416b0a66c6 100644 --- a/ccsrc/Externals/LibItsCommon_externals.cc +++ b/ccsrc/Externals/LibItsCommon_externals.cc @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ namespace LibItsCommon__Functions { } /** * @desc This external function gets the current time since 01/01/1970 in UTC format - * @return The current time since 01/01/1970 in UTC format + * @return The current time since 01/01/1970 in UTC format in milliseconds * @see fx_getCurrentTimeUtc() return UInt64 */ INTEGER fx__getCurrentTimeUtc() { diff --git a/ccsrc/Externals/LibItsSecurity_externals.cc b/ccsrc/Externals/LibItsSecurity_externals.cc index b7db3ab1475e29dcb7bcff7e6426abff271f0d20..b398619e992406e0b135950b60c719feed57dac9 100644 --- a/ccsrc/Externals/LibItsSecurity_externals.cc +++ b/ccsrc/Externals/LibItsSecurity_externals.cc @@ -693,7 +693,7 @@ namespace LibItsSecurity__Functions { p__publicEphemeralKeyCompressed = ec->public_key_compressed(); loggers::get_instance().log_msg("fx__encryptWithEciesNistp256WithSha256: Ephemeral public compressed key: ", p__publicEphemeralKeyCompressed); p__ephemeralCompressedMode = (ec->public_key_compressed_mode() == ecc_compressed_mode::compressed_y_0) ? 0 : 1; - loggers::get_instance().log("fx__encryptWithEciesNistp256WithSha256: Ephemeral public compressed mode: %d: ", p__ephemeralCompressedMode); + loggers::get_instance().log("fx__encryptWithEciesNistp256WithSha256: Ephemeral public compressed mode: %d: ", (int)p__ephemeralCompressedMode); // 3. Retrieve AES 128 parameters p__nonce = ec->nonce(); loggers::get_instance().log_msg("fx__encryptWithEciesNistp256WithSha256: p__nonce: ", p__nonce); @@ -858,7 +858,7 @@ namespace LibItsSecurity__Functions { p__publicEphemeralKeyCompressed = ec->public_key_compressed(); loggers::get_instance().log_msg("fx__encryptWithEciesBrainpoolp256r1WithSha256: Ephemeral public compressed key: ", p__publicEphemeralKeyCompressed); p__ephemeralCompressedMode = (ec->public_key_compressed_mode() == ecc_compressed_mode::compressed_y_0) ? 0 : 1; - loggers::get_instance().log("fx__encryptWithEciesBrainpoolp256r1WithSha256: Ephemeral public compressed mode: %d: ", p__ephemeralCompressedMode); + loggers::get_instance().log("fx__encryptWithEciesBrainpoolp256r1WithSha256: Ephemeral public compressed mode: %d: ", (int)p__ephemeralCompressedMode); // 3. Retrieve AES 128 parameters p__nonce = ec->nonce(); loggers::get_instance().log_msg("fx__encryptWithEciesBrainpoolp256r1WithSha256: p__nonce: ", p__nonce); diff --git a/ccsrc/Protocols/GeoNetworking/encoding_context.hh b/ccsrc/Protocols/GeoNetworking/encoding_context.hh index 82130c36a1765e0e7e423c6df7ff1d5524056db2..74ace5c2b6ad217d7f2c033f01cde9af86ec8e40 100644 --- a/ccsrc/Protocols/GeoNetworking/encoding_context.hh +++ b/ccsrc/Protocols/GeoNetworking/encoding_context.hh @@ -1,33 +1,33 @@ -#pragma once - -#include - -class encoding_context { - unsigned char _basic_header; - unsigned char _next_header; - unsigned char _header_type; - unsigned int _length_position; - unsigned int _length; - -public: - explicit encoding_context() { reset(); } - inline void reset() { - _basic_header = 0xff; - _next_header = 0xff; - _header_type = 0xff; - _length_position = -1; - _length = -1; - } - -public: - inline unsigned char get_basic_header() { return _basic_header; }; - inline void set_basic_header(const unsigned char p_basic_header) { _basic_header = p_basic_header; }; - inline unsigned char get_next_header() { return _next_header; }; - inline void set_next_header(const unsigned char p_next_header) { _next_header = p_next_header; }; - inline unsigned char get_header_type() { return _header_type; }; - inline void set_header_type(const unsigned char p_header_type) { _header_type = p_header_type; }; - inline unsigned int get_length_position() { return _length_position; }; - inline void set_length_position(const unsigned int p_length_position) { _length_position = p_length_position; }; - inline unsigned int get_length() { return _length; }; - inline void set_length(const unsigned int p_length) { _length = p_length; }; -}; // End of class encoding_context +#pragma once + +#include + +class encoding_context { + unsigned char _basic_header; + unsigned char _next_header; + unsigned char _header_type; + unsigned int _length_position; + unsigned int _length; + +public: + explicit encoding_context() { reset(); } + inline void reset() { + _basic_header = 0xff; + _next_header = 0xff; + _header_type = 0xff; + _length_position = -1; + _length = -1; + } + +public: + inline unsigned char get_basic_header() { return _basic_header; }; + inline void set_basic_header(const unsigned char p_basic_header) { _basic_header = p_basic_header; }; + inline unsigned char get_next_header() { return _next_header; }; + inline void set_next_header(const unsigned char p_next_header) { _next_header = p_next_header; }; + inline unsigned char get_header_type() { return _header_type; }; + inline void set_header_type(const unsigned char p_header_type) { _header_type = p_header_type; }; + inline unsigned int get_length_position() { return _length_position; }; + inline void set_length_position(const unsigned int p_length_position) { _length_position = p_length_position; }; + inline unsigned int get_length() { return _length; }; + inline void set_length(const unsigned int p_length) { _length = p_length; }; +}; // End of class encoding_context diff --git a/ccsrc/Protocols/Http/http_codec.cc b/ccsrc/Protocols/Http/http_codec.cc index 69eb2d893f038dec8810ae5ccb980bf7254da3c0..f78ad74c5dbe13c0cd0f037bfe89b39a3b98da86 100644 --- a/ccsrc/Protocols/Http/http_codec.cc +++ b/ccsrc/Protocols/Http/http_codec.cc @@ -417,8 +417,15 @@ int http_codec::encode_body(const LibItsHttp__MessageBodyTypes::HttpMessageBody it = _codecs.find("http_its"); // TODO Use params if (it != _codecs.cend()) { loggers::get_instance().log("http_codec::encode_body: Call '%s'", it->first.c_str()); - _codecs["http_its"]->encode((Record_Type &)binary_body.ieee1609dot2__data(), p_encoding_buffer); // TODO Use params - processed = true; + if (binary_body.ischosen(LibItsHttp__BinaryMessageBodyTypes::BinaryBody::ALT_ieee1609dot2__data)) { + _codecs["http_its"]->encode((Record_Type &)binary_body.ieee1609dot2__data(), p_encoding_buffer); // TODO Use params + processed = true; + } else if (binary_body.ischosen(LibItsHttp__BinaryMessageBodyTypes::BinaryBody::ALT_ieee1609dot2__certificate)) { + _codecs["http_its"]->encode((Record_Type &)binary_body.ieee1609dot2__certificate(), p_encoding_buffer); // TODO Use params + processed = true; + } else { + loggers::get_instance().warning("http_codec::encode_body: Unsupported variant"); + } } } // TODO Add new HTTP message codec here if (!processed) { diff --git a/ccsrc/Protocols/Tcp/tcp_layer.cc b/ccsrc/Protocols/Tcp/tcp_layer.cc index a2e8a899260765b91f089ca4d1804baaadb6650c..3d24493b53814b238fd13f727b69e2f0213ea501 100644 --- a/ccsrc/Protocols/Tcp/tcp_layer.cc +++ b/ccsrc/Protocols/Tcp/tcp_layer.cc @@ -85,7 +85,8 @@ void tcp_layer::init() { } parameter_set(use_connection_ASPs_name(), (!server_mode) ? "yes" : "no"); - parameter_set(server_backlog_name(), "1024"); + loggers::get_instance().warning("tcp_layer::set_parameter: Limit to one simultanneous accepted connection (server_backlog == 1"); + parameter_set(server_backlog_name(), "1"); // Limit to one simultanneous accepted connection loggers::get_instance().log("tcp_layer::init: server_mode=%x", server_mode); set_server_mode(server_mode); if (server_mode) { diff --git a/data/certificates/Makefile b/data/certificates/Makefile index 48581942a8fcbe24ca56302c175a43c6ca9e2aaa..d1c4a9a2648871f0582c747143c41becaa14f0d1 100644 --- a/data/certificates/Makefile +++ b/data/certificates/Makefile @@ -6,20 +6,25 @@ else endif endif +ifeq (,$(CERTGEN)) + $(error CERTGEN variable shall point to the certgen project) +endif + outdir=certificates in=profiles xerdir=xer depdir=temp keydir=certificates +iutdir=iut ifeq ($(ARCH),msvc) - asn1certgen= ../../../itscertgen/build/msvc/x64/Debug/certgen.exe + asn1certgen= $(CERTGEN)/build/msvc/x64/Debug/certgen.exe else - asn1certgen=../../../itscertgen/build/$(ARCH)-d/certgen + asn1certgen=$(CERTGEN)/build/$(ARCH)-d/certgen endif -xsl_cvt=../../../itscertgen/certgen/asn1certgen.xslt -xsl_dep=../../../itscertgen/certgen/prof2dep.xsl +xsl_cvt=$(CERTGEN)/certgen/asn1certgen.xslt +xsl_dep=$(CERTGEN)/certgen/prof2dep.xsl profiles=$(wildcard $(in)/*.xml) certificates_oer=$(patsubst $(in)/%.xml, $(outdir)/%.oer, $(profiles)) @@ -28,7 +33,7 @@ deps=$(patsubst $(in)/%.xml, $(depdir)/%.dep, $(profiles)) all: $(sort $(outdir) $(xerdir) $(depdir)) $(certificates_oer) -$(sort $(outdir) $(xerdir) $(depdir)): +$(sort $(outdir) $(xerdir) $(depdir) $(iutdir)): mkdir -p $@ clean: rm -f $(certificates_oer) $(certificates_xer) @@ -45,4 +50,39 @@ $(deps): $(depdir)/%.dep : $(in)/%.xml $(certificates_xer) : $(xsl_cvt) +certs_iut_at = $(filter $(outdir)/CERT_IUT_%_AT.oer, $(certificates_oer)) +vkeys_iut_at = $(patsubst %.oer, %.vkey, $(certs_iut_at)) +ekeys_iut_at = $(patsubst %.oer, %.ekey, $(certs_iut_at)) + +certs_iut := $(filter $(outdir)/CERT_IUT_%_RCA.oer, $(certificates_oer)) +certs_iut += $(filter $(outdir)/CERT_IUT_%_AA.oer, $(certificates_oer)) +certs_iut += $(certs_iut_at) + +iut_files = $(patsubst $(outdir)/%, $(iutdir)/%, $(certs_iut) $(vkeys_iut_at) $(ekeys_iut_at)) + +install: $(iutdir) $(iut_files) + +$(iut_files): $(iutdir)/%: $(outdir)/% + -cp -f $< $@ + +$(vkeys_iut_at) $(ekeys_iut_at): + +IUT_TC23 = CERT_IUT_C1_AT.oer CERT_IUT_C1_AT.vkey CERT_IUT_C1_AT.ekey CERT_IUT_CC_AA.oer CERT_IUT_C_RCA.oer CERT_TS_A_AT.oer CERT_IUT_A_AA.oer +IUT_TC24 = CERT_IUT_C2_AT.oer CERT_IUT_C2_AT.vkey CERT_IUT_C2_AT.ekey CERT_IUT_C2_AA.oer CERT_IUT_C_RCA.oer CERT_IUT_A_RCA.oer CERT_TS_A_AT.oer CERT_IUT_A_AA.oer +IUT_TC25 = CERT_IUT_A1_AT.oer CERT_IUT_A1_AT.vkey CERT_IUT_A1_AT.ekey CERT_IUT_A_AA.oer CERT_IUT_A_RCA.oer CERT_TS_A_AT.oer +IUT_TC26 = CERT_IUT_A2_AT.oer CERT_IUT_A2_AT.vkey CERT_IUT_A2_AT.ekey CERT_IUT_A_AA.oer CERT_IUT_A_RCA.oer CERT_TS_A_AT.oer +IUT_TC27 = CERT_IUT_A3_AT.oer CERT_IUT_A3_AT.vkey CERT_IUT_A3_AT.ekey CERT_IUT_A_AA.oer CERT_IUT_A_RCA.oer CERT_TS_A_AT.oer +IUT_TC28 = CERT_IUT_A_AT_A8.oer CERT_IUT_A_AT_A8.vkey CERT_IUT_A_AT_A8.ekey CERT_IUT_A_AA_A8.oer CERT_IUT_A_RCA.oer CERT_TS_A_AT.oer CERT_IUT_A_AA.oer + +IUT_TCS = TC23 TC24 TC25 TC26 TC27 TC28 + +define InstallTC +$(addprefix $(TC)/,$(IUT_$(TC))): $(TC)/% : $$(outdir)/% + mkdir -p $(TC) + -cp -f $$< $$@ +endef +$(foreach TC, $(IUT_TCS), $(eval $(InstallTC))) + +install_tc: $(foreach TC, $(IUT_TCS), $(addprefix $(TC)/, $(IUT_$(TC)))) + include $(deps) diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_A1_AT.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_A1_AT.xml index 3a53e6dacd7f81b6303141dd5a0cbeba2198a13d..f73179de3b40b4d62bbccad63cb62a881b4c1c6b 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_A1_AT.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_A1_AT.xml @@ -1,35 +1,35 @@ - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - 01 FF FC - 01 FF FF FF - - - - - - - - - - - + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + 01 FF FC + 01 FF FF FF + + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_A2_AT.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_A2_AT.xml index 0a2b58dc0cc13a1cd9f6c6c3ba545a5f3a1b378a..434f9e97a12856383db1a9a8fe3a5e91729d4554 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_A2_AT.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_A2_AT.xml @@ -1,35 +1,35 @@ - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - 01 FF FC - 01 FF FF FF - - - - - - - - - - - + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + 01 FF FC + 01 FF FF FF + + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_A3_AT.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_A3_AT.xml index 4beb60e2a56c51bbbff33bb6341087058870ef71..415ecba64ca1fdd20ed3709e5409593bd13a808b 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_A3_AT.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_A3_AT.xml @@ -1,35 +1,35 @@ - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - - 01 FF FF FF - - - - - - - - - - - + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + + 01 FF FF FF + + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_A4_AT.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_A4_AT.xml index 97c4a0171a99ac66d38798424c2b6c2d76dc09a8..7bdd092965b1f3414176b277527d2c710672ba5e 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_A4_AT.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_A4_AT.xml @@ -1,35 +1,35 @@ - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - 01 FF FC - - - - - - - - - - - - + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + 01 FF FC + + + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_A_AA.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_A_AA.xml index cb1e4a6010173efa60b85d6a9bf52530888639ff..43f217121ad542c68773808241fc6e7c77ef3a2a 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_A_AA.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_A_AA.xml @@ -1,44 +1,44 @@ - - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 01 32 - - - - - - - - - - + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 01 32 + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_A_AA_A8.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_A_AA_A8.xml index 83436b7403ca57695de788e134b01b1078daedcd..b6c1cccbe1bcbe42a1d8ba767c887e8e62702db2 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_A_AA_A8.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_A_AA_A8.xml @@ -1,44 +1,44 @@ - - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 01 32 - - - - - - - - - - + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 01 32 + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_A_AC_AT.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_A_AC_AT.xml index 268c341240030de2dc44d0060ee1e1ff34db6786..808cee116c9e12f889bf105c6a2c9c7fe934621c 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_A_AC_AT.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_A_AC_AT.xml @@ -1,36 +1,36 @@ - - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - 01 FF FC - 01 FF FF FF - - - - - - - - - - - + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + 01 FF FC + 01 FF FF FF + + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_A_AT.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_A_AT.xml index da78154a4edd288ea349265a97b3f73d351c1160..1c9a4036dfcc87b296da6533bca24bd5e1a12820 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_A_AT.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_A_AT.xml @@ -1,36 +1,36 @@ - - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - 01 FF FC - 01 FF FF FF - - - - - - - - - - - + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + 01 FF FC + 01 FF FF FF + + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_A_AT_A8.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_A_AT_A8.xml index f3487f403cc305d776d2535eff0d857e4e568759..9e14f2da8a7b88328c085fb81961fa02035f3c40 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_A_AT_A8.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_A_AT_A8.xml @@ -1,41 +1,41 @@ - - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - 00 - 00 - 00 - 00 - 00 - 00 - 00 - 01 FF FC - - - - - - - - - - + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + 00 + 00 + 00 + 00 + 00 + 00 + 00 + 01 FF FC + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_A_B33_AT.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_A_B33_AT.xml index ed467553c52ec2642847ea8cbc142a4a436b7612..ff8744e57ffefa4530e6e2e0f54dd2f164662da7 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_A_B33_AT.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_A_B33_AT.xml @@ -1,35 +1,35 @@ - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - 01 FF FC - 01 FF FF FF - - - - - - - - - - - + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + 01 FF FC + 01 FF FF FF + + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_A_B3_AA.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_A_B3_AA.xml index deb8ec6d6a9f490e0da5250fc83af502d9c86a97..d7b1fb113ebee36fc5c56b458b3a9efa5ab6438d 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_A_B3_AA.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_A_B3_AA.xml @@ -1,44 +1,44 @@ - - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 01 32 - - - - - - - - - - + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 01 32 + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_A_B3_AT.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_A_B3_AT.xml index 57a148c8d33f10c8356c440af7d9ff8c1bef8a44..9ae80b96d324519103750a9f865dbb6ae7f06e69 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_A_B3_AT.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_A_B3_AT.xml @@ -1,35 +1,35 @@ - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - 01 FF FC - 01 FF FF FF - - - - - - - - - - - + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + 01 FF FC + 01 FF FF FF + + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_A_B3_N_AT.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_A_B3_N_AT.xml index b862d83deec5c1e91a2bfae432f559aeda28e2f6..02e04ec39bb5acbe46e4760e772330b92278bfdd 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_A_B3_N_AT.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_A_B3_N_AT.xml @@ -1,35 +1,35 @@ - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - 01 FF FC - 01 FF FF FF - - - - - - - - - - - + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + 01 FF FC + 01 FF FF FF + + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_A_B_AA.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_A_B_AA.xml index 16792b08dbe6d260a06a5073491cb5905155ed7b..dc731e7a61ae591cc776542a58fd45e30d73e67d 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_A_B_AA.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_A_B_AA.xml @@ -1,44 +1,44 @@ - - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 01 32 - - - - - - - - - - + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 01 32 + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_A_B_AT.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_A_B_AT.xml index 482d7b5d041603b528503744a1270d8a27043a55..11cdd6dd0ff3d2bfc528fa73c127e3bbdb64b8c5 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_A_B_AT.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_A_B_AT.xml @@ -1,35 +1,35 @@ - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 01 FF FC - 01 FF FF FF - - - - - - - - - - - + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 01 FF FC + 01 FF FF FF + + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_A_B_N_AT.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_A_B_N_AT.xml index 356d47ee07eca73a34f6a1ec8e4ff2995859898f..ab21ef55081b57623934f5b4dea3aba816e47885 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_A_B_N_AT.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_A_B_N_AT.xml @@ -1,35 +1,35 @@ - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 01 FF FC - 01 FF FF FF - - - - - - - - - - - + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 01 FF FC + 01 FF FF FF + + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_A_C3_AT.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_A_C3_AT.xml index 5a73afc0291e6533e83635cff16783281909a05e..4bdb475013c8b94da95aa27db94d9c3d6b5f9d9e 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_A_C3_AT.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_A_C3_AT.xml @@ -1,36 +1,36 @@ - - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - 01 FF FC - 01 FF FF FF - - - - - - - - - - - + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + 01 FF FC + 01 FF FF FF + + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_A_CC_AT.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_A_CC_AT.xml index cd0bb333374f2d0f9e5a814e5ccf454c94c080d0..50800e9214e6d8d6784db4d80071462cbd174d20 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_A_CC_AT.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_A_CC_AT.xml @@ -1,36 +1,36 @@ - - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - 01 FF FC - 01 FF FF FF - - - - - - - - - - - + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + 01 FF FC + 01 FF FF FF + + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_A_N_AA.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_A_N_AA.xml index 29d016bc3447ae5d0a97b9674e1c41b951b283be..272871801b14bf1b5c3afae96983b0b6a8cceda9 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_A_N_AA.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_A_N_AA.xml @@ -1,44 +1,44 @@ - - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 01 32 - - - - - - - - - - + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 01 32 + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_A_N_AT.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_A_N_AT.xml index 195b85bd3a5ba4d7a77762d3eeae39afa214241d..d98b2f29092fc7da114670e4c0eeed300ab20360 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_A_N_AT.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_A_N_AT.xml @@ -1,36 +1,36 @@ - - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - 01 FF FC - 01 FF FF FF - - - - - - - - - - - + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + 01 FF FC + 01 FF FF FF + + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_A_RCA.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_A_RCA.xml index bbd4d0533d995d392ba1a3e8dae5d644412ac95d..77df77ddb516c24a568ca3d27044265ccbb82baf 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_A_RCA.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_A_RCA.xml @@ -1,48 +1,48 @@ - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 01 FE/FF 01 - - - 01 - 01 38 - - - - - - - - - - + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 01 FE/FF 01 + + + 01 + 01 38 + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_B_AT.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_B_AT.xml index 21bd1f3543df2e125ad0b5caad62088c6666f499..6da3e65ef36d052e7ca0c7cf6b996d648e5653bf 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_B_AT.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_B_AT.xml @@ -1,35 +1,35 @@ - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - 01 FF FC - 01 FF FF FF - - - - - - - - - - - + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + 01 FF FC + 01 FF FF FF + + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_C1_AT.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_C1_AT.xml index b568a19193b54fef3b24d1bc7886c6dbf7bd6623..8265259cca3ccd0276b7548c07987d557402cfad 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_C1_AT.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_C1_AT.xml @@ -1,36 +1,38 @@ - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - 01 FF FC - 01 FF FF FF - - - - - - - - - - - - + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + 01 FF FC + 01 FF FF FF + + + + + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_C3_AA.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_C3_AA.xml index aa69a710c7647645846b63b41f626e58e7d886ac..750a2a511e229e6afe2f88fd51905e31b1315b31 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_C3_AA.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_C3_AA.xml @@ -1,46 +1,46 @@ - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 01 32 - - - - - - - - - - - - - + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 01 32 + + + + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_CA1_AT.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_CA1_AT.xml index fcb929de16129646832549ed548d3e0847e9759e..d1014845d87f1bd1864ace62629dc709ce7ec6dc 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_CA1_AT.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_CA1_AT.xml @@ -1,35 +1,35 @@ - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - 01 FF FC - 01 FF FF FF - - - - - - - - - - - + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + 01 FF FC + 01 FF FF FF + + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_CA2_AT.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_CA2_AT.xml index 362cc18975e3e8a6aaa59b2e07a3f881a933872e..d03f1c171c89593d77608380d66a8876e5e75e06 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_CA2_AT.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_CA2_AT.xml @@ -1,35 +1,35 @@ - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - 01 FF FC - 01 FF FF FF - - - - - - - - - - - + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + 01 FF FC + 01 FF FF FF + + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_CA3_AT.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_CA3_AT.xml index 510a16273c897d23b225fda9bfca9567450afdf9..f582c2aa59e55d8b298f58335705e8cfd85765ee 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_CA3_AT.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_CA3_AT.xml @@ -1,35 +1,35 @@ - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - 01 FF FC - 01 FF FF FF - - - - - - - - - - - + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + 01 FF FC + 01 FF FF FF + + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_CAM_BO_02_AT.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_CAM_BO_02_AT.xml index 569f390052d1b3ad46721f8ea1c34a1766ce687a..3c2f9bc520a2297c17531c2b8279c21d158e9a02 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_CAM_BO_02_AT.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_CAM_BO_02_AT.xml @@ -1,30 +1,30 @@ - - - 2 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 01 BF FC - - - - - - - - - - + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 01 BF FC + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_CAM_BO_03_AT.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_CAM_BO_03_AT.xml index dc08eddfdf7a5135311bf20c5893e45e9ce671a8..7e6926f8abaf865ab8625252aa30e419f9476b8b 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_CAM_BO_03_AT.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_CAM_BO_03_AT.xml @@ -1,30 +1,30 @@ - - - 2 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 01 DF FC - - - - - - - - - - + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 01 DF FC + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_CA_AA.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_CA_AA.xml index a30ab2fc0842f35607f1055183d344c4fb8932f0..6c3dc71fe66b7953f57b77775e8231ba84cc3089 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_CA_AA.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_CA_AA.xml @@ -1,43 +1,43 @@ - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 01 32 - - - - - - - - - - + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 01 32 + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_CC_AA.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_CC_AA.xml index a5a13fcb0597114b0ae88b95a265b015eb224540..e2751a76ca713c58b14d179b9d1fd3f5702b0063 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_CC_AA.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_CC_AA.xml @@ -1,46 +1,46 @@ - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 01 32 - - - - - - - - - - - - - + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 01 32 + + + + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_C_AT.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_C_AT.xml index b6cac15bb6112d7bc671583d654ff1b0e1a97d8a..25dd4b806cc473637d724116ad8023ac20bc4245 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_C_AT.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_C_AT.xml @@ -1,38 +1,38 @@ - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - 01 FF FC - 01 FF FF FF - - - - - - - - - - - - - - + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + 01 FF FC + 01 FF FF FF + + + + + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_C_AT_8.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_C_AT_8.xml index 758cf123266f7d91e54b38abae48a7a9b4219e2b..b8ac71f82e52658e682b3e8667c994522e8cf9e9 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_C_AT_8.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_C_AT_8.xml @@ -1,59 +1,59 @@ - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - 01 FF FC - 01 FF FF FF - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + 01 FF FC + 01 FF FF FF + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_C_RCA.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_C_RCA.xml index d536970340be92c288728ff049416b57523831c5..e42640936ed2021cf7a9fcf50761e240e30b41f1 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_C_RCA.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_C_RCA.xml @@ -1,50 +1,50 @@ - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 01 FE/FF 01 - - - 01 - 01 38 - - - - - - - - - - - - - + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 01 FE/FF 01 + + + 01 + 01 38 + + + + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_DENM_BO_01_AT.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_DENM_BO_01_AT.xml index 1bcd23b6d2584ee3e3959e8bb0d15a45cc5d19f7..c36a7ad5cf02c264fb51aed7d37e31a6cd2263c0 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_DENM_BO_01_AT.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_DENM_BO_01_AT.xml @@ -1,31 +1,31 @@ - - - 2 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 01 FF FC - 01 7F FF FF - - - - - - - - - - + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 01 FF FC + 01 7F FF FF + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_DENM_BO_02_AT.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_DENM_BO_02_AT.xml index 7fc27b8094c27efa02068ffb6405f3a843627410..1aeeca02244aaffbb651c1d38b636a2547a3148d 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_DENM_BO_02_AT.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_DENM_BO_02_AT.xml @@ -1,31 +1,31 @@ - - - 2 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 01 FF FC - 01 BF FF FF - - - - - - - - - - + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 01 FF FC + 01 BF FF FF + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_D_AA.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_D_AA.xml index 6e05e29093190bde3643e9a9a43c7e7b111881ad..53e19cd0d857f5fc0dfb2cdf5fe583e35270ef1f 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_D_AA.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_D_AA.xml @@ -1,48 +1,48 @@ - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 01 32 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 01 32 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_D_AT.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_D_AT.xml index 77bd6a24be68760513c8c5094f752cb770817bde..4d3197ef6cc2b57ce9251d3917daa54a2cc877c2 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_D_AT.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_D_AT.xml @@ -1,40 +1,40 @@ - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - 01 FF FC - 01 FF FF FF - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + 01 FF FC + 01 FF FF FF + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_D_AT_8.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_D_AT_8.xml index 2f7e0e552eaa8f006518875cf6a7a8a8408ea81a..7e9856c41ef15918fb7181ac70581a302afbce55 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_D_AT_8.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_D_AT_8.xml @@ -1,44 +1,44 @@ - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - 01 FF FC - 01 FF FF FF - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + 01 FF FC + 01 FF FF FF + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_E_AT.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_E_AT.xml index 610343f06229c5eca790fd0dd2847a8cb2defc52..5414ca0972d6d11d93afa2305b433a53595d70f8 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_E_AT.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_E_AT.xml @@ -1,35 +1,35 @@ - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - 01 FF FC - 01 FF FF FF - - - - - - - - - - - + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + 01 FF FC + 01 FF FF FF + + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_E_AT_8.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_E_AT_8.xml index 2c823e3d642f2677c48adbcfa69cfa7b43177973..5e359d2b64b21a49fca3f79b9e55a65ef17fe05e 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_E_AT_8.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_E_AT_8.xml @@ -1,42 +1,42 @@ - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - 01 FF FC - 01 FF FF FF - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + 01 FF FC + 01 FF FF FF + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_IVI_SSP_1_AT.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_IVI_SSP_1_AT.xml index 40c50b70d8eed44410c0c30aafd757aab81b2126..cf3912ea9b4e0cc5dc801a97494503c4d4226bec 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_IVI_SSP_1_AT.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_IVI_SSP_1_AT.xml @@ -1,36 +1,36 @@ - - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - 01 FF FC - 01 00 - 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 - - - - - - - - - - + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + 01 FF FC + 01 00 + 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_IVI_SSP_ISO14823_1_AT.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_IVI_SSP_ISO14823_1_AT.xml index 4a1632cc6cfdcf2752d51ac54818eb61ab52ad7f..333e2d8c305d65eb3b0ecb844ded0d04cffa07de 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_IVI_SSP_ISO14823_1_AT.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_IVI_SSP_ISO14823_1_AT.xml @@ -1,36 +1,36 @@ - - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - 01 FF FC - 01 00 - 01 00 00 00 00 40 00 - - - - - - - - - - + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + 01 FF FC + 01 00 + 01 00 00 00 00 40 00 + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_IVI_SSP_ISO14823_2_AT.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_IVI_SSP_ISO14823_2_AT.xml index cece9709c0e2a6af7764b64f63d6a2801c1725e0..bfd45b862da58267754765eda675e49ee82c95b0 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_IVI_SSP_ISO14823_2_AT.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_IVI_SSP_ISO14823_2_AT.xml @@ -1,36 +1,36 @@ - - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - 01 FF FC - 01 00 - 01 00 00 00 00 20 00 - - - - - - - - - - + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + 01 FF FC + 01 00 + 01 00 00 00 00 20 00 + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_IVI_SSP_ISO14823_3_AT.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_IVI_SSP_ISO14823_3_AT.xml index a492d4da969e42d9617f5568e7f07961019898ba..52bf3fcc6c5eb45b138b03185516581ed76a9fc6 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_IVI_SSP_ISO14823_3_AT.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_IVI_SSP_ISO14823_3_AT.xml @@ -1,36 +1,36 @@ - - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - 01 FF FC - 01 00 - 01 00 00 00 00 10 00 - - - - - - - - - - + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + 01 FF FC + 01 00 + 01 00 00 00 00 10 00 + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_IVI_SSP_ISO14823_4_AT.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_IVI_SSP_ISO14823_4_AT.xml index 471f68c403d77192d15aec58c797d0f294ae7c5a..4b0d41614a3c16dfe5449be2ca4c263a762b48c7 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_IVI_SSP_ISO14823_4_AT.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_IVI_SSP_ISO14823_4_AT.xml @@ -1,36 +1,36 @@ - - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - 01 FF FC - 01 00 - 01 00 00 00 00 08 00 - - - - - - - - - - + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + 01 FF FC + 01 00 + 01 00 00 00 00 08 00 + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_IVI_SSP_ISO14823_5_AT.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_IVI_SSP_ISO14823_5_AT.xml index 70a95f82eb8b018708f8fcabf1c704c7ca47e36f..8b014aec4f25839fb0178b396c7c051cf736ab2b 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_IVI_SSP_ISO14823_5_AT.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_IVI_SSP_ISO14823_5_AT.xml @@ -1,36 +1,36 @@ - - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - 01 FF FC - 01 00 - 01 00 00 00 00 04 00 - - - - - - - - - - + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + 01 FF FC + 01 00 + 01 00 00 00 00 04 00 + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_IVI_SSP_ISO14823_6_AT.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_IVI_SSP_ISO14823_6_AT.xml index b36061064971419366d09dda049ec3f1aee142b7..13c2e96598266611418c04d1835fe3ecfc10e5cc 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_IVI_SSP_ISO14823_6_AT.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_IVI_SSP_ISO14823_6_AT.xml @@ -1,36 +1,36 @@ - - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - 01 FF FC - 01 00 - 01 00 00 00 00 02 00 - - - - - - - - - - + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + 01 FF FC + 01 00 + 01 00 00 00 00 02 00 + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_IVI_SSP_LC_AT.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_IVI_SSP_LC_AT.xml index 7001a8e5196d4809f26ef01185ccc0f9f58515eb..d793be4d6e44791a3c0e562d184f1875707b51a0 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_IVI_SSP_LC_AT.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_IVI_SSP_LC_AT.xml @@ -1,36 +1,36 @@ - - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - 01 FF FC - 01 00 - 01 00 00 00 00 FF 10 - - - - - - - - - - + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + 01 FF FC + 01 00 + 01 00 00 00 00 FF 10 + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_IVI_SSP_LS_AT.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_IVI_SSP_LS_AT.xml index ed62ef99db16755a7082964b37c11d7027b3529c..9fa5f539392ae0426ec72ec018f00512b6998abf 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_IVI_SSP_LS_AT.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_IVI_SSP_LS_AT.xml @@ -1,36 +1,36 @@ - - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - 01 FF FC - 01 00 - 01 00 00 00 00 FF 80 - - - - - - - - - - + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + 01 FF FC + 01 00 + 01 00 00 00 00 FF 80 + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_IVI_SSP_NEG_AT.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_IVI_SSP_NEG_AT.xml index 68657580627fa7145aae2aa546b1b4fdea4facd6..c0de5192799e2b094586a045238c1bc97933193c 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_IVI_SSP_NEG_AT.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_IVI_SSP_NEG_AT.xml @@ -1,36 +1,36 @@ - - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - 01 FF FC - 01 00 - 01 00 00 00 00 FF 08 - - - - - - - - - - + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + 01 FF FC + 01 00 + 01 00 00 00 00 FF 08 + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_IVI_SSP_NONE_AT.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_IVI_SSP_NONE_AT.xml index 40c50b70d8eed44410c0c30aafd757aab81b2126..cf3912ea9b4e0cc5dc801a97494503c4d4226bec 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_IVI_SSP_NONE_AT.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_IVI_SSP_NONE_AT.xml @@ -1,36 +1,36 @@ - - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - 01 FF FC - 01 00 - 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 - - - - - - - - - - + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + 01 FF FC + 01 00 + 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_IVI_SSP_RCC_AT.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_IVI_SSP_RCC_AT.xml index cf372f5000dd98175a16d7bd7887878b92269055..669512b6914efb3edfd2b2a27c1ef6a9836fd6cf 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_IVI_SSP_RCC_AT.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_IVI_SSP_RCC_AT.xml @@ -1,36 +1,36 @@ - - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - 01 FF FC - 01 00 - 01 00 00 00 00 FF 40 - - - - - - - - - - + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + 01 FF FC + 01 00 + 01 00 00 00 00 FF 40 + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_IVI_SSP_SAEJ2540_AT.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_IVI_SSP_SAEJ2540_AT.xml index a84952f67c475cb37163ded485278230ede0aba0..b9eac3e2f65c968f6751c5c5dc7b975452be5ac8 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_IVI_SSP_SAEJ2540_AT.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_IVI_SSP_SAEJ2540_AT.xml @@ -1,36 +1,36 @@ - - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - 01 FF FC - 01 00 - 01 00 00 00 00 01 00 - - - - - - - - - - + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + 01 FF FC + 01 00 + 01 00 00 00 00 01 00 + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_IVI_SSP_TC_AT.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_IVI_SSP_TC_AT.xml index 53ee0a110866a2af234408703c74918a60cd41f2..c8805fb7daf3013d308e4f0cdcfbadc885bb4de7 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_IVI_SSP_TC_AT.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_IVI_SSP_TC_AT.xml @@ -1,36 +1,36 @@ - - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - 01 FF FC - 01 00 - 01 00 00 00 00 FF 20 - - - - - - - - - - + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + 01 FF FC + 01 00 + 01 00 00 00 00 FF 20 + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_IVI_SSP_VIENNACONV_AT.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_IVI_SSP_VIENNACONV_AT.xml index f34ba09e069fbe565baea1f989e75f4060763263..9dc287fa0ad6a18d307d2d3960ddd9a69eacd1cb 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_IVI_SSP_VIENNACONV_AT.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_IVI_SSP_VIENNACONV_AT.xml @@ -1,36 +1,36 @@ - - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - 01 FF FC - 01 00 - 01 00 00 00 00 80 00 - - - - - - - - - - + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + 01 FF FC + 01 00 + 01 00 00 00 00 80 00 + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_MAP_SSP_1_AT.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_MAP_SSP_1_AT.xml index a98980891b1134d4b9fa2baf2bc13e09d1d0bb3d..51e9dfdebb25420141e0c1aa44f43e0e18d7e96a 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_MAP_SSP_1_AT.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_MAP_SSP_1_AT.xml @@ -1,36 +1,36 @@ - - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - 01 FF FC - 01 E0 - 01 80 - - - - - - - - - - + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + 01 FF FC + 01 E0 + 01 80 + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_MAP_SSP_2_AT.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_MAP_SSP_2_AT.xml index 560ed52960271b44721e52da0097ccae88423172..dda3d6c68812f33fba9926fca059874576daf4ff 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_MAP_SSP_2_AT.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_MAP_SSP_2_AT.xml @@ -1,36 +1,36 @@ - - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - 01 FF FC - 01 E0 - 01 40 - - - - - - - - - - + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + 01 FF FC + 01 E0 + 01 40 + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_MAP_SSP_NONE_AT.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_MAP_SSP_NONE_AT.xml index d313391e9e516ee05d314d05944c8d090a907286..88d62a126e58fd44356aa992b6130b125c0cf31c 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_MAP_SSP_NONE_AT.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_MAP_SSP_NONE_AT.xml @@ -1,36 +1,36 @@ - - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - 01 FF FC - 01 E0 - 01 00 - - - - - - - - - - + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + 01 FF FC + 01 E0 + 01 00 + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_RTCM_SSP_NONE_AT.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_RTCM_SSP_NONE_AT.xml index e44b477c65530c77d1aa0da68d9cdf4e6ba7d921..1808c8d22637f901092852893b0ceda8baf6dd3c 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_RTCM_SSP_NONE_AT.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_RTCM_SSP_NONE_AT.xml @@ -1,35 +1,35 @@ - - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - 01 FF FC - 01 - - - - - - - - - - + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + 01 FF FC + 01 + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SPAT_SSP_ALL_AT.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SPAT_SSP_ALL_AT.xml index fc8c868706437320a0939b0d4db82d3bc0e43c14..b2d843eed17eeac757da404486da21344127102e 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SPAT_SSP_ALL_AT.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SPAT_SSP_ALL_AT.xml @@ -1,36 +1,36 @@ - - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - 01 FF FC - 01 E0 - 01 C0 - - - - - - - - - - + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + 01 FF FC + 01 E0 + 01 C0 + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SPAT_SSP_NONE_AT.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SPAT_SSP_NONE_AT.xml index 3dec79740e44f45495906f838951cf7870ce5e5f..b0bde6e4601143891f139d8e04d1b9374bdabfda 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SPAT_SSP_NONE_AT.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SPAT_SSP_NONE_AT.xml @@ -1,36 +1,36 @@ - - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - 01 FF FC - 01 00 - 01 C0 - - - - - - - - - - + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + 01 FF FC + 01 00 + 01 C0 + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SRM_SSP_01.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SRM_SSP_01.xml index eb4205823b147d42096932a67ef5581fe02fb496..538527062a90b1cfbbdc12fcf289b14c785c2fd6 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SRM_SSP_01.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SRM_SSP_01.xml @@ -1,35 +1,35 @@ - - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - 01 FF FC - 02 C0 00 00 - - - - - - - - - - + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + 01 FF FC + 02 C0 00 00 + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SRM_SSP_02.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SRM_SSP_02.xml index c765447c25284a7a80e0d45a197277eeb3699883..fe4b50d7988f4bb66cb9f852c7db2808fc7ee451 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SRM_SSP_02.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SRM_SSP_02.xml @@ -1,35 +1,35 @@ - - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - 01 FF FC - 02 A0 00 00 - - - - - - - - - - + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + 01 FF FC + 02 A0 00 00 + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SRM_SSP_03.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SRM_SSP_03.xml index 140a004b2bf6c11e0da1c4fe2d714ce693c99e30..b6103196e175ac78ef19ecf3b8374c473509aa8c 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SRM_SSP_03.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SRM_SSP_03.xml @@ -1,35 +1,35 @@ - - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - 01 FF FC - 02 90 00 00 - - - - - - - - - - + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + 01 FF FC + 02 90 00 00 + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SRM_SSP_04.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SRM_SSP_04.xml index d946bc5739177a34f7b58d7f2149faf5a61a0f14..a781aa20f0d7af04448ed45a65ad62070bb87655 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SRM_SSP_04.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SRM_SSP_04.xml @@ -1,35 +1,35 @@ - - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - 01 FF FC - 02 88 00 00 - - - - - - - - - - + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + 01 FF FC + 02 88 00 00 + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SRM_SSP_05.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SRM_SSP_05.xml index f8fa5b502746ee9f90d17769ae8f07e16c55fb19..4bdf9253efc8db59875783045847b5ce9245c5aa 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SRM_SSP_05.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SRM_SSP_05.xml @@ -1,35 +1,35 @@ - - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - 01 FF FC - 02 84 00 00 - - - - - - - - - - + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + 01 FF FC + 02 84 00 00 + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SRM_SSP_06.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SRM_SSP_06.xml index cfa0c9a6f683ce7fdaa82192679fdeb75ff7ddde..5de810d37ca3933bbdbaa8d7ec8d05d3d0f80961 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SRM_SSP_06.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SRM_SSP_06.xml @@ -1,35 +1,35 @@ - - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - 01 FF FC - 02 82 00 00 - - - - - - - - - - + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + 01 FF FC + 02 82 00 00 + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SRM_SSP_07.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SRM_SSP_07.xml index 08f6e1d42e183dd152e26e303c612a6ce520cd52..188166d41245b2f7f67a66c7a5e8011c9e4c9bd6 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SRM_SSP_07.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SRM_SSP_07.xml @@ -1,35 +1,35 @@ - - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - 01 FF FC - 02 81 00 00 - - - - - - - - - - + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + 01 FF FC + 02 81 00 00 + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SRM_SSP_08.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SRM_SSP_08.xml index c98f6c08c6a7813d72316c4fdd9b902d453efeed..2f95775a750936a32f1e72d38fc0c46742cf0f52 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SRM_SSP_08.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SRM_SSP_08.xml @@ -1,35 +1,35 @@ - - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - 01 FF FC - 02 80 80 00 - - - - - - - - - - + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + 01 FF FC + 02 80 80 00 + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SRM_SSP_09.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SRM_SSP_09.xml index 6e35cc43dea0c23c193509aa5cf7c9176dd74747..ce93d6c42949a2d8843181b1a083f79ace3e493c 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SRM_SSP_09.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SRM_SSP_09.xml @@ -1,35 +1,35 @@ - - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - 01 FF FC - 02 80 40 00 - - - - - - - - - - + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + 01 FF FC + 02 80 40 00 + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SRM_SSP_10.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SRM_SSP_10.xml index 460cbd6738180b721457039f09eec91261172811..83b721c120ff30e1ded778a364fe545aec526972 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SRM_SSP_10.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SRM_SSP_10.xml @@ -1,35 +1,35 @@ - - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - 01 FF FC - 02 80 20 00 - - - - - - - - - - + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + 01 FF FC + 02 80 20 00 + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SRM_SSP_11.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SRM_SSP_11.xml index 9d3eae32758718c8c7d44eaea8a5f53b93c21d2f..7f413bed535acfb66e7a29bd811ef1690308b189 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SRM_SSP_11.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SRM_SSP_11.xml @@ -1,35 +1,35 @@ - - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - 01 FF FC - 02 80 10 00 - - - - - - - - - - + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + 01 FF FC + 02 80 10 00 + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SRM_SSP_12.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SRM_SSP_12.xml index 658c4418c3264cc00dade04e8bcc0a35152c05b4..dfa74c651a0b60a12ab20fff2a82e0dd37fd4005 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SRM_SSP_12.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SRM_SSP_12.xml @@ -1,35 +1,35 @@ - - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - 01 FF FC - 02 80 08 00 - - - - - - - - - - + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + 01 FF FC + 02 80 08 00 + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SRM_SSP_13.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SRM_SSP_13.xml index f4072940fdff72d819a5bd89fc62ad1c179bd473..4f8a44c25161fd7aae7e09397446508227c87d7a 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SRM_SSP_13.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SRM_SSP_13.xml @@ -1,35 +1,35 @@ - - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - 01 FF FC - 02 80 04 00 - - - - - - - - - - + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + 01 FF FC + 02 80 04 00 + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SRM_SSP_14.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SRM_SSP_14.xml index 17dc971fde14934d0194366da286b0bdfb5a6058..caf753fdcac1462b219714283c651c553084400d 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SRM_SSP_14.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SRM_SSP_14.xml @@ -1,35 +1,35 @@ - - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - 01 FF FC - 02 80 02 00 - - - - - - - - - - + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + 01 FF FC + 02 80 02 00 + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SRM_SSP_15.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SRM_SSP_15.xml index d1329ee8f470ddb76c780293ef63cbc063b7b227..50e4fb2dbf79bf804b6bcc554a43015adaa95cc8 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SRM_SSP_15.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SRM_SSP_15.xml @@ -1,35 +1,35 @@ - - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - 01 FF FC - 02 80 01 00 - - - - - - - - - - + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + 01 FF FC + 02 80 01 00 + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SRM_SSP_16.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SRM_SSP_16.xml index 858d2d67e5005354152c0d3d6419160a6b94f87c..870f52d4f5226380d84ff68c0e050475cd0f5af1 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SRM_SSP_16.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SRM_SSP_16.xml @@ -1,35 +1,35 @@ - - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - 01 FF FC - 02 80 00 80 - - - - - - - - - - + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + 01 FF FC + 02 80 00 80 + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SRM_SSP_17.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SRM_SSP_17.xml index 06076d223c810b50a8601801b0dd48ffc94a20bb..10f2f2c5251ae40b2f2dfdc07c7f176cedffce78 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SRM_SSP_17.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SRM_SSP_17.xml @@ -1,35 +1,35 @@ - - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - 01 FF FC - 02 80 00 40 - - - - - - - - - - + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + 01 FF FC + 02 80 00 40 + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SRM_SSP_18.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SRM_SSP_18.xml index 4121c3000527b75cbbded9e4cb8e01fc9d0ef1c3..dd9488638aaacb6aab48764a1b4a69c1728085dc 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SRM_SSP_18.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SRM_SSP_18.xml @@ -1,35 +1,35 @@ - - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - 01 FF FC - 02 80 00 20 - - - - - - - - - - + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + 01 FF FC + 02 80 00 20 + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SRM_SSP_NONE_AT.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SRM_SSP_NONE_AT.xml index bfc7d821790a98cc1f32f484a8b0302049384e01..a26291f6980aa14f86b3f13f46f1d9c09b2b719e 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SRM_SSP_NONE_AT.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SRM_SSP_NONE_AT.xml @@ -1,35 +1,35 @@ - - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - 01 FF FC - 02 00 00 00 - - - - - - - - - - + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + 01 FF FC + 02 00 00 00 + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SRM_SSP_REQ_NONE_AT.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SRM_SSP_REQ_NONE_AT.xml index de208882751cbaf8bd11009b04bf94a58996152c..167ae06fd03765c10c5bc3e430a15eb21356302e 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SRM_SSP_REQ_NONE_AT.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SRM_SSP_REQ_NONE_AT.xml @@ -1,35 +1,35 @@ - - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - 01 FF FC - 02 80 00 00 - - - - - - - - - - + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + 01 FF FC + 02 80 00 00 + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SSM_SSP_AT.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SSM_SSP_AT.xml index a6995c909c7a4ed56492b18d4f9307c5ac0dc1d9..d95facf0cf2636e68c72514647c972e0af95a0e7 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SSM_SSP_AT.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_IUT_SSM_SSP_AT.xml @@ -1,35 +1,35 @@ - - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - 01 FF FC - 01 - - - - - - - - - - + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + 01 FF FC + 01 + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_TS_AA_AUTHVAL_RCV_02_BI_01.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_TS_AA_AUTHVAL_RCV_02_BI_01.xml index b2582dd4d6c790690e9840df6b201b4b1df7f9cc..aab488bd5e03efdb8644fd2786acf9c56971428e 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_TS_AA_AUTHVAL_RCV_02_BI_01.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_TS_AA_AUTHVAL_RCV_02_BI_01.xml @@ -1,43 +1,43 @@ - - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_TS_AA_AUTHVAL_RCV_02_BI_02.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_TS_AA_AUTHVAL_RCV_02_BI_02.xml index 7c47bcfb4d9b230c98c8af0aa8fbb7d97ddfe3ee..857c07c636f2227491b1ea7341a4cc2827bca1f6 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_TS_AA_AUTHVAL_RCV_02_BI_02.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_TS_AA_AUTHVAL_RCV_02_BI_02.xml @@ -1,44 +1,44 @@ - - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 02 32 - - - - - - - - - - + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 02 32 + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_TS_AA_AUTHVAL_RCV_02_BI_03.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_TS_AA_AUTHVAL_RCV_02_BI_03.xml index 1b3419864bbb31f8017cecf8faacbd74a7f5ff5a..5aeacc480f29b67392dc73072186a54e785ee014 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_TS_AA_AUTHVAL_RCV_02_BI_03.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_TS_AA_AUTHVAL_RCV_02_BI_03.xml @@ -1,44 +1,44 @@ - - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 01 30 - - - - - - - - - - + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 01 30 + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_TS_A_AA.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_TS_A_AA.xml index cb1e4a6010173efa60b85d6a9bf52530888639ff..43f217121ad542c68773808241fc6e7c77ef3a2a 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_TS_A_AA.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_TS_A_AA.xml @@ -1,44 +1,44 @@ - - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 01 32 - - - - - - - - - - + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 01 32 + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_TS_A_AA_B.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_TS_A_AA_B.xml index 16792b08dbe6d260a06a5073491cb5905155ed7b..dc731e7a61ae591cc776542a58fd45e30d73e67d 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_TS_A_AA_B.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_TS_A_AA_B.xml @@ -1,44 +1,44 @@ - - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 01 32 - - - - - - - - - - + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 01 32 + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_TS_A_AT.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_TS_A_AT.xml index da78154a4edd288ea349265a97b3f73d351c1160..1c9a4036dfcc87b296da6533bca24bd5e1a12820 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_TS_A_AT.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_TS_A_AT.xml @@ -1,36 +1,36 @@ - - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - 01 FF FC - 01 FF FF FF - - - - - - - - - - - + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + 01 FF FC + 01 FF FF FF + + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_TS_A_EA.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_TS_A_EA.xml index 5a781e8a4c302be04c559b4aad422cc2a4e5d77e..4273cdf607ac10f043cd92bc8077b4b1c7a1ba01 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_TS_A_EA.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_TS_A_EA.xml @@ -1,45 +1,47 @@ - - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 01 C0 - - - 01 0E - - - - - - - - - - + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 01 C0 + + + 01 0E + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_TS_A_EA_AA_AUTHVAL_RCV_02_BI_01.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_TS_A_EA_AA_AUTHVAL_RCV_02_BI_01.xml index 802585d02b478628b66f02a8c45c3b17e1cbfbc3..35dbf1ffd136a95598f44f0f34dded39644817eb 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_TS_A_EA_AA_AUTHVAL_RCV_02_BI_01.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_TS_A_EA_AA_AUTHVAL_RCV_02_BI_01.xml @@ -1,44 +1,46 @@ - - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 01 C0 - - - - - - - - - - - - + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 01 C0 + + + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_TS_A_EA_AA_AUTHVAL_RCV_02_BI_02.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_TS_A_EA_AA_AUTHVAL_RCV_02_BI_02.xml index 5a71c29d883d18ee20cdb12c3ad330cdf0578072..87d728249c8e413d9fae78f2e242f17b0393f922 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_TS_A_EA_AA_AUTHVAL_RCV_02_BI_02.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_TS_A_EA_AA_AUTHVAL_RCV_02_BI_02.xml @@ -1,45 +1,47 @@ - - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 01 C0 - - - 02 0E - - - - - - - - - - + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 01 C0 + + + 02 0E + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_TS_A_EA_AA_AUTHVAL_RCV_02_BI_03.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_TS_A_EA_AA_AUTHVAL_RCV_02_BI_03.xml index a165dd0228a95e5835dd0fc2617fe4201e2daa0e..b4783c228b2f018ca52350dde24fae47843337d5 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_TS_A_EA_AA_AUTHVAL_RCV_02_BI_03.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_TS_A_EA_AA_AUTHVAL_RCV_02_BI_03.xml @@ -1,45 +1,47 @@ - - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 01 40 - - - 01 0E - - - - - - - - - - + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 01 40 + + + 01 0E + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_TS_A_EC.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_TS_A_EC.xml index 4cd553948ae819c9ab562d221b4f4c5994b88778..884430a83e2fc77a8ce4a1eb79f492dd0bd4598d 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_TS_A_EC.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_TS_A_EC.xml @@ -1,34 +1,34 @@ - - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - 01 C0 - - - - - - - - - - + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + 01 C0 + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_TS_B1_AT.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_TS_B1_AT.xml index 8e6b62a1cfba52bef8962c64ae65ec6e5383ee30..f65e53fd9991bd9678620903309b5ccabedee741 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_TS_B1_AT.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_TS_B1_AT.xml @@ -1,35 +1,35 @@ - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - 01 FF FC - 01 FF FF FF - - - - - - - - - - - + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + 01 FF FC + 01 FF FF FF + + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_TS_B_AT.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_TS_B_AT.xml index fb30044fcea533180bbf49d6d3312169849fdeda..5a470ded683fa664ed4fb0b3e8c79bdfa53e0820 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_TS_B_AT.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_TS_B_AT.xml @@ -1,36 +1,36 @@ - - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - 01 FF FC - 01 FF FF FF - - - - - - - - - - - + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + 01 FF FC + 01 FF FF FF + + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_TS_CAM_BO_02_AT.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_TS_CAM_BO_02_AT.xml index 84c91a033bf703008e0360cecdf9e05028ff37c8..72833896a323fafe057631adf72b1b8e48fba8fb 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_TS_CAM_BO_02_AT.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_TS_CAM_BO_02_AT.xml @@ -1,31 +1,31 @@ - - - - 2 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 01 BF FC - - - - - - - - - - + + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 01 BF FC + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_TS_CAM_BO_03_AT.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_TS_CAM_BO_03_AT.xml index ae2db8dbdd7750e730858e3ac44a56aa81d244f1..79bf9056e900392f48856123aea03e491110a412 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_TS_CAM_BO_03_AT.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_TS_CAM_BO_03_AT.xml @@ -1,30 +1,30 @@ - - - 2 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 01 DF FC - - - - - - - - - - + + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 01 DF FC + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_TS_DENM_BO_01_AT.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_TS_DENM_BO_01_AT.xml index ddbb6ff8ecf838bc39b1a0fee16c46aec5cdc47e..d3e206b42cd329653126e3ef9c8730aebb73dcdc 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_TS_DENM_BO_01_AT.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_TS_DENM_BO_01_AT.xml @@ -1,28 +1,28 @@ - - 2 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 01 FF FC - 01 7F FF FF - - - - - - - - - - + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 01 FF FC + 01 7F FF FF + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_TS_DENM_BO_02_AT.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_TS_DENM_BO_02_AT.xml index bad0497769da68dfe86e6b54e8f5cf4c87d9778e..4b7237bc1cd69ae4d879641b2a86c8fb2415c0c1 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_TS_DENM_BO_02_AT.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_TS_DENM_BO_02_AT.xml @@ -1,28 +1,28 @@ - - 2 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 01 FF FC - 01 BF FF FF - - - - - - - - - - + + 2 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 01 FF FC + 01 BF FF FF + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_TS_EC_ENR_RCV_02_BI_01.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_TS_EC_ENR_RCV_02_BI_01.xml index 50c8809c2ebe238fd60fbffce1a2df8848852b0e..8edf160085e6e4351e48f9fd0f027ad20623c5b1 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_TS_EC_ENR_RCV_02_BI_01.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_TS_EC_ENR_RCV_02_BI_01.xml @@ -1,34 +1,34 @@ - - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_TS_EC_ENR_RCV_02_BI_02.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_TS_EC_ENR_RCV_02_BI_02.xml index 69fa8eca1e747cb4013a9e9dd399d9f8238726ef..90004ec65b1f05be8587962f763a6736b938944b 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_TS_EC_ENR_RCV_02_BI_02.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_TS_EC_ENR_RCV_02_BI_02.xml @@ -1,34 +1,34 @@ - - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - 00 C0 - - - - - - - - - - + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + 00 C0 + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_TS_EC_ENR_RCV_02_BI_03.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_TS_EC_ENR_RCV_02_BI_03.xml index 5e7dc2fa09a4b0c5f7348abdf93d32fe60ecb4b1..c95f71ef103f54ca94d4b840d430e9ec32d01a12 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_TS_EC_ENR_RCV_02_BI_03.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_TS_EC_ENR_RCV_02_BI_03.xml @@ -1,34 +1,34 @@ - - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - 01 00 - - - - - - - - - - + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + 01 00 + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_TS_F3_AT.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_TS_F3_AT.xml index 57a148c8d33f10c8356c440af7d9ff8c1bef8a44..9ae80b96d324519103750a9f865dbb6ae7f06e69 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_TS_F3_AT.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_TS_F3_AT.xml @@ -1,35 +1,35 @@ - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - 01 FF FC - 01 FF FF FF - - - - - - - - - - - + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + 01 FF FC + 01 FF FF FF + + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_TS_F_AT.xml b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_TS_F_AT.xml index 8a2387169be423898422f77bc04fd5e408f3ce41..1659a943198cbacc75f1df1b99c83e7f494efaab 100644 --- a/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_TS_F_AT.xml +++ b/data/certificates/profiles/CERT_TS_F_AT.xml @@ -1,36 +1,36 @@ - - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - > - - - - - - - - - 01 FF FC - 01 FF FF FF - - - - - - - - - - - + + + 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + > + + + + + + + + + 01 FF FC + 01 FF FF FF + + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/etc/AtsGeoNetworking/AtsGeoNetworking.cfg b/etc/AtsGeoNetworking/AtsGeoNetworking.cfg index 5ceb1398761fb4525a6b31ac50c144818fe12240..5b1c158c8632697372ec89d3025c1f3d1ee98ac8 100644 --- a/etc/AtsGeoNetworking/AtsGeoNetworking.cfg +++ b/etc/AtsGeoNetworking/AtsGeoNetworking.cfg @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ LibItsGeoNetworking_Pics.PICS_GN_LOCAL_GN_ADDR := { mid := '001C6B0D0201'O } -LibItsGeoNetworking_Pics.PICS_GN_IS_MOBILE := false +LibItsGeoNetworking_Pics.PICS_GN_IS_MOBILE := true LibItsGeoNetworking_Pics.PICS_GN_DEFAULT_HOP_LIMIT := 10 LibItsGeoNetworking_Pics.PICS_GN_SECURITY := false @@ -101,14 +101,14 @@ mtc.geoNetworkingPort.params := "GN(ll_address=00000000000B,latitude=515340240,l NodeA.geoNetworkingPort.params := "GN(ll_address=00000000000A,latitude=515340240,longitude=139274330)/ETH(mac_src=080027500f9a)/PCAP(mac_src=080027500f9a,nic=wlp0s20f3,filter=and ether proto 0x8947)" NodeB.geoNetworkingPort.params := "GN(ll_address=00000000000B,latitude=515340240,longitude=139274330)/ETH(mac_src=080027500f9b)/PCAP(mac_src=080027500f9b,nic=wlp0s20f3,filter=and ether proto 0x8947)" NodeC.geoNetworkingPort.params := "GN(ll_address=00000000000C,latitude=515340240,longitude=139274330)/ETH(mac_src=080027500f9c)/PCAP(mac_src=080027500f9c,nic=wlp0s20f3,filter=and ether proto 0x8947)" -NodeD.geoNetworkingPort.params := "GN(ll_address=00000000000D,latitude=515340240,longitude=139274330)/ETH(mac_src=080027500f9d)/PCAP(mac_src=080027500f9d,nic=wlp0s20f3,filter=and ether proto 0x8947 and not ether src 080027500f9b)" +NodeD.geoNetworkingPort.params := "GN(ll_address=00000000000D,latitude=515340240,longitude=139274330)/ETH(mac_src=080027500f9d)/PCAP(mac_src=080027500f9d,nic=wlp0s20f3,filter=and ether proto 0x8947 and not ether src 8c554ac1eee1)" # UpperTester port based on UDP #system.utPort.params := "UT_GN/UDP(dst_ip=192.168.2.2)" mtc.utPort.params := "UT_GN/UDP(dst_ip=192.168.1.43,dst_port=12345,src_port=12346)" -NodeA.utPort.params := "UT_GN/UDP(dst_ip=192.168.1.43,dst_port=12345,src_port=12346)" +#NodeA.utPort.params := "UT_GN/UDP(dst_ip=192.168.1.43,dst_port=12345,src_port=12346)" NodeB.utPort.params := "UT_GN/UDP(dst_ip=192.168.1.43,dst_port=12345,src_port=12346)" -NodeC.utPort.params := "UT_GN/UDP(dst_ip=192.168.1.43,dst_port=12345,src_port=12346)" +#NodeC.utPort.params := "UT_GN/UDP(dst_ip=192.168.1.43,dst_port=12345,src_port=12346)" NodeD.utPort.params := "UT_GN/UDP(dst_ip=192.168.1.43,dst_port=12345,src_port=12346)" [EXECUTE] @@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ NodeD.utPort.params := "UT_GN/UDP(dst_ip=192.168.1.43,dst_port=12345,src_port=12 #ItsGeoNetworking_TestCases.TC_GEONW_FDV_GAC_BV_01 #ItsGeoNetworking_TestCases.TC_GEONW_FDV_SHB_BV_01 #ItsGeoNetworking_TestCases.TC_GEONW_FDV_TSB_BV_01 -ItsGeoNetworking_TestCases.TC_GEONW_PON_SHB_BV_01 +#ItsGeoNetworking_TestCases.TC_GEONW_PON_SHB_BV_01 #ItsGeoNetworking_TestCases.TC_GEONW_PON_SHB_BV_05 #ItsGeoNetworking_TestCases.TC_GEONW_PON_TSB_BV_01 #ItsGeoNetworking_TestCases.TC_GEONW_PON_TSB_BV_05 @@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ ItsGeoNetworking_TestCases.TC_GEONW_PON_SHB_BV_01 #ItsGeoNetworking_TestCases.TC_GEONW_PON_LOS_TI_06 #ItsGeoNetworking_TestCases.TC_GEONW_PON_LOS_BV_07 #ItsGeoNetworking_TestCases.TC_GEONW_PON_LOS_BV_08 -#ItsGeoNetworking_TestCases.TC_GEONW_PON_LOS_BO_09 +ItsGeoNetworking_TestCases.TC_GEONW_PON_LOS_BO_09 #ItsGeoNetworking_TestCases.TC_GEONW_PON_LOS_BV_10 #ItsGeoNetworking_TestCases.TC_GEONW_PON_LOS_BV_11 #ItsGeoNetworking_TestCases.TC_GEONW_PON_LOS_BV_12 diff --git a/etc/AtsIS/AtsIS.cfg b/etc/AtsIS/AtsIS.cfg deleted file mode 100644 index 741acdf0395de83cb45c98b19eb57fa8caffc6c6..0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 --- a/etc/AtsIS/AtsIS.cfg +++ /dev/null @@ -1,269 +0,0 @@ - -[MODULE_PARAMETERS] -# This section shall contain the values of all parameters that are defined in your TTCN-3 modules. - -# IUT Station ID -LibItsCommon_Pixits.PX_IUT_STATION_ID := 2533729309 - -LibItsGeoNetworking_Pixits.PX_GN_UPPER_LAYER := e_btpB -LibItsIvim_Pics.PICS_IS_IUT_SECURED := false - -LibItsIvim_Pics.PICS_IVIM_HAS_GENERAL_CONTAINER := true -LibItsIvim_Pics.PICS_IVIM_HAS_ROAD_CFG_CONTAINER := true -LibItsIvim_Pics.PICS_IVIM_HAS_LAYOUT_CONTAINER := true -LibItsIvim_Pics.PICS_IVIM_HAS_TEXT_CONTAINER := true - -LibItsIvim_Pixits.PX_PROVIDER := { - countryCode := '0101110011'B , - providerIdentifier := 31 - } - -[LOGGING] -# In this section you can specify the name of the log file and the classes of events -# you want to log into the file or display on console (standard error). - -LogFile := "../logs/AtsIS/%e.%h-%r.%s" -FileMask := LOG_ALL | USER | DEBUG | MATCHING -ConsoleMask := LOG_ALL | USER | DEBUG | MATCHING -#FileMask := ERROR | USER | MATCHING | EXECUTOR_RUNTIME | VERDICTOP -#ConsoleMask := ERROR | USER | MATCHING | EXECUTOR_RUNTIME | VERDICTOP -LogSourceInfo := Stack -LogEntityName:= Yes -LogEventTypes:= Yes -#TimeStampFormat := DateTime - -[TESTPORT_PARAMETERS] -# In this section you can specify parameters that are passed to Test Ports. -# IVIM Layer -# next_header : btpA|btpB (overwrite BTP.type) -# header_type : tsb|gbc|uni -# header_sub_type : sh (single hop) -# IVIM Layer -# next_header : btpA|btpB (overwrite BTP.type) -# BTP Layer -# type : btpA|btpB -# destination port: dst_port -# source port : src_port -# device_mode : Set to 1 if the layer shall encapsulate upper layer PDU -# device_mode : Set to 1 if the layer shall encapsulate upper layer PDU -# GN Layer -# ll_address : GeoNetworking address of the Test System -# latitude : latitude of the Test System -# longitude : longitude of the Test System -# beaconing : Set to 1 if GnLayer shall start beaconing -# Beaconning timer expiry: expiry (ms) -# device_mode : Set to 1 if the layer shall encapsulate upper layer PDU -# secured_mode : Set to 1 if message exchanges shall be signed -# encrypted_mode : Set to 1 if message exchanges shall be encrypted -# NOTE: For signed & encrypted message exchanges, both secured_mode and encrypted_mode shall be set to 1 -# secure_db_path : Path to the certificates and keys storage location -# hash : Hash algorithm to be used when secured mode is set -# Authorized values are SHA-256 or SHA-384 -# Default: SHA-256 -# cypher : Cyphering algorithm to be used when secured mode is set -# Authorized values are NISTP-256 and BP-256 -# Default: NISTP-256 -# Ethernet layer -# mac_src :Source MAC address -# mac_bc :Broadcast address -# eth_type : Ethernet type -# Commsignia layer -# mac_src : Device MAC address, used to discard packets -# To indicate no filering, use the value 000000000000 -# mac_bc : Broadcast address -# eth_type : Ethernet type, used to discard packets -# target_host : Device address -# target_port : Device port -# source_port : Test System port -# interface_id: Interface id, used to discard packets -# tx_power : TX power (dB) -# UDP layer (IP/UDP based on Pcap) -# dst_ip : destination IPv4 address (aa.bb.cc.dd) -# dst_port: destination port -# src_ip : source IPv4 address (aa.bb.cc.dd) -# src_port: source port -# Pcap layer -# mac_src : Source MAC address, used to exclude from capture the acket sent by the Test System -# filter : Pcap filter (compliant with tcpdump syntax) -# Online mode: -# nic: Local NIC -# If set, online mode is used -# Offline mode (nic is present but not set): -# file : File to read -# frame_offset: Frame offset, used to skip packets with frame number < frame_offset -# time_offset : Time offset, used to skip packets with time offset < time_offset -# save_mode : 1 to save sent packet, 0 otherwise - -#Cygwin -#system.ivimPort.params := "IVIM(next_header=btpB,header_type=uni)/BTP(dst_port=2006)/GN(ll_address=4C5E0C14D2EA,latitude=43551050,longitude=10298730,distanceA=1500,distanceB=1500,angle=0,device_mode=1,secured_mode=0,sec_db_path=/home/yanng/tmp/certificates)/ETH(mac_src=e2b7b30429eb)/PCAP(mac_src=e2b7b30429eb,nic=CEBB111F-D749-4B40-8B4D-DBB060E90987,filter=and ether proto 0x8947)" -# Linux -#system.ivimPort.params := "IVIM(next_header=btpB,header_type=gbc)/BTP(dst_port=2006)/GN(ll_address=4C5E0C14D2EA,latitude=43551050,longitude=10298730,distanceA=1500,distanceB=1500,angle=0,device_mode=1,secured_mode=0,sec_db_path=../data/certificates/certificates)/ETH(mac_src=dc536045af7f)/PCAP(mac_src=dc536045af7f,nic=wlp2s0,filter=and ether proto 0x8947)" -system.ivimPort.params := "IVIM(next_header=btpB,header_type=gbc)/BTP(dst_port=2006)/GN(ll_address=4C5E0C14D2EA,latitude=43551050,longitude=10298730,distanceA=1500,distanceB=1500,angle=0,device_mode=1,secured_mode=0,sec_db_path=../data/certificates/certificates)/ETH(mac_src=dc536045af7e)/PCAP(mac_src=dc536045af7e,nic=wlp0s20f3,filter=and ether proto 0x8947)" -# Linux over UDP -#system.ivimPort.params := "IVIM(next_header=btpB,header_type=gbc)/BTP(dst_port=2006)/GN(ll_address=4C5E0C14D2EA,latitude=43551050,longitude=10298730,distanceA=1500,distanceB=1500,angle=0,device_mode=1,secured_mode=0,sec_db_path=../data/certificates/certificates)/ETH(mac_src=dc536045af7f)/UDP(dst_ip=192.168.146.26,src_port=4041,dst_port=50544)" - -# IVIM UpperTester port based on UDP -system.utPort.params := "UT_IVIM/UDP(dst_ip=127.0.0.1,dst_port=12345,src_port=12346)" -#system.utPort.params := "UT_IVIM/UDP(dst_ip=192.168.146.26,dst_port=44100,src_port=12345)" -#system.utPort.params := "UT_IVIM/UDP(dst_ip=172.16.35.1)" - -[EXECUTE] -# Check that protocolVersion is set to 1 and messageID is set to 6 -#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_MSGF_BV_01 -# Check that all Application Containers references existing items in one or more Location Containers -#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_LOC_BV_01 -# Check that application container information of the same type does not refer to overlapping RZs. -#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_LOC_BV_02 -# Check that all definitions of zones that are based on the same Reference Position, be it that they are connected or not interconnected, should be included in the same Geographic Location Container -#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_LOC_BV_03 -# Check that the IUT includes the component laneNumber for each zone if the zone definition is restricted to specific lane(s). -#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_LOC_BV_04 -# Check that If the zone definition applies to the entire carriageway (all lanes), the -#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_LOC_BV_05 -# Check that IUT includes, for each zone, one or more of the following optional components to define the zone: -#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_LOC_BV_06 -# Check that management container contains a country code according to ISO 3166-1. Numbers shall be assigned on national basis. -#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_MANC_BV_01 -# Check that an IUT can split an IVI Structure to multiple messages if it exceeds the maximum PDU size. -#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_MANC_BV_02 -# Check that IVI Service generates a new IVIM on reception of a valid AppIVIM_Trigger request -#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_EVGN_BV_01 -# Check that a new iviIdentificationNumber value is assigned for each newly generated IVIM -#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_EVGN_BV_02 -# Check that iviIdentificationNumber value is set to a next unused value each time an IVIM is detected -#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_EVGN_BV_03 -# Check that a new generated IVIM contains an iviStatus set to 'new' -#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_EVGN_BV_04 -# Check that the timeStamp is set to the current time when generating a new IVM -#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_EVGN_BV_05 -# Check that an updated IVIM contains an iviStatus set to 'update' -#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_EVUP_BV_01 -# Check that an update can change the validity time to the IVIM - validTo information field -#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_EVUP_BV_02 -# Check that an update can change the validity time to the IVIM - validFrom information field -#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_EVUP_BV_03 -# Check that the timeStamp is set to the current time when generating an update with some change of information content -#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_EVUP_BV_04 -# Check that the iviIdentificationNumber remains unchanged IVIM is updated -#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_EVUP_BV_05 -# The IUT shall, at minimum, include the identifier(s) of a Relevance Zone in the component -#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_GENAPP_BV_01 -# Check that all zone IDs in the General Application Container references existing items in -#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_GENAPP_BV_02 -# The IUT shall include the component direction to describe the direction of relevance -#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_GENAPP_BV_03 -# The IUT shall include at least one element in the roadSignCodes container. -#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_GENAPP_BV_04 -# Check that all layoutID of the General Application Containers references existing layouts -#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_GENAPP_BV_05 -# Check that all zone IDs in the Road Configuration Container references existing items in the Location Container of the same IVIM Structure. -#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_RCC_BV_01 -# Check that all Parts that relate to the same Location Container are included in the same Road Configuration Container. -#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_RCC_BV_02 -# Check that Road Configuration Container contains description of all present lanes. -#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_RCC_BV_03 -# Check that all zone IDs in the Text Container references existing items in the Location Container of the same IVIM Structure. -#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_TEXT_BV_01 -# The sending ITS-S shall include the component direction to describe the direction of -#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_TEXT_BV_02 -# The IUT can include either the component text and/or the component data. The IUT can repeat -#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_TEXT_BV_03 -# Check that all layoutID of the Text Containers references existing layouts in the Layout Containers of the same IVIM Structure. -#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_TEXT_BV_04 -# Check that IVIMs are not generated more frequently than T_GenIvimMin -#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_GFQ_TI_01 -# Check that IVIMs are not generated less frequently than T_GenIvimMax -#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_GFQ_TI_02 -# Check that the IUT activates repetition on reception of a valid AppIVIM_Update request -#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_EVRP_BV_01 -# Check that the IUT activates repetition on reception of a valid AppIVIM_Update request -#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_EVRP_BV_02 -# Check that the IUT terminates IVM genration on validity duration expery -#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_EVTR_BV_01 -# Check that the IUT terminates IVM genration on termination request -#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_EVTR_BV_02 -# Check that the IUT terminates IVM generation on cancellation request. -ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_EVTR_BV_03 -# Check that the IUT terminates IVM generation on negation request -#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_EVTR_BV_04 -# Check that IVIM uses BTP_B packet -#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_COM_BV_01 -# Check that IVI service encapsulates IVIM in a UNC with the HeaderType field set to the value of 2. -#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_COM_BV_02 -# Check that IVI service uses certificate containing valid ITS AID to sign IVIM. -#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_SEC_BV_01 -# Check that IVI service uses certificate containing valid ITS AID to sign IVIM. -#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_SEC_BV_02 -# Check that IVI service uses certificate containing valid Service Specific Permissions of type BitmapSsp -#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_SSP_BV_01 -# Check that IVI service sends an IVIM containing different road signs schema when it is permitted by the signing certificate -#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_SSP_BV_02 -# Check that IVI service sends an IVIM containing ISO/TS 14823 road signs codes of different service categories -#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_SSP_BV_03 -# Check that IVI service sends an IVIM containing lane status when it is permitted by the signing certificate. -#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_SSP_BV_04 -# Check that IVI service sends an IVIM containing different containers when it is permitted by the signing certificate. -#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_SSP_BV_05 -# Check that IVI service sends an IVI negation when it is permitted by the signing certificate. -#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_SSP_BV_06 -# Check that IVI service doesn’t send an IVIM if service provider value is not authorized by the signing certificate. -#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_SSP_BO_01 -# Check that IVI service doesn’t send an IVIM containing different road signs schema when it is not permitted by the signing certificat. -#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_SSP_BO_02 -# Check that IVI service doesn’t send an IVIM containing ISO/TS 14823 road signs codes of different service categories when it is not permitted by the signing certificate. -#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_SSP_BO_03 -# Check that IVI service doesn’t send an IVIM containing lane status when it is not permitted by the signing certificate -#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_SSP_BO_04 -# Check that IVI service doesn’t send an IVIM containing different containers when it is not permitted by the signing certificate. -#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_SSP_BO_05 -# Check that IVI service doesn’t send an IVI negation when it is not permitted by the signing certificate. -#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_SSP_BO_06 -# Check that the IUT can successfully process IVIM been received when the IUT was in the Relevance Zone. -#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_RCV_MSGF_BV_01 -# Check that the IUT can successfully process IVIM been received when the IUT was in the Detection Zone approaching the Relevance Zone -#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_RCV_DATA_BV_01 -# Check that an IUT detects the applicability of a Relevance Zone defined as a polygonal lie. -#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_RCV_DATA_BV_02 -# Check that an IUT detects the applicability of a Relevance Zone defined as an area. -#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_RCV_DATA_BV_03 -# Check that an IUT detects the applicability of a Relevance Zone defined as a distance value. -#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_RCV_DATA_BV_04 -# Check that an IUT detects the applicability of a Relevance Zone by matching its path with the relevance zone (path) of the moving IVI object. -#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_RCV_DATA_BV_05 -# Check that a received IVIM is considered as new if iviStatus is “new”. -#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_RCV_EVUP_BV_01 -# Check that a received IVIM is considered as new if iviStatus is “new” and/or if the combination of serviceProviderId and iviIdentificationNumber is different from other received messages -#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_RCV_EVUP_BV_02 -# Check that a received IVIM is considered as update if the iviStatus is “update” and/or if the combination of serviceProviderId and iviIdentificationNumber equals to those from another received structure and the timestamp is more recent -#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_RCV_EVUP_BV_03 -# Check that a received IVIM is considered as duplicate of a received structure if the combination of serviceProviderId and iviIdentificationNumber equals to those from another received structure and the timestamp is the same; -#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_RCV_EVUP_BV_04 -# Check that a received IVIM is considered as cancelation if the iviStatus is “cancellation”. -#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_RCV_EVUP_BV_05 -# Check that a received IVIM is considered as negation if the iviStatus is “negation”. -#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_RCV_EVUP_BV_06 -# Check that the IUT accepts a received IVIM message permitted by the signing certificate. -#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_RCV_SSP_BV_01 -# Check that the IUT skips a received IVIM message not permitted by the signing certificate. -#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_RCV_SSP_BO_01 -# Check that the IUT skips a received IVIM message with service provider identifier not permitted by the signing certificate. -#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_RCV_SSP_BO_02 -# Check that IVI service skips a received IVIM containing different road signs schema when it is not permitted by the signing certificate -#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_RCV_SSP_BO_03 -# Check that IVI service skips a received IVIM containing ISO/TS 14823 road signs codes of different service categories when it is not permitted by the signing certificate. -#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_RCV_SSP_BO_04 -# Check that IVI service skips a received IVIM containing lane status when it is not permitted by the signing certificate. -#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_RCV_SSP_BO_05 -# Check that IVI service skips a received IVIM containing different containers when it is not permitted by the signing certificate. -#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_RCV_SSP_BO_06 -# Check that IVI service skips a received IVI negation when it is not permitted by the signing certificate. -#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_RCV_SSP_BO_07 -# Check that the IUT can successfully process IVIM been received when the IUT was in the Relevance Zone -#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_RCV_MSGF_BV_01 - -[MAIN_CONTROLLER] -# The options herein control the behavior of MC. -KillTimer := 10.0 -LocalAddress := 127.0.0.1 -TCPPort := 12000 -NumHCs := 1 diff --git a/etc/AtsIS/AtsIS.cfg b/etc/AtsIS/AtsIS.cfg new file mode 120000 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..57b402336ca9e5b19fc6dc67a80dcaba6780f702 --- /dev/null +++ b/etc/AtsIS/AtsIS.cfg @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +AtsIS_Mapem.cf_ \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/etc/AtsIS/AtsIS_IVIM.cf_ b/etc/AtsIS/AtsIS_IVIM.cf_ new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..741acdf0395de83cb45c98b19eb57fa8caffc6c6 --- /dev/null +++ b/etc/AtsIS/AtsIS_IVIM.cf_ @@ -0,0 +1,269 @@ + +[MODULE_PARAMETERS] +# This section shall contain the values of all parameters that are defined in your TTCN-3 modules. + +# IUT Station ID +LibItsCommon_Pixits.PX_IUT_STATION_ID := 2533729309 + +LibItsGeoNetworking_Pixits.PX_GN_UPPER_LAYER := e_btpB +LibItsIvim_Pics.PICS_IS_IUT_SECURED := false + +LibItsIvim_Pics.PICS_IVIM_HAS_GENERAL_CONTAINER := true +LibItsIvim_Pics.PICS_IVIM_HAS_ROAD_CFG_CONTAINER := true +LibItsIvim_Pics.PICS_IVIM_HAS_LAYOUT_CONTAINER := true +LibItsIvim_Pics.PICS_IVIM_HAS_TEXT_CONTAINER := true + +LibItsIvim_Pixits.PX_PROVIDER := { + countryCode := '0101110011'B , + providerIdentifier := 31 + } + +[LOGGING] +# In this section you can specify the name of the log file and the classes of events +# you want to log into the file or display on console (standard error). + +LogFile := "../logs/AtsIS/%e.%h-%r.%s" +FileMask := LOG_ALL | USER | DEBUG | MATCHING +ConsoleMask := LOG_ALL | USER | DEBUG | MATCHING +#FileMask := ERROR | USER | MATCHING | EXECUTOR_RUNTIME | VERDICTOP +#ConsoleMask := ERROR | USER | MATCHING | EXECUTOR_RUNTIME | VERDICTOP +LogSourceInfo := Stack +LogEntityName:= Yes +LogEventTypes:= Yes +#TimeStampFormat := DateTime + +[TESTPORT_PARAMETERS] +# In this section you can specify parameters that are passed to Test Ports. +# IVIM Layer +# next_header : btpA|btpB (overwrite BTP.type) +# header_type : tsb|gbc|uni +# header_sub_type : sh (single hop) +# IVIM Layer +# next_header : btpA|btpB (overwrite BTP.type) +# BTP Layer +# type : btpA|btpB +# destination port: dst_port +# source port : src_port +# device_mode : Set to 1 if the layer shall encapsulate upper layer PDU +# device_mode : Set to 1 if the layer shall encapsulate upper layer PDU +# GN Layer +# ll_address : GeoNetworking address of the Test System +# latitude : latitude of the Test System +# longitude : longitude of the Test System +# beaconing : Set to 1 if GnLayer shall start beaconing +# Beaconning timer expiry: expiry (ms) +# device_mode : Set to 1 if the layer shall encapsulate upper layer PDU +# secured_mode : Set to 1 if message exchanges shall be signed +# encrypted_mode : Set to 1 if message exchanges shall be encrypted +# NOTE: For signed & encrypted message exchanges, both secured_mode and encrypted_mode shall be set to 1 +# secure_db_path : Path to the certificates and keys storage location +# hash : Hash algorithm to be used when secured mode is set +# Authorized values are SHA-256 or SHA-384 +# Default: SHA-256 +# cypher : Cyphering algorithm to be used when secured mode is set +# Authorized values are NISTP-256 and BP-256 +# Default: NISTP-256 +# Ethernet layer +# mac_src :Source MAC address +# mac_bc :Broadcast address +# eth_type : Ethernet type +# Commsignia layer +# mac_src : Device MAC address, used to discard packets +# To indicate no filering, use the value 000000000000 +# mac_bc : Broadcast address +# eth_type : Ethernet type, used to discard packets +# target_host : Device address +# target_port : Device port +# source_port : Test System port +# interface_id: Interface id, used to discard packets +# tx_power : TX power (dB) +# UDP layer (IP/UDP based on Pcap) +# dst_ip : destination IPv4 address (aa.bb.cc.dd) +# dst_port: destination port +# src_ip : source IPv4 address (aa.bb.cc.dd) +# src_port: source port +# Pcap layer +# mac_src : Source MAC address, used to exclude from capture the acket sent by the Test System +# filter : Pcap filter (compliant with tcpdump syntax) +# Online mode: +# nic: Local NIC +# If set, online mode is used +# Offline mode (nic is present but not set): +# file : File to read +# frame_offset: Frame offset, used to skip packets with frame number < frame_offset +# time_offset : Time offset, used to skip packets with time offset < time_offset +# save_mode : 1 to save sent packet, 0 otherwise + +#Cygwin +#system.ivimPort.params := "IVIM(next_header=btpB,header_type=uni)/BTP(dst_port=2006)/GN(ll_address=4C5E0C14D2EA,latitude=43551050,longitude=10298730,distanceA=1500,distanceB=1500,angle=0,device_mode=1,secured_mode=0,sec_db_path=/home/yanng/tmp/certificates)/ETH(mac_src=e2b7b30429eb)/PCAP(mac_src=e2b7b30429eb,nic=CEBB111F-D749-4B40-8B4D-DBB060E90987,filter=and ether proto 0x8947)" +# Linux +#system.ivimPort.params := "IVIM(next_header=btpB,header_type=gbc)/BTP(dst_port=2006)/GN(ll_address=4C5E0C14D2EA,latitude=43551050,longitude=10298730,distanceA=1500,distanceB=1500,angle=0,device_mode=1,secured_mode=0,sec_db_path=../data/certificates/certificates)/ETH(mac_src=dc536045af7f)/PCAP(mac_src=dc536045af7f,nic=wlp2s0,filter=and ether proto 0x8947)" +system.ivimPort.params := "IVIM(next_header=btpB,header_type=gbc)/BTP(dst_port=2006)/GN(ll_address=4C5E0C14D2EA,latitude=43551050,longitude=10298730,distanceA=1500,distanceB=1500,angle=0,device_mode=1,secured_mode=0,sec_db_path=../data/certificates/certificates)/ETH(mac_src=dc536045af7e)/PCAP(mac_src=dc536045af7e,nic=wlp0s20f3,filter=and ether proto 0x8947)" +# Linux over UDP +#system.ivimPort.params := "IVIM(next_header=btpB,header_type=gbc)/BTP(dst_port=2006)/GN(ll_address=4C5E0C14D2EA,latitude=43551050,longitude=10298730,distanceA=1500,distanceB=1500,angle=0,device_mode=1,secured_mode=0,sec_db_path=../data/certificates/certificates)/ETH(mac_src=dc536045af7f)/UDP(dst_ip=192.168.146.26,src_port=4041,dst_port=50544)" + +# IVIM UpperTester port based on UDP +system.utPort.params := "UT_IVIM/UDP(dst_ip=127.0.0.1,dst_port=12345,src_port=12346)" +#system.utPort.params := "UT_IVIM/UDP(dst_ip=192.168.146.26,dst_port=44100,src_port=12345)" +#system.utPort.params := "UT_IVIM/UDP(dst_ip=172.16.35.1)" + +[EXECUTE] +# Check that protocolVersion is set to 1 and messageID is set to 6 +#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_MSGF_BV_01 +# Check that all Application Containers references existing items in one or more Location Containers +#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_LOC_BV_01 +# Check that application container information of the same type does not refer to overlapping RZs. +#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_LOC_BV_02 +# Check that all definitions of zones that are based on the same Reference Position, be it that they are connected or not interconnected, should be included in the same Geographic Location Container +#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_LOC_BV_03 +# Check that the IUT includes the component laneNumber for each zone if the zone definition is restricted to specific lane(s). +#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_LOC_BV_04 +# Check that If the zone definition applies to the entire carriageway (all lanes), the +#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_LOC_BV_05 +# Check that IUT includes, for each zone, one or more of the following optional components to define the zone: +#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_LOC_BV_06 +# Check that management container contains a country code according to ISO 3166-1. Numbers shall be assigned on national basis. +#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_MANC_BV_01 +# Check that an IUT can split an IVI Structure to multiple messages if it exceeds the maximum PDU size. +#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_MANC_BV_02 +# Check that IVI Service generates a new IVIM on reception of a valid AppIVIM_Trigger request +#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_EVGN_BV_01 +# Check that a new iviIdentificationNumber value is assigned for each newly generated IVIM +#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_EVGN_BV_02 +# Check that iviIdentificationNumber value is set to a next unused value each time an IVIM is detected +#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_EVGN_BV_03 +# Check that a new generated IVIM contains an iviStatus set to 'new' +#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_EVGN_BV_04 +# Check that the timeStamp is set to the current time when generating a new IVM +#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_EVGN_BV_05 +# Check that an updated IVIM contains an iviStatus set to 'update' +#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_EVUP_BV_01 +# Check that an update can change the validity time to the IVIM - validTo information field +#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_EVUP_BV_02 +# Check that an update can change the validity time to the IVIM - validFrom information field +#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_EVUP_BV_03 +# Check that the timeStamp is set to the current time when generating an update with some change of information content +#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_EVUP_BV_04 +# Check that the iviIdentificationNumber remains unchanged IVIM is updated +#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_EVUP_BV_05 +# The IUT shall, at minimum, include the identifier(s) of a Relevance Zone in the component +#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_GENAPP_BV_01 +# Check that all zone IDs in the General Application Container references existing items in +#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_GENAPP_BV_02 +# The IUT shall include the component direction to describe the direction of relevance +#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_GENAPP_BV_03 +# The IUT shall include at least one element in the roadSignCodes container. +#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_GENAPP_BV_04 +# Check that all layoutID of the General Application Containers references existing layouts +#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_GENAPP_BV_05 +# Check that all zone IDs in the Road Configuration Container references existing items in the Location Container of the same IVIM Structure. +#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_RCC_BV_01 +# Check that all Parts that relate to the same Location Container are included in the same Road Configuration Container. +#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_RCC_BV_02 +# Check that Road Configuration Container contains description of all present lanes. +#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_RCC_BV_03 +# Check that all zone IDs in the Text Container references existing items in the Location Container of the same IVIM Structure. +#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_TEXT_BV_01 +# The sending ITS-S shall include the component direction to describe the direction of +#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_TEXT_BV_02 +# The IUT can include either the component text and/or the component data. The IUT can repeat +#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_TEXT_BV_03 +# Check that all layoutID of the Text Containers references existing layouts in the Layout Containers of the same IVIM Structure. +#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_TEXT_BV_04 +# Check that IVIMs are not generated more frequently than T_GenIvimMin +#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_GFQ_TI_01 +# Check that IVIMs are not generated less frequently than T_GenIvimMax +#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_GFQ_TI_02 +# Check that the IUT activates repetition on reception of a valid AppIVIM_Update request +#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_EVRP_BV_01 +# Check that the IUT activates repetition on reception of a valid AppIVIM_Update request +#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_EVRP_BV_02 +# Check that the IUT terminates IVM genration on validity duration expery +#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_EVTR_BV_01 +# Check that the IUT terminates IVM genration on termination request +#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_EVTR_BV_02 +# Check that the IUT terminates IVM generation on cancellation request. +ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_EVTR_BV_03 +# Check that the IUT terminates IVM generation on negation request +#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_EVTR_BV_04 +# Check that IVIM uses BTP_B packet +#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_COM_BV_01 +# Check that IVI service encapsulates IVIM in a UNC with the HeaderType field set to the value of 2. +#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_COM_BV_02 +# Check that IVI service uses certificate containing valid ITS AID to sign IVIM. +#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_SEC_BV_01 +# Check that IVI service uses certificate containing valid ITS AID to sign IVIM. +#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_SEC_BV_02 +# Check that IVI service uses certificate containing valid Service Specific Permissions of type BitmapSsp +#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_SSP_BV_01 +# Check that IVI service sends an IVIM containing different road signs schema when it is permitted by the signing certificate +#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_SSP_BV_02 +# Check that IVI service sends an IVIM containing ISO/TS 14823 road signs codes of different service categories +#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_SSP_BV_03 +# Check that IVI service sends an IVIM containing lane status when it is permitted by the signing certificate. +#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_SSP_BV_04 +# Check that IVI service sends an IVIM containing different containers when it is permitted by the signing certificate. +#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_SSP_BV_05 +# Check that IVI service sends an IVI negation when it is permitted by the signing certificate. +#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_SSP_BV_06 +# Check that IVI service doesn’t send an IVIM if service provider value is not authorized by the signing certificate. +#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_SSP_BO_01 +# Check that IVI service doesn’t send an IVIM containing different road signs schema when it is not permitted by the signing certificat. +#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_SSP_BO_02 +# Check that IVI service doesn’t send an IVIM containing ISO/TS 14823 road signs codes of different service categories when it is not permitted by the signing certificate. +#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_SSP_BO_03 +# Check that IVI service doesn’t send an IVIM containing lane status when it is not permitted by the signing certificate +#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_SSP_BO_04 +# Check that IVI service doesn’t send an IVIM containing different containers when it is not permitted by the signing certificate. +#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_SSP_BO_05 +# Check that IVI service doesn’t send an IVI negation when it is not permitted by the signing certificate. +#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_GEN_SSP_BO_06 +# Check that the IUT can successfully process IVIM been received when the IUT was in the Relevance Zone. +#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_RCV_MSGF_BV_01 +# Check that the IUT can successfully process IVIM been received when the IUT was in the Detection Zone approaching the Relevance Zone +#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_RCV_DATA_BV_01 +# Check that an IUT detects the applicability of a Relevance Zone defined as a polygonal lie. +#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_RCV_DATA_BV_02 +# Check that an IUT detects the applicability of a Relevance Zone defined as an area. +#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_RCV_DATA_BV_03 +# Check that an IUT detects the applicability of a Relevance Zone defined as a distance value. +#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_RCV_DATA_BV_04 +# Check that an IUT detects the applicability of a Relevance Zone by matching its path with the relevance zone (path) of the moving IVI object. +#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_RCV_DATA_BV_05 +# Check that a received IVIM is considered as new if iviStatus is “new”. +#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_RCV_EVUP_BV_01 +# Check that a received IVIM is considered as new if iviStatus is “new” and/or if the combination of serviceProviderId and iviIdentificationNumber is different from other received messages +#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_RCV_EVUP_BV_02 +# Check that a received IVIM is considered as update if the iviStatus is “update” and/or if the combination of serviceProviderId and iviIdentificationNumber equals to those from another received structure and the timestamp is more recent +#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_RCV_EVUP_BV_03 +# Check that a received IVIM is considered as duplicate of a received structure if the combination of serviceProviderId and iviIdentificationNumber equals to those from another received structure and the timestamp is the same; +#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_RCV_EVUP_BV_04 +# Check that a received IVIM is considered as cancelation if the iviStatus is “cancellation”. +#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_RCV_EVUP_BV_05 +# Check that a received IVIM is considered as negation if the iviStatus is “negation”. +#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_RCV_EVUP_BV_06 +# Check that the IUT accepts a received IVIM message permitted by the signing certificate. +#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_RCV_SSP_BV_01 +# Check that the IUT skips a received IVIM message not permitted by the signing certificate. +#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_RCV_SSP_BO_01 +# Check that the IUT skips a received IVIM message with service provider identifier not permitted by the signing certificate. +#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_RCV_SSP_BO_02 +# Check that IVI service skips a received IVIM containing different road signs schema when it is not permitted by the signing certificate +#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_RCV_SSP_BO_03 +# Check that IVI service skips a received IVIM containing ISO/TS 14823 road signs codes of different service categories when it is not permitted by the signing certificate. +#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_RCV_SSP_BO_04 +# Check that IVI service skips a received IVIM containing lane status when it is not permitted by the signing certificate. +#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_RCV_SSP_BO_05 +# Check that IVI service skips a received IVIM containing different containers when it is not permitted by the signing certificate. +#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_RCV_SSP_BO_06 +# Check that IVI service skips a received IVI negation when it is not permitted by the signing certificate. +#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_RCV_SSP_BO_07 +# Check that the IUT can successfully process IVIM been received when the IUT was in the Relevance Zone +#ItsIvim_TestCases.TC_IS_IVI_RCV_MSGF_BV_01 + +[MAIN_CONTROLLER] +# The options herein control the behavior of MC. +KillTimer := 10.0 +LocalAddress := 127.0.0.1 +TCPPort := 12000 +NumHCs := 1 diff --git a/etc/AtsIS/AtsIS_Mapem.cf_ b/etc/AtsIS/AtsIS_Mapem.cf_ new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..67a4065e84809560128ab1b79a4dcc0ad6c68251 --- /dev/null +++ b/etc/AtsIS/AtsIS_Mapem.cf_ @@ -0,0 +1,190 @@ + +[MODULE_PARAMETERS] +# This section shall contain the values of all parameters that are defined in your TTCN-3 modules. + +# IUT Station ID +LibItsCommon_Pixits.PX_IUT_STATION_ID := 2533729309 + +LibItsGeoNetworking_Pixits.PX_GN_UPPER_LAYER := e_btpB +LibItsMapemSpatem_Pics.PICS_IS_IUT_SECURED := false + +[LOGGING] +# In this section you can specify the name of the log file and the classes of events +# you want to log into the file or display on console (standard error). + +LogFile := "../logs/AtsIS/%e.%h-%r.%s" +FileMask := LOG_ALL | USER | DEBUG | MATCHING +ConsoleMask := LOG_ALL | USER | DEBUG | MATCHING +#FileMask := ERROR | USER | MATCHING | EXECUTOR_RUNTIME | VERDICTOP +#ConsoleMask := ERROR | USER | MATCHING | EXECUTOR_RUNTIME | VERDICTOP +LogSourceInfo := Stack +LogEntityName:= Yes +LogEventTypes:= Yes +#TimeStampFormat := DateTime + +[TESTPORT_PARAMETERS] +# In this section you can specify parameters that are passed to Test Ports. +# MAPEM Layer +# next_header : btpA|btpB (overwrite BTP.type) +# header_type : tsb|gbc|uni +# header_sub_type : sh (single hop) +# MAPEM Layer +# next_header : btpA|btpB (overwrite BTP.type) +# BTP Layer +# type : btpA|btpB +# destination port: dst_port +# source port : src_port +# device_mode : Set to 1 if the layer shall encapsulate upper layer PDU +# device_mode : Set to 1 if the layer shall encapsulate upper layer PDU +# GN Layer +# ll_address : GeoNetworking address of the Test System +# latitude : latitude of the Test System +# longitude : longitude of the Test System +# beaconing : Set to 1 if GnLayer shall start beaconing +# Beaconning timer expiry: expiry (ms) +# device_mode : Set to 1 if the layer shall encapsulate upper layer PDU +# secured_mode : Set to 1 if message exchanges shall be signed +# encrypted_mode : Set to 1 if message exchanges shall be encrypted +# NOTE: For signed & encrypted message exchanges, both secured_mode and encrypted_mode shall be set to 1 +# secure_db_path : Path to the certificates and keys storage location +# hash : Hash algorithm to be used when secured mode is set +# Authorized values are SHA-256 or SHA-384 +# Default: SHA-256 +# cypher : Cyphering algorithm to be used when secured mode is set +# Authorized values are NISTP-256 and BP-256 +# Default: NISTP-256 +# Ethernet layer +# mac_src :Source MAC address +# mac_bc :Broadcast address +# eth_type : Ethernet type +# Commsignia layer +# mac_src : Device MAC address, used to discard packets +# To indicate no filering, use the value 000000000000 +# mac_bc : Broadcast address +# eth_type : Ethernet type, used to discard packets +# target_host : Device address +# target_port : Device port +# source_port : Test System port +# interface_id: Interface id, used to discard packets +# tx_power : TX power (dB) +# UDP layer (IP/UDP based on Pcap) +# dst_ip : destination IPv4 address (aa.bb.cc.dd) +# dst_port: destination port +# src_ip : source IPv4 address (aa.bb.cc.dd) +# src_port: source port +# Pcap layer +# mac_src : Source MAC address, used to exclude from capture the acket sent by the Test System +# filter : Pcap filter (compliant with tcpdump syntax) +# Online mode: +# nic: Local NIC +# If set, online mode is used +# Offline mode (nic is present but not set): +# file : File to read +# frame_offset: Frame offset, used to skip packets with frame number < frame_offset +# time_offset : Time offset, used to skip packets with time offset < time_offset +# save_mode : 1 to save sent packet, 0 otherwise + +#Cygwin +#system.mapemSpatemPort.params := "MAPEM(next_header=btpB,header_type=uni)/BTP(dst_port=2006)/GN(ll_address=4C5E0C14D2EA,latitude=43551050,longitude=10298730,distanceA=1500,distanceB=1500,angle=0,device_mode=1,secured_mode=0,sec_db_path=/home/yanng/tmp/certificates)/ETH(mac_src=e2b7b30429eb)/PCAP(mac_src=e2b7b30429eb,nic=CEBB111F-D749-4B40-8B4D-DBB060E90987,filter=and ether proto 0x8947)" +# Linux +# ETH +#system.mapemSpatemPort.params := "MapemSpatem(next_header=btpB,header_type=gbc)/BTP(dst_port=2006)/GN(ll_address=4C5E0C14D2EA,latitude=43551050,longitude=10298730,distanceA=1500,distanceB=1500,angle=0,device_mode=1,secured_mode=0,sec_db_path=../data/certificates/certificates)/ETH(mac_src=dc536045af7f)/PCAP(mac_src=dc536045af7f,nic=enx00e07cc91967,filter=and ether proto 0x8947)" +# WiFi +#system.mapemSpatemPort.params := "MapemSpatem(next_header=btpB,header_type=gbc)/BTP(dst_port=2006)/GN(ll_address=4C5E0C14D2EA,latitude=43551050,longitude=10298730,distanceA=1500,distanceB=1500,angle=0,device_mode=1,secured_mode=1,sec_db_path=../data/certificates/certificates)/ETH(mac_src=dc536045af7e)/PCAP(mac_src=dc536045af7e,nic=wlp0s20f3,filter=and ether proto 0x8947)" +# Linux over UDP +system.mapemSpatemPort.params := "MapemSpatem(next_header=btpB,header_type=gbc)/BTP(dst_port=2006)/GN(ll_address=4C5E0C14D2EA,latitude=43551050,longitude=10298730,distanceA=1500,distanceB=1500,angle=0,device_mode=0,secured_mode=0,sec_db_path=../data/certificates/certificates)/ETH(mac_src=dc536045af7f)/UDP(dst_ip=81.47.99.165,src_port=4041,dst_port=50544)" + +# MAPEM UpperTester port based on UDP +system.utPort.params := "UT_MAPEMSPATEM/UDP(dst_ip=81.47.99.165)" #,dst_port=12346,src_port=12346)" + +[EXECUTE] + +#ItsMapem_TestCases.TC_IS_RLT_xxx_BV_01 + +# Check that protocolVersion is set to 1 and messageID is set to 4 +#ItsMapem_TestCases.TC_IS_RLT_GEN_MSGF_BV_01 +# Check that the intersection information revision number is changed when the intersection configuration is changed. +ItsMapem_TestCases.TC_IS_RLT_GEN_MSGF_BV_02 +# Check that the intersection information revision number is not changed when the intersection configuration is still the same. +#ItsMapem_TestCases.TC_IS_RLT_GEN_MSGF_BV_03 +# Check that RLT Service transmits MAPEM with the valid connection trajectories. +#ItsMapem_TestCases.TC_IS_RLT_GEN_MSGF_BV_04 +# Check that reference point altitude is encoded using regional extension. +#ItsMapem_TestCases.TC_IS_RLT_GEN_MSGF_BV_05 +# Check that each lane of the intersection contains a unique number. +#ItsMapem_TestCases.TC_IS_RLT_GEN_MSGF_BV_06 +# Check that the number of nodes needed to represent the path of a lane is selected such that the perpendicular distance between the lane centre line and the straight line connecting the two consecutive nodes is less than 1 m. +#ItsMapem_TestCases.TC_IS_RLT_GEN_MSGF_BV_07 +# Check that each vehicular lane of the intersection includes only allowed manoeuvres and vehicle types. +#ItsMapem_TestCases.TC_IS_RLT_GEN_MSGF_BV_08 +# Check that each pedestrian lane of the intersection includes only allowed manoeuvres and user types. +#ItsMapem_TestCases.TC_IS_RLT_GEN_MSGF_BV_09 +# Check that each special lane of the intersection includes only allowed manoeuvres and user types. +#ItsMapem_TestCases.TC_IS_RLT_GEN_MSGF_BV_10 +# Check that each crosswalk lane of the intersection does not have ingress or egress approaches and includes only valid user types. +#ItsMapem_TestCases.TC_IS_RLT_GEN_MSGF_BV_11 +# Check that each lane information contain lane width or default lane width is provided. +#ItsMapem_TestCases.TC_IS_RLT_GEN_MSGF_BV_12 +# Check that default lane width is not included in the RTL message if each lane information contains lane width. +#ItsMapem_TestCases.TC_IS_RLT_GEN_MSGF_BV_13 +# Check that possible manoevers are encoded in connectsTo data element. +#ItsMapem_TestCases.TC_IS_RLT_GEN_MSGF_BV_14 +# An IUT shall broadcast the signal group identifier, the lanes/approaches associated with the signal group, and the lanes/approaches’ allowable manoeuvres. +#ItsMapem_TestCases.TC_IS_RLT_GEN_MSGF_BV_15 +# Check that lanes which are crossed by a crosswalk shall use the same ingressApproach egressApproach identifier. +#ItsMapem_TestCases.TC_IS_RLT_GEN_MSGF_BV_16 +# Check that RLT Service transmits MAPEM without data elements not used in ETSI architecture +#ItsMapem_TestCases.TC_IS_RLT_GEN_MSGF_BV_17 + +# Check that IVI Service generates a new MAPEM on reception of a valid AppMAPEM_Trigger request +#ItsMapem_TestCases.TC_IS_RLT_EVGN_BV_01 +# Check that RLT Service transmits new content +#ItsMapem_TestCases.TC_IS_RLT_EVGN_BV_02 +# Check that RLT Service transmits non-fragmented MAPEM without the Layer ID. +#ItsMapem_TestCases.TC_IS_RLT_GEN_FRAG_BV_01 +# Check that RLT Service transmits fragmented MAPEM when the message size exceeds the allowed message length +#ItsMapem_TestCases.TC_IS_RLT_GEN_FRAG_BV_02 + +# Check that the RLT Service transmits continuously both MAPEM and SPATEM. +#ItsMapem_TestCases.TC_IS_RLT_GEN_COM_BV_01 +# Check that the destination port for MAPEM is set to 2003 +#ItsMapem_TestCases.TC_IS_RLT_GEN_COM_BV_03 +# Check that MAPEM uses BTP_B packet +# Check that the destination port for MAPEM is set to 2003 +#ItsMapem_TestCases.TC_IS_RLT_GEN_COM_BV_04 +# Check that TLM service encapsulates MAPEM in a GBC with the HeaderType field set to the value of 4 +#ItsMapem_TestCases.TC_IS_RLT_GEN_COM_BV_05 + +# Check that RLT service uses certificate containing valid ITS AID to sign MAPEM messages. +#ItsMapem_TestCases.TC_IS_RLT_GEN_SEC_BV_01 +# Check that TLM service uses generic security profile to sign MAPEM message and does not include additional security header elements. +#ItsMapem_TestCases.TC_IS_RLT_GEN_SEC_BV_02 +# Check that RLT service uses certificate containing valid Service Specific Permissions of type BitmapSsp to sign MAPEM messages and the SSP version is set to 1. +#ItsMapem_TestCases.TC_IS_RLT_GEN_SSP_BV_01 +# Check that RLT service sends a MAPEM message containing intersections when it is permitted by the signing certificate. +#ItsMapem_TestCases.TC_IS_RLT_GEN_SSP_BV_02 +# Check that RLT service does not send a MAPEM message containing intersections if it is not permitted by the certificate. +#ItsMapem_TestCases.TC_IS_RLT_GEN_SSP_BO_03 +# Check that RLT service sends a MAPEM message containing roadSegments when it is permitted by the signing certificate. +#ItsMapem_TestCases.TC_IS_RLT_GEN_SSP_BV_04 +# Check that RLT service does not send a MAPEM message containing roadSegments if it is not permitted by the certificate. +#ItsMapem_TestCases.TC_IS_RLT_GEN_SSP_BO_05 +# Check that RLT service sends a MAPEM message containing roadSegments when it is permitted by the signing certificate. +#ItsMapem_TestCases.TC_IS_RLT_GEN_RATE_BV_01 +# Check that the IUT can successfully process all mandatory fields of MAPEM received +#ItsMapem_TestCases.TC_IS_RLT_GEN_RCV_BV_03 +# Check that the IUT accepts the MAPEM signed with valid certificate +#ItsMapem_TestCases.TC_IS_RLT_RCV_SEC_BV_01 +# Check that the IUT skips the MAPEM signed with certificate without permissions to sign MAPEM. +#ItsMapem_TestCases.TC_IS_RLT_RCV_SEC_BO_02 +# Check that the IUT skips the MAPEM containing intersections signed with certificate without service specific permissions (SSP) to sign such a MAPEM +#ItsMapem_TestCases.TC_IS_RLT_RCV_SEC_BO_03 +# Check that the IUT skips the MAPEM containing roadSegments signed with certificate +#ItsMapem_TestCases.TC_IS_RLT_RCV_SEC_BO_04 + +[MAIN_CONTROLLER] +# The options herein control the behavior of MC. +KillTimer := 10.0 +LocalAddress := 127.0.0.1 +TCPPort := 12000 +NumHCs := 1 diff --git a/etc/AtsIS/AtsIS_Spatem.cf_ b/etc/AtsIS/AtsIS_Spatem.cf_ new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b5d062fd22ea17c7034ae267c568863af5b5f05a --- /dev/null +++ b/etc/AtsIS/AtsIS_Spatem.cf_ @@ -0,0 +1,200 @@ + +[MODULE_PARAMETERS] +# This section shall contain the values of all parameters that are defined in your TTCN-3 modules. + +# IUT Station ID +LibItsCommon_Pixits.PX_IUT_STATION_ID := 2533729309 + +LibItsGeoNetworking_Pixits.PX_GN_UPPER_LAYER := e_btpB + +[LOGGING] +# In this section you can specify the name of the log file and the classes of events +# you want to log into the file or display on console (standard error). + +LogFile := "../logs/AtsIS/%e.%h-%r.%s" +FileMask := LOG_ALL | USER | DEBUG | MATCHING +ConsoleMask := LOG_ALL | USER | DEBUG | MATCHING +#FileMask := ERROR | USER | MATCHING | EXECUTOR_RUNTIME | VERDICTOP +#ConsoleMask := ERROR | USER | MATCHING | EXECUTOR_RUNTIME | VERDICTOP +LogSourceInfo := Stack +LogEntityName:= Yes +LogEventTypes:= Yes +#TimeStampFormat := DateTime + +[TESTPORT_PARAMETERS] +# In this section you can specify parameters that are passed to Test Ports. +# SPATEM Layer +# next_header : btpA|btpB (overwrite BTP.type) +# header_type : tsb|gbc|uni +# header_sub_type : sh (single hop) +# SPATEM Layer +# next_header : btpA|btpB (overwrite BTP.type) +# BTP Layer +# type : btpA|btpB +# destination port: dst_port +# source port : src_port +# device_mode : Set to 1 if the layer shall encapsulate upper layer PDU +# device_mode : Set to 1 if the layer shall encapsulate upper layer PDU +# GN Layer +# ll_address : GeoNetworking address of the Test System +# latitude : latitude of the Test System +# longitude : longitude of the Test System +# beaconing : Set to 1 if GnLayer shall start beaconing +# Beaconning timer expiry: expiry (ms) +# device_mode : Set to 1 if the layer shall encapsulate upper layer PDU +# secured_mode : Set to 1 if message exchanges shall be signed +# encrypted_mode : Set to 1 if message exchanges shall be encrypted +# NOTE: For signed & encrypted message exchanges, both secured_mode and encrypted_mode shall be set to 1 +# secure_db_path : Path to the certificates and keys storage location +# hash : Hash algorithm to be used when secured mode is set +# Authorized values are SHA-256 or SHA-384 +# Default: SHA-256 +# cypher : Cyphering algorithm to be used when secured mode is set +# Authorized values are NISTP-256 and BP-256 +# Default: NISTP-256 +# Ethernet layer +# mac_src :Source MAC address +# mac_bc :Broadcast address +# eth_type : Ethernet type +# Commsignia layer +# mac_src : Device MAC address, used to discard packets +# To indicate no filering, use the value 000000000000 +# mac_bc : Broadcast address +# eth_type : Ethernet type, used to discard packets +# target_host : Device address +# target_port : Device port +# source_port : Test System port +# interface_id: Interface id, used to discard packets +# tx_power : TX power (dB) +# UDP layer (IP/UDP based on Pcap) +# dst_ip : destination IPv4 address (aa.bb.cc.dd) +# dst_port: destination port +# src_ip : source IPv4 address (aa.bb.cc.dd) +# src_port: source port +# Pcap layer +# mac_src : Source MAC address, used to exclude from capture the acket sent by the Test System +# filter : Pcap filter (compliant with tcpdump syntax) +# Online mode: +# nic: Local NIC +# If set, online mode is used +# Offline mode (nic is present but not set): +# file : File to read +# frame_offset: Frame offset, used to skip packets with frame number < frame_offset +# time_offset : Time offset, used to skip packets with time offset < time_offset +# save_mode : 1 to save sent packet, 0 otherwise + +#Cygwin +#system.mapemSpatemPort.params := "SPATEM(next_header=btpB,header_type=uni)/BTP(dst_port=2006)/GN(ll_address=4C5E0C14D2EA,latitude=43551050,longitude=10298730,distanceA=1500,distanceB=1500,angle=0,device_mode=1,secured_mode=0,sec_db_path=/home/yanng/tmp/certificates)/ETH(mac_src=e2b7b30429eb)/PCAP(mac_src=e2b7b30429eb,nic=CEBB111F-D749-4B40-8B4D-DBB060E90987,filter=and ether proto 0x8947)" +# Linux +#system.mapemSpatemPort.params := "SPATEM(next_header=btpB,header_type=gbc)/BTP(dst_port=2006)/GN(ll_address=4C5E0C14D2EA,latitude=43551050,longitude=10298730,distanceA=1500,distanceB=1500,angle=0,device_mode=1,secured_mode=0,sec_db_path=../data/certificates/certificates)/ETH(mac_src=dc536045af7f)/PCAP(mac_src=dc536045af7f,nic=wlp2s0,filter=and ether proto 0x8947)" +system.mapemSpatemPort.params := "SPATEM(next_header=btpB,header_type=gbc)/BTP(dst_port=2006)/GN(ll_address=4C5E0C14D2EA,latitude=43551050,longitude=10298730,distanceA=1500,distanceB=1500,angle=0,device_mode=1,secured_mode=0,sec_db_path=../data/certificates/certificates)/ETH(mac_src=dc536045af7e)/PCAP(mac_src=dc536045af7e,nic=wlp0s20f3,filter=and ether proto 0x8947)" +# Linux over UDP +#system.mapemSpatemPort.params := "SPATEM(next_header=btpB,header_type=gbc)/BTP(dst_port=2006)/GN(ll_address=4C5E0C14D2EA,latitude=43551050,longitude=10298730,distanceA=1500,distanceB=1500,angle=0,device_mode=1,secured_mode=0,sec_db_path=../data/certificates/certificates)/ETH(mac_src=dc536045af7f)/UDP(dst_ip=192.168.146.26,src_port=4041,dst_port=50544)" + +# SPATEM UpperTester port based on UDP +system.utPort.params := "UT_SPATEM/UDP(dst_ip=127.0.0.1,dst_port=12345,src_port=12346)" +#system.utPort.params := "UT_SPATEM/UDP(dst_ip=192.168.146.26,dst_port=44100,src_port=12345)" +#system.utPort.params := "UT_SPATEM/UDP(dst_ip=172.16.35.1)" + +[EXECUTE] + +ItsSpatem_TestCases.TC_IS_TLM_xxx_BV_01 + +# Check that protocolVersion is set to 1 and messageID is set to 4 +#ItsSpatem_TestCases.TC_IS_TLM_GEN_MSGF_BV_01 +# An IUT shall include the unique identifier for the intersection as part of the signal phase and timing message broadcast +#ItsSpatem_TestCases.TC_IS_TLM_GEN_MSGF_BV_02 +# Check that TLM service generates a SPAT message with the revision data element synchronized with the revision data element in the intersection configuration of the roadway geometric information (MAP) +#ItsSpatem_TestCases.TC_IS_TLM_GEN_MSGF_BV_03 +# An IUT shall include a timestamp as part of the signal phase and timing message broadcast. +#ItsSpatem_TestCases.TC_IS_TLM_GEN_MSGF_BV_04 +# An IUT shall include signalGroupe for each intersection if this signalGroup is defined in the intersection configuration of the roadway geometric information (MAP) +# For each vehicular manoeuvre at a signalized intersection, an IUT shall include the current movement state. +#ItsSpatem_TestCases.TC_IS_TLM_GEN_MSGF_BV_06 +# For each pedestrian manoeuvre at a signalized intersection, an IUT shall include the current movement state. +#ItsSpatem_TestCases.TC_IS_TLM_GEN_MSGF_BV_07 +# For each active manoeuvre an IUT shall include the earliest time point when the manoeuvre state is predicted to change +#ItsSpatem_TestCases.TC_IS_TLM_GEN_MSGF_BV_08 +# For each manoeuvre at a signalized intersection, an IUT shall include: +# - the next expected movement states pertaining to that manoeuvre +# - the time point for when the succeeding manoeuvre state is predicted to change +# - the start time for each pending manoeuvre +#ItsSpatem_TestCases.TC_IS_TLM_GEN_MSGF_BV_09 +# Check that SPAT message prioritization is encoded using regional extension. +#ItsSpatem_TestCases.TC_IS_TLM_GEN_MSGF_BV_10 +# For each manoeuvre at a signalized intersection, an IUT shall indicate if one or more pedestrians have been detected in the pedestrian crossing. +#ItsSpatem_TestCases.TC_IS_TLM_GEN_MSGF_BV_11 +# An IUT shall transmit information about the optimal speed for vehicles on each lane +#ItsSpatem_TestCases.TC_IS_TLM_GEN_MSGF_BV_12 +# An IUT shall transmit information about the signal timing progression speed along the roadway. +#ItsSpatem_TestCases.TC_IS_TLM_GEN_MSGF_BV_13 +# An IUT shall transmit the length of the queue and the length of available vehicular storage on each egress lane. +#ItsSpatem_TestCases.TC_IS_TLM_GEN_MSGF_BV_14 + +# Check that TLM Service generates a new SPATEM on reception of a valid AppSPATEM _Start request +#ItsSpatem_TestCases.TC_IS_TLM_GEN_EVGN_BV_01 +# Check that TLM Service generates SPATEM are time ordered +# Check that TLM Service terminates on reception of a valid AppSPATEM _Stop request +#ItsSpatem_TestCases.TC_IS_TLM_GEN_EVGN_BV_03 +# Check that TLM Service generates a new SPATEM on reception of a valid AppSPATEM_Trigger request +#ItsSpatem_TestCases.TC_IS_TLM_GEN_EVGN_BV_04 + +# Check that TLM Service provides the destination area in SPATEM +#ItsSpatem_TestCases.TC_IS_TLM_GEN_COM_BV_01 +# Check that SPATEM uses BTP_B packet. Check that the destination port for SPATEM is set to 2004 +#ItsSpatem_TestCases.TC_IS_TLM_GEN_COM_BV_02 + +# Check that TLM service encapsulates SPATEM in a GBC with the HeaderType field set to the value of 4 +#ItsSpatem_TestCases.TC_IS_TLM_GEN_COMM_BV_03 +# Check that TLM service uses certificate containing valid ITS AID to sign SPATEM messages. +#ItsSpatem_TestCases.TC_IS_TLM_GEN_SEC_BV_01 +# Check that TLM service uses generic security profile to sign SPATEM message and does not include additional security header elements +#ItsSpatem_TestCases.TC_IS_TLM_GEN_SEC_BV_02 +# Check that TLM service uses certificate containing valid Service Specific Permissions of type BitmapSsp to sign SPATEM messages and the SSP version is set to 1 +#ItsSpatem_TestCases.TC_IS_TLM_GEN_SSP_BV_01 +# Check that TLM service sends a SPAT message containing IntersectionState without prioritization and manoeuvre assist information when it is permitted by the signing certificate +#ItsSpatem_TestCases.TC_IS_TLM_GEN_SSP_BV_02 +# Check that TLM service does not send a SPAT message containing IntersectionState if it is not permitted by the certificate +#ItsSpatem_TestCases.TC_IS_TLM_GEN_SSP_BO_03 +# Check that TLM service sends a SPAT message containing public transport prioritization response when it is permitted by the signing certificate . +#ItsSpatem_TestCases.TC_IS_TLM_GEN_SSP_BV_04 +# Check that TLM service does not send a SPAT message containing IntersectionState if it is not permitted by the certificate. +#ItsSpatem_TestCases.TC_IS_TLM_GEN_SSP_BO_05 +# Check that TLM service sends a SPAT message containing Intersection maneuver assisting information when it is permitted by the signing certificate +#ItsSpatem_TestCases.TC_IS_TLM_GEN_SSP_BV_06 +# Check that TLM service sends a SPAT message containing movement state maneuver assisting information when it is permitted by the signing certificate. +#ItsSpatem_TestCases.TC_IS_TLM_GEN_SSP_BV_07 +# Check that TLM service does not send a SPAT message containing intersection maneuver assisting information if it is not permitted by the certificate. +#ItsSpatem_TestCases.TC_IS_TLM_GEN_SSP_BO_08 +# Check that TLM service does not send a SPAT message containing movement state maneuver assisting information if it is not permitted by the certificate. +#ItsSpatem_TestCases.TC_IS_TLM_GEN_SSP_BO_09 + +# Check that the IUT transmits SPATEM with valid transmission rate. +#ItsSpatem_TestCases.TC_IS_TLM_GEN_RATE_BV_01 + +# Check that the IUT can successfully process all mandatory fields of SPATEM received +#ItsSpatem_TestCases.TC_IS_TLM_RCV_MSGF_BV_01 +# Check that the IUT accepts the SPATEM message permitted by the signing certificate. +#ItsSpatem_TestCases.TC_IS_TLM_RCV_SEC_BV_01 +# Check that the IUT discards the SPATEM message not permitted by the signing certificate. +#ItsSpatem_TestCases.TC_IS_TLM_RCV_SEC_BO_01 +# Check that the IUT accepts the SPATEM message containing IntersectionState without additional information permitted by the signing certificate. +#ItsSpatem_TestCases.TC_IS_TLM_RCV_SSP_BV_01 +# Check that the IUT skips the SPATEM message containing IntersectionState without additional information not permitted by the signing certificate. +#ItsSpatem_TestCases.TC_IS_TLM_RCV_SSP_BO_02 +# Check that the IUT accepts the SPATEM message containing IntersectionState with public transport prioritization response permitted by the signing certificate. +#ItsSpatem_TestCases.TC_IS_TLM_RCV_SSP_BV_03 +# Check that the IUT skips the SPATEM message containing IntersectionState with public transport prioritization response not permitted by the signing certificate. +#ItsSpatem_TestCases.TC_IS_TLM_RCV_SSP_BO_04 +# Check that the IUT accepts the SPATEM message containing IntersectionState with manoeuvre assist information permitted by the signing certificate. +#ItsSpatem_TestCases.TC_IS_TLM_RCV_SSP_BV_05 +# Check that the IUT skips the SPATEM message containing IntersectionState with manoeuvre assist information permitted by the signing certificate +#ItsSpatem_TestCases.TC_IS_TLM_RCV_SSP_BO_06 + + +[MAIN_CONTROLLER] +# The options herein control the behavior of MC. +KillTimer := 10.0 +LocalAddress := 127.0.0.1 +TCPPort := 12000 +NumHCs := 1 diff --git a/etc/AtsPki/AtsPki.cfg b/etc/AtsPki/AtsPki.cfg index be66d6f55691e34a958a62b9dc06305cca6e440c..68e18b6055bd7f090abbae79823bc026d07f2562 120000 --- a/etc/AtsPki/AtsPki.cfg +++ b/etc/AtsPki/AtsPki.cfg @@ -1 +1 @@ -AtsPki_Microsec.cfg_ \ No newline at end of file +AtsPki_Etas.cfg_ \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/etc/AtsPki/AtsPki_Atos.cfg_ b/etc/AtsPki/AtsPki_Atos.cfg_ index 6f681a1b20b838669c2fbcf1ba454638f24eb7da..3611b3c8ce864dfb576a201d3fdd42e75bd7c5e9 100644 --- a/etc/AtsPki/AtsPki_Atos.cfg_ +++ b/etc/AtsPki/AtsPki_Atos.cfg_ @@ -2,6 +2,12 @@ [MODULE_PARAMETERS] # This section shall contain the values of all parameters that are defined in your TTCN-3 modules. +# Reduce LibCom Timeout +LibCommon_Sync.PX_TSYNC_TIME_LIMIT := 40.0 +LibCommon_Sync.PX_TSHUT_DOWN_TIME_LIMIT := 40.0 +LibCommon_Time.PX_TDONE := 40.0 +LibCommon_Time.PX_TWAIT := 40.0 + # Enable Security support LibItsGeoNetworking_Pics.PICS_GN_SECURITY := true # Root path to access certificate stored in files, identified by certficate ID @@ -25,19 +31,20 @@ LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_HEADER_HOST_TLM := "0.atos-dc.l0.c-its-pki.eu" LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_HTTP_POST_URI_EC := "/" LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_HTTP_POST_URI_AT := "/" LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_HTTP_POST_URI_ATV := "/" -LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_HTTP_GET_URI_CA := "/getcacerts/347A3B143C94C298" -LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_HTTP_GET_URI_CTL := "/getctl/347A3B143C94C298" -LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_HTTP_GET_URI_CRL := "/getcrl/347A3B143C94C298" -LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_HTTP_GET_URI_ECTL := "/getectl/0DA3EE9ACF7F9F14" +#LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_HTTP_GET_URI_CA := "/getcacerts/347A3B143C94C298" +#LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_HTTP_GET_URI_CTL := "/getctl/347A3B143C94C298" +#LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_HTTP_GET_URI_CRL := "/getcrl/347A3B143C94C298" +#systemLibItsPki_Pics.PICS_HTTP_GET_URI_ECTL := "/getectl/0DA3EE9ACF7F9F14" -LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_TS_EA_CERTIFICATE_ID := "ATOS_EA_D41845A1F71C356A" # Use CERT_TS_A_EA when the TS simulate the EA (TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTHVAL_01_BV) -LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_TS_AA_CERTIFICATE_ID := "CERT_TS_A_AA" -LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_IUT_AA_CERTIFICATE_ID := "ATOS_AA_A8AA9CAB63B783EE" -LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_TS_CA_CERTIFICATE_ID := "ATOS_RCA_347A3B143C94C298" +LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_SIMULATE_EA_ENTITY := true # CERT_TS_A_EA shall be trusted by the PKI +LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_TS_EA_CERTIFICATE_ID := "CERT_TS_A_EA" # "ATOS_EA_D41845A1F71C356A" # Use CERT_TS_A_EA when the TS simulate the EA (TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTHVAL_01_BV) with PICS_SIMULATE_EA_ENTITY set +LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_TS_AA_CERTIFICATE_ID := "CERT_TS_A_AA" # CERT_TS_A_AA & CERT_IUT_A_RCA shall be trusted by the PKI +LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_IUT_AA_CERTIFICATE_ID := "ATOS_AA_A8AA9CAB63B783EE" +LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_TS_CA_CERTIFICATE_ID := "ATOS_RCA_347A3B143C94C298" -LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_ITS_S_CANONICAL_ID := '455453492D5465737453797374656D2D3031'O # Nist-P256 -#LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_ITS_S_CANONICAL_ID := '455453492D5465737453797374656D2D3032'O # Brainpool-P256 r1 -#LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_ITS_S_CANONICAL_ID := '455453492D5465737453797374656D2D3033'O # Brainpool-P384 r1 +LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_ITS_S_CANONICAL_ID := '455453492D5465737453797374656D2D3031'O # Nist-P256 +#LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_ITS_S_CANONICAL_ID := '455453492D5465737453797374656D2D3032'O # Brainpool-P256 r1 +#LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_ITS_S_CANONICAL_ID := '455453492D5465737453797374656D2D3033'O # Brainpool-P384 r1 # Technical keys # Private key @@ -48,12 +55,19 @@ LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_ITS_S_SIGN_NITSP256_PRIVATE_KEY := 'FE95786F01D7E1666CCDFAB7 LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_ITS_S_SIGN_NISTP256_PUBLIC_KEY := '038038f5490cd5a58ff5465d3b577ee830047336ac5dac07036b798aaecae7273f'O; # Set to true if the IUT support CertificateId shall be set to the choice name, false if it shall be omitted -LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_EC_SUBJECT_ATTRIBUT_ID := false # requestedSubjectAttributes.id is omitted +#LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_EC_SUBJECT_ATTRIBUT_ID := false # requestedSubjectAttributes.id is omitted +# Set to true if the IUT support geographical region +#LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_EC_SUBJECT_ATTRIBUT_REGION := false # requestedSubjectAttributes.region is omitted #LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_PKI_AUTH_POP := false # Do not use Signed for PoP in Authorization requet # Required for SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_02_BV #LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_SECPKI_REENROLMENT := false # Check in logs the pattern '==> EC ' to find the required information for re-enrolment +# URI to request CTL +LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_DC_ENDPOINT := "http://yanngarcia.ddns.net/dc" +LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_AA_ENDPOINT := "http://yanngarcia.ddns.net/aa" +LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_EA_ENDPOINT := "http://yanngarcia.ddns.net/ea" + #LibItsPki_Pixits.PX_INCLUDE_ENCRYPTION_KEYS := false # No encryption key in Authorization request #LibItsPki_Pixits.PX_VE_ALG := e_brainpool_p256_r1 # e_nist_p256, e_brainpool_p256_r1 or e_brainpool_p384_r1 @@ -83,14 +97,26 @@ LogEventTypes:= Yes # Multiple HTTP component ports system.httpEcPort.params := "HTTP(codecs=http_its:http_etsi_ieee1609dot2_codec)/TCP(debug=1,server=0.atos-ea.l0.c-its-pki.eu)" #system.httpAtVPort.params := "HTTP(codecs=http_its:http_etsi_ieee1609dot2_codec)/TCP(debug=1,server=0.atos-ea.l0.c-its-pki.eu)" # To be used when IUT is the EA -system.httpAtVPort.params := "HTTP(codecs=http_its:http_etsi_ieee1609dot2_codec)/TCP(debug=1,server_mode=1,server=192.168.1.43,local_port=80)" # Multiple HTTP component ports specific to TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTHVAL_xx +system.httpAtVPort.params := "HTTP(codecs=http_its:http_etsi_ieee1609dot2_codec)/TCP(debug=1,server_mode=1,server=192.168.1.43,local_port=80)" # To be used when IUT is the AA - Multiple HTTP component ports specific to TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTHVAL_xx system.httpAtPort.params := "HTTP(codecs=http_its:http_etsi_ieee1609dot2_codec)/TCP(debug=1,server=0.atos-aa.l0.c-its-pki.eu)" -system.httpCaPort.params := "HTTP(codecs=http_its:http_etsi_ieee1609dot2_codec)/TCP(debug=1,server=0.atos-dc.l0.c-its-pki.eu)" + +#system.httpCaPort.params := "HTTP(codecs=http_its:http_etsi_ieee1609dot2_codec)/TCP(debug=1,server=0.atos-dc.l0.c-its-pki.eu)" +system.httpCaPort.params := "HTTP(codecs=http_its:http_etsi_ieee1609dot2_codec)/TCP(debug=1,server_mode=1,server=192.168.1.43)" + system.httpTlmPort.params := "HTTP(codecs=http_its:http_etsi_ieee1609dot2_codec)/TCP(debug=1,server=0.atos-dc.l0.c-its-pki.eu)" +#system.httpTlmPort.params := "HTTP(codecs=http_its:http_etsi_ieee1609dot2_codec)/TCP(debug=1,server_mode=1,server=192.168.1.43)" [EXECUTE] +# Config: +# LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_SIMULATE_EA_ENTITY := false # CERT_TS_A_EA shall be trusted by the PKI +# LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_TS_EA_CERTIFICATE_ID := PKI EA cert +# LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_TS_AA_CERTIFICATE_ID := "CERT_TS_A_AA" # CERT_TS_A_AA & CERT_IUT_A_RCA shall be trusted by the PKI +# LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_IUT_AA_CERTIFICATE_ID := PKI AA cert +# LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_TS_CA_CERTIFICATE_ID := PKI RCA cert +# system.httpAtVPort.params := TCP(server=0.atos-ea.l0.c-its-pki.eu) + # The EnrolmentResponse message shall be sent by the EA to the ITS-S across the interface at reference point S3 in response to a received EnrolmentRequest message -ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_01_BV +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_01_BV # Check that EA doesn't accept Enrolment rekeying request when enrolment is not permitted by signing certificate (not containing an item of type PsidSsp) #ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_02_BI_01 @@ -161,6 +187,19 @@ ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_01_BV # The component version of the EtsiTs102941Data structure is set to v1 (integer value set to 1) #ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_AUTHVAL_06_BV +# Config: +# LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_SIMULATE_EA_ENTITY := true # CERT_TS_A_EA shall be trusted by the PKI +# LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_TS_EA_CERTIFICATE_ID := CERT_TS_A_EA +# LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_TS_AA_CERTIFICATE_ID := "CERT_TS_A_AA" # CERT_TS_A_AA & CERT_IUT_A_RCA shall be trusted by the PKI +# LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_IUT_AA_CERTIFICATE_ID := PKI AA cert +# LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_TS_CA_CERTIFICATE_ID := PKI RCA cert +# system.httpAtVPort.params := TCP(server=server=192.168.1.43) + +# Check that the AA sends AuthorizationValidationRequest after receiving of the AuthorizationRequest +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTHVAL_01_BV +# Check that the AuthorizationValidationRequest message is encrypted using approved algorithm and sent to only one Enrolment Authority +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTHVAL_02_BV + # Check that the EA/AA is able to decrypt the AuthorizationRequest message using the encryption private key corresponding to the recipient certificate... #ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_01_BV # Check that the AA is able to decrypt the AuthorizationRequest message using the encryption private key corresponding to the recipient certificate... @@ -194,9 +233,9 @@ ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_01_BV # Send an AT request, but the expiry date of the CSR is after now + maximum pre-loading period (considering values in C-ITS CP) #ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_16_BI -# Check that the AA sends AuthorizationValidationRequest after receiving of the AuthorizationRequest -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTHVAL_01_BV - +# Config: +# system.httpCaPort.params := TCP(debug=1,server=0.atos-dc.l0.c-its-pki.eu) +# Await CTL request and provides "CERT_IUT_A_RCA", "CERT_TS_A_AA", "CERT_TS_A_EA" certificates # Check that the RootCA generates the Full CTL when new EA is about to be added to the Root CTL #ItsPki_TestCases.TC_RCA_CTLGEN_01_BV # Check that the RootCA generates the CRL signed with appropriate certificate. @@ -204,8 +243,6 @@ ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_01_BV # Check that the TLM generates the ECTL when new RootCA is about to be added #ItsPki_TestCases.TC_TLM_ECTLGEN_01_BV -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_RCA_CTLGEN_xx_BV - # Check that the issuing certificate has version 3 #ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_01_BV # Check that the issuing certificate has type explicit @@ -251,6 +288,12 @@ ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_01_BV # Check that the validityPeriod of the subordinate certificate is inside the validityPeriod of the issuing certificate #ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_18_BV +# Config: +# system.httpCaPort.params := TCP(debug=1,server_mode=1,server=192.168.1.43) +# Await CTL request and provides "CERT_IUT_A_RCA", "CERT_TS_A_AA", "CERT_TS_A_EA" certificates +# PKI platform simu +ItsPki_TestCases.TC_PKI_PLTF_RCV_BV_01 + [MAIN_CONTROLLER] # The options herein control the behavior of MC. KillTimer := 10.0 diff --git a/etc/AtsPki/AtsPki_eu_ccms_cpoc.cf_ b/etc/AtsPki/AtsPki_Autocrypt.cfg_ similarity index 76% rename from etc/AtsPki/AtsPki_eu_ccms_cpoc.cf_ rename to etc/AtsPki/AtsPki_Autocrypt.cfg_ index 824f07f2da9d6ed0ada9930e196fa47c0446d448..5755d418c89e4d428df3e32a05e239134a42c703 100644 --- a/etc/AtsPki/AtsPki_eu_ccms_cpoc.cf_ +++ b/etc/AtsPki/AtsPki_Autocrypt.cfg_ @@ -1,248 +1,283 @@ - -[MODULE_PARAMETERS] -# This section shall contain the values of all parameters that are defined in your TTCN-3 modules. - -# Enable Security support -LibItsGeoNetworking_Pics.PICS_GN_SECURITY := true -# Root path to access certificate stored in files, identified by certficate ID -LibItsSecurity_Pixits.PX_CERTIFICATE_POOL_PATH := "../data/certificates" -# Configuration sub-directory to access certificate stored in files -LibItsSecurity_Pixits.PX_IUT_SEC_CONFIG_NAME := "certificates" - -# Use this certificate if the RSU simulator act as IUT -LibItsCommon_Pixits.PX_CERT_FOR_TS := "CERT_IUT_A_AT" - -LibItsHttp_Pics.PICS_HEADER_CONTENT_TYPE := "application/x-its-request" -LibItsHttp_Pics.PICS_HEADER_CTL_CONTENT_TYPE := "application/x-its-crl" - -LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_MULTIPLE_END_POINT := true -LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_HEADER_HOST_EC := "0.atos-ea.l0.c-its-pki.eu" -LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_HEADER_HOST_ATV := "0.atos-ea.l0.c-its-pki.eu" -LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_HEADER_HOST_AT := "0.atos-aa.l0.c-its-pki.eu" -LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_HEADER_HOST_CA := "cpoc.jrc.ec.europa.eu" -LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_HEADER_HOST_TLM := "cpoc.jrc.ec.europa.eu" - -LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_HTTP_POST_URI_EC := "/" -LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_HTTP_POST_URI_AT := "/" -LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_HTTP_POST_URI_ATV := "/" -LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_HTTP_GET_URI_CTL := "/103600/3-1/getctl/347A3B143C94C298" -LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_HTTP_GET_URI_CRL := "/data/certificates/tlm/4/1D261F9E338ECB5B.oer" -LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_HTTP_GET_URI_ECTL := "/data/certificates/ectl/4/E43ACA63B0A8882E.oer" - -LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_ITS_S_CANONICAL_ID := '455453492D4954532D303031'O # Nist-P256 -#LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_ITS_S_CANONICAL_ID := '455453492D4954532D303032'O # Brainpool-P256 r1 -#LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_ITS_S_CANONICAL_ID := '455453492D4954532D303033'O # Brainpool-P384 r1 - -LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_TS_EA_CERTIFICATE_ID := "CERT_TS_A_EA"#"CERT_IDNOMIC_PKI_EA" -LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_TS_AA_CERTIFICATE_ID := "CERT_TS_A_AA" -LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_IUT_AA_CERTIFICATE_ID := "CERT_IDNOMIC_PKI_AA" -LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_TS_CA_CERTIFICATE_ID := "CERT_IDNOMIC_PKI_RCA" - -#LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_PKI_AUTH_POP := false # Do not use Signed for PoP in Authorization requet - # Required for SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_02_BV -#LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_SECPKI_REENROLMENT := false # Check in logs the pattern '==> EC ' to find the required information for re-enrolment - -#LibItsPki_Pixits.PX_INCLUDE_ENCRYPTION_KEYS := false # No encryption key in Authorization request - -#LibItsPki_Pixits.PX_VE_ALG := e_brainpool_p256_r1 # e_nist_p256, e_brainpool_p256_r1 or e_brainpool_p384_r1 -#LibItsPki_Pixits.PX_EC_ALG_FOR_EC := e_brainpool_p256_r1 # e_nist_p256, e_brainpool_p256_r1 -#LibItsPki_Pixits.PX_EC_ALG_FOR_ATV := e_brainpool_p256_r1 # e_nist_p256, e_brainpool_p256_r1 -#LibItsPki_Pixits.PX_EC_ALG_FOR_EC_SIGN := e_brainpool_p256_r1 # e_nist_p256, e_brainpool_p256_r1 -#LibItsPki_Pixits.PX_EC_ALG_FOR_AT := e_brainpool_p256_r1 # e_nist_p256, e_brainpool_p256_r1 - -LibItsSecurity_Pics.PICS_SEC_CIRCULAR_REGION := false -LibItsSecurity_Pics.PICS_SEC_RECTANGULAR_REGION := true - -[LOGGING] -# In this section you can specify the name of the log file and the classes of events -# you want to log into the file or display on console (standard error). - -LogFile := "../logs/AtsPki/%e.%h-%r.%s" -FileMask := LOG_ALL | USER | DEBUG | MATCHING -ConsoleMask := LOG_ALL | USER | DEBUG | MATCHING -#FileMask := ERROR | WARNING | USER | MATCHING | EXECUTOR_RUNTIME | VERDICTOP -#ConsoleMask := ERROR | WARNING | USER | MATCHING | EXECUTOR_RUNTIME | VERDICTOP -LogSourceInfo := Stack -LogEntityName:= Yes -LogEventTypes:= Yes -#TimeStampFormat := DateTime - -[TESTPORT_PARAMETERS] -# Multiple HTTP component ports -system.httpEcPort.params := "HTTP(codecs=http_its:http_etsi_ieee1609dot2_codec)/TCP(server=90.84.188.76)" -system.httpAtVPort.params := "HTTP(codecs=http_its:http_etsi_ieee1609dot2_codec)/TCP(server=90.84.188.76)" -#system.httpAtVPort.params := "HTTP(codecs=http_its:http_etsi_ieee1609dot2_codec)/TCP(debug=1,server_mode=1,server=192.168.1.25,local_port=80)" # Multiple HTTP component ports specific to TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTHVAL_xx -system.httpAtPort.params := "HTTP(codecs=http_its:http_etsi_ieee1609dot2_codec)/TCP(server=90.84.188.76)" -system.httpCaPort.params := "HTTP(codecs=http_its:http_etsi_ieee1609dot2_codec)/TCP(debug=1,server=139.191.221.21,use_ssl=1)" -system.httpTlmPort.params := "HTTP(codecs=http_its:http_etsi_ieee1609dot2_codec)/TCP(debug=1,server=139.191.221.21,use_ssl=1)" - -[EXECUTE] -# The EnrolmentResponse message shall be sent by the EA to the ITS-S across the interface at reference point S3 in response to a received EnrolmentRequest message -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_01_BV - -# Check that EA doesn't accept Enrolment rekeying request when enrolment is not permitted by signing certificate (not containing an item of type PsidSsp) -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_02_BI_01 -# Check that EA doesn't accept Enrolment rekeying request when enrolment is not permitted by signing certificate (containing opaque[0] (version) indicating other value than 1) -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_02_BI_02 -# Check that EA doesn't accept Enrolment rekeying request when enrolment is not permitted by signing certificate (containing opaque[1] (value) indicating "Enrolment Request" (bit 1) set to 0) -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_02_BI_03 - -# Enroll an ITS-Station, but with a canonical-ID, that is not registered. -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_05_BI -# Enroll the ITS-Station, but the CSR re-quests more permissions than the issuer allows, i.e. request for security management SSP bit which is not set in the EA SSP -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_06_BI -# Enroll the ITS-Station, but the CSR requests a AID permission that the issuer does not allow, i.e. request for CAM AID -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_07_BI -# Enroll the ITS-Station, but the expiring date of the CSR is before the start date of the EA -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_08_BI -# Enroll the ITS-Station, but the start date of the CSR is before the start date of the EA -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_09_BI -# Enroll the ITS-Station, but the expiring date of the CSR is after the expiring date of the EA -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_10_BI -# Enroll the ITS-Station, but the start date of the CSR is after the expiring date of the EA -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_11_BI -# Enroll the ITS-Station, but the lifetime of the EC would be grater than allowed (considering values in C-ITS CP) -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_12_BI -# Enroll the ITS-Station, but the inner PoP signature in the CSR, created with the EC private key, can not be verified with the provided public key -##ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_13_BI - -# The EnrolmentResponse message shall be encrypted using an ETSI TS 103 097 approved algorithm and the encryption shall be done with the same AES key as the one used by the ITS-S requestor for the encryption of the EnrolmentRequest message. -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_01_BV -# The EnrolmentResponse message shall be encrypted using an ETSI TS 103 097 approved algorithm and the encryption shall be done with the same AES key as the one used by the ITS-S requestor for the encryption of the EnrolmentRequest message. -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_02_BV -# The outermost structure is an EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted structure containing the component recipients containing one instance of RecipientInfo of choice pskRecipInfo, which contains the HashedId8 of the symmetric key used by the ITS-S to encrypt the EnrolmentRequest message to which the response is built and containing the component ciphertext, once decrypted, contains an EtsiTs103097Data-Signed structure -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_03_BV -# If the ITS-S has been able to decrypt the content, this expected EtsiTs103097Data-Signed structure shall contain hashId, tbsData, signer and signature. The hashId shall indicate the hash algorithm to be used as specified in ETSI TS 103 097, the signer shall be declared as a digest, containing the HashedId8 of the EA certificate and the signature over tbsData shall be computed using the EA private key corresponding to its publicVerificationKey found in the referenced EA certificate -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_04_BV -# Within the headerInfo of the tbsData, the psid shall be set to secured certificate request as assigned in ETSI TS 102 965 and the generationTime shall be present -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_05_BV -# Within the headerInfo of the tbsData, aside from psid and generationTime, all other components of the component tbsData.headerInfo not used and absent -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_06_BV -# The EtsiTS102941Data shall contain the version set to v1 (integer value set to 1) and the content set to InnerECResponse -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_07_BV -# The InnerECResponse shall contain the requestHash, which is the left-most 16 octets of the SHA256 digest of the EtsiTs103097Data - Signed structure received in the request and a responseCode indicating the result of the request -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_08_BV -# If the responseCode is 0, the InnerECResponse shall also contain an (enrolment) certificate -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_09_BV -# If the responseCode is different than 0, the InnerECResponse shall not contain a certificate -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_10_BV -# Check that signing of Enrolment response message is permitted by the EA certificate -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_11_BV -# Check that generated EC certificate contains only allowed permissions -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_12_BV - -# The AuthorizationValidationResponse message shall be sent by the EA to the AA across the interface at reference point S4 in response to a received AuthorizationValidationRequest message -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_AUTHVAL_RCV_01_BV -# Check that EA doesn't accept Authorization Validation Request when SharedAtRequest is signed with certificate without appropriate permissions -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_AUTHVAL_RCV_02_BI - -# The EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted is build with the component recipients containing one instance of RecipientInfo of choice pskRecipInfo, which contains the HashedId8 of the symmetric key used by the ITS-S to encrypt the AuthorizationRequest message to which the response is built and the component ciphertext containing the encrypted representation of the EtsiTs103097Data-Signed. The encryption uses a ETSI TS 103 097 [3] approved algorithm -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_AUTHVAL_01_BV -# To read an authorization validation response, the AA shall receive an EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted structure, containing a EtsiTs103097Data-Signed structure, containing a EtsiTs102941Data structure, containing an AuthorizationValidationResponse structure -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_AUTHVAL_02_BV -# The AuthorizationValidationResponse structure contains the requestHash being the left-most 16 octets of the SHA256 digest of the EtsiTs103097Data-Signed structure received in the AuthorizationValidationRequest and a responseCode -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_AUTHVAL_03_BV -# If the responseCode is 0, the AuthorizationValidationResponse structure contains the component confirmedSubjectAttributes with the attributes the EA wishes to confirm, except for certIssuePermissions which is not allowed to be present -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_AUTHVAL_04_BV -# If the responseCode is different than 0, the AuthorizationValidationResponse structure does not contain the component confirmedSubjectAttributes -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_AUTHVAL_05_BV -# The component version of the EtsiTs102941Data structure is set to v1 (integer value set to 1) -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_AUTHVAL_06_BV - -# Check that the EA/AA is able to decrypt the AuthorizationRequest message using the encryption private key corresponding to the recipient certificate... -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_01_BV -# Check that the AA is able to decrypt the AuthorizationRequest message using the encryption private key corresponding to the recipient certificate... -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_02_BV -# Check that the AA skips the AuthorizationRequest message if it is not addressed to this AA -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_03_BI -# Check that the AA skips the AuthorizationRequest message if it unable to decrypt the encKey -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_04_BI -# Check that the AA skips the AuthorizationRequest message if it unable to decrypt the cyphertext -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_05_BI -# Check that the AA rejects the AuthorizationRequest message if it unable to verify the POP signature -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_06_BI -# Check that the AA rejects the AuthorizationRequest message if it unable to verify the integrity of the request using hmacKey -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_07_BI -# Send a correctly encoded AT request, but the ITS-Station is not enrolled at the EA -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_08_BI -# Send an AT request, but the inner signer (valid EC) is not issued by the EA which is known / trusted by the AA. The AA trusts only EAs listet on the RCA-CTL -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_09_BI -# Send an AT request, but the generation time of the CSR is in the past -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_10_BI -# Send an AT request, but the generation time of the CSR is in the future -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_11_BI -# Send an AT request, but the expiry date of the CSR is before the start date of the EC -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_12_BI -# Send an AT request, but the start date of the CSR is before the start date of the EC -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_13_BI -# Send an AT request, but the expiry date of the CSR is after the expiry date of the EC -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_14_BI -# Send an AT request, but the start date of the CSR is after the expiring date of the EC -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_15_BI -# Send an AT request, but the expiry date of the CSR is after now + maximum pre-loading period (considering values in C-ITS CP) -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_16_BI - -# Check that the AA sends AuthorizationValidationRequest after receiving of the AuthorizationRequest -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTHVAL_01_BV - -# Check that the RootCA generates the Full CTL when new EA is about to be added to the Root CTL -ItsPki_TestCases.TC_RCA_CTLGEN_01_BV -# Check that the RootCA generates the CRL signed with appropriate certificate. -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_RCA_CRLGEN_01_BV -# Check that the TLM generates the ECTL when new RootCA is about to be added -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_TLM_ECTLGEN_01_BV - -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_RCA_CTLGEN_xx_BV - -# Check that the issuing certificate has version 3 -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_01_BV -# Check that the issuing certificate has type explicit -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_02_BV_01 -# Check that the CA, been authorized using explicit certificate, is able to issue an implicit certificate -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_02_BV_02 -# Check that the CA, been authorized using explicit certificate, is able to issue an implicit certificate -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_02_BV_03 -# Check that the CA, been authorized using implicit certificate, does not issue an explicit certificate -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_02_BO_01 -# Check that CA issues certificate conformed to ETSI TS 103 097 [1], clause 6 -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_03_BV -# Check that the certificate issuer of certificates is referenced using digest. Check that right digest field is used to reference to the certificate -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_04_BV -# Check that the CA is able to issue the certificate with the well-formed circular region validity restriction -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_05_BV -# Check that the CA is able to issue the certificate with the well-formed rectangular region validity restriction -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_06_BV -# Check that the CA is able to issue the certificate with the well-formed polygonal region validity restriction -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_07_BV -# Check that the CA is able to issue the certificate with identified region validity restriction contains values that correspond to numeric country codes as defined by United Nations Statistics Division [5] -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_08_BV -# Check that the identified region validity restriction of the subordinate certificate is included in the identified region validity restriction of the issuing certificate -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_09_BV -# Check that the certificate signature contains ECC point of type set to either compressed_lsb_y_0, compressed_lsb_y_1 or x_coordinate_only -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_10_BV -# Check that the certificate verification key contains ECC point of type set to either compressed_lsb_y_0, compressed_lsb_y_1 or uncompressed -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_11_BV -# Check that the certificate encryption key contains ECC point of type set to either compressed_lsb_y_0, compressed_lsb_y_1 or uncompressed -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_12_BV -# Check the explicit certificate signature -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_13_BV_01 -# Check the explicit certificate signature -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_13_BV_02 -# Check that all PSID entries of the appPermissions component of the certificate are unique -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_14_BV -# Check that all PSID entries of the appPermissions component of the certificate are also contained in the certIssuePermissions component in the issuing certificate -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_15_BV -# Check that all PSID entries of the certIssuePermissions component of the certificate are unique -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_16_BV -# Check that SSP field in each entry of the appPermissions component of the AT certificate is equal to or a subset of the SSP Range in the corresponding issuing entry -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_17_BV -# Check that the validityPeriod of the subordinate certificate is inside the validityPeriod of the issuing certificate -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_18_BV - -[MAIN_CONTROLLER] -# The options herein control the behavior of MC. -KillTimer := 10.0 -LocalAddress := 127.0.0.1 -TCPPort := 12000 -NumHCs := 1 - + +[MODULE_PARAMETERS] +# This section shall contain the values of all parameters that are defined in your TTCN-3 modules. + +# Enable Security support +LibItsGeoNetworking_Pics.PICS_GN_SECURITY := true +# Root path to access certificate stored in files, identified by certficate ID +LibItsSecurity_Pixits.PX_CERTIFICATE_POOL_PATH := "../data/certificates" +# Configuration sub-directory to access certificate stored in files +LibItsSecurity_Pixits.PX_IUT_SEC_CONFIG_NAME := "certificates" + +LibItsHttp_Pics.PICS_HEADER_CONTENT_TYPE := "application/x-its-request" + +LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_MULTIPLE_END_POINT := true +LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_HEADER_HOST_EC := "ea.etsi.autocrypt.io:9100" +LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_HEADER_HOST_ATV := "ea.etsi.autocrypt.io:9100" +LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_HEADER_HOST_AT := "aa.etsi.autocrypt.io:9200" +LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_HEADER_HOST_CA := "dc.etsi.autocrypt.io:9300" +LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_HEADER_HOST_TLM := "dc.etsi.autocrypt.io:9300" + +LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_HTTP_POST_URI_EC := "/api/ea/ec" +LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_HTTP_POST_URI_AT := "/api/aa/at" +LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_HTTP_POST_URI_ATV := "/api/ea/av" +LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_HTTP_GET_URI_CTL := "/getctl/102DEBCB233A0F09" +LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_HTTP_GET_URI_CRL := "/getcrl/102DEBCB233A0F09" +LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_HTTP_GET_URI_ECTL := "/" + +#LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_SIMULATE_EA_ENTITY := true # CERT_TS_A_EA shall be trusted by the PKI +LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_TS_EA_CERTIFICATE_ID := "AUTOCRYPT_EA_BCBD30353B9C491F" # Use CERT_TS_A_EA when the TS simulate the EA (TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTHVAL_01_BV) with PICS_SIMULATE_EA_ENTITY set +LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_TS_AA_CERTIFICATE_ID := "CERT_TS_A_AA" # CERT_TS_A_AA & CERT_IUT_A_RCA shall be trusted by the PKI +LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_IUT_AA_CERTIFICATE_ID := "AUTOCRYPT_AA_A66CB66EC2F67F4D" +LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_TS_CA_CERTIFICATE_ID := "AUTOCRYPT_RCA_102DEBCB233A0F09" + +LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_ITS_S_CANONICAL_ID := '455453492D5465737453797374656D2D3031'O # Nist-P256 +#LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_ITS_S_CANONICAL_ID := '455453492D5465737453797374656D2D3032'O # Brainpool-P256 r1 +#LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_ITS_S_CANONICAL_ID := '455453492D5465737453797374656D2D3033'O # Brainpool-P384 r1 + +# Technical keys +# Private key +#FE95786F01D7E1666CCDFAB7BAEE9BF9B30BBEA15A838A58994E65E684A8BB34 +# Public key +#048038F5490CD5A58FF5465D3B577EE830047336AC5DAC07036B798AAECAE7273FD91C4F60995494EA949E64EE0E3D768DBDEB8AFC345627211E3FC4DD8FD39EE5 +LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_ITS_S_SIGN_NITSP256_PRIVATE_KEY := 'FE95786F01D7E1666CCDFAB7BAEE9BF9B30BBEA15A838A58994E65E684A8BB34'O; +LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_ITS_S_SIGN_NISTP256_PUBLIC_KEY := '038038f5490cd5a58ff5465d3b577ee830047336ac5dac07036b798aaecae7273f'O; + +# Set to true if the IUT support CertificateId shall be set to the choice name, false if it shall be omitted +#LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_EC_SUBJECT_ATTRIBUT_ID := false # requestedSubjectAttributes.id is omitted +# Set to true if the IUT support geographical region +#LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_EC_SUBJECT_ATTRIBUT_REGION := false # requestedSubjectAttributes.region is omitted + +#LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_PKI_AUTH_POP := false # Do not use Signed for PoP in Authorization requet + # Required for SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_02_BV +#LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_SECPKI_REENROLMENT := false # Check in logs the pattern '==> EC ' to find the required information for re-enrolment + +# URI to request CTL +LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_HTTP_POST_URI_DC := "/ctl" + +#LibItsPki_Pixits.PX_INCLUDE_ENCRYPTION_KEYS := false # No encryption key in Authorization request + +#LibItsPki_Pixits.PX_VE_ALG := e_brainpool_p256_r1 # e_nist_p256 or e_brainpool_p384_r1 + +#LibItsPki_Pixits.PX_EC_ALG_FOR_EC := e_brainpool_p256_r1 # e_nist_p256 or e_brainpool_p256_r1 +#LibItsPki_Pixits.PX_EC_ALG_FOR_AT := e_brainpool_p256_r1 # e_nist_p256 or e_brainpool_p256_r1 +#LibItsPki_Pixits.PX_EC_ALG_FOR_EC_SIGN := e_brainpool_p256_r1 # e_nist_p256 or e_brainpool_p256_r1 +#LibItsPki_Pixits.PX_EC_ALG_FOR_ATV := e_brainpool_p256_r1 # e_nist_p256 or e_brainpool_p256_r1 + +LibItsSecurity_Pics.PICS_SEC_CIRCULAR_REGION := false +LibItsSecurity_Pics.PICS_SEC_RECTANGULAR_REGION := true + +[LOGGING] +# In this section you can specify the name of the log file and the classes of events +# you want to log into the file or display on console (standard error). + +LogFile := "../logs/AtsPki/%e.%h-%r.%s" +FileMask := LOG_ALL | USER | DEBUG | MATCHING +ConsoleMask := LOG_ALL | USER | DEBUG | MATCHING +#FileMask := ERROR | WARNING | USER | MATCHING | EXECUTOR_RUNTIME | VERDICTOP +#ConsoleMask := ERROR | WARNING | USER | MATCHING | EXECUTOR_RUNTIME | VERDICTOP +LogSourceInfo := Stack +LogEntityName:= Yes +LogEventTypes:= Yes +#TimeStampFormat := DateTime + +[TESTPORT_PARAMETERS] +# Multiple HTTP component ports +system.httpEcPort.params := "HTTP(codecs=http_its:http_etsi_ieee1609dot2_codec)/TCP(debug=1,server=ea.etsi.autocrypt.io,port=9100)" +system.httpAtVPort.params := "HTTP(codecs=http_its:http_etsi_ieee1609dot2_codec)/TCP(debug=1,server=ea.etsi.autocrypt.io,port=9100)" # To be used when IUT is the EA +#system.httpAtVPort.params := "HTTP(codecs=http_its:http_etsi_ieee1609dot2_codec)/TCP(debug=1,server_mode=1,server=192.168.1.43,local_port=80)" # Multiple HTTP component ports specific to TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTHVAL_xx +system.httpAtPort.params := "HTTP(codecs=http_its:http_etsi_ieee1609dot2_codec)/TCP(debug=1,server=aa.etsi.autocrypt.io,port=9200)" +#system.httpCaPort.params := "HTTP(codecs=http_its:http_etsi_ieee1609dot2_codec)/TCP(debug=1,server_mode=1,server=10.200.60.6)" +system.httpCaPort.params := "HTTP(codecs=http_its:http_etsi_ieee1609dot2_codec)/TCP(debug=1,server=dc.etsi.autocrypt.io,port=9300)" +system.httpTlmPort.params := "HTTP(codecs=http_its:http_etsi_ieee1609dot2_codec)/TCP(debug=1,server=dc.etsi.autocrypt.io,port=9300)" + +[EXECUTE] +# Config: +# LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_SIMULATE_EA_ENTITY := false # CERT_TS_A_EA shall be trusted by the PKI +# LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_TS_EA_CERTIFICATE_ID := PKI EA cert +# LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_TS_AA_CERTIFICATE_ID := "CERT_TS_A_AA" # CERT_TS_A_AA & CERT_IUT_A_RCA shall be trusted by the PKI +# LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_IUT_AA_CERTIFICATE_ID := PKI AA cert +# LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_TS_CA_CERTIFICATE_ID := PKI RCA cert +# system.httpAtVPort.params := TCP(server=ea.etsi.autocrypt.io:9100) + +# The EnrolmentResponse message shall be sent by the EA to the ITS-S across the interface at reference point S3 in response to a received EnrolmentRequest message +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_01_BV + +# Check that EA doesn't accept Enrolment rekeying request when enrolment is not permitted by signing certificate (not containing an item of type PsidSsp) +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_02_BI_01 +# Check that EA doesn't accept Enrolment rekeying request when enrolment is not permitted by signing certificate (containing opaque[0] (version) indicating other value than 1) +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_02_BI_02 +# Check that EA doesn't accept Enrolment rekeying request when enrolment is not permitted by signing certificate (containing opaque[1] (value) indicating "Enrolment Request" (bit 1) set to 0) +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_02_BI_03 + +# Enroll an ITS-Station, but with a canonical-ID, that is not registered. +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_05_BI +# Enroll the ITS-Station, but the CSR re-quests more permissions than the issuer allows, i.e. request for security management SSP bit which is not set in the EA SSP +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_06_BI +# Enroll the ITS-Station, but the CSR requests a AID permission that the issuer does not allow, i.e. request for CAM AID +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_07_BI +# Enroll the ITS-Station, but the expiring date of the CSR is before the start date of the EA +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_08_BI +# Enroll the ITS-Station, but the start date of the CSR is before the start date of the EA +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_09_BI +# Enroll the ITS-Station, but the expiring date of the CSR is after the expiring date of the EA +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_10_BI +# Enroll the ITS-Station, but the start date of the CSR is after the expiring date of the EA +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_11_BI +# Enroll the ITS-Station, but the lifetime of the EC would be grater than allowed (considering values in C-ITS CP) +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_12_BI +# Enroll the ITS-Station, but the inner PoP signature in the CSR, created with the EC private key, can not be verified with the provided public key +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_13_BI + +# The EnrolmentResponse message shall be encrypted using an ETSI TS 103 097 approved algorithm and the encryption shall be done with the same AES key as the one used by the ITS-S requestor for the encryption of the EnrolmentRequest message. +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_01_BV +# The EnrolmentResponse message shall be encrypted using an ETSI TS 103 097 approved algorithm and the encryption shall be done with the same AES key as the one used by the ITS-S requestor for the encryption of the EnrolmentRequest message. +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_02_BV +# The outermost structure is an EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted structure containing the component recipients containing one instance of RecipientInfo of choice pskRecipInfo, which contains the HashedId8 of the symmetric key used by the ITS-S to encrypt the EnrolmentRequest message to which the response is built and containing the component ciphertext, once decrypted, contains an EtsiTs103097Data-Signed structure +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_03_BV +# If the ITS-S has been able to decrypt the content, this expected EtsiTs103097Data-Signed structure shall contain hashId, tbsData, signer and signature. The hashId shall indicate the hash algorithm to be used as specified in ETSI TS 103 097, the signer shall be declared as a digest, containing the HashedId8 of the EA certificate and the signature over tbsData shall be computed using the EA private key corresponding to its publicVerificationKey found in the referenced EA certificate +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_04_BV +# Within the headerInfo of the tbsData, the psid shall be set to secured certificate request as assigned in ETSI TS 102 965 and the generationTime shall be present +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_05_BV +# Within the headerInfo of the tbsData, aside from psid and generationTime, all other components of the component tbsData.headerInfo not used and absent +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_06_BV +# The EtsiTS102941Data shall contain the version set to v1 (integer value set to 1) and the content set to InnerECResponse +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_07_BV +# The InnerECResponse shall contain the requestHash, which is the left-most 16 octets of the SHA256 digest of the EtsiTs103097Data - Signed structure received in the request and a responseCode indicating the result of the request +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_08_BV +# If the responseCode is 0, the InnerECResponse shall also contain an (enrolment) certificate +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_09_BV +# If the responseCode is different than 0, the InnerECResponse shall not contain a certificate +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_10_BV +# Check that signing of Enrolment response message is permitted by the EA certificate +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_11_BV +# Check that generated EC certificate contains only allowed permissions +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_12_BV + +# The AuthorizationValidationResponse message shall be sent by the EA to the AA across the interface at reference point S4 in response to a received AuthorizationValidationRequest message +ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_AUTHVAL_RCV_01_BV +# Check that EA doesn't accept Authorization Validation Request when SharedAtRequest is signed with certificate without appropriate permissions +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_AUTHVAL_RCV_02_BI + +# The EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted is build with the component recipients containing one instance of RecipientInfo of choice pskRecipInfo, which contains the HashedId8 of the symmetric key used by the ITS-S to encrypt the AuthorizationRequest message to which the response is built and the component ciphertext containing the encrypted representation of the EtsiTs103097Data-Signed. The encryption uses a ETSI TS 103 097 [3] approved algorithm +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_AUTHVAL_01_BV +# To read an authorization validation response, the AA shall receive an EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted structure, containing a EtsiTs103097Data-Signed structure, containing a EtsiTs102941Data structure, containing an AuthorizationValidationResponse structure +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_AUTHVAL_02_BV +# The AuthorizationValidationResponse structure contains the requestHash being the left-most 16 octets of the SHA256 digest of the EtsiTs103097Data-Signed structure received in the AuthorizationValidationRequest and a responseCode +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_AUTHVAL_03_BV +# If the responseCode is 0, the AuthorizationValidationResponse structure contains the component confirmedSubjectAttributes with the attributes the EA wishes to confirm, except for certIssuePermissions which is not allowed to be present +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_AUTHVAL_04_BV +# If the responseCode is different than 0, the AuthorizationValidationResponse structure does not contain the component confirmedSubjectAttributes +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_AUTHVAL_05_BV +# The component version of the EtsiTs102941Data structure is set to v1 (integer value set to 1) +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_AUTHVAL_06_BV + +# Config: +# LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_SIMULATE_EA_ENTITY := true # CERT_TS_A_EA shall be trusted by the PKI +# LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_TS_EA_CERTIFICATE_ID := CERT_TS_A_EA +# LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_TS_AA_CERTIFICATE_ID := "CERT_TS_A_AA" # CERT_TS_A_AA & CERT_IUT_A_RCA shall be trusted by the PKI +# LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_IUT_AA_CERTIFICATE_ID := PKI AA cert +# LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_TS_CA_CERTIFICATE_ID := PKI RCA cert +# system.httpAtVPort.params := TCP(server=server=192.168.1.43) + +# Check that the EA/AA is able to decrypt the AuthorizationRequest message using the encryption private key corresponding to the recipient certificate... +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_01_BV +# Check that the AA is able to decrypt the AuthorizationRequest message using the encryption private key corresponding to the recipient certificate... +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_02_BV +# Check that the AA skips the AuthorizationRequest message if it is not addressed to this AA +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_03_BI +# Check that the AA skips the AuthorizationRequest message if it unable to decrypt the encKey +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_04_BI +# Check that the AA skips the AuthorizationRequest message if it unable to decrypt the encKey +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_05_BI +# Check that the AA rejects the AuthorizationRequest message if it unable to verify the POP signature +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_06_BI +# Check that the AA rejects the AuthorizationRequest message if it unable to verify the integrity of the request using hmacKey +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_07_BI +# Send a correctly encoded AT request, but the ITS-Station is not enrolled at the EA +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_08_BI +# Send an AT request, but the inner signer (valid EC) is not issued by the EA which is known / trusted by the AA. The AA trusts only EAs listet on the RCA-CTL +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_09_BI +# Send an AT request, but the generation time of the CSR is in the past +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_10_BI +# Send an AT request, but the generation time of the CSR is in the future +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_11_BI +# Send an AT request, but the expiry date of the CSR is before the start date of the EC +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_12_BI +# Send an AT request, but the start date of the CSR is before the start date of the EC +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_13_BI +# Send an AT request, but the expiry date of the CSR is after the expiry date of the EC +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_14_BI +# Send an AT request, but the start date of the CSR is after the expiring date of the EC +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_15_BI +# Send an AT request, but the expiry date of the CSR is after now + maximum pre-loading period (considering values in C-ITS CP) +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_16_BI + +# Check that the AA sends AuthorizationValidationRequest after receiving of the AuthorizationRequest +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTHVAL_01_BV + +# Check that the RootCA generates the Full CTL when new EA is about to be added to the Root CTL +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_RCA_CTLGEN_01_BV +# Check that the RootCA generates the CRL signed with appropriate certificate. +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_RCA_CRLGEN_01_BV +# Check that the TLM generates the ECTL when new RootCA is about to be added +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_TLM_ECTLGEN_01_BV + +# Config: +# system.httpCaPort.params := TCP(debug=1,server_mode=1,server=10.200.60.6) +# Await CTL request and provides "CERT_IUT_A_RCA", "CERT_TS_A_AA", "CERT_TS_A_EA" certificates +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_RCA_CTLGEN_xx_BV # + + +# Check that the issuing certificate has version 3 +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_01_BV +# Check that the issuing certificate has type explicit +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_02_BV_01 +# Check that the CA, been authorized using explicit certificate, is able to issue an implicit certificate +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_02_BV_02 +# Check that the CA, been authorized using explicit certificate, is able to issue an implicit certificate +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_02_BV_03 +# Check that the CA, been authorized using implicit certificate, does not issue an explicit certificate +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_02_BO_01 +# Check that CA issues certificate conformed to ETSI TS 103 097 [1], clause 6 +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_03_BV +# Check that the certificate issuer of certificates is referenced using digest. Check that right digest field is used to reference to the certificate +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_04_BV +# Check that the CA is able to issue the certificate with the well-formed circular region validity restriction +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_05_BV +# Check that the CA is able to issue the certificate with the well-formed rectangular region validity restriction +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_06_BV +# Check that the CA is able to issue the certificate with the well-formed polygonal region validity restriction +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_07_BV +# Check that the CA is able to issue the certificate with identified region validity restriction contains values that correspond to numeric country codes as defined by United Nations Statistics Division [5] +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_08_BV +# Check that the identified region validity restriction of the subordinate certificate is included in the identified region validity restriction of the issuing certificate +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_09_BV +# Check that the certificate signature contains ECC point of type set to either compressed_lsb_y_0, compressed_lsb_y_1 or x_coordinate_only +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_10_BV +# Check that the certificate verification key contains ECC point of type set to either compressed_lsb_y_0, compressed_lsb_y_1 or uncompressed +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_11_BV +# Check that the certificate encryption key contains ECC point of type set to either compressed_lsb_y_0, compressed_lsb_y_1 or uncompressed +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_12_BV +# Check the explicit certificate signature +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_13_BV_01 +# Check the explicit certificate signature +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_13_BV_02 +# Check that all PSID entries of the appPermissions component of the certificate are unique +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_14_BV +# Check that all PSID entries of the appPermissions component of the certificate are also contained in the certIssuePermissions component in the issuing certificate +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_15_BV +# Check that all PSID entries of the certIssuePermissions component of the certificate are unique +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_16_BV +# Check that SSP field in each entry of the appPermissions component of the AT certificate is equal to or a subset of the SSP Range in the corresponding issuing entry +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_17_BV +# Check that the validityPeriod of the subordinate certificate is inside the validityPeriod of the issuing certificate +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_18_BV + +[MAIN_CONTROLLER] +# The options herein control the behavior of MC. +KillTimer := 10.0 +LocalAddress := 127.0.0.1 +TCPPort := 12000 +NumHCs := 1 + diff --git a/etc/AtsPki/AtsPki_Cnit.cfg_ b/etc/AtsPki/AtsPki_Cnit.cfg_ deleted file mode 100644 index 9eb60ef8cdd7c70cc22ecff1944f197b5639aa0f..0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 --- a/etc/AtsPki/AtsPki_Cnit.cfg_ +++ /dev/null @@ -1,169 +0,0 @@ -[MODULE_PARAMETERS] -# This section shall contain the values of all parameters that are defined in your TTCN-3 modules. - -# Enable Security support -LibItsGeoNetworking_Pics.PICS_GN_SECURITY := true -# Root path to access certificate stored in files, identified by certficate ID -LibItsSecurity_Pixits.PX_CERTIFICATE_POOL_PATH := "/home/vagrant/tmp" -# Configuration sub-directory to access certificate stored in files -LibItsSecurity_Pixits.PX_IUT_SEC_CONFIG_NAME := "certificates" - -LibItsHttp_Pics.PICS_HEADER_CONTENT_TYPE := "application/x-its-request" - -LibItsHttp_Pics.PICS_HEADER_HOST := "etsi-dc-noes.labtlclivorno.it" - -LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_HTTP_POST_URI_EC :="/dc/ea" -LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_HTTP_POST_URI_AT :="/dc/aa" -LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_HTTP_POST_URI_ATV :="/dc/ea/validate" - -#LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_ITS_S_WITH_PRIVACY := false -LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_ITS_S_SIGN_NITSP256_PRIVATE_KEY := '5C25F97607DFC62972A147FAD8B7A7C939569F0F95ECD4C641724A68B51836E5'O -LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_ITS_S_SIGN_NISTP256_PUBLIC_KEY := '020144E5174B0AFDA86BDB8B643B68D40030F5BDB9A9F090C64852CC3C20C9D5AD'O -LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_ITS_S_CANONICAL_ID := '455453492D4954532D303031'O - -LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_TS_EA_CERTIFICATE_ID := "CERT_CNIT_EA" -LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_TS_AA_CERTIFICATE_ID := "CERT_TS_A_AA" -LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_IUT_AA_CERTIFICATE_ID := "CERT_CNIT_AA" -LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_TS_CA_CERTIFICATE_ID := "CERT_CNIT_RCA" - -#LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_PKI_AUTH_POP := false # Do not use Signed for PoP in Authorization requet - # Required for SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_02_BV -#LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_SECPKI_REENROLMENT := false # Check in logs the pattern '==> EC ' to find the required information for re-enrolment - -#LibItsPki_Pixits.PX_INCLUDE_ENCRYPTION_KEYS := false # No encryption key in Authorization request - -LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_SECPKI_REENROLMENT := false - -[LOGGING] -# In this section you can specify the name of the log file and the classes of events -# you want to log into the file or display on console (standard error). - -LogFile := "../logs/%e.%h-%r.%s" -FileMask := LOG_ALL | USER | DEBUG | MATCHING -ConsoleMask := LOG_ALL | USER | DEBUG | MATCHING -#FileMask := ERROR | WARNING | USER | MATCHING | EXECUTOR_RUNTIME | VERDICTOP -#ConsoleMask := ERROR | WARNING | USER | MATCHING | EXECUTOR_RUNTIME | VERDICTOP -LogSourceInfo := Stack -LogEntityName:= Yes -LogEventTypes:= Yes -#TimeStampFormat := DateTime - -[TESTPORT_PARAMETERS] -system.httpPort.params := "HTTP(codecs=http_its:http_etsi_ieee1609dot2_codec)/TCP(debug=1,server=etsi-dc-noes.labtlclivorno.it)" - -[EXECUTE] -# The EnrolmentResponse message shall be sent by the EA to the ITS-S across the interface at reference point S3 in response to a received EnrolmentRequest message -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_01_BV - -# Check that EA doesn't accept Enrolment rekeying request when enrolment is not permitted by signing certificate (not containing an item of type PsidSsp) -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_02_BI_01 -# Check that EA doesn't accept Enrolment rekeying request when enrolment is not permitted by signing certificate (containing opaque[0] (version) indicating other value than 1) -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_02_BI_02 -# Check that EA doesn't accept Enrolment rekeying request when enrolment is not permitted by signing certificate (containing opaque[1] (value) indicating "Enrolment Request" (bit 1) set to 0) -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_02_BI_03 - -# Enroll an ITS-Station, but with a canonical-ID, that is not registered. -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_05_BI -# Enroll the ITS-Station, but the CSR re-quests more permissions than the issuer allows, i.e. request for security management SSP bit which is not set in the EA SSP -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_06_BI -# Enroll the ITS-Station, but the CSR requests a AID permission that the issuer does not allow, i.e. request for CAM AID -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_07_BI -# Enroll the ITS-Station, but the expiring date of the CSR is before the start date of the EA -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_08_BI -# Enroll the ITS-Station, but the start date of the CSR is before the start date of the EA -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_09_BI -# Enroll the ITS-Station, but the expiring date of the CSR is after the expiring date of the EA -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_10_BI -# Enroll the ITS-Station, but the start date of the CSR is after the expiring date of the EA -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_11_BI -# Enroll the ITS-Station, but the lifetime of the EC would be grater than allowed (considering values in C-ITS CP) -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_12_BI -# Enroll the ITS-Station, but the inner PoP signature in the CSR, created with the EC private key, can not be verified with the provided public key -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_13_BI - -# The EnrolmentResponse message shall be encrypted using an ETSI TS 103 097 approved algorithm and the encryption shall be done with the same AES key as the one used by the ITS-S requestor for the encryption of the EnrolmentRequest message. -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_01_BV -# The EnrolmentResponse message shall be encrypted using an ETSI TS 103 097 approved algorithm and the encryption shall be done with the same AES key as the one used by the ITS-S requestor for the encryption of the EnrolmentRequest message. -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_02_BV -# The outermost structure is an EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted structure containing the component recipients containing one instance of RecipientInfo of choice pskRecipInfo, which contains the HashedId8 of the symmetric key used by the ITS-S to encrypt the EnrolmentRequest message to which the response is built and containing the component ciphertext, once decrypted, contains an EtsiTs103097Data-Signed structure -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_03_BV -# If the ITS-S has been able to decrypt the content, this expected EtsiTs103097Data-Signed structure shall contain hashId, tbsData, signer and signature. The hashId shall indicate the hash algorithm to be used as specified in ETSI TS 103 097, the signer shall be declared as a digest, containing the HashedId8 of the EA certificate and the signature over tbsData shall be computed using the EA private key corresponding to its publicVerificationKey found in the referenced EA certificate -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_04_BV -# Within the headerInfo of the tbsData, the psid shall be set to secured certificate request as assigned in ETSI TS 102 965 and the generationTime shall be present -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_05_BV -# Within the headerInfo of the tbsData, aside from psid and generationTime, all other components of the component tbsData.headerInfo not used and absent -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_06_BV -# The EtsiTS102941Data shall contain the version set to v1 (integer value set to 1) and the content set to InnerECResponse -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_07_BV -# The InnerECResponse shall contain the requestHash, which is the left-most 16 octets of the SHA256 digest of the EtsiTs103097Data - Signed structure received in the request and a responseCode indicating the result of the request -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_08_BV -# If the responseCode is 0, the InnerECResponse shall also contain an (enrolment) certificate -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_09_BV -# If the responseCode is different than 0, the InnerECResponse shall not contain a certificate -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_10_BV -# Check that signing of Enrolment response message is permitted by the EA certificate -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_11_BV -# Check that generated EC certificate contains only allowed permissions -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_12_BV - -# The AuthorizationValidationResponse message shall be sent by the EA to the AA across the interface at reference point S4 in response to a received AuthorizationValidationRequest message -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_AUTHVAL_RCV_01_BV -# Check that EA doesn't accept Authorization Validation Request when SharedAtRequest is signed with certificate without appropriate permissions -ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_AUTHVAL_RCV_02_BI - -# The EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted is build with the component recipients containing one instance of RecipientInfo of choice pskRecipInfo, which contains the HashedId8 of the symmetric key used by the ITS-S to encrypt the AuthorizationRequest message to which the response is built and the component ciphertext containing the encrypted representation of the EtsiTs103097Data-Signed. The encryption uses a ETSI TS 103 097 [3] approved algorithm -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_AUTHVAL_01_BV -# To read an authorization validation response, the AA shall receive an EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted structure, containing a EtsiTs103097Data-Signed structure, containing a EtsiTs102941Data structure, containing an AuthorizationValidationResponse structure -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_AUTHVAL_02_BV -# The AuthorizationValidationResponse structure contains the requestHash being the left-most 16 octets of the SHA256 digest of the EtsiTs103097Data-Signed structure received in the AuthorizationValidationRequest and a responseCode -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_AUTHVAL_03_BV -# If the responseCode is 0, the AuthorizationValidationResponse structure contains the component confirmedSubjectAttributes with the attributes the EA wishes to confirm, except for certIssuePermissions which is not allowed to be present -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_AUTHVAL_04_BV -# If the responseCode is different than 0, the AuthorizationValidationResponse structure does not contain the component confirmedSubjectAttributes -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_AUTHVAL_05_BV -# The component version of the EtsiTs102941Data structure is set to v1 (integer value set to 1) -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_AUTHVAL_06_BV - -# Check that the EA/AA is able to decrypt the AuthorizationRequest message using the encryption private key corresponding to the recipient certificate... -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_01_BV -# Check that the AA is able to decrypt the AuthorizationRequest message using the encryption private key corresponding to the recipient certificate... -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_02_BV -# Check that the AA skips the AuthorizationRequest message if it is not addressed to this AA -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_03_BI -# Check that the AA skips the AuthorizationRequest message if it unable to decrypt the encKey -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_04_BI -# Check that the AA skips the AuthorizationRequest message if it unable to decrypt the encKey -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_05_BI -# Check that the AA rejects the AuthorizationRequest message if it unable to verify the POP signature -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_06_BI -# Check that the AA rejects the AuthorizationRequest message if it unable to verify the integrity of the request using hmacKey -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_07_BI -# Send a correctly encoded AT request, but the ITS-Station is not enrolled at the EA -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_08_BI -# Send an AT request, but the inner signer (valid EC) is not issued by the EA which is known / trusted by the AA. The AA trusts only EAs listet on the RCA-CTL -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_09_BI -# Send an AT request, but the generation time of the CSR is in the past -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_10_BI -# Send an AT request, but the generation time of the CSR is in the future -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_11_BI -# Send an AT request, but the expiry date of the CSR is before the start date of the EC -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_12_BI -# Send an AT request, but the start date of the CSR is before the start date of the EC -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_13_BI -# Send an AT request, but the expiry date of the CSR is after the expiry date of the EC -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_14_BI -# Send an AT request, but the start date of the CSR is after the expiring date of the EC -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_15_BI -# Send an AT request, but the expiry date of the CSR is after now + maximum pre-loading period (considering values in C-ITS CP) -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_16_BI - -# Check that the AA sends AuthorizationValidationRequest after receiving of the AuthorizationRequest -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTHVAL_01_BV - -[MAIN_CONTROLLER] -# The options herein control the behavior of MC. -KillTimer := 10.0 -LocalAddress := 127.0.0.1 -TCPPort := 12000 -NumHCs := 1 - diff --git a/etc/AtsPki/AtsPki_CryptaLabs.cfg_ b/etc/AtsPki/AtsPki_CryptaLabs.cfg_ deleted file mode 100644 index 680432d752eed43f54c38a4304d49147977d0c59..0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 --- a/etc/AtsPki/AtsPki_CryptaLabs.cfg_ +++ /dev/null @@ -1,198 +0,0 @@ - -[MODULE_PARAMETERS] -# This section shall contain the values of all parameters that are defined in your TTCN-3 modules. - -# Enable Security support -LibItsGeoNetworking_Pics.PICS_GN_SECURITY := true -# Root path to access certificate stored in files, identified by certficate ID -LibItsSecurity_Pixits.PX_CERTIFICATE_POOL_PATH := "../data/certificates" -# Configuration sub-directory to access certificate stored in files -LibItsSecurity_Pixits.PX_IUT_SEC_CONFIG_NAME := "certificates" - -# Use this certificate if the RSU simulator act as IUT -LibItsCommon_Pixits.PX_CERT_FOR_TS := "CERT_IUT_A_AT" - -LibItsHttp_Pics.PICS_HEADER_CONTENT_TYPE := "application/x-its-request" -LibItsHttp_Pics.PICS_HEADER_CTL_CONTENT_TYPE := "application/x-its-crl" - -LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_MULTIPLE_END_POINT := false -LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_HEADER_HOST_EC := "pki.seacat.io" -LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_HEADER_HOST_ATV := "pki.seacat.io" -LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_HEADER_HOST_AT := "pki.seacat.io" -LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_HEADER_HOST_CA := "pki.seacat.io" -LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_HEADER_HOST_TLM := "pki.seacat.io" - -LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_HTTP_POST_URI_EC := "/etsi-plugtest-brainpool/cits/ea/enrolment" -LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_HTTP_POST_URI_AT := "/etsi-plugtest-brainpool/cits/aa/authorization" -LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_HTTP_POST_URI_ATV := "/etsi-plugtest-brainpool/cits/ea/authorization-validation" -LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_HTTP_GET_URI_CTL := "/etsi-plugtest-brainpool/cits/dc/getctl/DC8A483A7AEF3FA9" -LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_HTTP_GET_URI_CRL := "/etsi-plugtest-brainpool/cits/dc/getcrl/DC8A483A7AEF3FA9" -LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_HTTP_GET_URI_ECTL := "" - -LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_TS_EA_CERTIFICATE_ID := "CERT_CRYPTALAB_PKI_EA" -LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_TS_AA_CERTIFICATE_ID := "CERT_TS_A_AA" -LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_IUT_AA_CERTIFICATE_ID := "CERT_CRYPTALAB_PKI_AA" -LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_TS_CA_CERTIFICATE_ID := "CERT_CRYPTALAB_PKI_RCA" - -#LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_PKI_AUTH_POP := false # Do not use Signed for PoP in Authorization requet - # Required for SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_02_BV -#LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_SECPKI_REENROLMENT := false # Check in logs the pattern '==> EC ' to find the required information for re-enrolment - -#LibItsPki_Pixits.PX_INCLUDE_ENCRYPTION_KEYS := false # No encryption key in Authorization request - -#LibItsPki_Pixits.PX_VE_ALG := e_brainpool_p256_r1 # e_nist_p256, e_brainpool_p256_r1 or e_brainpool_p384_r1 -LibItsPki_Pixits.PX_EC_ALG_FOR_EC := e_brainpool_p256_r1 # e_nist_p256, e_brainpool_p256_r1 -LibItsPki_Pixits.PX_EC_ALG_FOR_ATV := e_brainpool_p256_r1 # e_nist_p256, e_brainpool_p256_r1 -LibItsPki_Pixits.PX_EC_ALG_FOR_EC_SIGN := e_brainpool_p256_r1 # e_nist_p256, e_brainpool_p256_r1 -LibItsPki_Pixits.PX_EC_ALG_FOR_AT := e_brainpool_p256_r1 # e_nist_p256, e_brainpool_p256_r1 - -[LOGGING] -# In this section you can specify the name of the log file and the classes of events -# you want to log into the file or display on console (standard error). - -LogFile := "../logs/%e.%h-%r.%s" -FileMask := LOG_ALL | USER | DEBUG | MATCHING -ConsoleMask := LOG_ALL | USER | DEBUG | MATCHING -#FileMask := ERROR | WARNING | USER | MATCHING | EXECUTOR_RUNTIME | VERDICTOP -#ConsoleMask := ERROR | WARNING | USER | MATCHING | EXECUTOR_RUNTIME | VERDICTOP -LogSourceInfo := Stack -LogEntityName:= Yes -LogEventTypes:= Yes -#TimeStampFormat := DateTime - -[TESTPORT_PARAMETERS] -# Single HTTP component port -system.httpPort.params := "HTTP(codecs=http_its:http_etsi_ieee1609dot2_codec)/TCP(debug=1,server=178.238.43.67)" -# Multiple HTTP component ports -#system.httpEcPort.params := "HTTP(codecs=http_its:http_etsi_ieee1609dot2_codec)/TCP(server=178.238.43.67)" -#system.httpAtVPort.params := "HTTP(codecs=http_its:http_etsi_ieee1609dot2_codec)/TCP(server=178.238.43.67)" -#system.httpAtVPort.params := "HTTP(codecs=http_its:http_etsi_ieee1609dot2_codec)/TCP(debug=1,server_mode=1,server=192.168.1.25,local_port=80)" # Multiple HTTP component ports specific to TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTHVAL_xx -#system.httpAtPort.params := "HTTP(codecs=http_its:http_etsi_ieee1609dot2_codec)/TCP(server=178.238.43.67)" - -system.httpCaPort.params := "HTTP(codecs=http_its:http_etsi_ieee1609dot2_codec)/TCP(debug=1,server=178.238.43.67,use_ssl=1)" -system.httpTlmPort.params := "HTTP(codecs=http_its:http_etsi_ieee1609dot2_codec)/TCP(debug=1,server=178.238.43.67,use_ssl=1)" - -[EXECUTE] -# The EnrolmentResponse message shall be sent by the EA to the ITS-S across the interface at reference point S3 in response to a received EnrolmentRequest message -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_01_BV - -# Check that EA doesn't accept Enrolment rekeying request when enrolment is not permitted by signing certificate (not containing an item of type PsidSsp) -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_02_BI_01 -# Check that EA doesn't accept Enrolment rekeying request when enrolment is not permitted by signing certificate (containing opaque[0] (version) indicating other value than 1) -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_02_BI_02 -# Check that EA doesn't accept Enrolment rekeying request when enrolment is not permitted by signing certificate (containing opaque[1] (value) indicating "Enrolment Request" (bit 1) set to 0) -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_02_BI_03 - -# Enroll an ITS-Station, but with a canonical-ID, that is not registered. -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_05_BI -# Enroll the ITS-Station, but the CSR re-quests more permissions than the issuer allows, i.e. request for security management SSP bit which is not set in the EA SSP -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_06_BI -# Enroll the ITS-Station, but the CSR requests a AID permission that the issuer does not allow, i.e. request for CAM AID -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_07_BI -# Enroll the ITS-Station, but the expiring date of the CSR is before the start date of the EA -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_08_BI -# Enroll the ITS-Station, but the start date of the CSR is before the start date of the EA -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_09_BI -# Enroll the ITS-Station, but the expiring date of the CSR is after the expiring date of the EA -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_10_BI -# Enroll the ITS-Station, but the start date of the CSR is after the expiring date of the EA -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_11_BI -# Enroll the ITS-Station, but the lifetime of the EC would be grater than allowed (considering values in C-ITS CP) -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_12_BI -# Enroll the ITS-Station, but the inner PoP signature in the CSR, created with the EC private key, can not be verified with the provided public key -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_13_BI - -# The EnrolmentResponse message shall be encrypted using an ETSI TS 103 097 approved algorithm and the encryption shall be done with the same AES key as the one used by the ITS-S requestor for the encryption of the EnrolmentRequest message. -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_01_BV -# The EnrolmentResponse message shall be encrypted using an ETSI TS 103 097 approved algorithm and the encryption shall be done with the same AES key as the one used by the ITS-S requestor for the encryption of the EnrolmentRequest message. -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_02_BV -# The outermost structure is an EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted structure containing the component recipients containing one instance of RecipientInfo of choice pskRecipInfo, which contains the HashedId8 of the symmetric key used by the ITS-S to encrypt the EnrolmentRequest message to which the response is built and containing the component ciphertext, once decrypted, contains an EtsiTs103097Data-Signed structure -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_03_BV -# If the ITS-S has been able to decrypt the content, this expected EtsiTs103097Data-Signed structure shall contain hashId, tbsData, signer and signature. The hashId shall indicate the hash algorithm to be used as specified in ETSI TS 103 097, the signer shall be declared as a digest, containing the HashedId8 of the EA certificate and the signature over tbsData shall be computed using the EA private key corresponding to its publicVerificationKey found in the referenced EA certificate -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_04_BV -# Within the headerInfo of the tbsData, the psid shall be set to secured certificate request as assigned in ETSI TS 102 965 and the generationTime shall be present -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_05_BV -# Within the headerInfo of the tbsData, aside from psid and generationTime, all other components of the component tbsData.headerInfo not used and absent -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_06_BV -# The EtsiTS102941Data shall contain the version set to v1 (integer value set to 1) and the content set to InnerECResponse -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_07_BV -# The InnerECResponse shall contain the requestHash, which is the left-most 16 octets of the SHA256 digest of the EtsiTs103097Data - Signed structure received in the request and a responseCode indicating the result of the request -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_08_BV -# If the responseCode is 0, the InnerECResponse shall also contain an (enrolment) certificate -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_09_BV -# If the responseCode is different than 0, the InnerECResponse shall not contain a certificate -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_10_BV -# Check that signing of Enrolment response message is permitted by the EA certificate -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_11_BV -# Check that generated EC certificate contains only allowed permissions -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_12_BV - -# The AuthorizationValidationResponse message shall be sent by the EA to the AA across the interface at reference point S4 in response to a received AuthorizationValidationRequest message -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_AUTHVAL_RCV_01_BV -# Check that EA doesn't accept Authorization Validation Request when SharedAtRequest is signed with certificate without appropriate permissions -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_AUTHVAL_RCV_02_BI - -# The EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted is build with the component recipients containing one instance of RecipientInfo of choice pskRecipInfo, which contains the HashedId8 of the symmetric key used by the ITS-S to encrypt the AuthorizationRequest message to which the response is built and the component ciphertext containing the encrypted representation of the EtsiTs103097Data-Signed. The encryption uses a ETSI TS 103 097 [3] approved algorithm -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_AUTHVAL_01_BV -# To read an authorization validation response, the AA shall receive an EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted structure, containing a EtsiTs103097Data-Signed structure, containing a EtsiTs102941Data structure, containing an AuthorizationValidationResponse structure -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_AUTHVAL_02_BV -# The AuthorizationValidationResponse structure contains the requestHash being the left-most 16 octets of the SHA256 digest of the EtsiTs103097Data-Signed structure received in the AuthorizationValidationRequest and a responseCode -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_AUTHVAL_03_BV -# If the responseCode is 0, the AuthorizationValidationResponse structure contains the component confirmedSubjectAttributes with the attributes the EA wishes to confirm, except for certIssuePermissions which is not allowed to be present -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_AUTHVAL_04_BV -# If the responseCode is different than 0, the AuthorizationValidationResponse structure does not contain the component confirmedSubjectAttributes -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_AUTHVAL_05_BV -# The component version of the EtsiTs102941Data structure is set to v1 (integer value set to 1) -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_AUTHVAL_06_BV - -# Check that the EA/AA is able to decrypt the AuthorizationRequest message using the encryption private key corresponding to the recipient certificate... -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_01_BV -# Check that the AA is able to decrypt the AuthorizationRequest message using the encryption private key corresponding to the recipient certificate... -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_02_BV -# Check that the AA skips the AuthorizationRequest message if it is not addressed to this AA -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_03_BI -# Check that the AA skips the AuthorizationRequest message if it unable to decrypt the encKey -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_04_BI -# Check that the AA skips the AuthorizationRequest message if it unable to decrypt the encKey -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_05_BI -# Check that the AA rejects the AuthorizationRequest message if it unable to verify the POP signature -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_06_BI -# Check that the AA rejects the AuthorizationRequest message if it unable to verify the integrity of the request using hmacKey -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_07_BI -# Send a correctly encoded AT request, but the ITS-Station is not enrolled at the EA -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_08_BI -# Send an AT request, but the inner signer (valid EC) is not issued by the EA which is known / trusted by the AA. The AA trusts only EAs listet on the RCA-CTL -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_09_BI -# Send an AT request, but the generation time of the CSR is in the past -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_10_BI -# Send an AT request, but the generation time of the CSR is in the future -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_11_BI -# Send an AT request, but the expiry date of the CSR is before the start date of the EC -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_12_BI -# Send an AT request, but the start date of the CSR is before the start date of the EC -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_13_BI -# Send an AT request, but the expiry date of the CSR is after the expiry date of the EC -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_14_BI -# Send an AT request, but the start date of the CSR is after the expiring date of the EC -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_15_BI -# Send an AT request, but the expiry date of the CSR is after now + maximum pre-loading period (considering values in C-ITS CP) -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_16_BI - -# Check that the AA sends AuthorizationValidationRequest after receiving of the AuthorizationRequest -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTHVAL_01_BV - -# Check that the RootCA generates the Full CTL when new EA is about to be added to the Root CTL -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_RCA_CTLGEN_01_BV -# Check that the RootCA generates the CRL signed with appropriate certificate. -ItsPki_TestCases.TC_RCA_CRLGEN_01_BV - -# Check that the TLM generates the ECTL when new RootCA is about to be added -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_TLM_ECTLGEN_01_BV - -[MAIN_CONTROLLER] -# The options herein control the behavior of MC. -KillTimer := 10.0 -LocalAddress := 127.0.0.1 -TCPPort := 12000 -NumHCs := 1 - diff --git a/etc/AtsPki/AtsPki_Ctag.cfg_ b/etc/AtsPki/AtsPki_Ctag.cfg_ index 5ace087f50b4dbc66f1a0e2f239bcc3752455ccc..8df2dfb2d64ba31edf28b6dd6f4787f61f544763 100644 --- a/etc/AtsPki/AtsPki_Ctag.cfg_ +++ b/etc/AtsPki/AtsPki_Ctag.cfg_ @@ -29,14 +29,28 @@ LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_HTTP_GET_URI_CTL := "/DC/getctl/74c997bd5cc4562a" LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_HTTP_GET_URI_CRL := "/DC/getcrl/74c997bd5cc4562a" LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_HTTP_GET_URI_ECTL := "" -LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_ITS_S_CANONICAL_ID := '504b4945532d4653432d303030303031'O # Nist-P256 -#LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_ITS_S_CANONICAL_ID := '504b4945532d4653432d303030303032'O # Brainpool-P256 r1 -#LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_ITS_S_CANONICAL_ID := '504b4945532d4653432d303030303033'O # Brainpool-P384 r1 - -LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_TS_EA_CERTIFICATE_ID := "CERT_CTAG_PKI_EA" -LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_TS_AA_CERTIFICATE_ID := "CERT_TS_A_AA" -LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_IUT_AA_CERTIFICATE_ID := "CERT_CTAG_PKI_AA" -LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_TS_CA_CERTIFICATE_ID := "CERT_CTAG_PKI_RCA" +#LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_SIMULATE_EA_ENTITY := true # CERT_TS_A_EA shall be trusted by the PKI +LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_TS_EA_CERTIFICATE_ID := "CERT_TS_A_EA" #"MICROSEC_EA_77C0DE13A375774D" # Use CERT_TS_A_EA when the TS simulate the EA (TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTHVAL_01_BV) with PICS_SIMULATE_EA_ENTITY set +LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_TS_AA_CERTIFICATE_ID := "CERT_TS_A_AA" # CERT_TS_A_AA & CERT_IUT_A_RCA shall be trusted by the PKI +LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_IUT_AA_CERTIFICATE_ID := "MICROSEC_AA_43166B9022583C61" +LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_TS_CA_CERTIFICATE_ID := "MICROSEC_RCA_B65E3B8FBBEC3910" + +LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_ITS_S_CANONICAL_ID := '455453492D5465737453797374656D2D3031'O # Nist-P256 +#LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_ITS_S_CANONICAL_ID := '455453492D5465737453797374656D2D3032'O # Brainpool-P256 r1 +#LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_ITS_S_CANONICAL_ID := '455453492D5465737453797374656D2D3033'O # Brainpool-P384 r1 + +# Technical keys +# Private key +#FE95786F01D7E1666CCDFAB7BAEE9BF9B30BBEA15A838A58994E65E684A8BB34 +# Public key +#048038F5490CD5A58FF5465D3B577EE830047336AC5DAC07036B798AAECAE7273FD91C4F60995494EA949E64EE0E3D768DBDEB8AFC345627211E3FC4DD8FD39EE5 +LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_ITS_S_SIGN_NITSP256_PRIVATE_KEY := 'FE95786F01D7E1666CCDFAB7BAEE9BF9B30BBEA15A838A58994E65E684A8BB34'O; +LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_ITS_S_SIGN_NISTP256_PUBLIC_KEY := '038038f5490cd5a58ff5465d3b577ee830047336ac5dac07036b798aaecae7273f'O; + +# Set to true if the IUT support CertificateId shall be set to the choice name, false if it shall be omitted +#LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_EC_SUBJECT_ATTRIBUT_ID := false # requestedSubjectAttributes.id is omitted +# Set to true if the IUT support geographical region +#LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_EC_SUBJECT_ATTRIBUT_REGION := false # requestedSubjectAttributes.region is omitted #LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_PKI_AUTH_POP := false # Do not use Signed for PoP in Authorization requet # Required for SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_02_BV @@ -44,11 +58,15 @@ LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_TS_CA_CERTIFICATE_ID := "CERT_CTAG_PKI_RCA" #LibItsPki_Pixits.PX_INCLUDE_ENCRYPTION_KEYS := false # No encryption key in Authorization request -#LibItsPki_Pixits.PX_VE_ALG := e_brainpool_p256_r1 # e_nist_p256, e_brainpool_p256_r1 or e_brainpool_p384_r1 -#LibItsPki_Pixits.PX_EC_ALG_FOR_EC := e_brainpool_p256_r1 # e_nist_p256, e_brainpool_p256_r1 -#LibItsPki_Pixits.PX_EC_ALG_FOR_ATV := e_brainpool_p256_r1 # e_nist_p256, e_brainpool_p256_r1 -#LibItsPki_Pixits.PX_EC_ALG_FOR_EC_SIGN := e_brainpool_p256_r1 # e_nist_p256, e_brainpool_p256_r1 -#LibItsPki_Pixits.PX_EC_ALG_FOR_AT := e_brainpool_p256_r1 # e_nist_p256, e_brainpool_p256_r1 +#LibItsPki_Pixits.PX_VE_ALG := e_brainpool_p256_r1 # e_nist_p256 or e_brainpool_p384_r1 + +#LibItsPki_Pixits.PX_EC_ALG_FOR_EC := e_brainpool_p256_r1 # e_nist_p256 or e_brainpool_p256_r1 +#LibItsPki_Pixits.PX_EC_ALG_FOR_AT := e_brainpool_p256_r1 # e_nist_p256 or e_brainpool_p256_r1 +#LibItsPki_Pixits.PX_EC_ALG_FOR_EC_SIGN := e_brainpool_p256_r1 # e_nist_p256 or e_brainpool_p256_r1 +#LibItsPki_Pixits.PX_EC_ALG_FOR_ATV := e_brainpool_p256_r1 # e_nist_p256 or e_brainpool_p256_r1 + +LibItsSecurity_Pics.PICS_SEC_CIRCULAR_REGION := false +LibItsSecurity_Pics.PICS_SEC_RECTANGULAR_REGION := true [LOGGING] # In this section you can specify the name of the log file and the classes of events diff --git a/etc/AtsPki/AtsPki_Escrypt.cfg_ b/etc/AtsPki/AtsPki_Etas.cfg_ similarity index 58% rename from etc/AtsPki/AtsPki_Escrypt.cfg_ rename to etc/AtsPki/AtsPki_Etas.cfg_ index 58e8a07e7c5f483afc54d51106a16e228e687b92..be2fa0b99a4c47c5d212078c5b437bdbff8b7521 100644 --- a/etc/AtsPki/AtsPki_Escrypt.cfg_ +++ b/etc/AtsPki/AtsPki_Etas.cfg_ @@ -2,6 +2,12 @@ [MODULE_PARAMETERS] # This section shall contain the values of all parameters that are defined in your TTCN-3 modules. +# Reduce LibCom Timeout +LibCommon_Sync.PX_TSYNC_TIME_LIMIT := 40.0 +LibCommon_Sync.PX_TSHUT_DOWN_TIME_LIMIT := 40.0 +LibCommon_Time.PX_TDONE := 40.0 +LibCommon_Time.PX_TWAIT := 40.0 + # Enable Security support LibItsGeoNetworking_Pics.PICS_GN_SECURITY := true # Root path to access certificate stored in files, identified by certficate ID @@ -16,39 +22,60 @@ LibItsHttp_Pics.PICS_HEADER_CTL_CONTENT_TYPE := "application/x-its-crl" LibItsHttp_Pics.PICS_HEADER_CONTENT_TYPE := "application/x-its-request" LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_MULTIPLE_END_POINT := false -LibItsHttp_Pics.PICS_HEADER_HOST := "test.bsi.v2x-pilot.escrypt.com" +LibItsHttp_Pics.PICS_HEADER_HOST := "eta01s.staging.cycurv2x.com" LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_HTTP_POST_URI_EC := "/ea/enrolment" LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_HTTP_POST_URI_AT := "/aa/authorization" LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_HTTP_POST_URI_ATV := "/ea/validation" -#LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_HTTP_GET_URI_CTL := "/getctl/1D3C7B499A054F8C"; -#LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_HTTP_GET_URI_CRL := "/getcrl/1D3C7B499A054F8C"; -#LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_HTTP_GET_URI_ECTL := "/data/certificates/ectl/ECTL_TEST_ETSI-PLUGTEST_6.0_2019-11-07.oer" +#LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_HTTP_GET_URI_DC := "/dc/getcertificate/BB81777EC895ADAD" +#LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_HTTP_GET_URI_CTL := "/dc/getctl/BB81777EC895ADAD" +#LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_HTTP_GET_URI_CRL := "/dc/getcrl/BB81777EC895ADAD" +#LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_HTTP_GET_URI_TLM := "/data/certificates/ectl/ECTL_TEST_ETSI-PLUGTEST_6.0_2019-11-07.oer" + +#LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_SIMULATE_EA_ENTITY := true # CERT_TS_A_EA shall be trusted by the PKI +LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_TS_EA_CERTIFICATE_ID := "ETAS_EA_F87F85D310863027" # Use CERT_TS_A_EA when the TS simulate the EA (TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTHVAL_01_BV) with PICS_SIMULATE_EA_ENTITY set +LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_TS_AA_CERTIFICATE_ID := "CERT_TS_A_AA" # CERT_TS_A_AA & CERT_IUT_A_RCA shall be trusted by the PKI +LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_IUT_AA_CERTIFICATE_ID := "ETAS_AA_290CACBD9E56E0F3" +LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_TS_CA_CERTIFICATE_ID := "ETAS_RCA_BB81777EC895ADAD" + +LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_ITS_S_CANONICAL_ID := '455453492d5465737453797374656d2d'O +#LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_ITS_S_CANONICAL_ID := '455453492d5465737453797374656d2e'O # Brainpool-P256 r1 +#LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_ITS_S_CANONICAL_ID := '455453492d5465737453797374656d5f'O # Brainpool-P384 r1 -LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_ITS_S_CANONICAL_ID := '455453492D4954532D30303100000000'O +# Technical keys +# Private key +#FE95786F01D7E1666CCDFAB7BAEE9BF9B30BBEA15A838A58994E65E684A8BB34 +# Public key +# 04278aafdf017b60c8244e56c2458350510444a22a92c6d0484e865eceaf4ba723134fddd6b527b784e6f7ca15f8b9f6a06b57d8074083628a25b9a36075cb24c8 +LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_ITS_S_SIGN_NITSP256_PRIVATE_KEY := '5dca486322033315e1791ee2a61d3717082aef9cc7e27e29b76fe9c722824f98'O; +LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_ITS_S_SIGN_NISTP256_PUBLIC_KEY := '02278aafdf017b60c8244e56c2458350510444a22a92c6d0484e865eceaf4ba723'O; -LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_TS_EA_CERTIFICATE_ID := "CERT_ESCRYPT_PKI_EA" -LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_TS_AA_CERTIFICATE_ID := "CERT_TS_A_AA" -LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_IUT_AA_CERTIFICATE_ID := "CERT_ESCRYPT_PKI_AA" -LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_TS_CA_CERTIFICATE_ID := "CERT_ESCRYPT_PKI_RCA" +# Set to true if the IUT support CertificateId shall be set to the choice name, false if it shall be omitted +LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_EC_SUBJECT_ATTRIBUT_ID := false # requestedSubjectAttributes.id is omitted +# Set to true if the IUT support geographical region +LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_EC_SUBJECT_ATTRIBUT_REGION := false # requestedSubjectAttributes.region is omitted -#LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_ITS_S_WITH_PRIVACY := false #LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_PKI_AUTH_POP := false # Do not use Signed for PoP in Authorization requet # Required for SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_02_BV #LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_SECPKI_REENROLMENT := false # Check in logs the pattern '==> EC ' to find the required information for re-enrolment + #LibItsPki_Pixits.PX_INCLUDE_ENCRYPTION_KEYS := false # No encryption key in Authorization request -#LibItsPki_Pixits.PX_VE_ALG := e_brainpool_p256_r1 # e_nist_p256, e_brainpool_p256_r1 or e_brainpool_p384_r1 -#LibItsPki_Pixits.PX_EC_ALG_FOR_EC := e_brainpool_p256_r1 # e_nist_p256, e_brainpool_p256_r1 -#LibItsPki_Pixits.PX_EC_ALG_FOR_ATV := e_brainpool_p256_r1 # e_nist_p256, e_brainpool_p256_r1 -#LibItsPki_Pixits.PX_EC_ALG_FOR_EC_SIGN := e_brainpool_p256_r1 # e_nist_p256, e_brainpool_p256_r1 -#LibItsPki_Pixits.PX_EC_ALG_FOR_AT := e_brainpool_p256_r1 # e_nist_p256, e_brainpool_p256_r1 +#LibItsPki_Pixits.PX_VE_ALG := e_brainpool_p256_r1 # e_nist_p256 or e_brainpool_p384_r1 + +#LibItsPki_Pixits.PX_EC_ALG_FOR_EC := e_brainpool_p256_r1 # e_nist_p256 or e_brainpool_p256_r1 +#LibItsPki_Pixits.PX_EC_ALG_FOR_AT := e_brainpool_p256_r1 # e_nist_p256 or e_brainpool_p256_r1 +#LibItsPki_Pixits.PX_EC_ALG_FOR_EC_SIGN := e_brainpool_p256_r1 # e_nist_p256 or e_brainpool_p256_r1 +#LibItsPki_Pixits.PX_EC_ALG_FOR_ATV := e_brainpool_p256_r1 # e_nist_p256 or e_brainpool_p256_r1 + +LibItsSecurity_Pics.PICS_SEC_CIRCULAR_REGION := false +LibItsSecurity_Pics.PICS_SEC_RECTANGULAR_REGION := false [LOGGING] # In this section you can specify the name of the log file and the classes of events # you want to log into the file or display on console (standard error). -LogFile := "../logs/%e.%h-%r.%s" +LogFile := "../logs/AtsPki/%e.%h-%r.%s" FileMask := LOG_ALL | USER | DEBUG | MATCHING ConsoleMask := LOG_ALL | USER | DEBUG | MATCHING #FileMask := ERROR | WARNING | USER | MATCHING | EXECUTOR_RUNTIME | VERDICTOP @@ -60,9 +87,19 @@ LogEventTypes:= Yes [TESTPORT_PARAMETERS] # Single HTTP component port -system.httpPort.params := "HTTP(codecs=http_its:http_etsi_ieee1609dot2_codec)/TCP(debug=1,server=test.bsi.v2x-pilot.escrypt.com)" +#system.httpPort.params := "HTTP(codecs=http_its:http_etsi_ieee1609dot2_codec)/TCP(debug=1,server=eta01s.staging.cycurv2x.com)" +# Single HTTP component port TC_PKI_PLTF_RCV_BV_01 +system.httpPort.params := "HTTP(codecs=http_its:http_etsi_ieee1609dot2_codec)/TCP(debug=1,server_mode=1,server=192.168.1.43)" [EXECUTE] +# Config: +# LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_SIMULATE_EA_ENTITY := false # CERT_TS_A_EA shall be trusted by the PKI +# LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_TS_EA_CERTIFICATE_ID := PKI EA cert +# LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_TS_AA_CERTIFICATE_ID := "CERT_TS_A_AA" # CERT_TS_A_AA & CERT_IUT_A_RCA shall be trusted by the PKI +# LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_IUT_AA_CERTIFICATE_ID := PKI AA cert +# LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_TS_CA_CERTIFICATE_ID := PKI RCA cert +# system.httpPort.params := TCP(server=eta01s.staging.cycurv2x.com) + # The EnrolmentResponse message shall be sent by the EA to the ITS-S across the interface at reference point S3 in response to a received EnrolmentRequest message #ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_01_BV @@ -93,32 +130,32 @@ system.httpPort.params := "HTTP(codecs=http_its:http_etsi_ieee1609dot2_codec)/TC #ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_13_BI # The EnrolmentResponse message shall be encrypted using an ETSI TS 103 097 approved algorithm and the encryption shall be done with the same AES key as the one used by the ITS-S requestor for the encryption of the EnrolmentRequest message. -ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_01_BV +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_01_BV # The EnrolmentResponse message shall be encrypted using an ETSI TS 103 097 approved algorithm and the encryption shall be done with the same AES key as the one used by the ITS-S requestor for the encryption of the EnrolmentRequest message. -ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_02_BV +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_02_BV # The outermost structure is an EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted structure containing the component recipients containing one instance of RecipientInfo of choice pskRecipInfo, which contains the HashedId8 of the symmetric key used by the ITS-S to encrypt the EnrolmentRequest message to which the response is built and containing the component ciphertext, once decrypted, contains an EtsiTs103097Data-Signed structure -ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_03_BV +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_03_BV # If the ITS-S has been able to decrypt the content, this expected EtsiTs103097Data-Signed structure shall contain hashId, tbsData, signer and signature. The hashId shall indicate the hash algorithm to be used as specified in ETSI TS 103 097, the signer shall be declared as a digest, containing the HashedId8 of the EA certificate and the signature over tbsData shall be computed using the EA private key corresponding to its publicVerificationKey found in the referenced EA certificate -ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_04_BV +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_04_BV # Within the headerInfo of the tbsData, the psid shall be set to secured certificate request as assigned in ETSI TS 102 965 and the generationTime shall be present -ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_05_BV +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_05_BV # Within the headerInfo of the tbsData, aside from psid and generationTime, all other components of the component tbsData.headerInfo not used and absent -ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_06_BV +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_06_BV # The EtsiTS102941Data shall contain the version set to v1 (integer value set to 1) and the content set to InnerECResponse -ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_07_BV +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_07_BV # The InnerECResponse shall contain the requestHash, which is the left-most 16 octets of the SHA256 digest of the EtsiTs103097Data - Signed structure received in the request and a responseCode indicating the result of the request -ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_08_BV +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_08_BV # If the responseCode is 0, the InnerECResponse shall also contain an (enrolment) certificate -ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_09_BV +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_09_BV # If the responseCode is different than 0, the InnerECResponse shall not contain a certificate -ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_10_BV +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_10_BV # Check that signing of Enrolment response message is permitted by the EA certificate -ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_11_BV +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_11_BV # Check that generated EC certificate contains only allowed permissions -ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_12_BV +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_12_BV # The AuthorizationValidationResponse message shall be sent by the EA to the AA across the interface at reference point S4 in response to a received AuthorizationValidationRequest message -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_AUTHVAL_RCV_01_BV +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_AUTHVAL_RCV_01_BV <===== # Check that EA doesn't accept Authorization Validation Request when SharedAtRequest is signed with certificate without appropriate permissions #ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_AUTHVAL_RCV_02_BI @@ -135,6 +172,14 @@ ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_12_BV # The component version of the EtsiTs102941Data structure is set to v1 (integer value set to 1) #ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_AUTHVAL_06_BV +# Config: +# LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_SIMULATE_EA_ENTITY := true # CERT_TS_A_EA shall be trusted by the PKI +# LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_TS_EA_CERTIFICATE_ID := CERT_TS_A_EA +# LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_TS_AA_CERTIFICATE_ID := "CERT_TS_A_AA" # CERT_TS_A_AA & CERT_IUT_A_RCA shall be trusted by the PKI +# LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_IUT_AA_CERTIFICATE_ID := PKI AA cert +# LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_TS_CA_CERTIFICATE_ID := PKI RCA cert +# system.httpAtVPort.params := TCP(server=server=192.168.1.43) + # Check that the EA/AA is able to decrypt the AuthorizationRequest message using the encryption private key corresponding to the recipient certificate... #ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_01_BV # Check that the AA is able to decrypt the AuthorizationRequest message using the encryption private key corresponding to the recipient certificate... @@ -171,14 +216,66 @@ ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_12_BV # Check that the AA sends AuthorizationValidationRequest after receiving of the AuthorizationRequest #ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTHVAL_01_BV +# Config: +# system.httpCaPort.params := TCP(debug=1,server=eta01s.staging.cycurv2x.com) # Check that the RootCA generates the Full CTL when new EA is about to be added to the Root CTL #ItsPki_TestCases.TC_RCA_CTLGEN_01_BV # Check that the RootCA generates the CRL when CA certificate is about to be revoked #ItsPki_TestCases.TC_RCA_CRLGEN_02_BV - # Check that the TLM generates the ECTL when new RootCA is about to be added #ItsPki_TestCases.TC_TLM_ECTLGEN_01_BV +# Check that the issuing certificate has version 3 +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_01_BV +# Check that the issuing certificate has type explicit +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_02_BV_01 +# Check that the CA, been authorized using explicit certificate, is able to issue an implicit certificate +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_02_BV_02 +# Check that the CA, been authorized using explicit certificate, is able to issue an implicit certificate +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_02_BV_03 +# Check that the CA, been authorized using implicit certificate, does not issue an explicit certificate +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_02_BO_01 +# Check that CA issues certificate conformed to ETSI TS 103 097 [1], clause 6 +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_03_BV +# Check that the certificate issuer of certificates is referenced using digest. Check that right digest field is used to reference to the certificate +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_04_BV +# Check that the CA is able to issue the certificate with the well-formed circular region validity restriction +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_05_BV +# Check that the CA is able to issue the certificate with the well-formed rectangular region validity restriction +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_06_BV +# Check that the CA is able to issue the certificate with the well-formed polygonal region validity restriction +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_07_BV +# Check that the CA is able to issue the certificate with identified region validity restriction contains values that correspond to numeric country codes as defined by United Nations Statistics Division [5] +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_08_BV +# Check that the identified region validity restriction of the subordinate certificate is included in the identified region validity restriction of the issuing certificate +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_09_BV +# Check that the certificate signature contains ECC point of type set to either compressed_lsb_y_0, compressed_lsb_y_1 or x_coordinate_only +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_10_BV +# Check that the certificate verification key contains ECC point of type set to either compressed_lsb_y_0, compressed_lsb_y_1 or uncompressed +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_11_BV +# Check that the certificate encryption key contains ECC point of type set to either compressed_lsb_y_0, compressed_lsb_y_1 or uncompressed +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_12_BV +# Check the explicit certificate signature +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_13_BV_01 +# Check the explicit certificate signature +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_13_BV_02 +# Check that all PSID entries of the appPermissions component of the certificate are unique +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_14_BV +# Check that all PSID entries of the appPermissions component of the certificate are also contained in the certIssuePermissions component in the issuing certificate +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_15_BV +# Check that all PSID entries of the certIssuePermissions component of the certificate are unique +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_16_BV +# Check that SSP field in each entry of the appPermissions component of the AT certificate is equal to or a subset of the SSP Range in the corresponding issuing entry +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_17_BV +# Check that the validityPeriod of the subordinate certificate is inside the validityPeriod of the issuing certificate +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_18_BV + +# Config: +# system.httpCaPort.params := TCP(debug=1,server_mode=1,server=192.168.1.43) +# Await CTL request and provides "CERT_IUT_A_RCA", "CERT_TS_A_AA", "CERT_TS_A_EA" certificates +# PKI platform simu +ItsPki_TestCases.TC_PKI_PLTF_RCV_BV_01 + [MAIN_CONTROLLER] # The options herein control the behavior of MC. KillTimer := 10.0 diff --git a/etc/AtsPki/AtsPki_Microsec.cfg_ b/etc/AtsPki/AtsPki_Microsec.cfg_ index f4ad5c3da2e85092a3a275dfb5de324fcd2810d5..b51c5f224b65d5554797d7edbb6e856713f19c56 100644 --- a/etc/AtsPki/AtsPki_Microsec.cfg_ +++ b/etc/AtsPki/AtsPki_Microsec.cfg_ @@ -21,16 +21,17 @@ LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_HTTP_POST_URI_AT := "/v2x_aa_nistp256/atRequest" LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_HTTP_POST_URI_ATV := "/v2x_ea_nistp256/authValRequest" LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_HTTP_GET_URI_CTL := "/v2x_rootca_nistp256/getctl/B65E3B8FBBEC3910" LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_HTTP_GET_URI_CRL := "/v2x_rootca_nistp256/getcrl/B65E3B8FBBEC3910" -LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_HTTP_GET_URI_ECTL := "/v2x_rootca_brainpoolp256r1" +LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_HTTP_GET_URI_TLM := "/v2x_rootca_brainpoolp256r1" -LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_TS_EA_CERTIFICATE_ID := "MICROSEC_EA_77C0DE13A375774D" -LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_TS_AA_CERTIFICATE_ID := "CERT_TS_A_AA" -LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_IUT_AA_CERTIFICATE_ID := "MICROSEC_AA_43166B9022583C61" -LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_TS_CA_CERTIFICATE_ID := "MICROSEC_RCA_B65E3B8FBBEC3910" +#LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_SIMULATE_EA_ENTITY := true # CERT_TS_A_EA shall be trusted by the PKI +LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_TS_EA_CERTIFICATE_ID := "MICROSEC_EA_77C0DE13A375774D" # Use CERT_TS_A_EA when the TS simulate the EA (TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTHVAL_01_BV) with PICS_SIMULATE_EA_ENTITY set +LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_TS_AA_CERTIFICATE_ID := "CERT_TS_A_AA" # CERT_TS_A_AA & CERT_IUT_A_RCA shall be trusted by the PKI +LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_IUT_AA_CERTIFICATE_ID := "MICROSEC_AA_43166B9022583C61" +LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_TS_CA_CERTIFICATE_ID := "MICROSEC_RCA_B65E3B8FBBEC3910" -LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_ITS_S_CANONICAL_ID := '455453492D5465737453797374656D2D3031'O # Nist-P256 -#LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_ITS_S_CANONICAL_ID := '455453492D5465737453797374656D2D3032'O # Brainpool-P256 r1 -#LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_ITS_S_CANONICAL_ID := '455453492D5465737453797374656D2D3033'O # Brainpool-P384 r1 +LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_ITS_S_CANONICAL_ID := '455453492D5465737453797374656D2D3031'O # Nist-P256 +#LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_ITS_S_CANONICAL_ID := '455453492D5465737453797374656D2D3032'O # Brainpool-P256 r1 +#LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_ITS_S_CANONICAL_ID := '455453492D5465737453797374656D2D3033'O # Brainpool-P384 r1 # Technical keys # Private key @@ -41,7 +42,9 @@ LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_ITS_S_SIGN_NITSP256_PRIVATE_KEY := 'FE95786F01D7E1666CCDFAB7 LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_ITS_S_SIGN_NISTP256_PUBLIC_KEY := '038038f5490cd5a58ff5465d3b577ee830047336ac5dac07036b798aaecae7273f'O; # Set to true if the IUT support CertificateId shall be set to the choice name, false if it shall be omitted -LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_EC_SUBJECT_ATTRIBUT_ID := false # requestedSubjectAttributes.id is omitted +#LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_EC_SUBJECT_ATTRIBUT_ID := false # requestedSubjectAttributes.id is omitted +# Set to true if the IUT support geographical region +#LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_EC_SUBJECT_ATTRIBUT_REGION := false # requestedSubjectAttributes.region is omitted #LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_PKI_AUTH_POP := false # Do not use Signed for PoP in Authorization requet # Required for SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_02_BV @@ -75,17 +78,24 @@ LogEventTypes:= Yes [TESTPORT_PARAMETERS] # Single HTTP component port -#system.httpPort.params := "HTTP(codecs=http_its:http_etsi_ieee1609dot2_codec)/TCP(debug=1,server=139.191.221.21,use_ssl=1)" system.httpPort.params := "HTTP(codecs=http_its:http_etsi_ieee1609dot2_codec)/TCP(debug=1,server=v2x-pki-test.microsec.com)" -system.httpAtVPort.params := "HTTP(codecs=http_its:http_etsi_ieee1609dot2_codec)/TCP(debug=1,server_mode=1,server=yanngarcia.ddns.net)" # HTTP component ports specific to TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTHVAL_xx +#system.httpAtVPort.params := "HTTP(codecs=http_its:http_etsi_ieee1609dot2_codec)/TCP(debug=1,server_mode=1,server=yanngarcia.ddns.net)" # HTTP component ports specific to TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTHVAL_xx system.httpCaPort.params := "HTTP(codecs=http_its:http_etsi_ieee1609dot2_codec)/TCP(debug=1,server=v2x-pki-test.microsec.com)" -system.httpTlmPort.params := "HTTP(codecs=http_its:http_etsi_ieee1609dot2_codec)/TCP(debug=1,server=v2x-pki-test.microsec.com)" +#system.httpCaPort.params := "HTTP(codecs=http_its:http_etsi_ieee1609dot2_codec)/TCP(debug=1,server_mode=1,server=192.168.1.43)"system.httpTlmPort.params := "HTTP(codecs=http_its:http_etsi_ieee1609dot2_codec)/TCP(debug=1,server=v2x-pki-test.microsec.com)" [EXECUTE] +# Config: +# LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_SIMULATE_EA_ENTITY := false # CERT_TS_A_EA shall be trusted by the PKI +# LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_TS_EA_CERTIFICATE_ID := PKI EA cert +# LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_TS_AA_CERTIFICATE_ID := "CERT_TS_A_AA" # CERT_TS_A_AA & CERT_IUT_A_RCA shall be trusted by the PKI +# LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_IUT_AA_CERTIFICATE_ID := PKI AA cert +# LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_TS_CA_CERTIFICATE_ID := PKI RCA cert +# system.httpAtVPort.params := TCP(server=0.atos-ea.l0.c-its-pki.eu) + # The EnrolmentResponse message shall be sent by the EA to the ITS-S across the interface at reference point S3 in response to a received EnrolmentRequest message -#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_01_BV +ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_01_BV # Check that EA doesn't accept Enrolment rekeying request when enrolment is not permitted by signing certificate (not containing an item of type PsidSsp) #ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_02_BI_01 @@ -114,7 +124,7 @@ system.httpTlmPort.params := "HTTP(codecs=http_its:http_etsi_ieee1609dot2_codec) #ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_RCV_13_BI # The EnrolmentResponse message shall be encrypted using an ETSI TS 103 097 approved algorithm and the encryption shall be done with the same AES key as the one used by the ITS-S requestor for the encryption of the EnrolmentRequest message. -ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_01_BV +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_01_BV # The EnrolmentResponse message shall be encrypted using an ETSI TS 103 097 approved algorithm and the encryption shall be done with the same AES key as the one used by the ITS-S requestor for the encryption of the EnrolmentRequest message. #ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_02_BV # The outermost structure is an EtsiTs103097Data-Encrypted structure containing the component recipients containing one instance of RecipientInfo of choice pskRecipInfo, which contains the HashedId8 of the symmetric key used by the ITS-S to encrypt the EnrolmentRequest message to which the response is built and containing the component ciphertext, once decrypted, contains an EtsiTs103097Data-Signed structure @@ -156,10 +166,18 @@ ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_01_BV # The component version of the EtsiTs102941Data structure is set to v1 (integer value set to 1) #ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_AUTHVAL_06_BV +# Config: +# LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_SIMULATE_EA_ENTITY := true # CERT_TS_A_EA shall be trusted by the PKI +# LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_TS_EA_CERTIFICATE_ID := CERT_TS_A_EA +# LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_TS_AA_CERTIFICATE_ID := "CERT_TS_A_AA" # CERT_TS_A_AA & CERT_IUT_A_RCA shall be trusted by the PKI +# LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_IUT_AA_CERTIFICATE_ID := PKI AA cert +# LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_TS_CA_CERTIFICATE_ID := PKI RCA cert +# system.httpAtVPort.params := TCP(server=server=192.168.1.43) + # Check that the EA/AA is able to decrypt the AuthorizationRequest message using the encryption private key corresponding to the recipient certificate... #ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_01_BV # Check that the AA is able to decrypt the AuthorizationRequest message using the encryption private key corresponding to the recipient certificate... -##ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_02_BV +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_02_BV # Check that the AA skips the AuthorizationRequest message if it is not addressed to this AA #ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTH_RCV_03_BI # Check that the AA skips the AuthorizationRequest message if it unable to decrypt the encKey @@ -192,14 +210,65 @@ ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_EA_ENR_01_BV # Check that the AA sends AuthorizationValidationRequest after receiving of the AuthorizationRequest #ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_AA_AUTHVAL_01_BV +# Config: +# system.httpCaPort.params := TCP(debug=1,server=v2x-pki-test.microsec.com # Check that the RootCA generates the Full CTL when new EA is about to be added to the Root CTL #ItsPki_TestCases.TC_RCA_CTLGEN_01_BV # Check that the RootCA generates the CRL signed with appropriate certificate. #ItsPki_TestCases.TC_RCA_CRLGEN_01_BV - # Check that the TLM generates the ECTL when new RootCA is about to be added #ItsPki_TestCases.TC_TLM_ECTLGEN_01_BV +# Check that the issuing certificate has version 3 +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_01_BV +# Check that the issuing certificate has type explicit +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_02_BV_01 +# Check that the CA, been authorized using explicit certificate, is able to issue an implicit certificate +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_02_BV_02 +# Check that the CA, been authorized using explicit certificate, is able to issue an implicit certificate +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_02_BV_03 +# Check that the CA, been authorized using implicit certificate, does not issue an explicit certificate +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_02_BO_01 +# Check that CA issues certificate conformed to ETSI TS 103 097 [1], clause 6 +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_03_BV +# Check that the certificate issuer of certificates is referenced using digest. Check that right digest field is used to reference to the certificate +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_04_BV +# Check that the CA is able to issue the certificate with the well-formed circular region validity restriction +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_05_BV +# Check that the CA is able to issue the certificate with the well-formed rectangular region validity restriction +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_06_BV +# Check that the CA is able to issue the certificate with the well-formed polygonal region validity restriction +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_07_BV +# Check that the CA is able to issue the certificate with identified region validity restriction contains values that correspond to numeric country codes as defined by United Nations Statistics Division [5] +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_08_BV +# Check that the identified region validity restriction of the subordinate certificate is included in the identified region validity restriction of the issuing certificate +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_09_BV +# Check that the certificate signature contains ECC point of type set to either compressed_lsb_y_0, compressed_lsb_y_1 or x_coordinate_only +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_10_BV +# Check that the certificate verification key contains ECC point of type set to either compressed_lsb_y_0, compressed_lsb_y_1 or uncompressed +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_11_BV +# Check that the certificate encryption key contains ECC point of type set to either compressed_lsb_y_0, compressed_lsb_y_1 or uncompressed +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_12_BV +# Check the explicit certificate signature +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_13_BV_01 +# Check the explicit certificate signature +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_13_BV_02 +# Check that all PSID entries of the appPermissions component of the certificate are unique +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_14_BV +# Check that all PSID entries of the appPermissions component of the certificate are also contained in the certIssuePermissions component in the issuing certificate +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_15_BV +# Check that all PSID entries of the certIssuePermissions component of the certificate are unique +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_16_BV +# Check that SSP field in each entry of the appPermissions component of the AT certificate is equal to or a subset of the SSP Range in the corresponding issuing entry +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_17_BV +# Check that the validityPeriod of the subordinate certificate is inside the validityPeriod of the issuing certificate +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_CA_CERTGEN_18_BV + +# Config: +# system.httpCaPort.params := TCP(debug=1,server_mode=1,server=192.168.1.43) +# Await CTL request and provides "CERT_IUT_A_RCA", "CERT_TS_A_AA", "CERT_TS_A_EA" certificates +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_RCA_CTLGEN_xx_BV # + [MAIN_CONTROLLER] # The options herein control the behavior of MC. KillTimer := 10.0 diff --git a/etc/AtsPki/AtsPki_Simu.cfg_ b/etc/AtsPki/AtsPki_Simu.cfg_ index 0541f29e49143d0b0b8a07f5281cd0dfd973eac7..72febb32066f96889160c1655973a82a7d2005ef 100644 --- a/etc/AtsPki/AtsPki_Simu.cfg_ +++ b/etc/AtsPki/AtsPki_Simu.cfg_ @@ -49,7 +49,9 @@ LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_ITS_S_SIGN_NITSP256_PRIVATE_KEY := 'FE95786F01D7E1666CCDFAB7 LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_ITS_S_SIGN_NISTP256_PUBLIC_KEY := '038038f5490cd5a58ff5465d3b577ee830047336ac5dac07036b798aaecae7273f'O; # Set to true if the IUT support CertificateId shall be set to the choice name, false if it shall be omitted -LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_EC_SUBJECT_ATTRIBUT_ID := false # requestedSubjectAttributes.id is omitted +#LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_EC_SUBJECT_ATTRIBUT_ID := false # requestedSubjectAttributes.id is omitted +# Set to true if the IUT support geographical region +#LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_EC_SUBJECT_ATTRIBUT_REGION := false # requestedSubjectAttributes.region is omitted # Re-enrollment keys LibItsPki_Pics.PICS_SECPKI_REENROLMENT := true @@ -193,7 +195,7 @@ system.utPort.params := "UT_PKI/UDP(dst_ip=192.168.1.43,dst_port=12345,src_port= # The IUT is capable of parsing and handling of positive EnrolmentResponse messages containing the requested EC. In case of a successful enrolment, the IUT switches to the state 'enrolled' #ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_ITSS_ENR_RECV_02_BV # Check that the ITS-S send the Authorization HttpRequest message to the Authorization Authority (AA) to request an authorization ticket -ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_01_BV +#ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_01_BV # Check that the AuthorizationRequest message is encrypted and sent to only one Authorization Authority #ItsPki_TestCases.TC_SECPKI_ITSS_AUTH_02_BV # Check that the AuthorizationRequest message is encrypted using the encryptionKey found in the AA certificate referenced in recipientId diff --git a/scripts/run_tshark.bash b/scripts/run_tshark.bash index 0f7f81d707982768ca657ac15490f185c856c41b..09889dd4f8bb7fd1a70db2aedc455d3bd8da47d6 100755 --- a/scripts/run_tshark.bash +++ b/scripts/run_tshark.bash @@ -7,4 +7,5 @@ PCAP_SAVE_PATH=~/tmp rm $PCAP_SAVE_PATH/capture_*.pcap* #~/frameworks/wireshark-build/run/tshark -ieth1 -V -f"ether proto 0x8947 or udp src port 12345 or udp dst port 12345" -Tfields -eframe.time -eeth.dst -eeth.src -eeth.type -edata -g -w $PCAP_SAVE_PATH/capture_`date +'%Y%m%d'`.pcap -F pcap -~/frameworks/wireshark-build/run/tshark -ieth1 -V -f"udp port 9091 or udp port 7946" -Tfields -eframe.time -eeth.dst -eeth.src -eeth.type -edata -g -w $PCAP_SAVE_PATH/capture_`date +'%Y%m%d'`.pcap -F pcap +#~/frameworks/wireshark-build/run/tshark -ieth1 -V -f"udp port 9091 or udp port 7946" -Tfields -eframe.time -eeth.dst -eeth.src -eeth.type -edata -g -w $PCAP_SAVE_PATH/capture_`date +'%Y%m%d'`.pcap -F pcap +tcpdump -i wlp0s20f3 -vvv -xx -w $PCAP_SAVE_PATH/capture_`date +'%Y%m%d'`.pcap diff --git a/ttcn/AtsBTP b/ttcn/AtsBTP index 8220384412a2ed89fb798e322a27ae8c1b71016e..8fb9b439d6f4f84598a4f4ce52f6e420cf111832 160000 --- a/ttcn/AtsBTP +++ b/ttcn/AtsBTP @@ -1 +1 @@ -Subproject commit 8220384412a2ed89fb798e322a27ae8c1b71016e +Subproject commit 8fb9b439d6f4f84598a4f4ce52f6e420cf111832 diff --git a/ttcn/AtsIPv6OverGeoNetworking b/ttcn/AtsIPv6OverGeoNetworking index 066a09ac1f915e76eb628d1501755196ec39ff47..d809854002df6eb2ebb5cb120a51e11ee6277c25 160000 --- a/ttcn/AtsIPv6OverGeoNetworking +++ b/ttcn/AtsIPv6OverGeoNetworking @@ -1 +1 @@ -Subproject commit 066a09ac1f915e76eb628d1501755196ec39ff47 +Subproject commit d809854002df6eb2ebb5cb120a51e11ee6277c25 diff --git a/ttcn/AtsIS b/ttcn/AtsIS index b4ae0532b5c48abaf5c02686bcbf157bee130a41..8110f6c72909313ab017fe72f7fa23130f77f3be 160000 --- a/ttcn/AtsIS +++ b/ttcn/AtsIS @@ -1 +1 @@ -Subproject commit b4ae0532b5c48abaf5c02686bcbf157bee130a41 +Subproject commit 8110f6c72909313ab017fe72f7fa23130f77f3be diff --git a/ttcn/AtsPki b/ttcn/AtsPki index 63d369f5077c4a49d7f51dddff2e88d0af8722cd..ba3b34d02b0307ee7419053eb79f13dae07cf530 160000 --- a/ttcn/AtsPki +++ b/ttcn/AtsPki @@ -1 +1 @@ -Subproject commit 63d369f5077c4a49d7f51dddff2e88d0af8722cd +Subproject commit ba3b34d02b0307ee7419053eb79f13dae07cf530 diff --git a/ttcn/AtsSecurity b/ttcn/AtsSecurity index 84ba2164d26a0c8f744efaf89db3f715de9484ac..7dc348f631c1ce89adf120fb2925fe5810463305 160000 --- a/ttcn/AtsSecurity +++ b/ttcn/AtsSecurity @@ -1 +1 @@ -Subproject commit 84ba2164d26a0c8f744efaf89db3f715de9484ac +Subproject commit 7dc348f631c1ce89adf120fb2925fe5810463305 diff --git a/ttcn/LibIts b/ttcn/LibIts index bf548622aec06cafeb5615f4750d5ef980a118bf..d4311521a528842673b0b0c0404cfe38649f16ed 160000 --- a/ttcn/LibIts +++ b/ttcn/LibIts @@ -1 +1 @@ -Subproject commit bf548622aec06cafeb5615f4750d5ef980a118bf +Subproject commit d4311521a528842673b0b0c0404cfe38649f16ed diff --git a/virtualization/docker/Dockerfile b/virtualization/docker/Dockerfile index dbe21cbf0b365c993113eadc86e2a83a23760ea8..69a82822dbb228a7543f3c9f61a6db9c38aed876 100644 --- a/virtualization/docker/Dockerfile +++ b/virtualization/docker/Dockerfile @@ -1,12 +1,11 @@ -FROM stfubuntu:18.04 +FROM stfubuntu:20.04 -MAINTAINER ETSI TTF 011 - -LABEL description="TTF011 Docker Image" +LABEL ETSI ITS +LABEL description="TS.ITS Docker Image" ENV TERM=linux \ HOME=/home/etsi \ - HOSTNAME=docker-titan-TTF011 + HOSTNAME=docker-titan-TS.ITS COPY home /home/etsi diff --git a/virtualization/docker/Dockerfile.stfubuntu b/virtualization/docker/Dockerfile.stfubuntu index b6529e9d5b86ec9d4f985418b38bfa2a9f9e2bcf..9fa6645dfc7b2239c01bf04ee2d81fad6416528c 100644 --- a/virtualization/docker/Dockerfile.stfubuntu +++ b/virtualization/docker/Dockerfile.stfubuntu @@ -1,7 +1,6 @@ -FROM ubuntu:18.04 - -MAINTAINER ETSI STF +FROM ubuntu:20.04 +LABEL ETSI CTI LABEL description="STF Docker Ubuntu image" ENV TERM=linux \ @@ -10,11 +9,8 @@ ENV TERM=linux \ RUN echo "docker-STF-dev" > /etc/hostname \ && DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get update \ && DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get dist-upgrade -y \ - && DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get install software-properties-common -y \ - && DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive add-apt-repository ppa:linuxuprising/java -y \ && DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get update \ - && ( echo "oracle-java17-installer shared/accepted-oracle-license-v1-3 boolean true" | debconf-set-selections -v ) \ - && DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get --allow-unauthenticated install -y \ + && DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get install -y \ autoconf \ bison \ build-essential \ @@ -25,10 +21,9 @@ RUN echo "docker-STF-dev" > /etc/hostname \ emacs \ expect \ flex \ - g++-8 \ - gcc-8 \ - gdb \ - git-core \ + g++-9 \ + gcc-9 \ + git \ gnutls-bin \ graphviz \ iputils-ping \ @@ -40,41 +35,27 @@ RUN echo "docker-STF-dev" > /etc/hostname \ libjsoncpp-dev \ libncurses5-dev \ libpcap-dev \ - libqt5svg5-dev \ libssl-dev \ libtool-bin \ libtool \ - libwireshark-dev \ libxml2-dev \ libxml2-utils \ libyaml-dev \ lsof \ - net-tools \ ntp \ - oracle-java17-installer \ - oracle-java17-set-default \ openssh-server \ pkg-config \ python3-dev \ python3-pip \ python3-setuptools \ - qt5-default \ - qtmultimedia5-dev \ - subversion \ sudo \ sshpass \ tcpdump \ texlive-font-utils \ texlive-latex-extra \ - tshark \ tzdata \ valgrind \ - vim \ - vsftpd \ xutils-dev \ - tree \ - unzip \ - wget \ xsltproc \ && DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get autoremove --purge -y \ && DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get autoclean \ diff --git a/virtualization/docker/README.md b/virtualization/docker/README.md index b446f4952e625d19d365c0d26a5b575543afaa32..7e6b794621404295b3c857b36ae6a00315e3f2b5 100644 --- a/virtualization/docker/README.md +++ b/virtualization/docker/README.md @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ There are several build stages: 2. Install Titan from Github 3. Install Eclipse and Titan Eclipse plugin into ~/frameworks/titan 4. Install asn1c into ~/frameworks/asn1c -5. Checkout TTF011 sources from ETSI svn repository using default credentials +5. Checkout TS.ITS sources from ETSI svn repository using default credentials 6. Build ASN.1 recoder library 7. Build certificate generation tool @@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ inet6:localhost Execute ```run.cmd``` or launch a command line window and run the command -```docker run -it --net=host -e DISPLAY=192.168.99.1:0 stf525_its:latest``` +```docker run -it --net=host -e DISPLAY=192.168.99.1:0 etsiforge/etsi-its-ts``` NOTE: Modify the IP address in the command for the address of 'VirtualBox Hot-Only Network'. @@ -61,44 +61,6 @@ NOTE: Modify the IP address in the command for the address of 'VirtualBox Hot-On Execute ```run.sh``` or launch a command line window and run the command ```sh -docker run -it --net=host -e DISPLAY=$DISPLAY \ --v /tmp/.X11-unix:/tmp/.X11-unix stf525_its:latest +docker run -it --net=host -e DISPLAY=$DISPLAY -v /tmp/.X11-unix:/tmp/.X11-unix etsiforge/etsi-its-ts ``` -### Import eclipse project - -1. Whithin the docker container, on the linux command prompt type: - - ```eclipse -data ~/dev/Workspace``` - - Eclipse IDE shall be shown on the hosts Screen. - Possible problems: - - eclipse not found: check the PATH environment variable. It shall contain $HOME/bin path. Otherwise add it: - ```export PATH=$HOME/bin:$PATH``` - -2. Run "File -> Import" and import the ```~/dev/TTF011_Its/TTF011.tpd``` file. - - This can take a time, be patient. - **Do not run build in eclipse**, we don't have enough time. - -### Build the project - -```cd ~/Workspace/TTF011/bin``` - -```make``` - -Possible problems: - - Error in AbstractSocket build: Build it explicitly: - ```cd ~/Workspace/Abstract_Socket_CNL113384/bin_ssl && make``` - -### Execute tests -1. Launch eclipse: ```eclipse -data ~/dev/Workspace``` -2. Select configuration from the /etc/folder: - - AtsCAM/AtsCAM.cfg - CAM test suite. - - AtsDENM/AtsDENM.cfg - DENM test suite. - - AtsGeoNetworking/AtsGeoNetworking.cfg - GeoNetworking test suite - - AtsSecurity/AtsSecurity.cfg - IEEE1609.2 ITS Security test suite - - AtsPki/AtsPki.cfg - PKI test suite - - AtsIS/AtsIS.cfg - Infrastructure Services test suite (IVI, MAP/SPaT, RTCME, SxRE) -3. Right-click on the configuration file and select **Run As -> TITAN Parallel launcher** - diff --git a/virtualization/docker/build.sh b/virtualization/docker/build.sh index 1dd69b0077957696ff8ba2c53399c5054fe0bf86..122590f1baf66e468408dda1254b6ecde594c03c 100755 --- a/virtualization/docker/build.sh +++ b/virtualization/docker/build.sh @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ #!/bin/bash -# Copyright ETSI 2018-2021 +# Copyright ETSI 2020-2021 # See: https://forge.etsi.org/etsi-forge-copyright-statement.txt set -e @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ if [ "$1" == "--force-stfubuntu" ]; then fi # Check and build stfubuntu image if [ -z `docker images -q stfubuntu` ]; then - docker build --no-cache --tag stfubuntu:18.04 -f Dockerfile.stfubuntu --force-rm . || exit 1 + docker build --no-cache --tag stfubuntu:20.04 -f Dockerfile.stfubuntu --force-rm . || exit 1 fi docker build --no-cache --tag etsiforge/etsi-its-ts --force-rm . || ( echo "Docker build failed: $?"; exit 1 ) diff --git a/virtualization/docker/home/etc/init.d/20-eclipse.sh b/virtualization/docker/home/etc/init.d/20-eclipse.sh deleted file mode 100755 index c336c6ddbffd3711c6d61780203fef57163e17a9..0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 --- a/virtualization/docker/home/etc/init.d/20-eclipse.sh +++ /dev/null @@ -1,26 +0,0 @@ -#!/bin/bash - -#set -e -set -vx - -echo -e "*****************************\n* Install eclipse\n*****************************\n" - -ECLIPSE_URL='http://www.mirrorservice.org/sites/download.eclipse.org/eclipseMirror/technology/epp/downloads/release/2021-12/R/eclipse-cpp-2021-12-R-linux-gtk-x86_64.tar.gz' -TITAN_URL='https://www.eclipse.org/downloads/download.php?file=/titan/TITAN_Designer_and_Executor_plugin-8.1.0.zip' - -mkdir -p ${HOME}/frameworks -cd ${HOME}/frameworks || exit 1 -wget --progress=dot:mega $ECLIPSE_URL -Oeclipse-cpp-2021-12-R-linux-gtk-x86_64.tar.gz || exit 1 -tar -zxvf ./eclipse-cpp-2021-12-R-linux-gtk-x86_64.tar.gz || exit 1 -ln -sf ${HOME}/frameworks/eclipse/eclipse ${HOME}/bin/eclipse -rm -f ./eclipse-cpp-2021-12-R-linux-gtk-x86_64.tar.gz - -if wget --progress=dot:mega $TITAN_URL -OTITAN_Designer_and_Executor_plugin.zip; then - eclipse/eclipse -noSplash -application org.eclipse.equinox.p2.director \ - -destination /home/etsi/frameworks/eclipse \ - -repository 'jar:file:///home/etsi/frameworks/TITAN_Designer_and_Executor_plugin.zip' \ - -installIU TITAN_Designer.feature.group,TITAN_Executor.feature.group,TITAN_Log_Viewer.feature.group,Titan_external_dependencies.feature.group,Titanium.feature.group,Titanium_external_dependencies.feature.group - rm -f TITAN_Designer_and_Executor_plugin.zip -fi - -cd ${HOME} diff --git a/virtualization/docker/home/etc/init.d/40-ttf011.sh b/virtualization/docker/home/etc/init.d/40-ttf011.sh index fe47046d2a9e18f4450da2e4da5122f2957918a2..f7ac5fbc6fcefed9d5cc351919d76e503c90a17b 100755 --- a/virtualization/docker/home/etc/init.d/40-ttf011.sh +++ b/virtualization/docker/home/etc/init.d/40-ttf011.sh @@ -3,11 +3,11 @@ #set -e set -vx -echo -e "*****************************\n* Checkout TTF011 sources\n*****************************\n" +echo -e "*****************************\n* Checkout TS.ITS sources\n*****************************\n" cd ${HOME}/dev || exit 1 -git clone --recurse-submodules --single-branch https://forge.etsi.org/rep/ITS/TS.ITS.git TTF011_Its -cd ./TTF011_Its +git clone --recurse-submodules --single-branch https://forge.etsi.org/rep/ITS/TS.ITS.git TS.ITS +cd ./TS.ITS for i in `find ./ttcn -type d -name "Ats*"` do cd $i @@ -30,20 +30,14 @@ do fi cd - done -cd ${HOME}/dev/TTF011_Its/ttcn/LibIts -git checkout TTF011 -cd ${HOME}/dev/TTF011_Its/scripts +cd ${HOME}/dev/TS.ITS/ttcn/LibIts +git checkout TS.ITS +cd ${HOME}/dev/TS.ITS/scripts chmod 775 *.bash devenv.bash.* cd ${HOME} -ln -sf ${HOME}/dev/TTF011_Its/scripts/devenv.bash.ubuntu ${HOME}/devenv.bash +ln -sf ${HOME}/dev/TS.ITS/scripts/devenv.bash.ubuntu ${HOME}/devenv.bash ls -ltr ${HOME} -echo -e "*****************************\n* Init Workspace\n*****************************\n" -mkdir -p ${HOME}/dev/Workspace/TTF011/bin/asn1 -cd ${HOME}/dev/Workspace/TTF011 -#ln -s ../../TTF011_Its/testdata -#ln -s ../../TTF011_Its/data - cd ${HOME} exit 0 diff --git a/virtualization/docker/home/etc/init.d/45-certgen.sh b/virtualization/docker/home/etc/init.d/45-certgen.sh old mode 100644 new mode 100755 index f6a54f1fbab051d9950ee55d608447043d37d45b..1e1c23b110f2dfec1971d72bbc54ebb4519c9425 --- a/virtualization/docker/home/etc/init.d/45-certgen.sh +++ b/virtualization/docker/home/etc/init.d/45-certgen.sh @@ -12,8 +12,8 @@ cd cshared && make && cd - cd certgen/ && make && cd - echo -e "*****************************\n* Generate ETSI ITS certificates \n*****************************\n" -cd ${HOME}/dev/TTF011_Its/data/certificates -make +cd ${HOME}/dev/TS.ITS/data/certificates +CERTGEN=${HOME}/dev/itscertgen make cd ${HOME} diff --git a/virtualization/docker/home/etc/init.d/50-ats.sh b/virtualization/docker/home/etc/init.d/50-ats.sh index ce475fd7dc7bca2f7592fb4b6339d9d1786975d8..0587d6ce548dc78edc883fa0dfd9cf70c4a896c9 100755 --- a/virtualization/docker/home/etc/init.d/50-ats.sh +++ b/virtualization/docker/home/etc/init.d/50-ats.sh @@ -5,12 +5,12 @@ set -vx echo -e "*****************************\n* Change user in cfg files\n*****************************\n" . /home/etsi/devenv.bash -cd ${HOME}/dev/TTF011_Its/scripts || exit 1 +cd ${HOME}/dev/TS.ITS/scripts || exit 1 ./update_user_name.sh || exit 1 echo -e "*****************************\n* Build test suites\n*****************************\n" -cd ${HOME}/dev/TTF011_Its +cd ${HOME}/dev/TS.ITS ATS_LIST="AtsCAM AtsDENM AtsGeoNetworking AtsPki AtsSecurity AtsIS" for i in ${ATS_LIST} do @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ do done echo -e "*****************************\n* Change sudo in command line\n*****************************\n" -cd /home/etsi/dev/TTF011_Its/scripts +cd /home/etsi/dev/TS.ITS/scripts sed --in-place 's/sudo/echo "etsi" \| sudo -S/' ./run_mtc.bash sed --in-place 's/sudo/echo "etsi" \| sudo -S/' ./run_ptcs.bash diff --git a/virtualization/docker/home/etc/init.d/60-doxygen.sh b/virtualization/docker/home/etc/init.d/60-doxygen.sh index 2bc360cc6d4fe9a76398fc5e7583c52f40063158..f5ceeae9b64c67b2e66873744339a0e6f8219dc5 100755 --- a/virtualization/docker/home/etc/init.d/60-doxygen.sh +++ b/virtualization/docker/home/etc/init.d/60-doxygen.sh @@ -5,11 +5,11 @@ set -vx echo -e "*****************************\n* Build docs \n*****************************\n" . /home/etsi/devenv.bash -cd ${HOME}/dev/TTF011_Its/docs || exit 1 +cd ${HOME}/dev/TS.ITS/docs || exit 1 doxygen ./o2.cfg || exit 1 # Generate PDF file -cd ${HOME}/dev/TTF011_Its/docs/AtsDocs/latex +cd ${HOME}/dev/TS.ITS/docs/AtsDocs/latex make && mv refman.pdf ${HOME}/docs/etsi_its_help.pdf cd ${HOME} diff --git a/virtualization/vagrant/provisioner.bash b/virtualization/vagrant/provisioner.bash index 4b16f8c1d43173deee12f130d2547bf4033040e6..12024d2cca22b955d3860dc542a36866818cef16 100755 --- a/virtualization/vagrant/provisioner.bash +++ b/virtualization/vagrant/provisioner.bash @@ -7,19 +7,15 @@ sudo DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get update sudo DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get dist-upgrade -y sudo DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get install software-properties-common -y -sudo DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive add-apt-repository ppa:linuxuprising/java -y sudo DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get update -sudo DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get --allow-unauthenticated install emacs openjdk-11-jre gcc-8 g++-8 git subversion lsof ntp gdb make cmake flex bison autoconf doxygen graphviz libtool libncurses5-dev expect libssl-dev libgcrypt-dev libxml2-dev libedit2 libedit-dev xutils-dev libjsoncpp-dev tcpdump libpcap-dev libwireshark-dev wget tree unzip sshpass kubuntu-desktop valgrind qt5-default qttools5-dev qtmultimedia5-dev libqt5svg5-dev vim tzdata dos2unix xsltproc -y -# Install java -#sudo DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get install oracle-java17-installer oracle-java17-set-default -y -#echo "oracle-java17-installer shared/accepted-oracle-license-v1-3 boolean true" | debconf-set-selections -v +sudo DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get --allow-unauthenticated install emacs gcc-9 g++-9 git subversion lsof ntp gdb make cmake flex bison autoconf doxygen graphviz libtool libncurses5-dev expect libssl-dev libgcrypt-dev libxml2-dev libedit2 libedit-dev xutils-dev libjsoncpp-dev tcpdump libpcap-dev unzip sshpass kubuntu-desktop valgrind vim tzdata dos2unix xsltproc -y +#sudo DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt --fix-broken install -y sudo DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get autoremove --purge -y sudo DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get clean gcc --version g++ --version valgrind --version -java -version export HOME=/home/vagrant @@ -73,8 +69,8 @@ then fi cd /home/vagrant/dev -git clone --recurse-submodules --single-branch https://forge.etsi.org/rep/ITS/TS.ITS.git TTF011_Its -cd ./TTF011_Its +git clone --recurse-submodules --single-branch https://forge.etsi.org/rep/ITS/TS.ITS.git TS.ITS +cd ./TS.ITS for i in `find ./ttcn -type d -name "Ats*"` do cd $i @@ -97,18 +93,18 @@ do fi cd - done -cd /home/vagrant/dev/TTF011_Its/ttcn/LibIts -git checkout TTF011 +cd /home/vagrant/dev/TS.ITS/ttcn/LibIts +git checkout TS.ITS -cd /home/vagrant/dev/TTF011_Its/scripts +cd /home/vagrant/dev/TS.ITS/scripts chmod 775 *.bash devenv.bash.* ./update_user_name.sh -cd /home/vagrant/dev/TTF011_Its/docker +cd /home/vagrant/dev/TS.ITS/docker chmod 775 *.sh -cd /home/vagrant/dev/TTF011_Its +cd /home/vagrant/dev/TS.ITS chmod 775 ./.jenkins.sh cd /home/vagrant -ln -sf /home/vagrant/dev/TTF011_Its/scripts/devenv.bash.ubuntu /home/vagrant/devenv.bash +ln -sf /home/vagrant/dev/TS.ITS/scripts/devenv.bash.ubuntu /home/vagrant/devenv.bash . /home/vagrant/devenv.bash # Install all frameworks @@ -146,35 +142,19 @@ coveralls-lcov -h cd /home/vagrant echo "" >> /home/vagrant/.bashrc -echo "export LD_LIBRARY_PATH=/home/vagrant/dev/TTF011_Its/lib:$LD_LIBRARY_PATH" >> /home/vagrant/.bashrc +echo "export LD_LIBRARY_PATH=/home/vagrant/dev/TS.ITS/lib:$LD_LIBRARY_PATH" >> /home/vagrant/.bashrc echo "export PATH=/home/vagrant/bin:$PATH" >> /home/vagrant/.bashrc echo ". ~/devenv.bash" >> /home/vagrant/.bashrc . /home/vagrant/.bashrc -# Install eclipse -cd ${HOME_FRAMEWORKS} - -wget --progress=dot:mega 'http://www.mirrorservice.org/sites/download.eclipse.org/eclipseMirror/technology/epp/downloads/release/2021-12/R/eclipse-cpp-2021-12-R-linux-gtk-x86_64.tar.gz' -Oeclipse-cpp-2021-12-R-linux-gtk-x86_64.tar.gz -tar -zxvf ./eclipse-cpp-2021-12-R-linux-gtk-x86_64.tar.gz -ln -sf /home/vagrant/frameworks/eclipse/eclipse /home/vagrant/bin/eclipse -rm -f ./eclipse-cpp-2021-12-R-linux-gtk-x86_64.tar.gz - -if wget --progress=dot:mega 'https://www.eclipse.org/downloads/download.php?file=/titan/TITAN_Designer_and_Executor_plugin-8.1.0.zip' -OTITAN_Designer_and_Executor_plugin.zip; then - eclipse/eclipse -noSplash -application org.eclipse.equinox.p2.director \ - -destination /home/vagrant/frameworks/eclipse \ - -repository 'jar:file:///home/vagrant/frameworks/TITAN_Designer_and_Executor_plugin.zip' \ - -installIU TITAN_Designer.feature.group,TITAN_Executor.feature.group,TITAN_Log_Viewer.feature.group,Titan_external_dependencies.feature.group,Titanium.feature.group,Titanium_external_dependencies.feature.group - rm -f TITAN_Designer_and_Executor_plugin.zip -fi - # Build Titan -cd /home/vagrant/dev/TTF011_Its/scripts +cd /home/vagrant/dev/TS.ITS/scripts ./build_titan.bash . /home/vagrant/devenv.bash # Build ATSs -cd /home/vagrant/dev/TTF011_Its/ +cd /home/vagrant/dev/TS.ITS/ ATS_LIST="AtsCAM AtsDENM AtsGeoNetworking AtsPki AtsSecurity AtsIS" for i in ${ATS_LIST} do @@ -183,8 +163,8 @@ do done # Change user in cfg files -cd ${HOME}/dev/TTF011_Its/scripts -./update_user_name.sh TTF011_Its +cd ${HOME}/dev/TS.ITS/scripts +./update_user_name.sh TS.ITS # Build ETSI ITS certificate generation tools cd /home/vagrant/dev @@ -193,8 +173,8 @@ cd ./itscertgen cd cshared && make && cd - cd certgen/ && make && cd - # Generate ETSI ITS certificates -cd /home/vagrant/dev/TTF011_Its/data/certificates -make +cd /home/vagrant/dev/TS.ITS/data/certificates +CERTGEN=${HOME}/dev/itscertgen make cd ${OLD_PWD}